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A b s t r a c t
For two decades, there has been a high-profile debate on the issue of cyberterrorism. 
Politicians, law enforcement agents, the information security industry, other experts and 
the press have all made claims about the threats to and vulnerabilities in our society, 
who is responsible and what should be done.
This is a UK study in the field of Information Systems based on interpretative 
philosophical assumptions. The framework for the study is provided by the concept of 
moral panic, propounded by Cohen (2002) and elaborated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
(1994) and Critcher (2003). Moral panic is used widely in the reference discipline of 
Sociology as a tool for investigating the social construction of social problems in cases 
where there is heightened public concern and intense media interest, closely followed 
by changes in legislation and social control mechanisms. This study employs moral 
panic as an heuristic device to assist in the investigation of the social mechanisms at 
work in the social construction of cyberterrorism
The corpus of data for analysis comprised articles from the UK national press relevant 
to cyberterrorism. A grounded theory approach was used to analyse these articles in 
order to identify images, orientations, stereotypes and symbolisation and to examine 
representational trends over time. Reflexivity in such a task is of the utmost 
importance, and the analytic process leading to an explanation of the social processes at 
work was deliberately divorced from the moral panic framework in order to guarantee 
rigour in the findings.
The findings set out an explanation of how the concept of cyberterrorism has been 
constructed over two decades and compares this explanation with a framework provided 
by a model of moral panic. These findings are then linked to wider issues about 
national security, civil liberties and state control of information and communication 
technologies.
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C h a p t e r  1
In t r o d u c t io n
C o m pu ter  T err o r ism  ‘C om ing  to  Br it a in ’ The Independent, 28 November 1991
Al-Q a id a  P lanning  C yber-A tta ck s  The Guardian, 28 June 2002
C y ber  T errorists  W h o  C o u ld  B ring  Br ita in  To  A  C o m plete  Sta n d st il l  Sunday
Express, 30 October 2005
1. T he  RESEARCH QUESTION
The ubiquitous presence of the Internet and the palpable sense that its pervasiveness 
leaves us vulnerable to threats from electronic wrongdoers is now firmly entrenched in 
Western societies, and cyberterrorism appears to be the latest incarnation of this threat. 
The Internet has become established at the heart of modem society relatively quickly. 
Its first incarnation was the ARPANET, established in 1969 by the US Department of 
Defense. It is often thought that the purpose of the original ARPANET was as a 
network architecture for the US military that could survive disruptions fom the enemy, 
including a nuclear attack due to its distributed nature (Nader 1998). However, it has 
also been argued that ARPANET was, in reality, nothing more than a method of making 
the most economical use for research purposes out of what were, at the time, scarce 
computing resources (Raymond and Steele 1996).
Raymond gives an account of the genesis of the Internet as we know it today 
(Raymond and Steele 1996). It is likely that ARPANET’S main function, as originally 
conceived, would have been to sipport early remote login and other forms of distributed 
computing. However, users soon realised the potential of early electronic mail 
technology and this came to dominate ARPANET’S usage. This communication 
network steadily increased in importance as growing numbers of academics, researchers 
and many others, including hackers, started to connect. The next 25 years saw many 
changes, most notable among which were the development of computers to the stage 
where PC use was widespread in homes as well as in businesses; and the growing 
capabilities of the Internet’s protocols, notably the shift from NCP/IP to TCP/IP in 1982
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and the implementation of the Domain Name System in 1983. It was around this time 
that the collection of interconnected networks clustered around ARPANET came to be 
referred to as the “Internet”.
In 1986, the National Science Foundation opened up access to five regional 
supercomputing centres through NSFnet, which became the backbone of the Internet. 
ARPANET formally closed down in 1990. NSFnet was then sold off to private 
telecommunications companies between 1990 and 1994 so that, ultimately, the Internet 
backbone became completely commercial. It was around 1994 that the Internet became 
mainstream as the public took to the hypertext and multimedia functions of the World 
Wide Web (Raymond and Steele 1996).
Growth in Internet users has been astonishing since then, with over 37.5 million users, 
representing over 60% of the population, in the UK alone as at September 2006 
(www.intemetworldstats.com/europa.htm). In December 2006, the use of high-speed 
broadband connections accounted for 79.2% of all UK Internet connections, up from 
75.8% in September 2006 (National Statistics 2007). Turning to UK businesses, the 
value of Internet sales rose to £103.3bn in 2005, up 56% from 2004, while the 
proportion of businesses selling online rose by 22% over the same period. In 2005, 
nearly 75% of UK businesses reported using broadband, a rise of 25% on 2004; nearly 
70% of UK businesses had a website in 2005, up by 4% on 2004; and the proportion of 
UK businesses using the Internet to interact with public authorities rose from 41% to 
over 50% between 2004 and 2005 (National Statistics 2006). At the national level, the 
UK government continues to integrate services into the electronic environment and has 
recently taken a step further in its acknowledgement of the importance of the electronic 
element of the critical national infrastructure by setting up the Centre for the Protection 
of National Infrastructure. This is an inter-departmental organisation which 
incorporates the work previously carried out by the NISCC, that is, the provision of 
advice and information on computer network defence and other information assurance 
issues, and integrates this information security advice with advice relating to personnel 
and physical security (www.cpni.gov.uk).
Headlines like those presented at the beginning of this Introduction will be familiar to 
anyone who reads a UK national newspaper on a regular basis. Having come to put so 
much reliance on the Internet and related technologies, die public has been made aware 
that everything from the critical national infrastructure (CNI) to their personal identities 
is threatened, most recently by cyberterrorists. Or is it? When an interested person digs
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a little deeper, it turns out that most academics and many other experts agree that no 
terrorist organisation is so far known to have deliberately caused substantial damage by 
electronic means alone. This gives rise to several questions, not the least of which is 
how society got to the point of being concerned about a phenomenon which apparently 
does not yet exist.
My interest in this question arose out of research I did on hackers for a Masters degree 
in Criminology in 2000. This led to the insight that an understanding of the 
phenomenon of hacking and its consequences requires more than just the study of 
delinquent behaviour: it requires a broader understanding of technology in society to 
place that behaviour in context. A switch to the Information Systems (IS) discipline for 
doctoral research was indicated. It was whilst I was in the early stages of formulating 
my research question that the atrocities of 9/11 occurred. The horror I felt as I watched 
the towers of the World Trade Center collapse live on television affected me 
profoundly, as it did millions of others. As the story unfolded in the news over the 
weeks and months that followed, I listened to the stories of those who were killed and 
those who survived and admired the courage of a nation getting back to work, a nation 
which, unlike ours, was unused to terrorist attacks on home soil.
However, this admiration sat uneasily with another feature of the aftermath of 9/11, the 
call to arms and the hasty legislation enacted to ‘address’ the terrorist problem. Here 
were policies which were being rushed through with little meaningful debate using 9/11 
as crude justification for very serious measures. In the UK, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 was passed in a hurry and, despite a spirited opposition mounted 
in the House of Lords, contained contentious provisions including police access to 
personal records and retention of communications data. The problem was that these 
provisions applied to criminal investigations, yet were justified in Parliament with 
reference to arguments about terrorism. All of this was conducted against a background 
of media reports that al Qaeda operatives were using the Internet for planning and 
communication and that cyberterrorist attacks were imminent. The Internet was 
portrayed as somehow complicit with terrorism. As one journalist put it, “Can the 
internet do anything right? After a year of being blamed for the biggest speculative 
binge since the 1920s, it is now cast as the helpmate of modem terrorism” Qhe 
Guardian, 15 November 2001). No wonder the Government wanted enhanced access to 
communications data.
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Here, then, was the opportunity for a study which encompassed my existing research 
interests of hacking, technology and society, but was made both timely and more 
intriguing with the addition of the elements of terrorism and the social control culture. 
Having observed what looked very much like Government policy- making and serious 
extensions of police powers based on the rhetoric of fear, I started considering the 
possibility that cyberterrorism looked rather like a moral panic. Certain groups, 
including the press and politicians, were making claims about the cyberterrorist threat, 
yet these claims appeared somewhat distorted. Most people I talked to seemed to know 
cyberterrorism was a problem but, when pressed, were not sure what it was or how 
prevalent it might be. Closer examination of numerous press reports revealed that many 
of the stories were familiar hacking tales dressed up as cyberterrorism. In short, high 
profile groups, the press and, in a rather woolly way, some members of the public 
seemed to be getting quite concerned about a phenomenon which did not yet seem to 
exist. Was the threat from cyberterrorism a social construction in the purest sense -  a 
non-existent phenomenon which had effectively been brought into existence by public 
expressions of concern -  and, if so, how had it been constructed, by whom and why? 
The task was, therefore, to deconstruct cyberterrorism.
2. R esea r c h  appro ach  a n d  th e  In fo r m a tio n  S ystem s  disc iplin e
These were wide questions and a framework was needed in order to effect a scientific 
analysis of the social mechanisms at work. First, the three fundamental themes that run 
through this study -  information and communication technology, hacking and terrorism 
-  needed to be placed in their social context with particular attention to the socio- 
technical dynamic emphasised in the IS discipline. IS researchers have always 
addressed questions of technology and social change and have more recently considered 
the nature, use and impact of the Internet, together with policy aspects of the 
‘Information Society’ (Avgerou 2000). By viewing cyberterrorism as a socio-technical 
artefact, it is located squarely within this tradition. Moreover, cyberterrorism is 
fundamentally a question of information security, a theme which has received extensive 
study within the IS field. A significant body of literature on cyberterrorism has been 
generated by information security researchers and this, along with literature from other 
fields, is reviewed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of moral panic, which is borrowed from the reference 
discipline of Sociology (Keen 1980). It has its roots in a transactional approach to 
deviance, notable in its day for overturning the orthodoxy that deviance could be
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identified and explained as a form of rule-breaking. Instead, deviance is seen as the 
product of a society which formulates rules and decides how to apply them. Deviance, 
on this view, is not a characteristic of the act itself, but a category constructed in the 
course of interaction between the ‘deviant’ and other powerful elements in society, 
notably agents of social control (Becker 1963). Moral panic has also been developed 
within the US in the constructivist tradition, which challenged the notion that social 
problems were self-evident. The task for sociologists was to expose and explain the 
social processes which define social problems and how those definitions are 
institutionally adopted and acted upon (Critcher 2003). Given that this study was based 
on a suspicion that cyberterrorism had more to do with social anxieties about 
technology and terrorism than with actual behaviour identified in terrorist cells, moral 
panic seemed an interesting way to approach the subject.
Chapter 4 outlines the interpretivist philosophies which underpin this study and how 
they tie in with a research method designed to untangle and make explicit the social 
processes which might have combined to construct cyberterrorism. Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2001) have noted that, in IS generally and information security research in 
particular, there has been a historical emphasis on the functionalist approach with its 
associated notions of objective empirical reality and an essential integrated order in the 
social world. Such an approach fails to illuminate the interplay between technology and 
the social world and the complexity which derives from the indeterminate nature of 
human intention and behaviour. They argue for a greater focus on socio-organisational 
perspectives in IS and security research, based in the interpretative tradition, to allow 
exploration of the importance of concepts of power, authority, responsibility, influence 
and control (see also Galliers 1985; Galliers 1991; Lee 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 
1991; Walsham 1995; Klein and Myers 1999; Mingers 2001; Mingers 2001a). It is 
hoped that the work recounted in this dissertation is another step along the path that they 
illuminate.
When a researcher sets forth to test out an idea, it is of paramount importance to 
demonstrate as rigorously as possible that all aspects of the phenomenon have been 
considered so that the conclusions drawn will have been amply demonstrated. This is 
particularly important with interpretative research, in which tradition the criteria for 
judging scientific research are less developed than in the positivist tradition. The IS 
domain has in the past been subject to criticism that the disparate nature of its themes 
and research approaches has led to a lack of scientific rigour (Avgerou 2000) and
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strategies have been developed to address this criticism (for example, Galliers and Land 
1987; Galliers 1991; Lee 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Klein and Myers 1999; 
Mingers 2001). Accordingly, a set of principles for enhancing scientific rigour are set 
out in Chapter 4 and were applied in the analysis and findings of this study, set out in 
Chapters 5-8. The findings are extensive because of the complexity encountered in the 
subject and the need to demonstrate a solid basis for the discussion and conclusions in 
Chapter 9, which reconsiders the questions about how cyberterrorism has been 
constructed, by whom, for what ends and whether it amounts to a moral panic. Finally, 
the contributions of this study and a number of avenues for future research are identified 
in Chapter 10.
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Ch a p t e r  2
C y b e r t e r r o r is m  in  t h e  L it e r a t u r e
1. O ver v ie w
There is a considerable, multi-disciplinary literature on cyberterrorism which has been 
growing steadily since the early 1990s and exploded following the atrocities of 11 
September 2001. Around 60% of the total academic output originates in the period 
since 9/11, the events of that day having focussed the minds of many scholars on future 
terrorist strategies and how society might prepare itself. The number of terrorism 
courses offered by universities has also increased dramatically (Gordon 2005).
There are, roughly, three categories of contribution to a literature comprised of just 
under 300 articles. First, around 70% of the literature is security-oriented, most of it 
written by scholars of information security, computer science and military studies. This 
literature is almost exclusively written from within the positivist paradigm. The second 
category is political in nature and accounts for about 25% of the literature. It includes 
contributions from the disciplines of political science, international relations and law. 
The third category, representing the remaining 5%, includes many of the social sciences 
-  sociology, psychology, anthropology, media studies -  and considers the more human 
aspects of the socio-technical phenomenon of cyberterrorism.
The majority of commentators adopt the perspective of the United States. The US is a 
natural focus because it was the location of the most deadly terrorist atrocity of modem 
times; it is also technologically the most highly connected and dependent state in the 
world and, therefore, arguably the most vulnerable to cyberterrorist attack; and the US 
government has lavished more resources on research and infrastructure protection since 
9/11 than any other nation (Giacomello 2004). The review below will often refer to the 
US position but the same or similar arguments may apply to the UK. Cyberterrorism is 
presented as a trans-national issue in the literature. There are important differences 
between the two countries, however. The experience of terrorist attacks on home soil is 
still a relatively new phenomenon for the US, whereas the UK has been living with the 
terrorist campaigns of the IRA, and al Qaeda more recently, for many decades.
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Whereas the UK is more used to sustained nationalist terrorist campaigns aimed at 
economic and political harm, both countries are now coming to terms with a different 
type of religious fundamentalist terrorism, aimed more at mass casualties through 
suicide bombings, but the starting point for each nation’s attempts at adaptation is 
necessarily different because of their diverse historical experiences.
A macro view of the literature reveals adherence to a risk analysis model, with 
contributions concentrating either on threats or vulnerabilities, sometimes both. Most 
studies concentrate on the standpoint of the potential victim of cyberterrorism, with the 
spotlight on vulnerabilities and reactions to ‘what i f  scenarios. This is understandable 
because analysis of the terrorist threat at first hand is problematic due to lack of access 
either to terrorist groups or to government intelligence which is classified. Those few 
attempts at structured analysis of the terrorist perspective are all the more important for 
portraying a sense, if only limited, of what the genuine level of the cyberterrorist threat 
might be.
There are several components necessary for an accurate assessment of the threat from 
cyberterrorism: a clear definition of cyberterrorism; a conception of who might engage 
in it; reliable information on how terrorists are currently using information 
communication technologies (ICTs); and a rigorous assessment of how likely it is that 
terrorists will progress from using technology in the normal course of their activities to 
attacks using computers. These factors will be assessed in turn below according to the 
existing literature.
The corresponding vulnerabilities also require detailed assessment and the identification 
of these is intimately bound up with views on the appropriate social reaction to the 
threat of cyberterrorism. The social reaction will, accordingly, be analysed at three 
levels: national, public-private relationship and international. First, it is necessary to 
determine a working definition of cyberterrorism.
2. D efin itio n s  o f  c y berterro rism
The military influence in the literature is apparent nowhere so much as in the debate 
over the definition of cyberterrorism. A number of terms have been coined which are 
frequently referred to and require some explanation.
2.1 Netwar
The concept of netwar was developed by Ronfeldt and Arquilla in the early 1990s to 
describe a mode of conflict at the societal end of the military-societal spectrum in which
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small groups of actors can combine together using the new ICTs. Yet the emphasis of 
the concept is on organisation and doctrine rather than the technology (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 1999; Arquilla, Ronfeldt et al. 2000). It describes both conflict -  especially 
non-military -  and crime, and the actors are non-state, paramilitary, irregulars, criminals 
or activists. The organisational structure is flat, rather than hierarchical, with no central 
leadership and decision-making and operations are decentralised, guided by a shared set 
of ideas and interests. Attacks come in swarms, described as packeting. In terms of 
defence, the network structure itself is effective, since the destruction of parts of the 
network will not affect the viability of the whole.
This concept runs through much of the literature on terrorism and ICTs, even if it is not 
referred to by name. ICTs have made possible the emergence of a large number of 
networked organisations, terrorist, criminal, and activist, who can use their structures 
and technology to wield power at levels far greater than would otherwise be possible, 
achieving a degree of asymmetry. The traditional hierarchical structure of the state is 
seen as unwieldy and ineffective in combating networked organisations (Desouza 
2005).
The trend within Middle Eastern terrorism is away from the traditional, state-sponsored, 
bureaucratic terrorist organisations of the 1960s and 1970s, towards the new-generation 
groups with more fluid and less hierarchical organisational forms which rely on a 
fundamentalist view of Islam for a radical ideology. Examples can be found in Hamas, 
Hezbollah, the Egyptian Islamic Group and al Qaeda. These groups are decentralised, 
with loose ties amongst dispersed units and individuals and decision-making tends to be 
delegated. Al Qaeda epitomises the notion of transnationalism, denoting international 
interactions between non-state actors. Although al Qaeda found assistance from state 
actors such as the Taliban rulers in Afghanistan, this is not the essence of the 
organisation, which has continued to operate long after the Taliban have been deposed. 
These new-generation terrorists rely on ICTs in order to maintain this structure and, 
increasingly, to coordinate activities and disseminate propaganda and ideology (Whine 
1999; Zanini 1999; Whine 1999a; Arquilla, Ronfeldt et al. 2000). Zanini (1999) was 
prescient in noting the importance of the networked structure to the organisation now 
known as al Qaeda. She noted that:
It is important to avoid equating the bin Laden network solely with bin Laden. He 
represents a key node in the Arab Afghan terror network, but there should be no 
illusions about the likely effect on the network of actions taken to neutralize him. The 
network conducts many operations without his involvement, leadership or financing -  
and will continue to be able to do so should he be killed or captured.
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2.2 Information warfare
If netwar is predominantly about organisation and doctrine, then information warfare 
(IW) is about offensive and defensive control of the information environment There is 
fierce debate about the definition of IW, with those at one extreme claiming that future 
wars can be won with information dominance and without bloodshed and sceptics at the 
other extreme claiming that information control has always been key in warfare 
(Rathmell 1997). Schwartau (2000) takes a very broad view of IW, including 
intimidation of individuals, corporate espionage and inter-state conflict. He underlines 
the current state of asymmetry, in which conventional US militaiy forces are 
overwhelmingly more powerful than their enemies. Unable to fight the US on its own 
terms, Schwartau foresees smaller opponents seeking asymmetries of their own: 
engaging in terrorist activities which lie outside internationally accepted modes of 
behaviour against an enemy constrained by democratic principles; and seeking out IW 
as a means of fighting a more powerful enemy which represents a much larger, more IT 
dependent and, therefore, more vulnerable target. As this example demonstrates, 
asymmetries can be characterised as positive and negative, with the former generating 
an offensive advantage and the latter a vulnerability (Kshetri 2005a). Schwartau warns 
that the US fails to take IW seriously at its peril, claiming that “asymmetrical conflict is 
now the norm ... [and] is the only strategy that makes sense for erstwhile allies as well 
as enemies, since they cannot compete under traditional rules”. The fact that it makes 
sense does not, of course, mean that the threat is as imminent or as great as Schwartau 
claims.
More moderate definitions of IW include “targeting the information and information 
systems that comprise and support civilian and military infrastructures of an adversary” 
(Devost, Houghton et al. 1997); and “activities carried o u t ... with specific political and 
strategic objectives, aimed at the integrity, availability and confidentiality of the data 
collected, stored and transferred inside information systems connected to the Internet” 
(Valeri and Knights 2000). However, the important element is that IW constitutes 
attacks on information activities generally, not information systems specifically 
(Rathmell 1997).
The centrality of information control in the military environment has been termed a 
Revolution in Military Affairs, so that “The fight to obtain an information advantage 
will take place in the physical space with bombs and bullets, in the cyberspace with 
hackers and jammers, and in the “mental space” with deception and psychological
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operations” (Brown 1996). Data are operational targets and a tactical goal of IW is to 
manipulate this data and transform it into information to further a political or strategic 
objective so that, for example, the enemy is induced to act on false information (Valeri 
and Knights 2000). Thus, IW is about more than just electronic operations, it concerns 
the information itself.
Netwar and IW are not synonymous, but do converge in networked groups using ICTs 
to engage in IW (Zanini 1999). On the other hand, IW can also be waged by state actors 
from within the normal hierarchical paradigms. The US military, for example, 
reportedly used viruses and hacking techniques against Iraqi air defences in the first 
Gulf war and engaged in cyber-disinformation campaigns, gathered intelligence and 
distorted data received by Serb gunners in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
(Arquilla 2000; Stanton 2002). Such mechanisms can be seen as both offensive and 
defensive, at the same time compromising the ability of the enemy to use its information 
systems effectively and protecting against electronic and physical counterattack.
2.3 Cyberterrorism
Cyberterrorism, also referred to in the literature as ‘information terrorism’, is a subset of 
both information warfare (Devost, Houghton et al. 1997; Rathmell 1997; Schwartau
2000) and terrorism and can be considered as the area of overlap between terrorism and 
information warfare. Defining cyberterrorism is problematic, however, for several 
reasons. First, the term is often used broadly and without rigour, particularly in the 
news media (Post, Ruby et al. 2000; Embar-Seddon 2002; Gordon and Ford 2002; 
Weimann 2005). There is confusion between cyberterrorism and cybercrime, terrorists 
and hackers coupled with a failure to distinguish between terrorist use of ICTs as a 
facilitator of activities and use of ICTs as either weapon or target (Ingles-Le Nobel 
1999; Conway 2002; Weimann 2005). Second, there is a tendency to create neologisms 
by placing cyber-, computer- and information- in front of other words to create 
seemingly new concepts which are, in reality, rarely new at all (Embar-Seddon 2002; 
Weimann 2005). Third, there is no settled definition of terrorism itself (Rabbie 1991; 
Reid 1997; Ballard, Homik et al. 2002; Embar-Seddon 2002). Terrorism is usually 
defined as including an element of actual or threatened violence aimed at 
communicating a message to or influencing a target audience wider than the immediate 
victims in an attempt to achieve political objectives (Rabbie 1991; Reid 1997; 
Richardson 1999). The terrorism literature is heavily influenced by governments, 
particularly the US government who, through preconceived policies and programmes,
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have had an impact on definitions of terrorism, the types of data used, selection of 
research problems, dissemination of findings and marketing of ideas. Yet, even within 
one government administration, different departments may work to different definitions 
of terrorism (Mahmood 2001) highlighting the fact that its definition is a politically 
vexed question, often having as much to do with vested interests as anything else. This 
has lead some researchers to adopt a classification-based approach rather than wrestle 
with one all-encompassing definition (Ballard, Homik et al. 2002).
The lines of debate on the definition of cyberterrorism can be drawn in a number of 
different ways. There is the division between those who require violence or the threat 
of violence as an element of the definition (Pollitt 1998; Conway 2002a; Iqbal 2004) 
and those who do not. The latter group is far more numerous. Alternatively, Ballard, 
Homik et al. (2002) discern three broad patterns in attempts to define cyberterrorism. 
The first group use one of the existing definitions of terrorism, altered to account for the 
electronic element. Barry Collin at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in 
California coined the term ‘cyberterrorism’ in the 1980s to refer to the convergence of 
cyberspace and terrorism (Denning 2000). Cyberterrorism has been defined as 
“premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, 
computer programs, and data which result in violence against non-combatant targets by 
sub national groups or clandestine agents” (Pollitt 1998; Conway 2002a); “politically 
motivated hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe 
economic damage” (Denning 2000); and “an individual who uses computer/network 
technology to control, dominate or coerce through the use of terror in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.” (Rogers 2003).
There are others in this first group who espouse very wide definitions of cyberterrorism, 
setting aside the requirements of violence, serious harm and terror and claiming that all 
terrorist use of computers is cyberterrorism, not just their use as tools or targets 
(Desouza and Hensgen 2003). Foltz (2004) achieved a similarly broad definition by 
amalgamating many of the major definitions which had come before:
... cyberterrorism is an attack or threat of an attack (Denning 2000a), politically 
motivated (Denning 2000a), intended to:
• Interfere with the political, social (Denning 2000a), or economic (McFeatters
2001) functioning of a group, organization, or country; or
• Induce either physical violence (Pollitt 1998) or the unjust use of power; or
• In conjunction with a more traditional terrorist action (Bronskill 2001).
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Such broad approaches strip the term of all sense, including under the umbrella of 
cyberterrorism much that would commonly be regarded as criminal and rendering it a 
blunt tool for any meaningful discussion about either the cyberterrorist threat or 
counter-terrorism policy.
Second, there are definitions which are predicated on existing legal definitions, so that 
reference is made to unlawful attacks against information systems to intimidate or 
coerce to promote political or social objectives (Denning 2000a). The definitions of 
terrorism and cyberterrorism may not have settled in the political literature, but the law 
provides an authoritative, although not incontrovertible, definition (Walker 2000). In 
the UK, the Terrorism Act 2000, Section 1(1) defines terrorism as an action or threat of 
action which is designed to influence the government or intimidate the public for a 
political, religious or ideological cause. Section 1(2) sets out the types of action which 
constitute terrorism, which include violence against the person, but also serious property 
damage and endangering life, health or safety of individuals. Cyberterrorism is 
expressly provided for in section l(2)(e), defined as action designed seriously to 
interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. Section 1(4) gives the 
definition extra-territorial application. Crucially, this definition of cyberterrorism 
dispenses with the need for violence or even damage to property, since interference or 
disruption of an electronic system does not necessarily imply either.
Third, there are attempts to combine definitions of terrorism with a classificatory 
approach. Gordon and Ford (2002) attempt a reductionist approach, splitting definitions 
of terrorism into their component parts and analysing the impact of ICTs on each 
element. This results in a wide definition of cyberterrorism, encompassing all forms of 
terrorist use of ICTs. They argue that a narrow definition of cyberterrorism leads to 
undue compartmentalisation of approaches to solutions, whereas the ‘cyber’ element of 
terrorism should be accounted for in all areas of the counter-terrorism model. This is 
quite true, but the same effect can be achieved by recognising terrorist uses of ICTs as 
points on a continuum, with cyberterrorism at the extreme end. Such an approach 
requires a narrow definition of cyberterrorism but, at the same time, recognises the need 
for solutions to all other points on the scale. An over-wide definition of cyberterrorism, 
on the other hand, can lead to disproportionate counter-terrorist measures which are not 
effective in countering the perceived threat and risk impinging on civilian liberties.
Using similar arguments to Gordon and Ford, Desouza and Hensgen (Desouza and 
Hensgen 2003; Hensgen, Desouza et al. 2003; Desouza and Hensgen 2003a) outline a
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semiotic approach to the study and prediction of cyberterrorism. On the first, 
morphological rung of the semiotic ladder, the task is to assess the ICT-related activities 
of individual terrorist agents. At the next, empirical level, the task is to group like with 
like based on characteristics identified at the morpholo gical level, finding, for example, 
patterns of behaviour which may point to communication between members of a 
terrorist cell. The syntactical level focuses on identifying and defining patterns and 
relationships between agents and objects observed at the morphological and empirical 
levels. The semantic phase then places these patterns and relationships in a systemic 
context. Terrorist attacks at this level focus on destruction or large-scale disruption of 
the critical national infrastructure (CNI) and the attacker would require both technical 
skills and systemic knowledge in order to exploit weaknesses. Desouza and Hensgen 
consider that most of the cyberterrorism literature is focussed at this level. Finally, the 
response to what has been learned at previous levels is formed at the pragmatic level. 
Moreover, it is not possible to prevent attacks higher up the semiotic ladder without first 
dealing with issues arising at the morphological and empirical levels. This semiotic 
framework appears instructive until the authors claim that the distinction between 
cybercrime and cyberterrorism should be eliminated since it is merely a semantic 
distinction: both involve the intent to destroy. This contention is false. Terrorist intent 
goes beyond criminal intent in its aim of terrorising an audience beyond the immediate 
victim for political advantage. This is where their model breaks down and the fault lies 
in their over-wide definition of cyberterrorism. There must also be a line between 
terrorist use of ICTs and cyberterrorism (see further section 4) because of the 
consequences at the pragmatic level -  retributive social consequences -  of defining 
behaviour on the lowest rungs of the semiotic ladder as terrorist.
Devost, Houghton et al. (1997) also take a classificatory approach and adopt a wide 
definition of cyberterrorism as “the intentional abuse of a digital information system, 
network or component toward and end that supports or facilitates a terrorist campaign or 
action”. This definition is wide in that ‘cyberterrorism’ does not require violence and 
need only support or facilitate a terrorist campaign, a position which seems to include 
disruption as well as destruction. Much of the literature on cyberterrorism adopts, 
implicitly or explicitly, the second part of the analysis of Devost, Houghton et al., which 
comprises a matrix-based classification of terrorist acts, setting physical/digital targets 
against physical/digital tools.
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Target
Physical Digital
Tool Physical (a) (b)
Digital (c) (d)
Source: adapted from Devost, Houghton et al. (1997)
It is important to notice that the definition of terrorism must be applied first, only then 
does the matrix classification operate. Cell (a) represents conventional terrorism. 
According to the authors, the other three categories are cyberterrorism and cell (d) is 
said to be ‘pure’ cyberterrorism. Cell (b) represents a conventional attack on a high- 
tech target and the authors give the example of IRA bombings in the City of London. I 
cannot agree that this is ‘cyberterrorism’, since any damage to information systems in 
such an attack is usually considered collateral damage. The same effect occurred with 
the atrocities of 9/11: some trading activity was disrupted in the following days due to 
the geographic concentration of the financial services industry and its dependence on 
the badly damaged communications infrastructure (Marlin 2001), yet 9/11 has never 
seriously been labelled a ‘cyberterrorist attack’. This was collateral damage. 
Accordingly, type (b) incidents are treated as conventional terrorism in this study.
Cell (c) is more ambiguous. Devost et al. give the example of an electronic attack on an 
air traffic control system intended to cause a plane crash. This might more naturally be 
labelled cyberterrorism. Indeed, many of the disaster scenarios commonly presented, 
such as electronic attacks causing train crashes, bursting dams, nuclear reactor 
explosions, are of this type (Shockwavewriter 2000). The President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP 1997) foresaw grave danger from 
cyberterrorists who might cause explosions in power stations through virus attacks on 
the computer command centre or render pharmaceuticals lethal by accessing the 
processing control system of a drug manufacturer to alter the formulae. The element of 
terror is strongest in cell (c), although there are bigger questions about whether such 
attacks are possible or likely (Pollitt 1998).
This contrasts with cell (d), which undoubtedly represents cyberterrorism in its pure 
form, if only one can argue that the element of terror is present. In an earlier version of 
this paper (Devost, Houghton et al. 1996), the authors argue that terrorism scholars who 
view physical violence as a necessary component of terrorism should broaden that view
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to reflect the centrality of technology in modem society. However, this argument only 
works once the attack has reached a certain level of seriousness. A vims or denial of 
service (DoS) attack, if perpetrated by a terrorist group, arguably does not amount to 
cyberterrorism because the result tends to be disruption, rather than destruction and fear. 
On the other hand, a successful electronic attack by terrorists on the London Stock 
Exchange, bringing trading to a halt for a significant period of time, might be regarded 
as sufficiently serious to qualify as a cyberterrorist attack, leaving aside the question of 
whether such an outcome is possible in these days of distributed computing. The 
PCCIP certainly defined as cyberterrorism the disruption of banks, international finance 
transactions and stock exchanges leading to a public loss of trust in the economic 
system (PCCIP 1997). Nevertheless, an attack would have to be on an unprecedented 
scale in order to achieve such an effect.
Post, Ruby et al. (2000) take a somewhat different approach, using a three-part test to 
determine whether a particular attack amounts to cyberterrorism. The attack should be:
1. ideologically motivated;
2. use and/or target an information system by either digital or physical means to 
affect the information system itself or persons or property dependent on it;
3. intended to influence, intimidate or coerce an audience beyond the immediate 
target of the attack.
Limb 2 of this test embodies the same matrix approach as Devost, Houghton et al. and 
includes in the definition a physical attack on an information system (cell b), a position 
which is not accepted in this study. However, limb 3 of the test renders this definition 
narrower than that used by Devost, Houghton et al. because it looks behind the attack to 
the intentions of the perpetrators and beyond the attack to its effect on the ultimate 
audience. On this analysis, however, hacktivism -  using hacking techniques against an 
electronic target with the intent of disrupting normal operations but not causing serious 
damage (Denning 2000) -  by political activist groups who would not usually be thought 
of as terrorists would also qualify as ‘cyberterrorism’. Post, Ruby et al. suggest that 
hacktivism and cyberterrorism exist at different points on a sliding scale and that the 
difference between the two is likely to reduce to “a qualitative analysis of the degree to 
which the attack was designed to produce fear and intimidation in a target audience in 
order to accomplish an ideological goal”.
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2.4 Definition of cyberterrorism adopted in this study
The following definition blends a number of the approaches outlined above. 
Cyberterrorism is:
1. an action or threat of action which is designed to engender fear or terror so as to 
influence the government or intimidate the public for a political, religious or 
ideological cause; and
2. the action involves use of digital means to attack a digital target, the direct 
consequences of which may be tangible or intangible and which are sufficiently 
serious as to be likely to cause the effects in part 1.
This definition does not focus on the nature of the damage. This circumvents the 
arguments about the type of damage necessary to qualify as terrorism: does violent 
injury, damage to property, economic damage or minor disruption constitute terrorism? 
Such arguments become difficult when the target is digital. Rather this definition 
focuses on the psychological effects on a wider population, the essence of terrorism. 
Any type of damage will qualify and the only question is whether it is likely or not to 
engender fear or terror. On this model, an attack causing widespread economic damage 
may be sufficient if it causes such economic instability that people fear for their 
financial wellbeing. Fear of losing the economic means to a good fife may be equally 
coercive as the fear of physical violence. On the other hand, an attack causing an 
outage of some part of the CNI will not qualify unless its severity is on an 
unprecedented scale. People routinely suffer interruptions in electricity, telephone and 
water services, sometimes for days at a time, and there is rarely any sense of fear or 
panic. Cyberterrorism goes beyond fear and terror, however, because it requires the 
perpetrator to be acting in furtherance of a cause, political, religious or ideological. 
Thus, a group mounting a major attack for personal gain are not terrorists even though 
they may cause fear and terror.
The matrix of Devost, Houghton et al. (1997) is integrated into the definition above, but 
with modifications. Only use of digital means qualifies as cyberterrorism. A bomb 
exploding the physical components of a network would not count: this is conventional 
terrorism. Further, cell (c) (digital tool/physical target) is misleading, because any 
digital attack aimed ultimately at a physical target requires interference with an 
electronic system which in turn causes damage to a physical target. Thus, cells (c) and 
(d) are both digital attacks on digital targets but, in cell (c), the ultimate aim is that the 
compromised digital target will result in tangible, catastrophic, physical consequences,
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whereas, in cell (d) the ultimate aim is to cause catastrophic, intangible consequences, 
such as commercial meltdown and huge economic losses. With this clarification, the 
distinctions made by Devost, Houghton et aL are retained in the definition used in this 
study.
This definition of cyberterrorism is deliberately restrictive. It draws a clear distinction 
between cyberterrorism and cybercrime. Both fit into the matrix part of the definition, 
and this will be explored in chapter 4, but only cyberterrorism fulfils the first limb of the 
test. It also draws a clear distinction between terrorist use of ICTs and cyberterrorism, 
since the former does not of itself inspire fear or terror.
3 . W h o  a r e  th e  cyberterro rists?
Social awareness of cyberterrorism is high due to a combination of psychological, 
political and economic factors (Weimann 2005). Both terrorism and technology are 
established sources of social anxiety capable of inspiring public fear and concern 
(Sandywell 2006). The combination of the two results in potent anxiety. The mass 
media have been assiduous in their pursuit of alarmist headlines about what terrorists, 
particularly al Qaeda, are capable of. Likewise, there have been many films and novels 
which have exploited the dramatic potential of cyberterrorism. If terrorism and 
technology inspire fear, it is partly because they are also sources of ignorance. The 
public do not understand the issues but then, arguably, nor do policy makers and those 
who influence them. As a result, hackers are confounded with terrorists and terrorist 
use of ICTs is characterised as cyberterrorism. Such confusion of distinct issues is not 
helpful since there is no coherent target at which to aim counter-terrorism policy.
There is a pressing need to distinguish between all the possible sources of an electronic 
attack (Vatis 2001; Schell and Dodge 2002) and acknowledge that, so far, no publicly 
documented attack has ever been made by a terrorist group (Denning 2000a; Weimann 
2005), although this does not preclude the possibility that such an attack has taken place 
but that this information has not been released into the public domain. Hackers, on the 
other hand, are known to be active and much of the myth surrounding cyberterrorists 
can be understood by looking at the long and chequered history of hackers in the public 
psyche. There is a paucity of empirical research on hackers and most literature relies on 
conjecture, hearsay and myth (Schell and Dodge 2002). Skibell (2002) has written that 
hackers as a conceptual, as opposed to real, group obtained cohesion with the attribution 
of certain characteristics unique to them. A distinct psychological discourse emerged 
which attributed to hackers a pathological addiction to computers, locking themselves
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away from the real world and engaging with others solely through the clinical interface 
of a computer. A second set of attributed characteristics emerged, in which hackers had 
almost magical, unlimited powers to break into systems, a theme which subsists today 
in the myth of the cyberterrorist capable of causing death and destruction by hacking 
into the CNI. With the increasing computerisation of society, hacking was perceived as 
an escalating threat and was re-characterised from nuisance to crime, with hackers 
becoming all-powerful, underground criminals. Hackers may even have been complicit 
in their own demonisation. If hackers publicly expose security flaws and many are 
happy to boast about it, often enhancing accounts of their own prowess in the process, 
they are seen as threatening, mysterious, powerful and dangerous. There is also an 
element of shooting the messenger in public hostility towards hackers (Weimann 2005). 
The myth of hackers as a cohesive and coordinated social group with a dangerous 
agenda became entrenched as fact and no distinction between different types of attacker 
was recognised.
The next stage of the hacker myth is now evolving towards terrorism (Halbert 1997). 
Whereas previously the hacker was seen as an adolescent challenger to the adult order, 
bent on destabilising adult-created computer-dependent systems, now the cyberterrorist 
is seen as challenging the computer-dependent systems on which nations’ 
infrastructures are founded. Just as Skibell found that, contrary to popular perceptions, 
most computer hackers are neither dangerous nor highly skilled, so too with 
cyberterrorism.
There is one category of actor which, many agree, is far more dangerous than all others: 
the insider (Brull and Wagley 2001; Hinde 2001; Weimann 2005). Even this common 
perception may be false, as the CSI/FBI survey has consistently found that the numbers 
of attacks coming from the outside are roughly the same as the numbers from the inside 
year on year (CSI/FBI 2005). This says nothing about seriousness of damage resulting, 
however. An insider is more likely than others to have sufficient information on the 
layout of a critical system and sufficient access to perpetrate a successful electronic 
attack on a critical system. There is a long history of attacks perpetrated by disgruntled 
employees and there is a genuinely merited fear that the best and most certain method 
for a cyberterrorist would be to infiltrate the target organisation. Whether the resulting 
damage would be as extensive as the scaremongers have claimed is debatable. A 2004 
survey found that the most serious incidents were roughly equally caused externally and 
internally (PWC/DTI2004).
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One of the key problems for those hying to crystallise the issues is that cyber-attackers 
can relatively easily achieve anonymity, so that it can be very difficult for victims to 
trace the source of an attack (Jones 2005). Hackers, insiders and cybeiterrorists are, 
therefore, easily confounded because it is almost impossible to establish definitively 
which it was. This suits those with an interest in amplifying the problem. For example, 
media reports overwhelmingly fail to distinguish hackers from terrorists, with escalated 
accounts making better stories. Concerns have been raised about the motivations of 
politicians in promoting anxiety about cyberterrorism, with insinuations of ulterior 
motives (Hosein and Whitley 2002; Weimann 2005), for instance justification for 
extending the national security apparatus (Halbert 1997) or for aggressive stances 
towards suspect nations like Iraq (Weimann 2005). If ignorance can be exploited for 
ideological reasons, it can also be exploited for commercial ones and it is certainly true 
that the IT security industry has done very well out of governments and organisations 
concerned about the threats from cyberterrorism.
4 . T err o r ist  ex plo ita t io n  o f  IC T s
Terrorism is evolving in tandem with new uses of ICTs which broaden the spectrum of 
conflict and foster networked organisations (Whine 1999). Most commentators agree 
that modem terrorist groups currently make plentiful use of ICTs in the everyday 
running of their organisations (Ingles-Le Nobel 1999; Gilmore Commission 2002; 
Newton 2002; Stanton 2002). Some even argue that ICTs have facilitated the creation 
of and shaped modem terrorist and activist groups (Crilley 2001).
Whine (1999) notes the many benefits of ICTs to terrorist organisations (also Goodman, 
Kirk et al. 2006): they allow communication and networking, both internal and external 
to the group; secrecy and anonymity, both amongst themselves and from the outside 
world; low financial cost; a force multiplication effect, effectively allowing David to 
fight Goliath whilst at the same time remaining well-defended; and target audiences are 
within easy reach for the spreading of propaganda, particularly when traditional media 
channels are closed to extremists. The single effort of developing one exploit is 
sufficient to unleash multiple, synchronised attacks (Desmedt 2002). All of these 
factors are supportive of netwar. Danitz and Strobel (1999) have also highlighted as 
advantages the low cost of Internet communication; organisational advantages, 
particularly in mobilising large numbers of geographically diverse individuals; fast 
access to up-to-date information and intelligence; and replication and rapid 
dissemination of successful strategies.
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As disadvantages, Danitz and Strobel note that Internet communications can easily be 
monitored and intercepted; opponents can sabotage Internet activities; information 
disseminated via the Internet can be inaccurate; the digital divide -  the ICT ‘haves’ and 
‘have nots’ -  can be problematic, particularly for non-English-speaking groups; and 
decentralised, networked organisations relying on ICTs for communication may become 
unstable more rapidly than centralised, hierarchical organisations. Certainly, the US has 
noted that modem terrorist organisations’ reliance on ICTs creates an opportunity for 
their counter-terrorist forces to gather intelligence and compromise operations (Gilmore 
Commission 2002).
Conway (2002) distinguishes four points on a spectrum of uses of the Internet for 
political activism, ranging from terrorist ‘use’ of the Internet at one end, through 
‘misuse’ and ‘offensive use’, to ‘cyberterrorism’ at the other. Terrorist activities, she 
finds, have hitherto focussed on the first three tiers, with the vast majority of activity 
amounting only to terrorist ‘use’ of the Internet. Such use is a necessary and inevitable 
part of netwar and does not of itself amount to cyberterrorism, which she defines 
narrowly. Terrorist ‘use’ of the Internet amounts to online activity which would be 
perfectly legal if done by an ordinary member of the public, such as association, 
communication, intelligence gathering through legitimate searches and dissemination of 
information and messages about an organisation. When done by terrorists, this last is 
usually considered propaganda and studies have revealed that spreading propaganda via 
the Internet is quite persuasive, especially when the receiver is either neutral or 
sympathetic to the cause (Lee and Leets 2002). Moreover, use of the Internet by 
extremists is not a new phenomenon, the use of bulletin board systems being well 
documented in the early 1980s. Modem terrorist organisations such as Hamas and 
Hizbollah have dedicated websites and, although al Qaeda is an exception in this 
respect, its use of the Internet for email communication and research into potential 
methods of physical attack is documented (Levin 2002). Whilst some websites may just 
contain information about a given terrorist organisation, others have crossed the 
boundary from ‘use’ into ‘misuse’ or ‘offensive ise’ by inciting violence against or 
murder of Westerners, particularly Americans and there have been discussions about 
what legal recourse authorities may have to prevent this (Crocco 2004; Hawkins 2005).
Denning (2000) has noted the widespread, non-disraptive use of the Internet by 
terrorists in support of their cause and has also commented on misuse and offensive use 
of ICTs. She characterises these as ‘hacktivism’ -  using hacking techniques against an
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electronic target with the intent of disrupting normal operations but not causing serious 
damage -  but the perpetrators are usually groups or individuals other than terrorists. 
There are limited examples of terrorists engaging in hacktivism. They may, however, 
support their activities financially through both legitimate Internet-based businesses and 
Internet- facilitated fiaud (Valeri and Knights 2000). The latter would fall into 
Conway’s ‘misuse’ category. The most frequently cited example of offensive use is 
that of the Tamil Tigers, who swamped Sri Larkan embassies with 800 emails a day for 
two weeks, thereby generating publicity for their cause. There are no verified virus or 
worm attacks peipetrated by terrorists, but Denning notes that this is potentially a potent 
tool in their hands. There is also the prospect of semantic attacks, in which attackers 
surreptitiously alter the meaning of text on information-based sites such as news 
websites in order to convey false information or messages (Jones 2002).
Rathmell (1997) categorises use of IW by sub-state groups, notably terrorists but also 
including criminals and individuals, into:
1. new techniques applied to traditional activities, including intelligence gathering, 
communications, finance and propaganda;
2. old techniques applied to new activities, involving physical attacks against 
information activities including information infrastructures;
3. new techniques applied to new activities, being digital attacks against 
information activities.
This scheme constitutes an amalgamation of the matrix definition of cyberterrorism 
provided by Devost, Houghton et al. (1997) and Conway’s (2002) sliding scale of 
terrorist use of the Internet. Consistent with other scholars, Rathmell finds that 
terrorists are active in category 1, have occasionally attempted category 2 attacks, but 
are not yet active in category 3.
5. T h e  risk s  fr o m  cyberterro rism
There is not yet an academic consensus on the risks from cyberterrorism. Desouza and 
Hensgen (2003) note two schools of thought. The first holds that cyberterrorism is a 
myth, recalling the Millennium Bug which was ultimately easily correctable and did not 
produce the disasters predicted (Desmedt 2002). The second, mostly comprising 
technical specialists, contends that the threat is real and points to huge economic losses 
already caused by cyber-attacks.
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Due to a lack of hard evidence, the literature tends to focus on modelling vulnerabilities 
and/or threats. On the vulnerability side, it is almost trite that any analysis commences 
with a picture of a society increasingly reliant on IT and correspondingly vulnerable to 
increasing information security threats. Although formal use of scientific risk 
assessment principles has been mooted in connection with terrorism (Anderson 2002; 
Deisler 2002; Garrick 2002; Haimes and Longstaff 2002), to the extent that 
vulnerability studies of the CNI have been carried out, they are largely classified and the 
results not openly available (Garrick 2002). The Internet is a particular concern since 
there is a duality in the vulnerabilities it creates. On the one hand it is the conduit by 
which attacks might be carried out against the CNI and other targets; on the other hand 
it appears to be a target in its own right as a vital infiastructure (Walden 2005). Yet, 
although the Internet itself may appear to present an obvious target for terrorists 
(Brunskill 2002), using the Internet may be more important to terrorists than its 
destruction.
In a careful analysis of the issues of critical infrastructure protection, Rathmell (1999) 
identifies a number of reasons for society’s increasing vulnerability, including the rapid 
adoption of open-network architectures and the fact that a combination of privatisation, 
deregulation and globalisation of key industries has removed the owners and operators 
of important, trans-national networks from government control. Devost and Houghton 
(1996) predict that, as the military-industrial complex becomes increasingly dependent 
on technology, so it is increasingly likely that this technology will become a focus for 
attack. In addition, 9/11 has amply demonstrated that geographic boundaries are no 
longer a good defence against enemies, and the potential for electronic attack 
compounds the problem (PCCIP 1997; Wehde 1998).
On the threat side, the positive reasons for turning to cyberterrorism from a terrorist 
perspective have been set out: low cost, anonymity, variety and number of targets, 
remoteness and asymmetric characteristics of attack (Weimann 2005). Threats are 
thought to have increased, at the lower level of seriousness because of increasing IT 
literacy and ready access to tools for low-level attacks and, at the higher level, because 
nation states are pursuing the strategic military development of IW and information 
operations (IO) (Rathmell 1999). A change of terrorist strategy towards increasing 
attacks on vulnerable information structures may be imminent (Arquilla, Ronfeldt et al. 
2000; Bunker 2000; Crilley 2001). Embar-Seddon (2002) has claimed that there are 
currently terrorists with hacking skills who are most likely to use those skills for force
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multiplication. This would work at three levels: first, web propaganda might achieve 
the illusion that a terrorist group is bigger and more powerful than it is; second, literal 
force multiplication might be achieved with the recruitment of new members via the 
Internet; third, technology might be used as a force multiplier to magnify the harm 
caused during a conventional attack, disabling emergency communications, for 
example. Embar-Seddon does not quite arrive at the concept of asymmetry described 
above, but that would form a logical part of this third level.
Post, Ruby et al. (2000) reason that capability alone is not a sufficient measure of risk 
because it tends towards overestimation. Intention and context are, therefore, essential 
in risk evaluations for cyberterrorism and they list several factors indicating increased 
risk, including: the terrorist group identifies computers and networks as tools used by an 
adversary for security or dominance; the group leader is computer literate or growing 
computer literacy of group members; information-rich and -dependent environments 
post-industrial societies; offensive use of computers against a terrorist group; and 
successful offensive information operations of a rival terrorists group. Post, Ruby et al. 
also highlight the influence of what they call virtual group dynamics, in which 
communities of belief develop in online associations, characterised by high conflict, low 
cohesion, limited stability and strong resistance to hierarchical forms of leadership and 
control. They see this as fertile ground for terrorist groups, both in terms of their 
general operations and the possibility that disaffected, skilled hackers may be drawn 
into such organisations through online contact, then use their skills for terrorist 
purposes. They see the future threat of cyberterrorism coming from a subset of 
alienated individuals from within the hacker culture who are seduced into pursuing an 
anti-authoritarian agenda from within social-revolutionary terrorist groups. Denning 
(2000a) finds this unlikely, asserting that hackers mostly lack the motivation, 
organisation and psychology for violent attack or severe social or economic harm (also 
Embar-Seddon 2002; Schell and Dodge 2002). Post, Ruby et al conclude, however, 
that there are four main reasons why a major cyberterrorist attack has not yet occurred: 
attacks targeted against the CNI or calculated to cause human casualties are extremely 
difficult to achieve; conventional means of attack remain the most effective; terrorists 
are not inclined to threaten an information structure on which they themselves rely; 
finally, the range of hacker targets has traditionally been narrow, confined mostly to 
ideological opposition to use of the Internet by government and corporate interests.
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Given the lack of concrete evidence of terrorist intentions, scholars have attempted to 
model terrorist behaviour as a means of gauging the threat. Rabbie has mapped a 
behavioural interaction model which offers a social-psychological framework for 
examining terrorist behaviour over time (Rabbie 1991). The model effectively links 
together a number of different theories of behaviour, each of which operates at a 
different level and the last of which is interesting for present purposes. Rabbie cites the 
theory of reasoned action in which it is assumed that, where there are competing 
tendencies towards specific actions, the actor will choose that action which (1) appears 
to achieve his goal, (2) has a high probability of success, and (3) results in the most 
favourable cost/benefit analysis. These factors are instrumental in the formation of 
intention which is, in turn, the best predictor of behaviour.
Applying this part of Rabbie’s model to cyberterrorism, the terrorists concerned would 
have to believe that their goals would be achieved by a cyber attack, that the attack has a 
high probability of success and that the cost/benefit analysis would lean in favour of the 
attack. Only then might an intention to commit cyberterrorism be formed which, in 
turn, would be a good indication that it might actually happen. When put like this, 
problems arise for those who claim that cyberterrorist attacks are imminent. First, it is 
doubtful whether a cyber attack is capable of inspiring fear in its victims and others, 
rather than annoyance or exasperation. As one industry insider put it:
At the moment, the only way that you will scare most people with ‘cyber’ capabilities is
to threaten to throw the equipment at them. (Jones 2005)
The goal of terrorising a section of society might not easily be achieved through 
cyberterrorism. Second, only a handful of hackers are capable of executing targeted 
attacks producing very specific outcomes and, even then, many critical systems have 
failsafes (Pollitt 1998). The probability of success may, in fact, be quite low, especially 
when compared with highly successful conventional terror campaigns. Third, despite 
many claims about the positive benefits for terrorists of adopting cyberterrorism, the 
cost/benefit analysis may not actually indicate this. Giacomello (2004) has conducted a 
careful cost-benefit analysis of cyberterrorism from a terrorist point of view and 
concluded that it was not an efficient substitute for traditional tools such as bombs and 
that online propaganda and activism were more effective ways of exploiting electronic 
media.
Present conditions being what they are, Rabbie’s model suggests that terrorists are 
unlikely to form an intention to perpetrate a pure cyberterrorist attack and, intention
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being the best predictor of behaviour, are unlikely to carry it out. This does not 
preclude the possibility of a cyber attack ancillary to a conventional attack, however, 
nor does it say anything about future conditions. Assuming a terrorist group actually 
attempted a cyber attack now or in the future, the outcome of that attack, successful or 
not, would feed back into the future decision-making process, according to Rabbie’s 
model. Put another way, if pure cyberterrorism is as hard to achieve as many 
commentators suggest, terrorist groups might well abandon further attempts for the 
foreseeable future.
Giacomello’s formal cost-benefit analysis (2004) also characterised terrorists as rational 
choice actors and bears closer scrutiny. He concluded that the technological 
environment is not yet sufficiently advanced, meaning that societies are not sufficiently 
IT dependent and terrorists do not have ready access to the requisite skills, for 
cyberterrorism to be attractive as a mainstream mode of attack. Even if attacks on the 
CNI could theoretically produce the kind of devastation terrorists seek, the expertise 
required for such an operation is currently so rare that terrorist groups would almost 
certainly have to hire mercenaries and the evidence is that most are extremely reluctant 
to do this, especially when conventional terrorism is still relatively cheaper, easier, more 
certain and can be achieved ‘in-house’. The only entities with sufficient resources to 
launch an effective information attack against a nation state are other nations, and only 
wealthy ones at that. The gravest damage would likely be to the economy, both national 
and global, and to trust in information networks. This may act as a disincentive for 
foreign nations as they vould be directly or indirectly affected by the damage. A 
central pillar of Giacomello’s thesis rests on his finding that there is no conclusive 
evidence that physical destruction can result from an electronic attack on the CNI, 
leading him to conclude that, for the foreseeable future, terrorists are only likely to use 
electronic tools to leverage a wider, conventional attack.
A different view is provided by Devost, Houghton et al. (1996) who have applied a 
similar, ‘reasoned action’ model to cyberterrorism They claim that terrorists will 
increasingly adopt technologically oriented tactics and strategies as technology becomes 
more cost-effective to them: financial and other costs diminish whilst availability and 
potential scale of disruption increase. The likelihood of success is increased by 
targeting modest goals to ensure success and visibility (Hoffman 1994), leading to low- 
risk, high-visibility outcomes. Devost, Houghton et al do not explain, however, how 
attacks on more modest goals will lead to terror, as opposed to mere disruption. In
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addition, low-level attacks on information systems are often difficult to identify, since it 
is surprisingly difficult to establish whether a complex system is actually in good order 
(Brunskill 2002). Attacks which either go unnoticed or are discovered only much later 
are likely of tittle interest to terrorists pursuing a high-visibility goal (Lewis 2002).
Cilluffo and Gergely (1997) note the increasing use of technology by terrorist groups in 
the execution of their objectives, gathering intelligence, planning and conducting 
attacks, communication and propaganda. They consider that information warfare, 
which includes but is not limited to cyberterrorism as defined by Devost, Houghton et 
aL (1997), is a threat to US national security but, contrary to Devost, Houghton et al., 
believe that terrorists are more likely to use IW techniques in conjunction with 
conventional attacks in order to compound their effects. In contrast with the genuine 
threat from these blended attacks, the threat from ‘pure’ cyberterrorism should not be 
exaggerated. They see no evidence that terrorists currently intend to engage in IW, but 
they agree that increasing dependence of the US on interconnected, networked 
information systems makes it more likely. They expand on the theme of asymmetry, 
introduced by the comparatively greater reliance of a Western state on its networked 
systems when compared with the terrorists’ own, more modest, requirements. US 
information systems tend to lack redundancy for economic reasons and may be 
dependent on a limited number of critical nodes. An attack could inflict considerable 
damage whilst the modest systems of the attacker are relatively easy to defend. 
Moreover, Cilluffo and Gergely note the low number of critical assets in infrastructure 
systems and conclude that, for this reason, there is a low probability of damage during 
an untargeted attack, such as a natural disaster, and a correspondingly high probability 
of extensive damage during a targeted attack from an intelligent adversary. Devost, 
Houghton et al reply (1997a) that “such a linear, proportional causality analysis is 
rarely applicable to complex information infrastructures” and relatively minor, 
untargeted incidents can cause extensive damage. Conversely, they would not 
exaggerate the importance of cyberterrorism as a strategic technological threat to 
national security.
What is interesting about the reasoned action model so often used in the literature to 
predict terrorist interest in cyberterrorism is that it flies in the face of traditional views 
of terrorists as irrational fanatics. Such irrationality is often assumed in religious 
extremists who tend towards the suicide attacks characteristic of modem terrorism, 
whose theology is considered alien and not understandable (Mahmood 2001). Yet these
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very extremists, particularly the al Qaeda network, are the ones acknowledged to be 
making the greatest use of ICTs for communication, administrative and planning 
purposes and the ones most commentators suspect of actively pursuing a cyberterrorist 
agenda because it apparently makes sense for them to do so.
Denning (2000) has assessed the potential of activism, hacktivism and cyberterrorism 
side-by-side. Interestingly, she found that activism -  that is normal, non-disruptive use 
of the Internet in support of an agenda or cause -  has proved by far the most influential 
mechanism for influencing foreign policy, citing successful campaigns against the 
Clipper chip, US cryptography policy and the international campaign to ban landmines. 
These methods are most effective when used to supplement traditional forms of activist 
activity. Hacktivism, on the other hand -  website hacks, virtual sit-ins, viruses and 
worms -  achieves high levels of publicity for activists and their causes, a fact which 
was used to good effect by the Mexican Zapatistas, but has rarely had much influence in 
changing government policy. At the far end of the scale, it is impossible to measure the 
impact of cyberterrorism on foreign policy since it has never been tested. However, 
Denning finds that the threat of cyberterrorism has motivated government critical 
infrastructure protection initiatives at both national and international levels.
On Denning’s analysis, to the extent that terrorist organisations are motivated by the 
desire to promote their cause rather than a desire for mindless violence, rational choice 
theory might suggest that terrorist Internet activities are more likely to migrate towards 
the activism end of the scale, consolidating their propaganda efforts and recruiting new 
supporters to the cause, rather than towards the destructive end of the scale which is 
more likely to result in the hardening of both potential targets and hearts. This analysis 
has some support in lie literature, with claims that terrorists are most likely to take 
advantage of public disaffection with the counter-terrorism messages promoted by 
Western governments and are turning to the Internet for less biased, uncensored 
accounts of world events. If terrorists are accomplished in the art of spreading 
propaganda via the Internet, they have an opportunity to manipulate public perceptions 
and opinions (Stanton 2002).
Some scholars have attempted more holistic models for cyberterrorism. Kshetri (2005) 
has constructed a framework for understanding global cyber-attacks which, in theory, 
would encompass terrorist cyber-attacks. The framework highlights characteristics of 
the attacker, his environment and the victim. Kshetri notes a number of variables 
contributing to the likelihood of an attack, including the regulatory, normative and
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cognitive aspects of the national environment, the skills of the hacker, the motivations 
for the attack, whether the attack is targeted or opportunistic and, finally, the profile of 
the target organisation. His framework highlights ideology as part of the cognitive 
institutions which are associated with national culture, affirming that Islamic ideology 
has already motivated a number of low-level cyber-attacks, mostly hacktivism. 
Terrorists, however, are unlikely to be motivated towards opportunistic attacks which 
may go unnoticed and are more likely to attempt targeted, symbolic attacks with 
obligation- or community-based motivations. Nevertheless, the aspect of the 
framework relating to hacking skills suggests that sophisticated skills are required to 
effect a targeted hack and, accordingly, the probability of a terrorist cyber-attack is 
much reduced.
Valeri and Knights (2000), arguing from an offensive information warfare perspective, 
find it more probable that terrorists would choose to manipulate or exploit data within 
information systems -  a semantic attack -  with the specific objective of undermining 
the perception of trust which necessarily underlies all commercial and social 
transactions online, rather than targeting the CNI directly. This, they argue, would 
strike right at the heart of the Internet’s success, including its social systems and e- 
commerce (see also Smith 2002). They, too, note that an attack on the CNI is complex 
operationally because the topography of networked communications and the CNI is 
difficult to map making targets difficult to locate. Successful, targeted system intrusion 
would require considerable skill, time and patience. In addition, governments are 
investing heavily in risk avoidance technology and procedures for the CNI.
Other studies have supported this view, finding that, whilst computer networks may be 
vulnerable to attacks which are damaging to the economy, the CNI is distributed, 
diverse, redundant and self-healing, with periodic, accidental outages being relatively 
routine and easily dealt with (Lewis 2002). Government is ahead of the private sector 
in terms of information security and risk avoidance for potential government and 
military targets. Most key systems, particularly the supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems, are isolated from the Internet and even from internal 
networks (Green 2002). In contrast, e-commerce ventures in private hands employ the 
cheaper and less complex option of risk management so that such targets are rather 
easier to attack. Valeri and Knights’ argument is that, by systematically attacking these 
ventures, they can undermine the perception of reliability and trustworthiness of Internet 
ventures, cause economic losses, and thereby indirectly affect the CNI by harming
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public trust in the Internet in general. This thesis is difficult to sustain six years after 
publication, trust in the Internet having survived the negative publicity of Y2K, various 
destructive worms and viruses, high-profile thefts of credit card details and attacks on 
the DNS.
In sum, the bulk of the literature in this area is speculative, some of it carefully 
reasoned, some of it less so. The evidence so far is that terrorists make plentiful use 
ICTs but have not yet engaged in cyberterrorism (Ronfeldt 1999; Whine 1999; Whine 
1999a; Arquilla, Ronfeldt et al. 2000; Denning 2000; Green 2002). Nevertheless, 
reports that cyberterrorism exists or is imminent are legion -  from the media, 
consultants, ‘experts’, information systems security specialists, law enforcers and 
politicians -  so that the motives behind such claims must be suspect. Commentators 
have reasoned that such claims are made for ulterior motives such as news circulation, 
pitches for increased budget or widened remit, and promoting sales of information 
security products or services (Shockwavewriter 2000). Others have noted that the gap 
between what is technically feasible and what has actually happened is very large 
(Denning 2000; Post, Ruby et al. 2000).
6. R isks and response: the  information  security perspective
There is a plentiful information security literature dealing with cyberterrorism, but it 
tends to be rather one-dimensional and it is almost entirely found in article form, the 
subject of cyberterrorism not yet having reached major information security textbooks 
(Prichard and MacDonald 2004). There is also a large practitioner literature, comprised 
of corporate white papers, conference proceedings and articles in trade journals. The 
analysis presented in these bodies of work tends to converge around technical 
possibilities, and intentions and motivations of terrorist organisations are considered 
only as a function of this: an attack on air traffic control systems is technically possible 
and the outcomes are potentially devastating, so terrorists must be considering it 
(Crilley 2001; Kovacich and Jones 2002). The views presented, particularly in the 
practitioner literature, are often alarmist and these are the views most widely 
represented in the media (Shockwavewriter 2000; Brunskill 2002; Embar-Seddon 
2002).
An element of future-gazing was apparent from the early 1990s. Commentators on 
information security started looking for future issues and seem to have assumed that 
cyberterrorism was both a natural progression in terms of seriousness of information 
security attacks and a natural progression in terms of terrorist activity. It was claimed
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that terrorists would turn to cyber-attack and that they were already using well-known 
hacker exploits (Forcht and Pierson 1994; Fumell and Warren 1999). Such thinking is 
still current in the literature to a large extent and there seem to be two major approaches. 
In the first approach, the benefits to terrorist organisations of using the Internet are 
considered to be overwhelming evidence in themselves that cyberterrorist attacks are 
inevitable (Fumell and Warren 1999; Crilley 2001). The second approach highlights 
society’s dependence on ICTs and argues that this dependence must make us vulnerable 
to cyber-attack from terrorists (Fumell and Warren 1999; Griffith 1999; Crilley 2001). 
Often, no thought is given to the difficulties of attacking specific targets and attacks are 
described in general terms with the reader left in no doubt about the terrible 
consequences (Crilley 2001; Kovacich and Jones 2002).
Terrorist use of the Internet is often confounded with cyberterrorism (Fumell and 
Warren 1999; Hinde 2000; Shockwavewriter 2000; Crilley 2001). Some commertators 
even label ordinary hacking ‘cyberterrorism’, applying that alarmist label for impact in 
much the same way as do the news media (Griffith 1999; Hinde 2000; Ballesteros
2001). Whilst it is often the case that low-level attacks and basic disruption are 
relatively easy to perpetrate and require minimal skill (Hinde 2000; Paul 2001; 
Brunskill 2002), some argue that it is not valid to extrapolate from that position and 
assume that high-end attacks on CNI with catastrophic consequences are similarly easy 
(Lemos 2002), as others have done (Dwan 2001; Lawson 2002).
A few have effected a more nuanced analysis, explicitly noting the difference between 
hacktivism, other low-level hacker activity and cyberterrorism (Jordan 2001). Similarly 
countering the scaremongers, Pollitt (1998) notes that attacks on the CNI are likely to 
cause most damage but that the impact is rarely likely to be serious or fatal because such 
systems are usually mediated by human beings (also Green 2002; Neville-Jones 2003). 
He considers it essential that this element of human mediation in critical processes is 
maintained for security reasons.
The immediate aftermath of 9/11 saw an explosion in the number of articles written by 
information security experts, industry and academic alike. There was a sense amongst 
security professionals working within organisations that there was a window of 
opportunity for taking advantage of heightened management concern (Cresson Wood 
2001; Harreld and Fonseca 2001; Rombel 2001; Senia 2001). Despite claims that 
information security was a high priority for top management in 75% of businesses 
(PWC/DTI 2004), this concern did not translate into increased spending and
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management reverted to traditional imperatives for return on investment (Brunskill 
2002; Schultz 2003) or simply did not agree that the threat had heightened and the extra 
cost was justified (George and Whatford 2002). Some security professionals were also 
wary of over-hyping a threat which had yet to materialise for fear of losing credibility at 
board level as some felt they had done with the Millennium Bug (Schultz 2003). 
Security vendors also saw economic opportunity at a time when businesses were 
keeping a tight rein on IT budgets. They saw an opening for the industry in the shape of 
governments who were ready to open the public coffers for massive investment in the 
prevention of cyberterrorism and in other technologies needed to fight lengthy wars on 
foreign soil (Rombel 2002; Williams 2002).
Commentators post-9/11 highlighted the potential for cyberterrorist attack (Boni 2001; 
Brull and Wagley 2001; Hinde 2001; Brunskill 2002; Kovacich and Jones 2002; Foltz
2004), particularly as a retaliatory measure resulting from Allied attacks on Afghanistan 
and in Iraq (Hinde 2003). Many contributions were speculative and alarmist rather than 
rigorous, but some attempted a more structured analysis. Vatis (2001) made a 
systematic predictive analysis of the kinds of attacks which might be expected during 
the War on Terror. Although he considered the CNI a target for cyber-attack by 
terrorists, nation states and anti-US hackers with catastrophic consequences, a close 
reading of the analysis reveals that much of the activity anticipated really amounted to 
low-level nuisance, such as website hacks. In the event, a spate of reciprocal hacks did 
take place, mostly amounting to website defacements (Cover Story 2001), but nothing 
more serious.
Other attempts have been made at structured approaches to risk analysis, mostly from a 
technical perspective. Desmedt (2002) noted attempts to identify the most critical 
infrastructures, a controversial question in itself, and the rather older, larger body of 
work on establishing cyber-vulnerabilities. He discussed ways of integrating these 
approaches, underlining the risk that information security alone will not be a complete 
answer in the event of a physical or blended attack (see also Gordon and Ford 2002).
A few months after 9/11, however, many experts were beginning to reassess their initial 
claims, acknowledging that destructive cyberterrorism was theoretically possible but 
convinced that it was infinitely more complex and much less cost effective for terrorists 
than they had once feared (Lemos 2002; Harper 2003; Simpson 2003). The major types 
of attack or misuse experienced by organisations have, for many years, been viruses,
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insider abuse of Internet access and laptop/mobile theft, in that order (CSI/FBI 2005), 
and cyberterrorism does not feature at all.
If the claims were initially overblown, the professional advice, aimed mostly at the 
private sector, was sound. Whether the source of an attack was terrorist or criminal, 
some argued that the effects on the target would substantially be the same and 
preparation was essential (Hinde 2003). Information systems vulnerabilities tend to 
correlate with the level and type of threat, since news of a vulnerability tends to spread 
fast and exploitative actions can be engineered rapidly before system administrators 
either know of the vulnerability or have time to patch it (Brunskill 2002). Many 
commentators urged governments and industry alike towards comprehensive security 
policies (Bray 2002; Middlemiss 2003), with rigorous risk assessments, threat 
monitoring, tightened security measures and top-level personnel hking responsibility 
(Boni 2001; Cresson Wood 2001; Harreld and Fonseca 2001; Hinde 2001; Kirk 2001; 
Rombel 2001; Vatis 2001). Still, only a third of UK businesses had a security policy in 
2004 (PWC/DTI2004).
Many organisations caught in the destruction of 9/11 had reason to be grateful for 
lessons learned in preparation for the Millennium Bug (Seifert 2002) in terms of the 
importance of disaster recovery and contingency planning, as well as the availability 
and desirability of insurance against cyber-risks (Boni 2001; Brail and Wagley 2001; 
Kirk 2001; Marlin 2001; Keegan 2002; Leivesley 2002; Smith 2002). Nevertheless, 
75% of organisations still do not have external insurance against cybersecurity risks 
(CSI/FBI 2005). In purely technical terms, the desirability of redundancy, networked 
communication technologies and approaches to robust, secure, distributed computation 
have also been highlighted (Desmedt 2002; Seifert 2002). The importance of sharing 
threat and incident data has been emphasised (Boni 2001; Brunskill 2002), both through 
national infrastructure protection centres, such as the US NIPC and the UK NISCC, and 
with industry cooperatives. Indeed, Microsoft and other IT giants set up the 
Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center following 9/11 
(News 2001). Information sharing within industry does seem to be taking off, although 
reporting to law enforcement and legal counsel is declining. Fear of negative publicity 
and losing competitive advantage remain the major reasons fer this decline (CSI/FBI
2005), although another survey found that the incidents were too small to report or that 
they were not even criminal (FBI 2005).
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Insiders have also been identified as the most likely and threatening of potential 
attackers (Brull and Wagley 2001; Hinde 2001), either working on their own or as 
agents of a terrorist organisation (Vatis 2001). Behavioural profiling is increasingly 
being used to evaluate this problem within organisations (Shaw 2006). In addition, one 
of the biggest problems facing organisations directly affected by 9/11 was replacing 
skilled staff, not reinstating damaged technology (Cresson Wood 2001). Consequently 
the wisdom of concentrating key staff in one geographical area has been challenged 
(Smith 2002). Yet, F personnel are part of the problem, they are also part of the 
solution. All personnel coming into contact with company information should be 
informed and responsible and it is no longer sufficient to concentrate information 
security in the hands of a few, dedicated professionals.
7. T h e  in stitutio nal  respo nse
The institutional response occurs at the national, organisational and international levels 
and the response at each level is connected to the others. Rathmell (1999) identifies 
three key assumptions which have become conventional wisdom amongst governments: 
first, that the government, military and commerce must embrace the information 
revolution in order to remain competitive politically, economically and militarily; 
second, that government and defence information infrastructures are a requisite part of 
the National Information Infrastructure (Nil) and that e-commerce should be promoted 
through technological and regulatory measures; and, third, that government and the Nil 
must be secured against low level attacks and, in the event of a major strategic attack, 
core activities must still function. Individuals and corporations are expected to protect 
themselves against routine threats, ensuring reliable and efficient functioning of the e- 
environment and protection from ‘normal’ misuse and abuse. On the other hand, the 
protection of the Nil from the lower probability but high-level attacks by hostile states 
and terrorists properly remains the responsibility of the state.
This has given rise to a new approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), the 
concept of which is not new but has been rendered more complex by the evolving 
information technology element. Rathmell outlines several key problems which relate 
to CIP generally, whether the source of the threat be terrorists, criminals or hostile 
states. Highly complex and evolving system interdependencies renders vulnerability 
analysis extremely difficult. At the same time, assessing and monitoring the level and 
direction of the threat is problematic because of a lack of reliable data and the dynamic 
nature of the threat. Data tends to be unreliable because of under-reporting from
48 *
organisations due to lack of monitoring systems and reporting procedures and also the 
reluctance of commercial organisations to admit to weaknesses in security. Prediction 
of the threat is even harder so that “some agencies have rejected threat-based 
approaches in favour of vulnerability-based approaches”. The isue of CIP has also 
intensified the security v liberty debate, best exemplified in the cryptography policies 
adopted by the US in the late 1990s. In this context, Hosein and Whitley (2002) have 
also noted that cryptography policy necessarily impacts on e commerce too, a fact 
which was recognised in the UK before the debate moved on to national security -  in 
the US, the debate happened the other way around. Importantly, there are also 
controversies surrounding the definition of the CNI -  what is critical and to whom? 
Finally, Rathmell identifies problems of coordination, control and influence of vertical 
government structures over networked threats. This last problem has many facets, 
many of which exemplify the general problems posed by netwar to traditional, 
hierarchical government and they can be analysed at the national, public-private 
relationship and international levels. This will be the focus of the next three sections.
7.1 National challenges
(a) Structural issues
Advancing technology can be extremely disruptive of the status quo, often leading to 
governments attempting intervention (Hosein and Whitley 2002). The first category of 
problems relates to the intra-government environment since information security issues 
cut across the responsibilities of so many different departments (Rathmell 1999). The 
authorities are concerned about emerging modes of operation of their opponents as 
much as the attacks themselves. Returning to Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s concept of 
netwar (1999), they argue that, since netwar operates outside the traditional societal 
structures, it s challenging epistemologically the very structure of governments and 
society itself.
A netwar actor may aim to confound people’s fundamental beliefs about the nature of 
their culture, society, and government, partly to foment fear but perhaps mainly to 
disorient people and unhinge their perceptions. This is why social netwar tends to be 
about disruption more than destruction. The more epistemological the challenge, the 
more confounding it may be from an organizational standpoint. Whose responsibility is 
it to respond? Whose roles and missions are at stake? Is it a military, police, 
intelligence, or political matter? When the roles and missions of defenders are not easy 
to define, both deterrence and defence may become quite problematic. (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 1999)
This certainly highlights concerns noted by other scholars. Contemporary use of the 
Internet could be viewed as challenging the structure of Society by forcing its members
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to think and act in different ways. The major western democracies lack a national 
strategy and current laws and enforcement structures lack coordination and are largely 
ineffective against the perceived threats from networked organisations making frill use 
of networked technologies (Gilmore Commission 2000).
Devost, Houghton et al. (1997; 1997b) assert that cyberterrorism is a legitimate concern 
for law enforcement, the intelligence community and the military, none of which is 
currently capable of responding individually to the cyberterrorist threat. They call for a 
new agency covering the related problems of drug enforcement, counter-terrorism, 
international organised crime and information attack mitigation. This agency would 
have power to draw upon and coordinate law enforcement, intelligence and military 
resources as appropriate. They also advocate the creation of units with an offensive 
capability which would involve detecting, locating and countering cyberterrorists. 
Strikes would be authorised by the US government, but would be executed so that the 
government would be able to deny involvement.
Such proposals make uncomfortable reading for those concerned with democracy and 
the rule of law. Cilluffo and Gergely (1997) consider that the proposed agency would 
be overwhelmed with information and functionally useless. In addition, the functions 
ascribed to the proposed offensive units are probably illegal and might constitute an act 
of war. They prefer the approach of a national information assurance policy on which 
reasonable, protective information security measures would be based. They also 
advocate intelligence-gathering, the better to understand terrorist use of information 
warfare, which includes cyberterrorism; establishing a warning and crisis management 
centre; and creating national strategy and response options to guide retaliation in case of 
cyber attack.
These proposals are akin to what was eventually proposed by the US Gilmore 
Commission (2002) in its vision for a national counter-terrorism strategy. This included 
a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) which would assume responsibility for 
intelligence and threat assessment; enhanced powers for the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), which would be able to commission intelligence collection and 
analysis, and combine threat assessments generated by the intelligence community and 
the NCTC with its own vulnerability assessments on the US CNI; clear lines of 
responsibility of the DHS and other Federal agencies before, during and after an attack 
on the CNI; commissioning a comprehensive risk assessment for the CNI, both physical 
and electronic; and merger of policy development for physical and cyber-security
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policy. These proposals effectively acknowledged the difficulties faced by a rigid state 
edifice in dealing with malfunction in any part of the CNI. Different parts of the 
infrastructure are increasingly connected and problems in one place will inevitably 
ripple out to affect other parts of the CNI (Brunskill 2002). No one part of the state 
machinery is equipped to deal with the consequences of such an event, be it due to 
terrorist attack or simple malfunction, and lines of responsibility must be clarified in 
advance.
(b) Legal issues
It is clear that states can and must take action to protect the public against activities 
which seriously threaten safety and democracy and the UK has elected to address this 
issue with permanent, rather than emergency, legislation in the shape of the Terrorism 
Act 2000. There are a number of justifications for this position (Walker 2000). First, 
liberal democracies are justified in defending their existence and values and defending 
their citizens’ right to life, even if this requires some temporary limitation of civil rights. 
Second, terrorism is an illegitimate form of political expression and its physical 
manifestations probably amount to war crimes. Third, terrorism is a distinct form of 
criminality which presents particular challenges for law enforcers in terms of 
remoteness and sophistication of the perpetrators, and their capacity to intimidate an 
audience wider than the immediate targets. These justifications are broadly accepted by 
the UK government and electorate alike. Walker prefers a permanent legislative code 
over emergency legislation, which better “reflects the philosophy of constitutionalism 
and democratic accountability -  that the legislature can secure an important input if it 
can speak in advance in a way which cannot be drowned by the screams of a crisis”. 
The pitfall, of course, is that such permanently available powers will be used too 
frequently and without proper cause unless proper safeguards are in place. This seems 
to be a major point of contention with the Terrorism Act 2000, which has certainly been 
used in inappropriate circumstances, as in the case of Walter Wolfgang, an octogenarian 
attending the Labour Party conference in 2005, arrested under the Terrorism Act for 
heckling. There must be concern about the very broad extension to the definition of 
terrorism under section l(2)(e) which, in its definition of cyberterrorism, dispenses with 
the requirement of any physical damage to persons or property. As Walker points out:
“it is the final decoupling of the Terrorism Act from its historical grounding in Ireland
and the consequent impact on the scope of the definitipn that raises the possibility of the
use of draconian provisions in circumstances where ordinary policing and laws could
easily respond to isolated and incompetent terrorists.” ;■
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It has been argued that, as the threat from terrorism becomes increasingly diffused as a 
result of terrorist use of ICTs, the need for a coherent system of Internet surveillance 
becomes increasingly urgent (Merl 2001). A central plank of the UK anti-terrorism 
regime in this context is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), 
although powers under this Act are restricted neither to anti-terrorism nor to the 
electronic environment (Bowden 2002). RIPA sets out the circumstances in which law 
enforcers, intelligence services and, controversially, other agencies can intercept 
communications, acquire communications data, and require disclosure of encrypted data 
(not yet in force).
Hosein and Whitley (2002) note that this legislation poses a number of conundrums, 
many of which were sidestepped or ignored at the time it was debated. First, personal 
security enhanced by encryption can be inimical to national security, which is 
challenged by use of the same technology by criminals and terrorists. Second, rapidly 
changing technology presents a particular challenge for any legislative regime seeking 
to maintain the status quo in terms of traditional powers of state since a technical 
circumvention or avoidance of new legislation can often be found relatively quickly. A 
good example is the use of pre-paid mobile phones to avoid identification through 
telephone traffic data (Bowden 2002). This challenge was acknowledged in a report of 
an all-party Parliamentary committee which heard a quantity of evidence advocating a 
technologically neutral approach to legislation. The committee ultimately 
recommended that the Home Office keep the efficacy of data retention legislation under 
review (APIG 2003). Whitley and Hosein have argued elsewhere (2005) that 
attempting technological neutrality is misguided, since understanding differing 
technological characteristics is fundamental to any evaluation of the impact of related 
policies. Third, legislation requiring the production of encryption keys or allowing 
surveillance of electronic activity increases both costs and risks to citizens and 
organisations and may seriously impact human rights. Fourth, there is the additional 
challenge of regulating in an environment increasingly affected by globalisation. 
Interestingly, whilst they set out a number of options which might have been open to the 
UK government, Whitley and Hosein state that legislation imposing obligations on 
individuals and industry was “selected as the only effective way of meeting the interests 
of the British Government”. Clearly, Whitley and Hosein harbour no illusion that 
governments are acting t) secure the safety of citizens rather than their own vested 
hegemonic interests.
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A raft of legislation was rushed through in both the US and the UK in the months 
following 9/11, much of which granted new powers to law enforcers in the name of 
enhancing national security, another term for which there is no settled legal definition 
(Pounder 2002). However, as is often the case with emergency legislation (Walker 
2000), powers were augmented at the same time as safeguards were sacrificed. There 
were, indeed, strong reasons for new surveillance powers, but legislatures were 
repealing safeguards which had been instituted because of previous abuse (Swire 2001). 
In the UK, the most notable development was the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001, Part 11 of which provides for the possibility of blanket traffic data retention 
by all communications providers who might then be called on by law enforcement and 
security services to provide that data for analysis in the course of terrorist and non­
terrorist investigations. Retention of the content of communications is not within the 
scope of this law, although law enforcement agencies can apply to monitor content 
through other, more stringent, mechanisms. Nevertheless, the nature of traffic data is 
evolving and its distinction from content is being blurred, particularly when a URL will 
give investigators a very clear idea of the kind of information the object of surveillance 
is pursuing (Walden 2005). Part 3 of the Act opens wide the possibilities for sharing 
data, not only between UK agencies, but also with foreign agencies.
Clearly, similar concerns apply as for RIPA: that there are many ways to ensure 
anonymity in electronic communications, so that the wide powers are unlikely to be 
effective against determined terrorists or criminals; and these wide surveillance 
capabilities threaten the privacy, security and freedom of expression of the law-abiding. 
By way of safeguards, there is a patchwork of privacy legislation which acts as a 
safeguard against abuse of these powers, but the approach is fragmented and many 
different public bodies are involved. In addition, the increasing use of the notion of 
proportionality theoretically provides a restraint on disclosure of communications data 
and such disclosure should never be arbitrary or unfair. However, these safeguards are 
reactive rather than proactive and require the data subject to be aware of the surveillance 
and in a position to enforce his rights against the authorities through the courts (Pounder 
2002). Many are concerned that the motivation for such legislation goes beyond 
counter-terrorism to the ambitions of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
reduce the barriers to terrorist and criminal intelligence and investigation (Bowden 
2002; Saiban and Sykes 2002).
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In the US, law enforcers have access to some potent electronic investigatory powers 
under the Patriot Act 2001, including use of the Carnivore software, an electronic 
surveillance tool probably far more powerful than anything available to the UK 
authorities. The FBI has also developed eavesdropping software, basically a key logger, 
called Magic Lantern and it is claimed that the National Security Agency operates a 
transnational electronic surveillance operation called Echelon together with its 
counterparts in Australia, New Zealand, the UK and Canada (Levin 2002). There has 
been serious concern in the US over the way in which Carnivore is used, particularly in 
relation to the vague and alterable audit trails, so that Carnivore could be used for 
unwarranted surveillance and the trails covered over (Meehan 2001).
RIPA has been held up in the US as a model in this context for how Internet 
surveillance can be balanced effectively against the protection of civil liberties, 
especially privacy (Merl 2001), but this account of RIPA ignores the serious civil 
liberties concerns which have been voiced in the UK. However, it has been pointed out 
in the US context, which is similar to the UK position, that the privacy situation may 
not be as dire as many claim. Surveillance powers have certainly been extended and the 
main casualty has been the information privacy of ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, these 
are mostly incremental changes in degree rather than kind and other privacy protections 
have either remained the same or been improved. A long-term trend for incremental 
changes may still be dangerous but the situation is not, it is argued, at a critical stage yet 
(Gellman 2002).
As personal information has arguably become less private, government information has 
become more opaque. The view of national security as an information restriction 
concept has a long history (Gellman 2002), the Official Secrets Act 1989 being its most 
obvious expression in the UK. In the US, much government and military information 
has recently been removed from public access for fear that it might be useful to 
terrorists looking for intelligence and ways to attack US interests. Much of this 
information had been in the public domain for many years and was notable for its 
usefulness to citizens, rather than terrorists. The danger is that, in increasing 
government secrecy when this is not strictly necessary, the democratic pillars of 
fundamental openness and accountability will be eroded and citizens will be less 
informed on the workings of government (Feinberg 2002; Halchin 2002).
Reinares (1998) has warned that incompetence or ineffectiveness of law enforcers, 
including excessive brutality, detaining innocents and detention without charge, is an
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instrumental factor in determining whether or not terrorism takes root in a particular 
democracy. Rather, the state should be scrupulous in responding to terrorism in a 
limited, defined and credible fashion, respecting the legal fiamework. Counter­
terrorism measures should be effective without being overly broad so as to affect the 
general population. As a result of sustained terrorism, society may be willing to accept 
restrictions on its liberties to ensure the personal safety of its members and the survival 
of the political system However, Reinares finds that an excessively repressive and 
indiscriminate response that fails to distinguish between the terrorists themselves and 
the society in which they operate serves to alienate significant sectors of that society, 
turning them against the government, which then affects the government’s institutional 
legitimacy and may win support for the terrorist cause. It has been noted elsewhere 
(Chermak and Weiss 2005) that police organisations routinely brief the news media in 
such a way as to maintain their organisational legitimacy. The effects Reinares 
highlights may be artificially minimised by careful handling of the media who provide 
an opportunity to shape public understandings of crime in society, promote certain 
understandings of the police response to crime and generate support for certain policy 
options. In return, the media gain access to easy and interesting law and order stories 
for publication.
(c) Strategic issues 
The UK Parliament has been advised that the current threat to the CNI from 
cyberterrorism is low, although the situation is not stable so that policies of prevention 
and enhancing resilience should be actively pursued (Neville-Jones 2003). Certainly, 
there is a chance that cyberterrorism will become a reality in the future and the issue 
cannot be ignored. It is also possible that the Government and security services possess 
classified evidence about cyberterrorism which has not been put in the public domain. 
Notwithstanding that caveat, cybercrime, on the other hand, is a real and serous 
economic threat to society and some argue that society’s resources and efforts should be 
concentrated here (Denning 2000a; Green 2002; King 2003). In so doing, society 
would automatically be putting itself in a better position to respond to cyberterrorism if 
it ever materialised. Similarly, Rathmell (1997) urges governments to be proactive in 
addressing vulnerabilities rather than reacting when or if terrorist groups actually 
embrace cyberterrorism, noting that the US has started the process of reviewing 
vulnerabilities (Presidential Decision Directive 63 1998) but that a similar process in the 
UK lacks government leadership. Others have underlined the dangers in taking 
disproportionate steps to counter an unknown threat, particularly if the public later
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discerns the exaggeration and grows cynical towards warnings about real threats (Green 
2002).
Policy makers and academics alike should be aware of the trap which terrorism sets. 
Just as the rhetoric of terrorists is used to frighten, persuade and cajole, so too is the 
counter-terrorist rhetoric, with its good against evil subtext.
Terrorism is a concept that mystifies rather than illuminates; it is a political and not an
academic notion. (Mahmood 2001)
Suspicion is growing that governments are hyping the cyberterrorism threat in order to 
progress a broader agenda, conveniently ignoring or brushing aside the lack of evidence 
(Green 2002). The challenge is to peg policies to reality, to acknowledge what is not 
known, to take sensible, proportionate precautions against what can reasonably be 
expected and to keep Draconian legislation to a minimum. To react disproportionately 
to a threat which cannot easily be quantified, thereby eroding fundamental rights of 
citizens, risks achieving part of the terrorist goal (Embar-Seddon 2002). There are 
plenty of claims in the media, by politicians, industry insiders and experts, about what 
cyberterrorists might be able to do (Green 2002; Harvey 2002). Much of this is fanciful 
and leads a concerned public to imagine attacks rather worse than are realistically 
possible (Giacomello 2004). Rarely, if ever, do public figures say, “This is what 
cyberterrorists cannot do”. They cannot remotely launch nuclear missiles, since their 
control systems are isolated from the Internet; nor are they likely to be able to crash 
aircraft by attacking air traffic control systems, because their systems are mediated by 
humans, there are contingency plans, redundancy in the systems and pilots rarely rely 
exclusively on air traffic control (Embar-Seddon 2002; Giacomello 2004); and the 
breach of a dam, even if it were possible by purely electronic means, would be so much 
cheaper, simpler and more certain if a conventional bomb were used that no ‘rational’ 
terrorist would ever consider the electronic route (Giacomello 2004). The academy has 
a duty to check government propaganda as well as to correct innocent mistakes and 
propose solutions (Shneiderman 2002). If such errors are left unchecked, exaggeration 
of the evil qualities of and risks from terrorists will continue to produce the over­
reaction characteristic of counter-terrorism measures which, in turn, risk escalating the 
very violence they seek to control (Mahmood 2001; Cohen 2002)
7.2 The challenge of public-private relationships
The main target for cyberterrorists is usually thought to be the CNI but detailed 
vulnerability assessments are usually classified and much of the literature on this
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subject is necessarily general or speculative in nature. Much of the CNI, not to mention 
the health of the economy, is concentrated in the hands of organisations in the private 
sector (George and Whatford 2002; Rathmell 2003; Gumming 2005), yet counter­
terrorism is still perceived as a government function (Farrell 2003). This creates several 
challenges.
First, privatisation, deregulation and globalisation of many industries and utilities have 
led to reduced government control over and knowledge of owners and operators of 
information networks and regulation of the Internet in particular is extremely 
challenging (Madsen 1996; Rathmell 1999). Fierce commercial competition has also 
rendered businesses reluctant to work with government, particularly given their desire 
to avoid any unduly restrictive regulation (Lewis 2005). Many governments and their 
law enforcement agencies, including those in the UK, are now in the position of 
wanting to reassert control over the telecommunications networks and are facing an 
uphill struggle against a public whose imagination has been captured by the perceived 
freedoms offered by the Internet (Madsen 1996). In addition, the digital network 
encompasses every online business and individual, so the data required by law enforcers 
to monitor potential and actual threats is unprecedented in scope (Rathmell 1999). In 
the UK, this controversial issue was highlighted by the introduction of RIPA, granting 
new powers of interception of and access to communications data, powers which have 
subsequently been strengthened by adoption of EU Directives regulating data retention 
in 2002 and 2005.
Second, legislating for national security often has an adverse impact on commerce 
generally, because either greater restrictions or onerous duties are imposed (Hosein
2006).
[Homeland security] policy action is a source of risk itself that must be managed. 
Policy responses can create their own climate of uncertainty and risk. In the process of 
developing a coherent vision and policy for its actions both at home and abroad, the US 
government will inevitably make a number of mistakes of over-reaction, missing 
opportunities, omission/commission errors and the like. These actions will have 
consequences for US firms in their international competition. (Spich and Grosse 2005)
The risk is that, in securing the nation against the threats of crime and terrorism, a
government may go too far so that market freedoms are adversely affected, commercial
organisations are forced to engage in regulatory arbitrage and business is lost to another
country (Bowden 2002; Hosein and Whitley 2002). Members of the UK Parliament
have already recognised the risk that the substantial costs of data retention legislation in
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the UK and across the EU will put European communications service providers at a 
competitive disadvantage to their US counterparts (APIG 2003).
Third, the private sector must have relevant information and the means of protecting 
itself in order that both the economy and the privately-owned part of the CNI may 
remain secure against cyberterrorist attack. The US Gilmore Commission (2000; 2001) 
has advocated greater cooperation between the public and private sectors to address the 
problems of both cybercrime and terrorism, proposing that a framework for 
coordination be developed, including the use of security standards for critical 
technologies. The Commission (2001) also noted that the US National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (NIPC), with responsibility for critical infrastructure alert, warning 
and response coordination, was failing in its duties partly because it operated from 
within the FBI, thus encouraging a belief that the NIPC had more to do with law 
enforcement than information sharing. It was seen as extremely important that the 
NIPC be seen to represent all stakeholders, public and private alike.
In the UK, the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) was 
founded in 1999 with the remit of identifying the electronic CNI, threat assessment, 
outreach to private organisations, response, research and development. This is an inter­
departmental government centre which coordinates input from many parts of 
government: defence, trade, Home Office, intelligence services, central policy and law 
enforcement (Cumming 2005). Part of the NISCC’s remit is to coordinate this 
government expertise with that of the private sector. In addition, they promote 
information sharing within industry. Early attempts to establish an Information Sharing 
and Analysis Centre within the IT communications sector failed because of an 
unwillingness of commercial organisations to divulge information on the existence and 
severity of successful attacks (Brunskill 2002). However, as part of its strategy to 
protect the UK’s CNI from electronic attack, the NISCC is now promoting information 
sharing in tandem with the Central Sponsor for Information Assurance and provides 
assistance in setting up Warning, Advice and Reporting Points (WARPs). WARP 
members agree to work together in a specific community, perhaps based on a business 
sector, and share information to provide early warning of alerts and vulnerabilities, 
thereby reducing the risk of their information systems being compromised. Strategies 
such as these are also important in order to distinguish patterns in cyberattack which 
may prove helpful to security efforts (Kjaerland 2006). 1
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There is a good deal more work to be done to coordinate the UK authorities’ 
cooperation with the private sector and there are significant barriers. First, there are 
numerous relevant government agencies whose remits overlap and their roles are very 
confusing at the interface with the private sector. There is a need to share resources and 
information, not only between the public and private sectors (Devost and Pollard 2002), 
but also between public agencies who have a tendency to defend their turf. Second, 
public and private organisations need to cooperate but have very different priorities, the 
former being process-driven and the latter outcome-oriented. This has historically led 
to wariness and lack of a common language and understanding. Third, the public sector 
needs to encourage the IT industry to build in security features, yet there is often little 
commercial incentive to do so. Fourth, further attempts must be made by the public 
sector to encourage information sharing within the private sector and find a way to 
overcome the trust, confidentiality and competition issues which have historically 
formed a barrier to success. This is the Holy Grail for public-private cooperation and 
probably the hardest of all the goals to achieve (Brunskill 2002).
A 2004 survey found that half of large UK businesses respondents drew on government 
security guidelines (PWC/DTI 2004), suggesting that government has the potential for 
positive influence through careful guidance as an alternative or in addition to formal 
regulation Lewis (2005) disagrees and has argued in a US context that the 
government’s cyber-security policies based on market forces and voluntary cooperation 
of the private sector are perverse in the heightened security environment post 9/11. He 
argues that defence and security are public goods which the market will never supply in 
sufficient quantity. Ironically, one of the major barriers to sensible government 
regulation has been the over-hyping of the cyberterrorist threat which has given the 
impression that regulation of the private telecommunications sector would need to be 
extensive and, inevitably, very costly. By mapping the CNI and grading the importance 
and vulnerability of each element, Lewis proposes a model for minimal government 
interference in the market whilst still ensuring suitable levels of security through 
achievable levels of regulation in the most critical areas. Crucially, this involves 
abandoning crude ‘electronic Pearl Harbor’ scenarios.
As well as assisting government to defend national infrastructures and pursue terrorists 
through data retention, commercial organisations must also attend to the terrorist threat 
they face themselves (George and Whatford 2002; Leivesley 2002; Smith 2002; Veness
2002). There is evidence that al Qaeda associates have considered corporate targets as
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part of a general campaign against Western economies (Davies 2002). The private 
sector must minimise the impact of terrorism on their own organisations and thereby on 
society as a whole (Bray 2002). All industries are implicated, of course, not just the 
telecommunications sector. The FSA, the UK financial services regulator, has noted 
that terrorist finance poses significant danger to the reputation of UK financial markets. 
The international and domestic counter-terrorist financing regime is designed to make 
operation in the financial environment for terrorists and their financiers difficult by 
increasing both the costs and risks for these groups (FSA 2006). Others have 
characterised terrorism as a market imperfection, increasing transaction costs, creating a 
barrier to the free flow of goods and hindering potential gains, all of which calls for 
specialised marketing strategies to prevent consumer drop-off (Czinkota, Knight et al. 
2005). High levels of outsourcing arrangements are the norm in both public and private 
sectors, particularly in the field of information and communications technologies, 
resulting in many-to-many relationships which often have networked information 
infrastructures. A successful attack on one organisation therefore has the potential to 
affect many contractual partners. Similarly, a successful information security strategy 
will involve a coordinated response from a number of different organisations (Brunskill 
2002).
7.3 International challenges
The threats and vulnerabilities relating to cyberterrorism and other security risks are 
transnational, as evidenced by the ripple effects across the globe after 9/11 in economic, 
political, social and psychological terms (Rathmell 2002). This means that any 
successful solution requires international cooperation on CIP (Rathmell 2003), but 
Rathmell (1999) has noted a number of barriers. The first issue is that governments 
prefer to establish their national arrangements before attending to international 
cooperation and the domestic challenges are legion. Governments recognise that they 
cannot work in a vacuum but international cooperation is considered a challenge too far 
for now, leading to an ad hoc response based on existing international structures. These 
rely on bilateral security and intelligence cooperation, such as the strong ties which 
exist between the US and UK; multilateral fora such as the G8 and EU; and 
international information security standards, such as IS017799.
The concept of transnational risk is best characterised by the fact that online deviance 
routinely has its source in one country and its target in another. This creates problems 
with enforcement and prosecution of the criminal law which is, traditionally, territorial
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in nature. There are, however, four generally recognised principles on which 
extraterritorial application of criminal law will be tolerated, relating to nationality of the 
perpetrator, nationality of the victim, crimes against humanity and safeguarding the 
national interest. Indeed, the trend in the UK for provisions relating to cybercrimes and 
terrorism is towards specific provision for extraterritorial application in the relevant 
legislation. But national legislation with extraterritorial application is only helpful if 
such laws can be pursued and enforced with the cooperation of other states. In the 
context of cybercrime, much good work has been done in the Council of Europe and by 
the OECD, which may indicate a way forward for similar work on cyberterrorism. The 
importance of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime is that its signatories 
include, not only the majority of CoE members, but also the US, Japan, South Africa 
and Canada. This provides much-needed harmonisation of the response to the security 
threat posed by criminal and terrorist networks in cyberspace (Walden 2005).
A second issue is definitional in nature (Rathmell 1999; Rathmell 2003): how the 
problem is characterised dictates which international fora are appropriate. If the threat 
is defined as being from organised crime, hackers, corporate espionage and sub-state 
terrorism, then the threat is to the economy and social stability. In this paradigm, all 
nations have an incentive to work together, drawing on a range of technical, policy, 
legal and law enforcement mechanisms. If the threat is defined as being from nation 
states and focuses on IW and information operations as tools of strategic coercion, 
covert action and espionage, then the solutions are found in international approaches to 
arms control and the laws of armed conflict. This approach is highly problematic 
because imperatives of national security and intelligence mean that states want to retain 
their IW capabilities. The international tension surrounding these issues was nicely 
highlighted by the Russian UN General Assembly resolution proposing arms control 
approaches and calling for an “acknowledgement that the use of information weapons 
against vital structures is comparable to the consequences of the use of weapons of mass 
destruction” (UNGA 53/70). The resolution was ultimately buried as a result of some 
neat procedural manoeuvres by, primarily, the US.
From a legal perspective, Dartnell (1999) has noted that the lack of an international 
consensus on the definition of terrorism accounts for the weak international response to 
counter-terrorism. Identical arguments apply to cyberterrorism and cybercrime. He 
criticises this state of affairs, noting that failure to define terrorism may lead to abuse in 
both directions when the question arises of whether an offence is political or non­
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political. The loose frameworks established by the current conventions leave a wide 
discretion to individual states and a lack of due process provisions can lead to further 
abuse, undermining the international order. Dartnell advocates perseverance at the 
international level, however, because “international conventions on terrorism embody 
‘positive globalization’ by broadening the imperative to not inflict physical harm on 
peoples or materials with whom one might not share bonds based in a political or other 
type of community.” The international effort should focus on violence as a by-product 
of multiple interests, values and experiences which produce conflict. Once terrorism is 
viewed this way, Dartnell argues, policy makers are liberated from ideology and can 
base international laws on “management models or relational-based concepts rather than 
notions of ‘order’ that do not correspond to the inter-network character of contemporary 
global societies, economies, politics, technologies and cultures.” Hence, a global legal 
framework should, first, deal with the substantive causes of conflict in an attempt to 
remove the reasons for terrorism and, second, address the means of coercion and 
destruction. The mechanisms for international co-operation established, it would fall to 
individual states to elaborate further levels of governance.
International agreement on regulation of any issue related to the transnational 
phenomenon of the Internet is fraught with problems because of the vested interests of 
each state involved. The Internet is global and states are territorial, so that conflict in 
any international debate on regulation is almost guaranteed. Moreover, at the 
international level, politics are even further removed from the public interest, with states 
being more concerned with protecting and extending their own powers. Any balanced 
and informed approach to regulation at this level would have to involve stakeholders 
from many different sectors: public, business, technical communities, human rights 
organisations. The list would be long and the negotiations unwieldy, but truly public 
policy on Internet-related issues should not be the exclusive preserve of governments 
(Internet Governance Project 2005).
8. T h e  pu blic  r espo n se
There are no authoritative surveys available which deal specifically with public attitudes 
to cyberterrorism. There are some industry surveys about attitudes of information 
security professionals to the threat from cyberterrorism, but they are difficult to evaluate 
because the term is never defined. For example, one survey found that pre-9/11 22% 
were very concerned about cyberterrorism whereas, one year later, 48% claimed to be 
very concerned, with 4% claiming their companies were less concerned than they were
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in 2001 (M2.com 2002). Two years after 9/11, a survey of 725 cities conducted by the 
National League of Cities found that city officials ranked cyberterrorism alongside 
biological and chemical weapons at the head of a list of fears (Green 2002). Another 
survey claimed that 49% of respondents consider cyberterrorism a bigger threat than a 
power outage or natural disaster (CIO Insight 2004). In each case there was no clear 
indication of what exactly constitutes ‘cyberterrorism’ and the results suggest a broad 
interpretation.
The latest available UK information on attitudes of the general public towards 
technology crime generally is found in the British Crime Survey 2002/3, a victimisation 
survey, and the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey 2003, a self-report offending 
survey (Allen, Forrest et al. 2005). 46% of BCS respondents (aged 16-65) had
personally accessed the Internet, compared with 71% of OCJS respondents (aged 10- 
65). Of BCS respondents who used the Internet, 49% had used a payment card for 
online purchases and, of those who had not, 41% said they would consider it. Of those 
who had used payment cards online, 75% were concerned about the security of doing 
so. 35% were worried about giving personal details online. This compares with a more 
recent survey finding half of active Internet users are ‘extremely’ or ‘veiy’ concerned 
about the potential fraud risk of making an online transaction (FSA 2006). 74% of BCS 
respondents who shopped online looked for secure sites as a primary precaution and 
around half said they would only shop from reputable companies, recommended or 
well-known sites. Despite these worries, only 1% (n=86) of OCJS respondents 
admitted any kind of card fraud and, of these, only n=4 admitted to accessing card 
details online.
Only 18% of BCS households accessing the internet reported a computer virus infection 
for the previous 12 months and only a third of these reported the problem. Less than 
1% of OCJS respondents admitted to sending out a virus in that time. 2% of BCS 
households accessing the Internet thought someone had hacked into their files in the 
previous 12 months and less than 1% of OCJS respondents admitted to hacking 
activities. One third of Internet users were worried about accessing or receiving 
offensive, pornographic or threatening material over the Internet, and one fifth had 
actually done so, but only 18% reported it. Most worries seem to be connected with 
children in the home and pornography.
None of these figures suggest panic about online deviance generally, let alone 
cyberterrorism. Respondents may be concerned about credit card fraud, but this does
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not stop them shopping online. The low numbers reporting problems with viruses, 
hacking and offensive material and even lower numbers sufficiently concerned to report 
problems suggest that people are relatively comfortable with their everyday use of their 
home computers. The online market is currently the fastest growing sector of UK retail. 
Consumer confidence and expectation is increasing and one in four consumers now 
purchase goods online, with 14.6 million online shoppers in 2005 (Verdict 2006). Of 
further comfort is the fact that, of OCJS respondents, less than 1% admitted to visiting a 
racist website and less than 2% had visited a site giving details on how to commit a 
crime. This would appear to answer in some measure the fears of those who are 
concerned that large numbers of individuals will be drawn to terrorist websites and look 
for ways to commit cyberterrorism.
Allen, Forrest et al. (2005) point out that there is very little known about public attitudes 
to these issues and the BCS is the first large-scale household survey to cover them. 
There is certainly no major research into public attitudes towards cyberterrorism. 
Established annual surveys, such as those produced by the CSI/FBI in the US and 
PWC/DTI in the UK, concentrate on organisational respondents and survey only 
criminal breaches of security for the very good reason that these are what victim 
organisations are routinely experiencing. There is an urgent need for scholarly research 
on attitudes of the general public towards hacking generally and cyberterrorism in 
particular.
9. S o c ia l  r e a c t io n  to  c yberterro rism  a n d  th e  po w er  of
DEFINITION
There is power in a name. Careless use of terminology impedes understanding, flow of 
ideas, sense making and policy decisions (Desouza 2005). Forming policy to counter a 
phenomenon which is insufficiently understood may result in rules which either do not 
address the issue adequately or overextend the law into areas where it is not warranted 
(Walden 2005). The literature summarised in this chapter highlights many of the 
consequences of characterising an action as ‘terrorist’ in the information environment. 
The dramatic associations of terrorism may inspire fear and apprehension and the public 
are led to fear the worst: whether they follow that lead is a separate question. 
Governments resort to Draconian policy measures, often involving infringements of 
civil liberties of both suspects and the wider population which are justified by the 
extreme nature of the threat they are intended to counter. Military and intelligence 
services, as well as police, become involved and counter-terrorist operations take on a
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quasi-military character. Very large sums of money are expended on prevention 
measures, counter- intelligence and investigation in both the public and private sectors 
(Giacomello 2004). Social stigma attaches to those labelled ‘terrorist’, their cause, their 
methods and their associates.
This last point leads to a perspective largely absent in the cyberterrorism literature: that 
of the social scientist. Outside the political science field, social science studies on 
terrorism generally are rare enough (Ballard, Homik et al. 2002) and the social science 
literature on cyberterrorism is even more restricted. Current research is uncoordinated 
and fragmented and cross-disciplinary studies are unknown (Desouza, Koh et al. 2006). 
This accounts for the rather one-dimensional approach in the literature reviewed in this 
chapter. A rigorous assessment of cyberterrorism from within the social science domain 
is long overdue and would add significant clarity to future debate. As Becker says:
What can social science contribute to understanding and solving any social problems? 
It helps in several ways: (1) by sorting out the different definitions of the problem; (2) 
by locating assumptions made by interested parties -  assumptions belied by the facts; 
(3) by discovering strategic points of intervention in the social structures and processes 
that produce the problem; (4) by suggesting alternative moral points of view from which 
the problem area can be assessed. (Becker 1966: 23)
This study aims to proceed a little way along the path outlined by Becker.
Cyberterrorism is a peculiar case of a problem being defined without any significant
underlying empirical evidence to substantiate it. It is a problem based on assumptions,
namely that ICTs can easily be used to achieve destructive outcomes and that terrorists
are inexorably moving towards this sphere of operation. Governments, agents of social
control and industry stakeholders are constantly seeking ways of preventing or
mitigating the problem. Finally, perceptions of cyberterrorism are overwhelmingly
technical and the military perspective is dominant. Alternative conceptions of the
problem are urgently needed in order to build a multi-faceted understanding of the
social response.
As concern about the scope of counter-terrorism measures in the UK grows, it is vital to 
understand the definitions of cyberterrorism being used to justify some of these 
measures. The wider the definitions used, the greater the encroachment on civil 
liberties is seemingly justified and the greater the impact on the groups and individuals 
labelled ‘cyberterrorists’. The next chapter will introduce the concept of moral panic 
which focuses on the definition of deviance as a social process, involving discourses 
between a variety of stakeholders, including the media. It focuses on the social reaction
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to deviance and integrates notions of social control, labelling and deviance amplification 
in a manner particularly suited to the study of the social reaction to cyberterrorism.
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C h a p t e r  3
M o r a l  p a n ic : d e f in in g  d e v ia n c e
1. In tr o d u c t io n
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to 
societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, 
politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their 
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the 
condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. 
Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something 
which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. 
Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective 
memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might. 
(Cohen 2002: I)1
This classic formulation of the moral panic appeared in Stan Cohen’s book on the social 
furore surrounding the Mods and Rockers in the 1960s (Cohen 1972). The concept was 
later comprehensively restated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda in 1994 in “Moral Panics: 
the social construction of deviance” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). The models of 
moral panic provided by each of these texts were then analysed, applied and refined by 
Chas Critcher in his 2003 book “Moral Panics and the Media” (Critcher 2003). This 
study draws on these three works to create a framework for analysing the social 
definition of and reaction to cyberterrorism.
2. M oral  p a n ic : an  o v e r v ie w
Cohen’s classic formulation of a moral panic is by far the most quoted and evokes 
nicely the social atmosphere characteristic of an archetypal moral panic. Moral panic is 
an empirically verifiable phenomenon (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 41) but it is also, 
more importantly, an abstract model of a process which can be used as an heuristic 
device so that the emergence of a real-life social problem can be compared with the 
ideal type moral panic to discover both which elements are present and which are not 
(Critcher 2003: 2). Such a view of moral panic broadens the spectrum of its application
1 References in this chapter are to the 3rd edition of “Folk Devils and Moral Panics” because this edition 
contains the important “Introductions” to both the 2nd and 3rd editions, both of which progressed the moral 
panic debate.
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to encompass social phenomena which may not empirically amount to a moral panic but 
which are, nevertheless, illuminated by rigorous analysis according to the moral panic 
framework.
Before addressing the specifics of the two models of moral panic used in this study, it is 
necessary to set out in broad terms the social processes at work during such an episode. 
Critcher argues persuasively that moral panic has three dimensions (Critcher 2003: 5 
and 177): it is a process of definition and action; it marks the moral boundaries of 
society; and it represents a set of discourses at various fevels. Critcher finds that the 
existing models of moral panic require modification to encompass all three of these 
elements, since they do not currently deal adequately with the second and third.
2.1 A process of definition and action
First, social problems are viewed as socially constructed, with no necessary connection 
between the objective nature of the problem and its social definition. Indeed, it is 
possible to have a moral panic over an issue which, on an objective analysis, does not 
even exist. Specifically, behaviour is defined as deviant if it is perceived as threatening 
to certain values or interests of society. The social reaction to deviance thus defined 
will, in an archetypal moral panic, be disproportionate to the objective nature of the 
threat
The central problematic of moral panic lies in this juxtaposition of objective reality with 
subjective concern or reaction. Waddington has claimed that the concept of moral panic 
lacks any notion of how the gravity of the phenomenon and the reaction to it might be 
measured and compared; that the concept is value-laden and lacks objective validity 
(Waddington 1986). It provides neither the quantitative, objective criteria by which to 
claim that the reaction is disproportionate to the action, nor the universal, moral criteria 
to judge that the reaction is an inappropriate response to the moral gravity of the action 
(Cohen 2002: xxviii).
The response to such criticism exposes the philosophical underpinnings of the concept 
of moral panic. The constructionist approach adopted is necessarily what has been 
termed contextual constructionism since moral panic scholars believe the objective 
dimension is both admissible and empirically identifiable, albeit with difficulty (Goode 
and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 94). Indeed it must be so if an endless cycle of claims-making 
and value judgement is to be avoided: strict constructionists would deny entirely the 
existence of the objective dimension on which the concept of moral panic relies, 
insisting that the researcher’s ‘social construction’ of the issue is not ontologically
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privileged. There is no room for relativism here since the objective dimension provides 
at least part of the all-important historical context, without which we are unable to 
answer the questions: why this? Why here? Why now?
More problematic than ascertaining the objective dimension itself is the evaluation of 
the subjective against the objective dimension. This is not a comparison of like with 
like. As Cohen says:
Questions of symbolism, emotion and representation cannot be translated into 
comparable sets of statistics. Qualitative terms like ‘appropriateness’ convey the 
nuances of moral judgement more accurately than the (implied) quantitative measure of 
‘disproportionate’ -  but the more they do so, the more obviously they are socially 
constructed.
The critics are right that there is a tension between insisting on a universal measuring 
rod for determining the action/reaction gap -  yet also conceding that the measurement is 
socially constructed and all the time passing off as non-politically biased the decision of 
what panics to ‘expose’. (Cohen 2002: xxix)
Perhaps the universal measuring rod is problematic, but nor is it entirely necessary. A
common sense approach allows the researcher to view the ‘action/reaction gap’ as a
continuum, with obvious examples of disproportionality/inappropriateness at the centre,
and grey areas at the edges. The obvious cases are intuitively so, which does not deny
the theoretical force of the criticism, but mitigates its concerns to acceptable levels for
practical purposes.
2.2 Marking the moral boundaries
Whilst claims for the empirical verifiability of an underlying social condition may be 
admissible -  and social science research spanning decades has made this assumption -  
claims that there are universal moral criteria by which to judge the appropriateness of a 
reaction must surely founder (Ungar 2001). Yet, at any given time and, most 
importantly, in a given context, one or more dominant moral codes can be identified. 
Society does produce pockets of consensus which, whilst not universal, represent the 
views of a significant section of society. In no sense does the concept of moral panic 
demand a universal moral standard. Rather, it seeks to identify where and how the 
moral boundaries are drawn and how these are used to influence social outcomes.
During the course of a moral panic, the definition of behaviour as deviant may also 
involve the identification of specific individuals as wholly responsible and lying outwith 
the moral boundaries of society. The attributed characteristics of folk devils, in Cohen’s 
terms, are unambiguously negative, even evil. This enables the maintenance of the 
moral status quo, but may go further so that certain powerful elements in society claim 
the moral high ground at the expense of those successfully cast as folk devils who lack
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the means to fight back. Moral boundaries are, thus, not so much maintained as 
redefined. Critcher argues that folk devils should no longer be considered an essential 
feature of a moral panic (Critcher 2003: 151) and his case studies demonstrate how the 
moral dimension can be applied to the behaviour itself without the successful casting of 
a folk devil.
2.3 The underlying discourse
The definition of both social problems and moral boundaries is a manifestation of 
negotiation and struggle amongst and between subcultural groups, and relationships 
between those with differing relative amounts of political power. Although definitions 
are very often contested, where agreement cannot be reached, solutions are imposed by 
those wielding greater political power (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 82). A discourse 
can be mobilised and brought to prevail through a clear process of symbolisation, 
usually through the media, which results in stereotyping the features of deviance and 
deviants and establishing a “simplified dichotomy between good and evil” (Critcher 
2003: 144). Critcher argues that the underlying discourse in many moral panics over 
recent decades has shifted from a continuing discourse on youth and deviance in the 
1960s and 1970s, exemplified by Cohen’s Mods and Rockers (Cohen 1972) and Hall’s 
muggers (Hall, Critcher et al. 1978), towards a discourse on children as victims, 
including concerns about video nasties, child abuse and paedophilia (Critcher 2003: 
155). The discourse on youth and deviance persists, of course, and it is pertinent to this 
study because hacking is perceived as youth deviance. Additionally, the definition of 
cyberterrorism draws on existing discourses on technology and terrorism.
Cohen notes that a study of crime reporting in Britain has found that there has been a 
shift in focus from offence, offender and criminal justice system towards victims 
(Cohen 2002: xxiv). Offenders become easier to demonise if the context of their actions 
are ignored (motivation, social circumstances etc) so that stereotypes can be drawn 
without serious contest. Stereotypes are crucial to the demonisation process:
Moral panics depend on the generation of diffuse normative concerns, while the
successful creation of folk devils rests on their stereo-typical portrayal as atypical actors
against a background that is overtypical. (Cohen 2002: 45)
Once these targets for social hostility have been set up and made instantly recognisable, 
demands are made that ‘something must be done’, with the ultimate aim that folk devils, 
or at least the identified behaviour, should be eradicated (Cohen 1972: 41-4; Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda 1994: 28-9). Once a discourse has been established during a moral panic,
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its participants are sensitised to the issues and the symbols and stereotypes are available 
for the future, possibly leading to a serial panic (Critcher 2003: 145).
This account of the importance of the discourses underlying a moral panic is not 
unproblematic. Arguments about mobilisation of discourses and imposition of a 
specific definition by the socially powerful imply, and sometimes make explicit, that 
moral panics are deliberately engineered by the elite for their own hegemonic purposes 
(eg Hall, Critcher et al. 1978). The counterclaim is that ‘moral panic’ is a value-laden 
concept used by leftist liberals and political radicals to condemn the actions of the 
political elite. As the use of the term ‘moral panic’ became used in the media itself, it 
became more common for politicians, first those in the Thatcher administration and 
later those in the New Labour administration, to reinforce the causal theories which 
underpinned moral panics and to claim that those using the term ‘moral panic’ were out 
of touch with public opinion which was justly concerned about the relevant issue. 
Blame was laid at the door of “the ‘jargon-laden left’ for using the term so selectively” 
(Cohen 2002: xxxii).
Cohen counters (2002: xxxiii-xxxv) that, if the phenomenon just described amount to 
‘bad’ moral panics, then there are also such things as ‘good’ moral panics, using the 
social mechanisms identified as constituting moral panics to raise awareness about 
issues which would otherwise be ignored. From time to time the media attempt to 
create moral concern in a climate of denial, and Cohen gives the example of work by 
Moeller (1999) who describes ‘compassion fatigue’ in relation to the atrocities in 
Rwanda and Bosnia. He concludes that:
Sociologists have no privileged status in pointing [social injustice] out and suggesting 
remedial policies. But even if their role is relegated to being merely another claims- 
maker, this must include not only exposing under-reaction (apathy, denial and 
indifference) but making the comparisons that could expose over-reaction 
(exaggeration, hysteria, prejudice and panic).
In other words, you cannot have your cake and eat it.
The next sections will consider two models of moral panic, provided by Cohen (2002) 
and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) respectively, as modified by Critcher (2003). These 
two models will be used as a framework for this study: Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s 
attributional model to organise the findings and Cohen’s processual model to structure 
the discussion of the findings. In addition, the discussion will pay attention to the 
elements described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 which are perhaps not dealt with adequately 
in the processual model: marking the moral boundaries and the underlying discourse. In
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each of the case studies employed by Critcher to assess the usefulness of moral panic as 
an heuristic device, these elements are discussed in a section entitled “Beyond Moral 
Panics” (Critcher 2003: 41, 58, 74, 92, 112) and he concludes that the insights gained 
from this extension of the analysis should be incorporated into any future model of 
moral panic (Critcher 2003: 177).
Cohen is discussed first in this chapter because his was the first formulation of the 
moral panic concept.
3 . C o h e n : th e  pr o c essu a l  m o d el
In order to elicit what he terms the ‘processual model’, Critcher draws together three 
aspects of Cohen’s work: the elements in his classic statement (quoted in Section 1), his 
disaster analogy, and the deviancy amplification model.
What is usually taken to be Cohen’s classic statement is not comprehensive, even in 
Cohen’s own terms, notably leaving out any mention of folk devils, control culture and 
underplaying the role of the media, all of which he considered central. However, it does 
give a sense of how Cohen organised his analysis according to a succession of social 
processes:
1. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as 
a threat to societal values and interests;
2. its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media;
3. the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right- 
thinking people;
4. socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions;
5. ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to;
6. the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more 
visible. (Cohen 2002: 1)
As a framework for his account of the social reaction to the Mods and Rockers, Cohen 
used an analogy drawn from disaster research, which had identified several sequential 
stages in public reaction. Cohen distilled these stages into four: warning, impact, 
inventory and reaction. It is possible to see how this framework can be used to discuss 
the six elements described above, yet Critcher criticises the analogy of moral panic with 
disaster as forced because disasters generally lack the moral dimension (Critcher 2003: 
11).
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Finally, there is Cohen’s deviancy amplification model. His work is based on a 
transactional approach to deviance, according to which deviance is constructed in the 
course of interactions between the ‘deviant’ and society. Definitions of deviance and 
identification of, and reaction to, folk devils are central to a moral panic, even though 
the existence of a folk devil is not, perhaps, an invariable rule (Ungar 2001; Critcher 
2003: 151). Indeed, the concept of moral panic owes a great debt to Howard Becker’s 
work on labelling theory, which encompasses the idea that:
Deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the 
application by others of rules and sanctions to an offender. The deviant is one to whom 
that label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so 
label. (Becker 1963)
On this view, the successful labelling of behaviour as deviant and/or the creation of a 
folk devil occurs only after their identification as threatening to certain social values or 
interests, setting in motion various societal control responses. In connection with the 
societal control culture, Cohen describes a process of ‘deviancy amplification’. The 
deviancy amplification model rests on the idea that ‘social control leads to deviance’ is 
potentially a richer premise for studying deviance than ‘deviance leads to social control’ 
(Lemert 1951; Lemert 1972; Cohen 2002: 6). An initial, social problem leads a sub­
cultural group to construct a (deviant) solution which draws a reaction from society in 
general and the societal control culture in particular. The processes of exploitation and 
stereotyping which form part of this reaction and the application of the ‘deviant’ label 
have the effect of isolating and stigmatising the ‘deviant’ group which, in turn, leads to 
its alienation and isolation. They therefore turn to each other for support, share 
information, and engage in a renewed and escalated round of deviant behaviour, 
confirming the stereotypes. Nevertheless, Cohen accepts that, just because a person is 
labelled, this does not mean he necessarily accepts the label and behaves accordingly 
(Cohen 2002: 5). This is, perhaps, one reason why some moral panics ‘fail’ or, in other 
words, never amount to a true moral panic.
Deviancy amplification can also found in a more literal sense in the phenomenon of net- 
widening, whereby otherwise innocent people and innocuous activities peripheral to the 
core deviance are drawn into the definition and likewise labelled suspicious and deviant. 
In his Introduction to the 3fd Edition of his book, Cohen revised his view of deviancy 
amplification by rooting it more firmly in the constructionist perspective. He referred 
to:
...the thin idea of media-induced deviancy amplification. This is not causation in the 
constructionist sense - moral panics ‘cause’ folk devils by labelling more actions and
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people - but causation in the positivist sense and without the inverted commas. This 
psychology still uses concepts such as triggering off, contagion and suggestibility. 
Later cognitive models are far more plausible. For those who define and those who are 
defined, sensitization becomes a matter of cognitive framing and moral thresholds. 
Rather than a stimulus (media message) and response (audience behaviour) we look for 
the points at which moral awareness is raised (‘defining deviance up’) or lowered 
(‘defining deviance down’). (Cohen 2002: xxiv)
This admits of the possibility that deviance amplification can be attributed to more
zealous prosecution of offences which had previously been ignored, as Jenkins (1998)
suggests. Heightened awareness may lead to diffusion, escalation and innovation in the
societal control culture which in turn lead to a seeming increase in the incidence and
frequency of deviance of a particular sort. In other words, the behaviour may have
existed in those quantities before, but sensitisation has led to more of this behaviour
being officially identified and brought to public attention.
The processes at work in the societal control culture are important. When a society 
perceives that it is under threat, one natural reaction is to strengthen the control culture 
in both formal and informal ways. The obvious formal institutions of the control culture 
are the police, the courts and the legislature. In the context of cyberterrorism, the 
intelligence agencies are also relevant because of the nature of the threat and its 
implications for national security.
During a moral panic, Cohen identified three processes at work at the formal level. 
First diffusion is found when the control culture gradually spreads out from the 
immediate vicinity of the original impact (Cohen 2002: 66). Ties between local and 
regional police forces are established and strengthened, and those between local and 
national levels of law enforcement (police, intelligence agencies, courts, legislature, 
Home Office) are activated in order to deal more effectively with the ‘threat’. Second, 
escalation in the control culture may occur where the number of control agents is 
increased, and the scope and intensity of the control culture are extended. Third, 
innovation is found when new laws or new methods of applying existing laws are 
suggested and used. Innovation may exist at a number of levels: the police may become 
more proactive in enforcing laws they had hitherto not considered a priority; courts may 
extend or reinvent the application of existing law and increase the severity of sentences; 
governments may promulgate new law and order policies; and legislatures may pass 
new law. Such measures are justified by reference to the perceived threat and the 
generalised belief system which surrounds the threat (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 26- 
7; Cohen 2002: 66-7)
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Despite Cohen’s insistence on the need for a ‘circular and amplifying’ model (Cohen 
2002: 13), his model of an individual moral panic, once distilled, is somewhat linear 
even if the social processes involved are indeed circular and amplifying (Critcher 2003: 
13). The following model is constructed by Critcher out of the three elements described 
above -  Cohen’s classic statement, the disaster analogy and the deviancy amplification 
model -  and modified according to Critcher’s own findings in his meta-study of a series 
of moral panics to which Cohen’s original model was applied (Critcher 2003: 151-4).
3.1 Emergence
Although the first element of the processual model concerns emergence of a moral 
panic, paradoxically, it is at this stage it becomes obvious that the model’s value lies in 
its use as an heuristic device. It has no predictive value: emergence of a moral panic 
can only be ascertained retrospectively. There is not necessarily a key event which 
precipitates a moral panic. The perception of the threat, general apprehension and 
specific focus on imminent danger may emerge gradually. If there is a key event, it may 
happen during the moral panic rather than at the beginning and its importance is in what 
the event comes to symbolise as much as anything else. The researcher must look for 
the form in which the problem emerges, what is perceived as novel and how it is seen to 
threaten the moral or social order. Although a folk devil may be identified, this is not 
essential for a moral panic.
3.2 Media inventory
Here, the threat is explained and those responsible identified, primarily by way of the 
mass media who become sensitised to what has been identified as a social problem. 
Cohen identifies several processes at work: exaggeration/distortion, prediction and 
symbolisation. Stereotypes of who or what is responsible can be identified. Critcher 
argues that researchers should distinguish between different media constituents, so that 
sensitisation, exaggeration/distortion, prediction, symbolisation and stereotyping can be 
identified not just in the mid- and downmarket press, but also in the upmarket press and 
broadcasting.
Caution is required when identifying the role of the media in a moral panic. Media 
views should not be confounded with public opinion. Public opinion may follow that 
expressed in the media, albeit in an attenuated form (Cohen 2002: 49), however, it is not 
necessary for there to be strong public opinion on an issue for it to escalate into a moral 
panic (see further Section 4.1). Nor is the role of the media as simple as reporting the 
views of others. Cohen identifies three roles, one or mote of which the media may be
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fulfilling in any given moral panic (Cohen 2002: xxiii). The first is agenda setting: the 
filtering of newsworthy events and the further refinement of choosing which issues to 
escalate and which to attenuate. The second role is image transmission. The media 
transmit the claims of claims-makers, again either enhancing or attenuating the rhetoric 
of moral panics. The third role of the media is that of claims-maker. Here, the media 
themselves are initiators, or at least organisers, of moral concern. Cohen has noted that 
the opinions portrayed by the media will not be homogeneous, and may be more 
extreme and stereotypical than opinions held by the public at large (Cohen 2002: 49).
3.3 Moral entrepreneurs/claims-makers
Groups or individuals can be identified as moral entrepreneurs, alternatively ‘claims- 
makers’, which may be more specific and a more accurate term. They may either lead, 
follow or operate in parallel with the media and will offer emotional and intellectual 
perspectives on the ‘problem’, generate images of the deviants and/or their behaviour 
and tender causal explanations. Some such groups may proffer what is best termed 
propaganda and stand ready to capitalise when a significant event occurs.
3.4 Experts
Experts are not straightforwardly distinguished from claims-makers. The researcher 
must identify who, if anyone, claims expertise and on what grounds, and whether they 
are accredited as experts by the media. Critcher notes that experts are often not 
prominent in a moral panic, indeed those claiming expertise are sometimes suppressed 
by the media. He finds it is much more common for claims-makers to be accredited as 
experts in order to lend greater weight to their claims, so that expertise is not so much 
inherent as bestowed by the media and political elites.
3.5 Elite consensus and concern, lack of organised opposition
This element is rot present in Cohen, but was added by Critcher as a result of lessons 
learned from Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994). A successful moral panic requires 
sufficient consensus and concern amongst elite groups, usually achieved through 
distortion of the issue. Distortion may be evident in disproportionality of the response 
when compared with either the objective severity of the condition or its causes and 
effects.
Elite consensus and concern can dominate, however, only when identified folk devils 
are vulnerable to attack, unable to fight back effectively and there is no-one else willing 
or able to speak up for them. As Cohen says:
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...manipulation of the appropriate symbols ... is made easier when the object of attack is 
both highly visible and structurally weak. (Cohen 2002:167)
Examples of ‘failed panics’ may occur where folk devils have successfully fought back,
usually through gaining a voice in the media.
3.6 Coping and resolution
The media, claims-makers and experts will have pronounced on solutions to the 
problem. Existing powers of social control will be exploited, perhaps in innovative 
ways. If these are found insufficient, legal reform may follow. It is necessary to 
identify which solutions are advocated and by whom; whether they are instigated and by 
whom; whether there is procedural or legal innovation; and, most importantly, whether 
reforms are effective or symbolic. Critcher notes that such reform invariably heralds 
closure of the moral panic narrative.
3.7 Fade away
The moral panic may end, but there is always the possibility that it will re-emerge. 
When and why concern ends and whether it does or might recur must be established. 
The researcher should also identify the subsequent status of the problem. The decline of 
a moral panic may be explained by the manner of its ending, so that it either loses 
impetus, is routinised into existing frameworks or may be renewed by subsequent 
events.
3.8 Legacy
A moral panic may leave no lingering effect or it may produce profound and lasting 
changes in social policy, law or society’s self-perception or identity. The latter may be 
evidenced by subtle shifts in the underlying social discourse, for example, the shift from 
youth to childhood described in Section 2.3. It is also important to establish the 
relationship of a moral panic to previous and subsequent events.
4 . G o o de  &  B en-Ye h u d a : t h e  a ttributio nal  m o d e l
The contextual constructionist perspective is crucial to an understanding of the work of 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994). They assert that, although the relationship between the 
social construction of a problem and its objective nature may be problematic, 
nevertheless, it is still capable of empirical verification.
The moral panic is a phenomenon - given its broad and sprawling nature - that can be 
located and measured h a fairly unbiased fashion. It does not matter whether we 
sympathize with the concern or not. What is important is that the concern locates a 
“folk devil”, is shared, is out of synch with the measurable seriousness of the condition 
that generates it, and varies in intensity over time. ... The point that the moral panics 
concept is scientifically defensible, and not an invidious, ideologically motivated term
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of debunking, needs to be stressed in the strongest possible fashion. (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda 1994:41)
The point made in Section 2.1 above, that measurement of concern against seriousness 
(disproportionality, put another way) is not an unproblematic concept, applies equally 
here. Goode & Ben-Yehuda assert that measurement can be reasonably unbiased, yet 
there is always the issue of the researcher’s position in the research It is the importance 
of the interpretation of the researcher in moral panic research which gives rise to the 
criticism of ideological motivation.
Goode & Ben-Yehuda’s model, deemed the ‘attributional model’ by Critcher (Critcher 
2003: 23), is made up of five elements: concern, consensus, hostility, disproportionality 
and volatility (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 33-41).
4.1 Concern
Moral panic involves heightened concern about a certain issue which is manifested in 
measurable ways. Goode and Ben-Yehuda specify the use of “opinion polls, public 
commentary in the form of media attention, proposed legislation, social movement 
activity, and so on” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 33). However, empirical evidence 
of public concern is one of the most problematic elements of the attributional model, 
and some researchers have fudged this issue by equating public concern with media 
reaction and/or legislative activity (Ungar 2001). This is unsatisfactory. Public opinion 
may follow media coverage, albeit in an attenuated form (Cohen 2002: 49). Yet at other 
times the media invoke or construct public opinion in order to add weight to a narrative 
and Critcher therefore concludes that public opinion should be considered one of the 
unnecessary factors in the attributional model (Critcher 2003: 150).
It is, however, crucial to a moral panic that claims-making activity leads to concern 
among the political and media elites. The task is to assess the concern here and 
understand how and why these social forces become convinced of the gravity of a given 
problem.
4.2 Hostility
Goode & Ben-Yehuda saw folk devils, constructed through a process of stereotyping, as 
essential to a moral panic (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 33). Increased levels of 
hostility are displayed towards those identified as folk devils and as engaging in 
behaviour perceived as threatening to the values, interests or existence of society, or a 
segment of it. They are characterised unambiguously as the ‘enemy’, harmful and 
threatening.
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Critcher has found that a successful moral panic does not necessarily require a folk 
devil, and it would be a ‘serious empirical mistake’ to assume otherwise (Critcher 2003: 
150). Nevertheless, in the case of cyberterrorism, it happens that two classes of folk 
devil are easily identified: the hacker and the terrorist.
4.3 Consensus
There is no rule as to how many people make a moral panic. It is not necessary for 
every member, nor even a majority, of the society to experience concern or partake in 
the consensus.
...moral panics come in different sizes -  some gripping the vast majority of the 
members of a given society at a given time, others creating concern only among certain 
of its groups or categories...Consensus that a problem exists and should be dealt with 
can grip the residents of a given group or community, but may be lacking in the society 
as a whole; this does not mean that a moral panic does not exist, only that there is group 
or regional variation in the eruption of moral panics. (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 
34).
At some point in a moral panic, concern condenses into a consensus about what the 
threat is, who is responsible for it, and what the solution should be. Consensus need not 
be universal and is a matter of degree. However, in a moral panic, there is an unusually 
high level of consensus in society or the relevant segment of society (Goode and Ben- 
Yehuda 1994: 102). On the other hand, consensus may be prevented and the panic 
made to fail by organised opposition to the claims-makers. Claims are often contested 
in a moral panic, but the extent to which these counter-claims are heard depends on 
which messages die media amplify and which they attenuate.
Once again, there are empirical problems in locating the wider consensus in society. 
More important, and essential to a successful moral panic, is the identification of a 
consensus among elite elements across pressure groups, media and politicians. Any 
model of moral panic should retain the insight that the “extent and nature of opposition 
within elite opinion is an important determinant of the outcome of a potential moral 
panic” (Critcher 2003: 151).
4.4 Disproportionality
Notwithstanding the critique discussed above (section 2.1), the concept of 
disproportionality is fundamental to moral panic and it is evident when fear and concern 
exceed the levels which are deemed appropriate and directly proportionate to the 
objective nature of the threat.
.. .certain fears and concerns must be grounded in the conditions of social and economic 
life; they do not arise for no reason at all. At the same time, these concerns may be
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fuelled by specific threats that are materially nonexistent or grossly exaggerated. 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 49)
Goode and Ben-Yehuda identify four indicators of disproportionality (1994: 43-5):
1. statistics have been exaggerated;
2. statistics have been fabricated;
3. the attention paid to condition A is vastly more than the attention paid to
condition B, where B is as harmful or more so than A; or
4. the attention paid to condition A at time X is vastly more than the attention paid 
at an earlier or later time Y where there is no change in the objective seriousness 
of condition A between times X and Y.
Critcher has noted that exaggeration of the magnitude of the social problem is extremely 
important but so, too, is the distortion of its causes and effects (Critcher 2003: 151). 
The element of disproportionality should, therefore, be considered to be wider than 
simple exaggeration and should include these different kinds of distortion.
4.5 Volatility
The element of volatility is the logical adjunct to the concept of panic. A panic erupts 
suddenly and dramatically, and then subsides. Volatility essentially refers to the 
fluctuations in levels of social concern over a particular issue, here one day and gone the 
next.
Of the criticisms levelled at moral panic, two are related: criticisms of the use of the 
term ‘panic ’ and of the notion of volatility. Cohen has noted the pejorative connotations 
of the term ‘panic’ which is associated with irrationality, lack of control and baying 
mobs. He considers these connotations unfortunate and has accepted “the downgrade of 
‘panic’ to a mere metaphor” (Cohen 2002: xxvii). Nevertheless, he stands by the 
analogy, arguing that recent literature on disasters, both natural and man-made, has 
emphasised the social element in these episodes (eg Scraton 1999). The related 
criticism of the concept of moral panic is that relating to volatility (Thompson 1998: 8- 
11; McRobbie and Thornton 1995). It is argued that volatility of concern in society has 
actually given way to a permanent sense of unease, so that panics are no longer discrete, 
but more sequential or continuous and simply move from one area of anxiety to another. 
McRobbie and Thornton have argued that relations between social groups and the 
media, ‘reality’ and representation are now so complex that even an updated model of 
moral panic cannot take account of these complexities. The concept of moral panic as a
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genuine social phenomenon is outdated and, far from being volatile episodes, have 
become:
.. .a standard response, a familiar, sometimes weary, even ridiculous rhetoric rather than 
an exceptional emergency intervention. Used by politicians to orchestrate consent, by 
business t> promote sales ... and by the media to make home and social affairs 
newsworthy, moral panics are constructed on a daily basis. (McRobbie and Thornton 
1995)
In so far as the claim is that there are more panics occurring in recent years, this does 
not necessarily negate the element of volatility. If the claim is that we are, somehow, in 
a ‘permanent moral panic’, then this is an oxymoron: by definition, a panic is temporary 
(Cohen 2002: xxix). Nevertheless, its temporary status may last months or even years. 
Panics may also be sequential, the subsequent panic building on the previous one and 
continuing the narrative. Periods of greater intensity can often be identified at different 
times during longer episodes. In short, the criterion of volatility can be expressed in 
myriad ways and this vagueness makes it one of the least useful and testable attributes 
of a moral panic. In consequence, Critcher recommends that it be abandoned (Critcher 
2003: 151).
Volatility is, however, the element most closely linked with historical context. It goes 
to the heart of essential and under-researched questions, such as ‘why do moral panics 
start?’; ‘why do some potential panics fail?’; and ‘why do moral panics end?’. If we are 
to avoid a positivistic, formulaic, cyclical approach to the study of moral panics by 
emphasising historical context, answers to these questions are essential, although 
perhaps not under the, too general, rubric of ‘volatility’.
4.6 Claims-makers
Critcher adds this sixth attribute to the original list of five because claims-makers are 
fundamental to the constructionist perspective espoused by Goode and Ben-Yehuda. 
The role of claims-makers is central to the cultural and political struggles over social 
problem definition and they may be of one of two types: rule creators, who seek to 
impose their morality and beliefs on others; and rule enforcers, who are less 
ideologically motivated and more concerned with promoting the business of rule 
enforcement. Claims-makers may, therefore, operate for ideological or economic 
reasons. This is characterised as exploitation, which uses the mechanisms of deviance 
amplification and orchestrating social reactions to achieve social control. According to 
Ungar (2001), this social manipulation leads to the desired state of panic, having a 
consolidating influence on consensus, which rallies to the dominant ideology.
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The researcher should identify: who the claims-makers are; whether relevant 
organisations are already in existence or are formed in response to the specific social 
problem; what strategies are adopted for claims-making; and whether the media 
themselves are engaging in active claims-making (Critcher 2003: 151).
5. MORAL PANIC AND CYBERTERRORISM
It was amply demonstrated in Chapter 2 that the technical definition of cyberterrorism is 
contested. Yet cyberterrorism is more than just a technical act, it is also the term 
applied, in a wider social context, when fears about the intersection of terrorism, 
technology and hacking rise to the surface. This study characterises cyberterrorism as a 
socially constructed phenomenon, widely discussed in society as if it is a current 
problem yet, with the caveat that the government and security services may be in 
possession of classified information relating to cyberterrorist activity, a genuine 
cyberterrorist attack has never been publicly identified. The focus of this study is, 
indeed, the social construction of cyberterrorism and not the likelihood or otherwise of 
its occurrence. As Cohen argues:
The idea that social problems are socially constructed does not question their existence 
nor dismiss issues of causation, prevention and control. It draws attention to a meta 
debate about what sort of acknowledgement the problem receives and merits. The issue 
indeed is proportionality. (Cohen 2002: xxxiv)
This is exactly the point with reference to cyberterrorism. Only in deconstructing the
social construction can we arrive at an understanding of the status quo and navigate to a
solution, although the latter is outwith the scope of this study. Moral panic remains a
sharp sociological tool where an issue ‘emerges as a symbolic threat’ (Critcher 2003:
154). When viewed as an heuristic device, it is clear that it can be used to expose
definitions of cyberterrorism; who is constructing them and who is contesting them; the
extent to which these definitions are accepted by media and political elites; the role of
experts in defining the problem and constructing the solution; and how the state is
dealing with the issue in terms both of claims-making and instituting repressive
measures by way of a ‘solution’.
There are other ways of excavating the social construction of cyberterrorism. It is 
arguable that there is no need for an established analytical or theoretical framework in 
order to conduct this study with rigour. Grounded theory methods, addressed in detail 
in the following chapter, might on their own be used to identify emergent concepts, 
categories and relationships from the chosen corpus of data and integrate them into a 
substantive theory which explains what is going on in the particular case of
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cyberterrorism. As it turns out, grounded theory methods are indeed important to this 
study, but it was felt that the moral panic framework -  particularly the use of both 
models at different stages of this study -  would be valuable for comparison with the 
emergent findings of this study and that these findings might, in turn, add something to 
the moral panic literature. At the very least, moral panic provides a context for the 
discussion of the findings on the social construction of cyberterrorism.
An alternative approach to moral panic can be found in the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework (Kasperson, Kasperson et al. 2003), which is increasingly popular within 
the Information Systems domain. SARF considers how risk communication interacts 
with social, psychological, institutional and cultural processes to produce interpretations 
of risk. Clearly there are close parallels with deviance definition here. Risks may 
either be amplified, as n a classic moral panic, or attenuated, as in a failed panic. 
However, the overall framework is based on a classic, linear communication model, 
despite the feedback and iteration apparent in the amplification and attenuation phases. 
This leads to a tendency towards a ‘ticking the box’ approach when fitting a given 
social phenomenon inside the framework and historical context may be underplayed. 
Moreover, SARF is primarily concerned with risk, whereas moral panic places greater 
importance on morality, which is such an essential part of the pervasive terrorism 
narrative of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Perception and acceptance of risk is so often tied to a 
process of blaming, the obvious moral dimension of which is better highlighted by 
moral panic. An account of moral panic will place the media in a central role, yet 
SARF views it as a stage in the linear process, a conduit for, rather than originator of, 
information. There is also an emphasis on public perception, whereas moral panic 
admits of the possibility that amplification of social problems need only occur at the 
elite levels of society for far-reaching social consequences to ensue. For these and other 
reasons, moral panic was considered a better framework for the study of cyberterrorism 
giving, as it does, a more rounded view of socio-political processes and a stronger 
emphasis on morality. SARF’s emphasis on the public perception of risk will 
undoubtedly be important in future studies in this area, but it was not the intention in 
this study to put that is sue centre-stage.
Both the attributional and processual models of moral panic described in this chapter 
will be used to frame this study and their precise role is discussed in the following 
chapter.
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C h a p t e r  4
M e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  R e s e a r c h  D e s ig n
1. M et h o d o lo g y
It is apparent from the review in Chapter 2 that social science studies of cyberterrorism 
from an interpretative perspective are almost entirely absent from the literature. This 
study is an attempt to step into that gap. Whereas the emphasis in the existing literature 
is often on description and prediction of cyberterrorist behaviour which then form a 
basis for proposed solutions, this study seeks to understand the phenomenon of 
cyberterrorism as a process of social definition. The research approach fillows the 
interpretivist tradition which eschews the notion of a single, objective reality and 
emphasises the existence of many differing perspectives on the same reality (Walsham 
1993). Social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, 
documents, tools and other artefacts are considered to be the source of knowledge of 
reality (Klein and Myers 1999) and there is a focus on complexity in the way humans 
make sense of the world and on the communicative properties of all social processes 
(Kincaid 1996). Orlikowski and Baroudi give a detailed account of interpretative 
research in the IS domain (1991). Ontologically, social reality is not given, but can only 
be interpreted:
[I]nterpretive researchers recognize that as meanings are formed, transferred, and used, 
they are also negotiated, and hence that interpretation of reality may shift over time as 
circumstances, objectives, and constituencies change. (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991)
Epistemologically, social processes can only be understood from the point of view of
those engaging in them, so that the language humans use to describe those processes is
key.
Understanding social reality requires understanding how practices and meanings are 
formed and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans working 
towards some shared goal. (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991)
The task of the interpretative researcher, according to Orlikowski and Baroudi, is to
explain how these subjective meanings are created and maintained in a particular social
context. However, the researcher cannot assume a neutral position in relation to his
investigation, which is inevitably shaped by his own assumptions, beliefs, values and
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interests. A ‘strong’ constructionist view considers the researcher to be inextricably a 
part of his account of a social phenomenon and is presumed to enact the social reality he 
is studying (Astley 1985; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). He has no access to reality 
except through his own knowledge and experiences. On the other hand, on die ‘weak’ 
constructionist view espoused in this study, the researcher attempts an understanding of 
meaning systems shared by actors by means of an interpretation of the data he has 
collected and an account of what these actors are doing, how and why (Fay 1987). A 
high degree of reflexivity is required if he is not to skew his account of the object of 
study.
Klein and Myers’ account (1999) of interpretative research within the IS domain was 
particularly influential when trying to enhance the opportunities £>r reflexivity during 
the design phase of this study. They distinguish a set of seven principles for the 
construction and evaluation of field research in the interpretive paradigm from the 
philosophical perspective of hermeneutics. The authors argue that the “emergent 
nature” of interpretivist research is not necessarily compromised by a set of principles, 
so long as the researcher uses them as a means to exercise judgment and avoids slavish 
adherence. Use of these principles makes explicit that all angles have been considered 
by the researcher and provides an evaluative tool by which others may judge the work. 
The seven principles, although originally conceived for application to field studies, are 
particularly relevant to this study, since the model of moral panic was chosen first, and 
the subsequent process of textual data collection and analysis had to be divorced from 
the modeL Only on this basis could there be a meaningful discussion of how the 
findings compared with the ‘ideal type’ moral panic described by the model The 
principles and their application to this study are, in summary, as follows:
1. The fundamental principle o f the hermeneutic circle, “a meta principle on which the 
following six principles expand”. Human understanding is achieved through 
iteration between understanding of the meaning of inter-dependent parts and 
understanding of the whole. The iterative nature of the analytic process used in this 
study will be made apparent below and this fits very neatly with the principle of the 
hermeneutic circle.
2. The principle o f contextualisation requires the author to pay particular attention to 
the social and historical background of the research setting. There is an inevitable 
difference in understanding between the researcher and the author of a text, created 
by the historical distance between them. People are both products and producers of
history. Moral panic researchers must constantly ensure that their research is 
grounded in its social and historical context in order to understand the social 
definition of and reaction to social problems and to avoid recourse to positivist 
views of historical cycles.
3. The principle o f interaction between the researcher and the subject. The researcher 
must acknowledge his interaction with the subject of study. This is most important 
in studies involving personal interaction between researcher and participant, such as 
field studies. However, the principle has relevance in studies like this which use 
textual analysis because the researcher must have a critical awareness of how his 
construction of a corpus of data will affect the results of the study.
4. The principle o f abstraction and generalization. Whilst not theory-testing in any 
positivist sense, it is possible to relate the particular details discovered to wider 
propositions which describe the nature of human understanding and social action. 
This is precisely the process involved in comparing the evolution of social 
processes with an ‘ideal type’ such as moral panic.
5. The principle o f dialogical reasoning. In hermeneutics, prejudice is seen as a 
necessary starting point for understanding. The researcher must confront his 
preconceptions (prejudices) which guided the original research design with the data 
which emerge. This is a repeated and iterative process. Philosophical assumptions 
must be made explicit. When coding the corpus of data in this study, it was 
necessary to start with an idea of what to look out for based on assumptions derived 
from moral panic. These ideas changed constantly and were frequently revisited 
during the coding process so that preconceptions which did not stand up to the data 
were modified or abandoned.
6. The principle o f multiple interpretations requires the researcher to seek out, 
examine and explain possible differing interpretations among actors which may, for 
example, be expressed in multiple narratives. “Even if eventually none are found, 
the principle of multiple interpretations is of heuristic value because it leads to 
probing beneath the surface.” Multiple interpretations, and their eventual 
distillation into a consensus, are central to the social processes evident in a moral 
panic. This principle is, therefore, extremely important.
7. The principle o f suspicion, which is used more in critical social theory than 
interpretivism. The idea is not to take things at face value and to reveal socially
86
constructed distortions and delusions. An ideal type moral panic is based on 
distorted claims and these must first be recognised, then their genesis and effects 
explained. This principle highlights the fact that, although moral panic research can 
be carried out within the interpretivist tradition, there are elements which nod 
towards critical social theory, particularly the debunking of myths and the idea that 
clarity of understanding will unveil vested interests and empower people to engage 
in social change.
Making explicit the interpretative perspective of this study is particularly important 
because it is possible to use the moral panic model in a linear and deterministic fashion 
which would correspond more to a positivist approach to theory testing. Indeed, Cohen 
has been accused of ignoring historical context and claiming that the cycle of a moral 
panic is historically timeless (Hunt 1997). This problem is overcome if it is made 
explicit that the model is used as an heuristic device, as Critcher suggests (2003: 2), 
which allows the researcher first to identify patterns in a narrative and only then to 
compare those patterns against the ideal type of a moral panic. Although there maybe a 
meta-structure for all moral panics which would include some or all of the elements 
outlined in the processual and attributional models, the particular route which the panic 
takes and the way it is expressed by different sections of society will be different in each 
case. This is why the use of moral panic as an heuristic device rather than as a 
diagnostic tool is important.
In order to operationalise this strategy, it was necessary to provide a link between the 
corpus of data used and the moral panic model. Moreover, the research method used 
had to be grounded in the corpus so that any patterns identified could truly be said to 
have been derived from the corpus rather than imposed by the moral panic framework. 
Two possible approaches which were considered were Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) and content analysis. CDA is relevant to this field of study in that it is 
fundamentally concerned with the investigation, from a critical perspective, of “social 
inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language 
use (or in discourse)” (Wodak 2001). Discourse is considered both as an instrument of 
power and control and as an instrument of the social construction of reality (van 
Leeuwen 1993). CDA researchers see ideology as instrumental in the maintenance of 
unequal power relations and one of the central aims of CDA is to demystify discourses 
by deciphering these ideologies (Wodak 2001). CDA focuses not only on texts, but also
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on the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of those texts 
and how individuals and groups give those texts meaning.
This fits with moral panic which is, in part, concerned with power inequalities in the 
processes of social definition, resulting in a deviant class being defined and cast outside 
“acceptable” society. Moral panic research is traditionally carried out using a variety of 
texts, often drawn from the mass media, and it is easy to see how CDA could be used as 
the linking mechanism between data and the moral panic framework. Meyer (2001) has 
noted that it is permissible to use CDA in conjunction with a wide variety of theories 
and frameworks, and moral panic would be no exception. Moreover, Meyer states that 
the processes of data collection and analysis are not considered discrete, so that the two 
may go along together, stepwise, until an acceptable degree of saturation is reached. 
Accordingly, CDA methodology is often placed in the hermeneutic tradition.
A wide variety of methodologies can be found within the realm of CDA, including 
those dealing with mass media coverage and large data corpora like the one in this 
study. However, despite the wide field of application of CDA, this tradition represents 
a step too far for the purposes of the research aims of this study. The major reason for 
this is the fact that CDA has its roots in, and is fundamentally concerned with, 
linguistics. Meyer is quite specific that “in contrast to other approaches to text and 
discourse analysis (for example, content analysis, grounded theory, conversation 
analysis...) CDA strongly relies on linguistic concepts such as actors, mode, time, 
tense, argumentation and so on” (Meyer 2001). The study presented here does not go 
this far. The core operationalisations of this research are topics and contents, not 
linguistic concepts. Put another way, this study is a first step in demystifying a topic 
and its related concepts. A next logical step would be to go further and examine the 
language used in the context of a true discourse analysis using CDA. This study does 
not set out to achieve an analysis of the discourses involved in cyberterrorism: it merely 
identifies those discourses as being present and in need of further research.
Content analysis (CA) is another methodology which might have been chosen for this 
study. CA was developed for social research as a method for analysing textual 
materials, specifically newsprint. It is a very general approach, is able to deal with large 
quantities of data and lends itself particularly to historical data. Bauer (2000) presents it 
as a systematic, procedurally explicit and replicable technique for making inferences 
from a text to its social context. He notes that a given text may allow the researcher to 
draw inferences about the “worldviews, values, attitudes, opinions, prejudices and
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stereotypes” of the source of the text. Equally, each text has an audience in respect of 
whom the text is a “medium of appeal” which may have an “influence on people’s 
prejudices, opinions, attitudes and stereotypes”. CA has, for example, been used in 
media-effect studies on agenda-setting (Neumann 1989). However, the fact that CA 
often involves statistical treatment of texts gives the clue that it is most often used in 
positivist qualitative research and is, therefore, not ideal if the researcher wishes to take 
an interpretative approach, as in this study. Although the method is flexible enough to 
accommodate a wide range of theories and research problems, the rigid nature of the 
coding frame is too inflexible for the purposes of this research since it is constructed in 
advance, albeit with reference to the texts themselves, and then imposed on the texts. A 
more flexible approach was required, one which evolved out of the texts themselves on 
an ongoing basis and could take account of rarity and absence, as well as presence, of a 
concept. This is why Grounded theory was considered the most appropriate method.
In The Discovery o f Grounded Theory, Glaser and Strauss (1967) presented a method 
consisting essentially of systematic, inductive guidelines for collecting and analysing 
data with the ultimate goal of building substantive theories explaining the collected 
data. Although a considerable variety of grounded theory approaches has developed 
over the last 40 years, a number of strategies can be identified which are common to 
most: simultaneous collection and analysis of data; a multi-stage coding process; 
comparative methods; memo writing aimed at the construction of conceptual analyses; 
theoretical sampling to refine emerging ideas; and integration of the theoretical 
framework (Charmaz 2000).
As Grounded theory became more popular and was elaborated, Glaser and Strauss 
began to part ways, a development which became most apparent with the publication of 
Strauss and Corbin’s book Basics o f Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
Procedures and Techniques (1990) to which Glaser made a critical reply (Glaser 1992). 
Strauss and Corbin later updated their work in a second edition (Strauss and Corbin 
1998). In essence, Strauss and Corbin’s work elaborated a series of analytic steps, 
provided detailed examples and introduced new techniques. Although the second 
edition was less prescriptive, Glaser (1992) considered their developments to be made at 
the expense of the emergent and open-ended character of Glaser and Strauss’ earlier 
work. Strauss and Corbin emphasised the qualities of validity, reliability and 
verification, whereas Glaser emphasised the emergence of theory through the analysis 
of basic social processes using constant comparison Glaser (1992) considered that
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Strauss and Corbin were forcing data and analysis through their preconceptions, 
questions and techniques and argued that constant comparison should be sufficient. He 
asserted that the purpose of grounded theory methods should be to generate theory, not 
to verify it through a method which really amounts to full conceptual description rather 
than theory building. Nevertheless, Strauss and Corbin’s statement of the significance 
of description and conceptual ordering for theory development is compelling (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998: 16-21) and there is no doubt that their methods are aimed at theory 
building, albeit not with the same purist zeal that Glaser espouses.
Strauss and Corbin’s 1998 edition of Basics o f Qualitative Research was chosen as the 
guiding text for this study precisely because they offer a rich variety of strategies for 
conceptualising, ordering and theorising about data. Although the Glaser critique 
suggests that their prescriptions risk the forcing of data into a framework, Strauss and 
Corbin are not necessarily as prescriptive as all that. As Charmaz points out (2000), 
readers may reify authors’ earlier written words and this may account for the view that 
they have presented a method to be unswervingly followed. Strauss and Corbin 
demonstrate more flexibility in their approach to theory building than Glaser gives them 
credit for and allow that grounded theory may be used for other purposes:
We also believe that we have something to offer in the way of techniques and 
procedures to those researchers who want to do qualitative analysis but who do not wish 
to build theory. Building theory is not the only goal of doing research. High-level 
description and what we call conceptual ordering also are important to the generation of 
knowledge and can make a valuable contribution to a discipline. (Strauss and Corbin 
1998: x)
In this study, the central concern is to understand how cyberterrorism has been 
constructed and the representation of this issue in the UK national press has been 
chosen as the most effective and efficient focus for the study. The use of moral panic as 
an heuristic device, a framework against which the case of cyberterrorism might be 
compared, gives a clear direction to the study but this does not mean that it should drive 
the data analysis. To the contrary, the analysis has to be explicitly divorced from the 
details of the moral panic framework in order for the comparison between the patterns 
emerging from the data and the moral panic framework to have validity. The insistence 
of grounded theory methodology on the emergent quality of theory from data is the 
principal reason for choosing this approach. This research does not set out to prove or 
disprove a hypothesis that the social reaction to cyberterrorism amounts to a moral 
panic. Rather, it seeks to describe the social processes which appear to be at work, to 
formulate an explanation of what is going on (“substantive theory building” in the sense
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meant by Strauss and Corbin) and to compare this explanation to the moral panic model. 
The approach set out by Strauss and Corbin (1998: eg 49, 80, 155) admits of the use of 
their grounded theory methods for these purposes. As well as providing a theoretical 
explanation of the social processes at work in the particular case of the social 
construction of cyberterrorism, the findings of this study will also contribute to the 
wider debate on moral panic by adding another case to the literature, discussing the 
relevance and usefulness of the moral panic framework and making some modest 
suggestions for modification.
2. R e se a r c h  desig n
2.1 Summary
The aim of this study is to explore how cyberterrorism has been socially constructed. 
Moral panic has been identified as a suitable heuristic device to enrich the analysis of 
the relevant social processes and two distinct models of moral panic, Cohen’s 
processual model and Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s attributional model, were summarised 
Chapter 3. The research design is, in essence, as follows. This is a study focussed on 
the UK. All available articles in the UK national press relevant to cyberterrorism were 
collected and their text imported into new project, called a ‘hermeneutic unit’, in 
Atlas/ti, a software application designed to assist grounded theory researchers. These 
texts were then coded extensively. Some codes were identified in advance with 
reference to some very general notions, derived from the literature, of what concepts 
might turn out to be relevant and were used from the start in order to generate some 
quantitative frequency data. The vast majority of the codes, however, were the result of 
an iterative, multi-stage coding process from which qualitative concepts emerged in 
accordance with grounded theory methods. An extensive approach was taken to the 
coding process and everything of relevance to the issue of cyberterrorism was coded, 
regardless of relevance to one or other of the moral panic models. The results are 
written up in Chapters 5-8 and organised according to the six elements of the 
attributional model of moral panic. A large amount of axial coding and theoretical 
sampling was carried out at the writing-up stage in order to effect a more nuanced 
analysis and build a more complete and balanced explanation of the social processes 
identified. Finally, the findings in relation to the social construction of cyberterrorism 
are discussed in Chapter 9 and these findings are compared with the framework 
provided by the processual model of moral panic. The subsidiary question whether 
cyberterrorism amounts to a moral panic is answered. The use of the grounded theory
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methods, together with the deployment of two distinct models of moral panic at 
different stages of the research process, enabled a rich picture of the social construction 
of cyberterrorism is built up.
The following account of the research process is inevitably artificial, since it splits the 
discussion into distinct stages of corpus collection and analysis. In reality, these two 
activities occurred more or less simultaneously and carried on well into the writing up 
phase. This approach is dictated by grounded theory methods which can, in this sense, 
be characterised as being within the hermeneutic tradition. Nevertheless, in the interests 
of clarity, it is convenient to consider corpus collection and analysis separately for the 
purposes of the following explanation
2.2 Corpus collection
The grounded theory methods of Strauss and Corbin do not have much to say about the 
choice of a research question and the initial location of data sources, beyond setting out 
a number of practical considerations (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 29-34, Chapter 4). It is 
really up to the researcher to decide where and how to start collecting data, with 
subsequent data collection being driven by the analysis itself. The concept of sampling 
and its associations with quantitative research and the positivist paradigm is 
inappropriate in this study. The concept of corpus construction, in this case referring to 
a corpus of data built up with reference to the principles of relevance and saturation, is 
more appropriate (Bauer and Aarts 2000). Construction of the corpus of data for this 
study had four distinct stages: first, the source of the data was chosen; second, relevant 
data were extracted by means of a carefully refined search string; third, the results were 
sifted for relevance and duplication; fourth, additional texts were added where, during 
the coding process, it became apparent that certain data were missing and needed to be 
incorporated. The processes involved are set out in more detail in the remainder of this 
Section.
It will be apparent from Chapter 3 that a study of moral panic might use data from a 
large number of sources. For example, Cohen’s study on Mods and Rockers used 
sources including local and national press, radio and television broadcasts, parish 
newsletters, Hansard, correspondence received by a relevant pressure group and 
interviews with members of the public (Cohen 2002: 173). The disturbances Cohen 
investigated were limited in time -  1964-1966 -  and space -  a handful of English 
seaside resorts -  and he was able to consider multiple sources without drowning in 
information. The list of potential sources of data relevant to the social construction of
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cyberterrorism is, similarly, very broad and would include the national press, 
information security industry publications and research, police publications and 
statements, government publications and statements, political reports, public interviews, 
interviews with hackers and so forth. The concept of cyberterrorism, however, is at 
least 20 years old and the sheer volume of potentially relevant information is 
overwhelming. It is not possible, therefore, for one researcher to make sense of 
multiple sources of information in the time allowed for a PhD.
It was decided that the UK national press would be a sufficient and appropriate source 
of data for the study of the social construction of cyberterrorism. This can be justified 
by reference to the moral panic model, in which the media play the central role in 
bringing an issue into the public domain Media sensitisation to a social problem puts it 
on the public stage; they report the claims of claims-makers and those who are not 
reported are excluded from the public discourse; they attribute expertise to those 
deemed worthy to pronounce on the problem and solutions; with politicians, they 
construct an elite consensus; and when they loose interest, the issue fades from public 
attention. In other words, anything which does not pass through die filter of the media 
is, by definition, excluded from the discourses which make up a moral panic. Absence 
is important, of course, and it was necessary to be aware of what was being excluded as 
well as what was included. The national press is, clearly, only one constituent of the 
media but it is an obvious choice for a study such as this where time and resources are 
not limitless and choice of data source is, for pragmatic reasons, dictated by ease of 
access and the lack of any need for transcription The choice of data source inevitably 
affects the scope of the findings of this research because the claims of claims-makers 
can only be discussed to the extent that they have been reported in the UK national 
press and have inevitably passed through at least two interpretive filters: the journalist 
and the researcher. Such a study can say nothing about issues which have been 
neglected by the press but which may be considered important by other claims-makers. 
Nevertheless, it was decided that the findings, such as they might be, would still be 
interesting and there is always the possibility of taking the research into different areas 
in the future. In some respects, this is a penalty inevitably paid by a researcher entering 
a subject area not yet well-covered in the literature and the researcher must, 
accordingly, be content to take and give an account of those first steps.
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The Lexis-Nexis Professional service was used as the most efficient, comprehensive 
and searchable source of UK national press articles. Nevertheless, Lexis-Nexis 
coverage is variable, and the details are set out below.
Publication Days published Date Lexis-Nexis coverage starts
The Guardian Mon-Sun 14 July 1984
The Times Mon-Sat 1 July 1985
Sunday Times Sim 1 July 1985
The Independent Mon-Sat 19 September 1988
Independent on Sunday Mon-Sat 19 September 1988
The Observer Sun 7 October 1990
Daily Mail Mon-Sat 1 January 1992
Mail on Sunday Sun 1 January 1992
The People Sun 2 January 1994
Daily Mirror Mon-Sat 29 May 1995
Sunday Mirror Sun 29 May 1995
The News of the World Sun 26 July 1998
The Business Sun 2 May 1999
Sunday Business Sun 2 May 1999
The Express Mon-Sat 2 October 1999
Sunday Express Sun 2 October 1999
The Sun Mon-Sun 1 January 2000
The Daily Telegraph Mon-Sat 30 October 2000
The Sunday Telegraph Sun 30 October 2000
Daily Star Mon-Sat 15 December 2000
Morning Star Mon-Sat 2 July 2001
Sunday Star Sun 15 September 2002
In order to generate the most complete corpus of data possible, searches were performed 
on the whole Lexis-Nexis database of UK national newspapers. No back-stop date was 
imposed and all dates were searched up to 31 December 2005. Collecting data from 
complete years was important for the purposes of quantitative analysis and this is why 
data from the available part of 2006 were not included. A search string was constructed 
to collect all articles referring to both hacking and terrorism in some form. Some of 
these articles refer to cyberterrorism specifically, but many do not: it was necessary to 
cast the net wide in order to gain a sense of how the portrayal of hackers and terrorists 
separately impacts on the portrayal of cyberterrorism specifically. Several preliminary 
search attempts were made and a high-level analysis of the results was performed. The 
results of this analysis were then used to refine the search string in order to exclude
94
irrelevant data and include data which was discovered to be relevant. The eventual 
form of the primary search string was:
(cyberterror! OR cyber-terror! OR cyber w/1 terror!) OR (information pre/1 terror!) OR 
((hacker! OR hacking) AND terror!)
A number of problems had to be resolved in the course of defining this search string. 
Hack! is not a useful search term, since it throws up large volumes of articles using the 
word ‘hack’ to refer to journalists or politicians in the pejorative. Hackney, in London, 
also features prominently. To define such instances out of the search string is extremely 
difficult and hardly worth the effort due to the minimal number of relevant articles 
using the word ‘hack’ but not the more usual ‘hacker’ or ‘hacking’. The term ‘hacked’ 
has similar problems. It can be used in the sense of ‘hacked into a computer’, but this is 
rare in the absence of the terms ‘hacker’ or ‘hacking’ in the same article. ‘Hacked’ is 
far more often used in the sense of ‘hacked off, therefore it is left out of the search 
string. The search string ‘information pre/1 terror!’ was used in an attempt to capture 
references to ‘information terrorism’. As it turns out, this term is not much used in the 
UK national press, ‘cyberterrorism’ being by for the more common term.
These results were then sifted for relevance and duplicates and the coding process was 
begun As new concepts emerged from the coding of the data and the making of 
comparisons between these concepts, gaps in the data were discovered and variety in the 
data hinted at, indicating that a fresh round of data gathering was necessary in order to 
maximise the opportunities to document variations between concepts and to add 
properties and dimensions to the emergent code categories. This is what Strauss and 
Corbin term theoretical sampling (1998: Chapter 13), although the use of this technique 
was relatively limited due to the very wide net cast for the original corpus of data. For 
example, during the sifting and coding processes, variety in the terms used to denote 
cyberterrorists was discovered in the texts, such as ‘techno-terrorists’, ‘electronic 
terrorists’, ‘e-terrorists’ and ‘IT terrorists’. These terms were made the subject of a new 
Lexis-Nexis search and the results sifted again. The results of this type of sampling 
were not always fruitful. ‘IT terror! ’ did not produce any useable results since Lexis- 
Nexis considers invisible such small words as ‘it’, ‘the’, ‘all’ etc. Thus a search for the 
specific term ‘IT terror! ’ threw up results such as “It was the terrorists...”. When sifting 
through around 270 results on an all-dates search, no instances of the use of the term ‘IT 
terrorism’ or its variants were found.
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The corpus resulting from this extended collection process comprises 681 articles, the 
first of which is dated 26 May 1987 and the last 31 December 2005. Each relevant 
article was saved as a separate .txt file with a file name identifying the date and name of 
publication.
2.3 Corpus analysis
To facilitate the analysis of the corpus, each article in .txt form was loaded as a ‘primary 
document’ into a new ‘hermeneutic unit’ in Atlas/ti, a software programme designed to 
assist qualitative researchers, particularly those using grounded theory methods. Such 
software is no substitute for the researcher’s understanding of the meaning of texts, but 
it does assist with a large number of, sometimes quite complex, mechanical tasks (Kelle 
2000). Using grounded theory methods, data analysis and theory construction are 
closely linked and it is necessary to keep track of the various concepts, ideas and 
arguments which the researcher generates during the course of the analysis. This is 
often a mammoth task and so it proved to be the case with this study: analysis of the 
collected texts took a little over 18 months.
Atlas/ti facilitates many of the techniques described by Strauss and Corbin, including 
open, axial and selective coding, the creation and ordering of memos and diagrams and, 
perhaps most importantly of all, a sophisticated mechanism for retrieving coded 
segments of texts. In Atlas/ti, the retrieval mechanism can be used to build ‘queries’ 
which allow the researcher to compile, for example, a Boolean search combining a 
variety of different concepts and categories in order to retrieve very specific items from 
a large body of data. More information on the use of Atlas/ti in this study is presented 
in the Appendix.
(a) Quantitative data 
It is possible to refine Atlas/ti techniques to elicit quantitative, as well as qualitative, 
data. These techniques are not necessarily made explicit by the authors of Atlas/ti 
(www.atlasti.com/manual.html) but the software is sophisticated enough that, if the 
researcher finds he or she needs to achieve a certain result, it is nearly always possible 
to identify a work-around which will do the job. A combination of coding, 
categorisation and retrieval mechanisms was used to compile some sophisticated 
quantitative data which are presented in Chapters 5-8.
Despite a tendency to associate quantitative data with positivist research, there is no 
reason why quantitative data should not feature in an interpretative study and there is a
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current view in social science that quantitative and qualitative data are mutually 
informing (Bryman 2001). Strauss and Corbin agree, arguing that:
Qualitative and quantitative forms of research both have roles to play in theorising ... 
we are advocating ... a true interplay between the two. The qualitative should direct the 
quantitative and the quantitative feedback into the qualitative in a circular, but at the 
same time evolving, process with each method contributing to the theory in ways that 
only each can. (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 34)
However, they stress that, although it is permissible for researchers to use the literature
to sensitise themselves to certain issues (1998: 49), it is not permissible to impose a list
of preconceived concepts on the data: they must emerge from the data. Preliminary,
high-level analysis of the corpus revealed that at least three concepts were ubiquitous:
date of each article, the behaviour referred to in the article and the source of the
information reported in the article. It became obvious at an early stage that quantitative
data relating to these concepts would be important for the study.
Accordingly, he first type of quantitative data used in this study is the date of each 
individual article which was inserted as part of the file name of each ‘primary 
document’. For example, “1987-05-06 The Times.txt” is the file name assigned to the 
first UK newspaper article which refers to ‘electronic terrorists’. Using the format 
yyyy-mm-dd was necessary so that all articles were automatically arranged and then 
loaded into the hermeneutic unit in chronological order. Primary documents could then 
be sorted into groups by year to allow complex time-based analysis when combined 
with other codes at a later stage in the analysis.
The second type of quantitative data was generated by assigning certain categories to 
each article as a whole. It was important to get, so far as possible, an objective view of 
what types of underlying behaviour were being discussed in the press regardless of the 
labels assigned in the text. A non-exclusive category of behaviour was assigned to each 
article, meaning that an article might be referring to more than one category. As a result 
of the preliminary, high-level analysis, a variety of behaviours was identified which 
roughly corresponded with the eight main categories derived from the 
conventional/digital tool/target matrix approach of Devost, Houghton et al. (1997), 
described in Chapter 2. They use their matrix in the context of terrorist behaviour, but 
the same matrix can be applied in the context of criminal behaviour. The difference is 
the underlying intention. This approach produces eight categories as the beginnings of 
a taxonomy of offending behaviour:
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Terrorist activity:
1. Conventional terrorism
2. Conventional tool; digital target
3. Digital tool; conventional target
4. Cyberterrorism 
Criminal activity:
5. Conventional crime
6. Conventional tool; digital target
7. Digital tool; conventional target
8. Cybercrime
During the coding process further categories were added as they emerged from the texts 
and these are described in context in Chapter 5. The categories assigned to each article 
reflected the basic subject matter of the article as a whole, judged according to the ‘real’ 
subject matter of the article and ignoring labels assigned in the text. For example, an 
article concerning ‘cyberterrorist’ teenage pranksters who defaced a website is 
categorised as an article on cybercrime: there is no suggestion of terrorist involvement 
beyond the label attributed by the author of the article and the acts of the teenagers are 
technically criminal at English law (Computer Misuse Act 1990).
In addition to the behaviour categories, it emerged that the sources of information used 
for each article were equally important. For example, was the article predominantly a 
commentary piece generated from the views of the author himself, or was the material 
primarily a report of the views of others and, if so, who? Again, ro codes were pre­
defined in this case, so the sources of information gradually emerged from the text. 
Once again, the categories are non-exclusive, so that one article may be coded as having 
two or more primary sources. These data are presented in graphical form in Chapter 5 
and reveal the major contributors to the public discourse on cyberterrorism.
These were the only types of code which were applied to articles as a whole. All other 
codes were applied to segments of text, known in Atlas/ti as ‘quotations’, usually one or 
more sentences within an article. Initially, an open coding technique was used, 
essentially to generate qualitative data, but it should be noted here that the third type of 
quantitative data used in this study comes from the frequencies with which these codes 
are encountered in the corpus as a whole. These are represented graphically throughout 
the findings chapters in conjunction with the qualitative findings to illustrate
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frequencies of use of various concepts and how they have waxed and waned in 
importance over time.
(b) Qualitative data 
Klein and Myers’ fifth principle of dialogical reasoning came into its own when coding 
the corpus. In the absence of any more obvious strategy, the corpus was coded in 
chronological order, starting with those texts written at a time when the concept of 
cyberterrorism was not particularly sophisticated. At the start and, indeed, all the way 
through the coding process, anything remotely relevant to either hacking, terrorism or 
both was coded so as not to miss any important nuance in the discourse which might not 
necessarily be flagged up by the moral panic model. Although it was impossible to 
forget the model, which had already been carefully researched before coding began, it 
was possible to put it to one side in the search for anything and everything which might 
be relevant. Assumptions made at the start of the coding process were repeatedly 
challenged and modified or abandoned as the process continued and other ideas, not 
previously guessed at, emerged from the texts and had to be incorporated. As a general 
example, at the start of the coding process I had a preconception that I would discover 
the police to be making strong claims about the dangers from cyberterrorism and the 
powers and tools they would require to address the problem. In fact, as the findings in 
Chapter 6 show, the police rarely make such claims publicly, preferring instead a 
restrained and realistic approach. This view emerged from the data and replaced the 
incorrect preconception at a relatively early stage.
Grounded theory methods are geared towards challenging preconceptions in this way. 
Data are constantly compared with other data, emerging concepts and categories, and 
these concepts and categories are similarly compared with the data and with each other. 
It is a process of constant testing, questioning, affirmation and revision. This amounts 
to what grounded theorists term ‘constant comparison’. This is central to grounded 
theory methods and it is the mechanism by which concepts are developed, categories 
and sub-categories formed and theory built. The open coding was deliberately intuitive, 
the aim being for the researcher to become immersed in the texts to saturation point and 
to produce the richest possible coding scheme. No regard was paid to the number of 
codes generated, but it was necessary to know them by heart in order not to miss a 
coding opportunity when it arose. Constant revision of the coding scheme and 
revisiting of earlier texts were required to ensure that a concept just ‘discovered’ had
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not, in fact, occurred in an earlier text which had already been coded. This was a very 
long process and, as noted above, took a little over 18 months to complete.
The next stage in the analysis was to carry out axial coding. Again, it is perhaps 
misleading to characterise these as distinct stages, rather, they iterated between one and 
the other and proceeded stepwise. Axial coding is essentially the process of relating 
categories to their sub-categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998: Chapter 9). Whereas data 
are fractured during the open coding process, they are reassembled during axial coding 
so that categories and sub-categories are linked to form explanations about phenomena 
found in the corpus. Importantly for theory building, the links are made at the 
conceptual level because the text has, at this stage, been converted into concepts, 
represented by open codes, which are then reassembled into some sort of order. For 
example, use of the future threat scenario was identified as a dimension associated with 
three major concepts: hackers, the terrorist link and demonisation o f technology. This, 
then, provided a cross-cutting link between these three concepts and formed a central 
plank of the eventual theoretical explanation of the social processes at work.
On several occasions, it was found that a particular code was used so frequently that a 
secondary analysis had to be carried out, resulting in a tree-like structure of coding. 
Since Atlas/ti only permits two levels of coding -  codes and code families -  the third 
level was achieved using a code naming system. For example, the technology code was 
applied to 253 quotations. A more nuanced analysis was required to make sense of the 
data, so each of these 253 quotations was coded again with several sub-codes using the 
form Tech -  xyz, making it obvious that this was a sub-code of technology.
The use of memos and diagrams is another technique advocated by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998: Chapter 14) which is facilitated by Atlas/ti. Perhaps surprisingly, diagrams were 
not found to be particularly useful in this study, perhaps because the evolving coding 
scheme turned out to be so highly structured itself. Memos, on the other had, were 
extremely important. All ideas about the data, codes, how they inter-relate, 
observations about relationships, indeed anything remotely interesting were recorded 
immediately as a memo in Atlas/ti. These memos might be freestanding, attached to 
particular segments of text -  perhaps more than one -  or attached to codes or code 
families. They provided a record of the sequence of the researcher’s thinking during the 
analysis and ultimately became the building blocks of the ultimate theoretical 
explanation of the social processes identified.
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What Charmaz terms ‘rendering through writing’ (Charmaz 2000) was a highly 
complex process. The decision to start writing up was triggered by the fact that all the 
texts had been coded, most of them several times over, and it was clear how the coding 
scheme, representing the concepts which had emerged from the texts, was to be 
integrated into a theoretical explanation. The writing up process itself was essentially 
the mechanism by which those concepts were integrated into the theory. In this sense, 
analysis did not stop when writing up started, indeed a great deal of selective coding 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998: Chapter 10) continued throughout the writing up process 
where gaps in the explanation were discovered or where a specific category required 
integrating and refining. The ultimate goal of these accumulated processes was to reach 
theoretical saturation, the point in category development at which no new properties, 
dimensions or relationships emerge during analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 143). 
This point was not reached until all the issues had been bottomed out and the writing up 
was complete.
Writing up required the discipline imposed by the meta-structure of the attributional 
model of moral panic. This was not allowed to interfere with the analysis per se, but 
was used to organise the approach by isolating a limited number of categories of 
information for investigation at any one time. This is legitimate, according to Strauss 
and Corbin (1998: pp 49 et seq) for a number of reasons. The six elements of the 
attributional model of moral panic can be considered as concepts derived from the 
literature which provide a source for making comparisons to data at the levels of 
properties and dimensions. This allows the researcher to identify similarities and 
differences between the concept known from literature and the emergent concept, thus 
giving the latter specificity. Another way to consider this approach is that it allowed the 
researcher to organise the material according to a few themes which were not specific 
enough to influence the interpretation of the data but were sufficient to give order and 
direction to a very large body of material. There was no question of forcing the data: 
this approach was legitimated by the fact that the emergent concepts really did fit the 
meta structure of the attributional model of moral panic. Finally, where the researcher’s 
intention is to extend an already existing theory, it is legitimate, according to Strauss 
and Corbin (1998: 50) to engage in research with some concepts and relationships in 
mind and look for how their properties and dimensions vaiy under different conditions. 
This is a good description of what happened in this study. The concepts and 
relationships described in the existing moral panic literature were indeed compared with
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the concepts and conditions which emerged from the specific case of cyberterrorism. 
Similarities and differences were noted and some modest alterations to the moral panic 
model suggested. As Strauss and Corbin argue:
Bringing the literature into the writing not only demonstrates scholarliness but also
allows for extending, validating, and refining knowledge in the field. (Strauss and
Corbin 1998: 52)
The retrieval mechanisms provided by Atlas/ti came into their own at the writing up 
stage. Two basic processes were used to consolidate the theoretical explanation and 
write up the findings. First, the mechanics of coding in Atlas/ti is essentially an 
indexing process, permitting retrieval of all quotations relating to the particular concept 
encapsulated in that code. When relevant quotations were read together in one place, 
rather than being sprinkled across hundreds of newspaper articles, definite patterns 
emerged which were then integrated into the theoretical model and reported in the 
findings chapters. Second, a complex retrieval process was used. Because it was 
decided that the coding structure should be allowed to become as complex as the texts 
seemed to merit, one quotation was most often coded with multiple codes. Atlas/ti 
permits retrieval of quotations using a query tool which can combine any number of 
codes. This resulted in findings in which two or more concepts were related, allowing a 
rich picture to be built up and integrated into the storyline of the findings.
It will now be apparent that writing up the findings and additional coding cycles were 
necessarily concurrent exercises because of the iterative nature of the processes of 
information retrieval and making sense of that information. Reflexivity was paramount 
and theoretical preconceptions were continuously challenged through constant 
comparison of concepts and categories, leading to subsequent revisions: essentially the 
principle of dialogical reasoning in action The result is, hopefully, a rich picture of the 
discourse on cyberterrorism using integrated quantitative and qualitative data.
A brief personal insight to enlighten the reader who may find curious my approach to 
the research design of this study. Whilst acknowledging certain philosophical 
influences, it was always my intention to come to this research with a clean sheet. 
Doubtless, there are many other studies which have trodden a similar path to this one. 
Doubtless, too, I could have fashioned a more elegant approach to my material had I 
drawn a template for research design from work done by researchers more distinguished 
and experienced than me. I chose not to do so. We all come to our work with personal 
motivations apart from the pure desire to know more about our subject. My motivations 
came as much from the desire to be free from the constraints of the professional legal
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environment in which I have been raised, where method and procedure are sometimes 
even more important than substance; and to exercise my new-found academic freedom 
in the best way possible: to start from scratch and engage h  some blue-sky thinking. I 
settled on this research design simply because it seemed the best way to do it. When 
problems came, I rationalised and solved them, always with an eye to analytic integrity 
and that all-important reflexivity -  a skill not entirely alien to the professional lawyer. I 
wanted simply to set off on the path the data indicated and see where it led. What 
follows is a summary of how that happened.
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S e c t i o n  n
T h e  F i n d i n g s
The findings of this study are presented in four chapters. Chapter 5, sets out the 
patterns of reporting on the issue of cyberterrorism in the UK national press; how the 
press has set the agenda in the debate on cyberterrorism; how it has transmitted 
associated images and stereotypes; and highlights specific claims made by the press on 
the subject.
Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s attributional model of moral panic (1994) is used to organise 
the findings in Chapters 6-8. Chapter 6 will present evidence relating to the expression 
of concern about cyberterrorism and the building of a consensus about what the 
problems are. This evidence will be presented from the perspectives of various claims- 
makers in the debate: politicians, agents of law enforcement and national security, the 
information security industry and other experts. Chapter 7 will go on to consider the 
evidence on hostility: is there consensus in identification of the folk devils; how has 
hostility towards these groups evolved? Chapter 8 will deal with the social reaction to 
perceptions of cyberterrorism; evidence as to whether or not this reaction is 
disproportionate to the threat; and consideration of the volatility or otherwise of the 
reaction.
A note on the format of these chapters. This study is based on an analysis of a very 
large quantity of textual data -  nearly 700 UK national press articles. The results of this 
analysis have yielded both quantitative and qualitative data. The former are largely 
represented in graphical form, this being the most accessible manner of presenting a 
large quantity and variety of data to the reader. Whilst there will always be attendant 
explanations, it is intended also that the various charts should speak for themselves.
Discussions of the qualitative findings are punctuated with a large number of quotations 
from the corpus. This may look unconventional to the reader. However, the findings 
have been put together in such a way that the quotations flow logically with the 
commentary. They are intended to be read as part of the narrative, illustrating a point 
and adding a fresh dimension to the argument. This prevents the need for undue 
repetition so that, where a quotation in its context makes a point, there is no need to 
rehearse that point again in the attached commentary. Importantly, this use of 
quotations substantially avoids the risk of over-interpreting the material and adding
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personal biases (Hosein and Whitley 2002) by making plain the meaning of the original 
text and forcing the researcher to greater reflexivity. Although a large proportion of the 
chapters which follow are made up of quotations from the corpus, it is the choice of 
quotations, their logical ordering and the manner in which they are woven into a 
coherent narrative which represents the task undertaken by the researcher. This study, 
based as it is on textual material, requires such a format in order to provide sufficient 
evidence for the arguments being made. Exemplar quotations are limited to two or 
three at most in each case, although many more examples can usually be found in the 
corpus.
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C h a p t e r s
F i n d i n g s :
B r i n g i n g  t h e  d e b a t e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c : t h e  U K  n a t i o n a l
PRESS
Cohen has identified three main roles for the media: agenda setting, image transmission 
and claims-making (Cohen 2002: xxiii). This chapter will set out the position of the UK 
national press in relation to each of these three roles in the context of the narrative on 
cyberterrorism.
1. Se t t in g  t h e  a g en d a : t h e  a sso c ia tio n  o f  h a c k in g  and
TERRORISM
An analysis of the quantity of UK national press articles over time shows that there has 
been a striking rise in the reporting of hacking and terrorism together, from a total of 
three in 1997 to 81 in 2005 (Figures 1 and 2). A total of 681 UK national press articles 
make up the corpus of data for this study. The absolute figures are relatively low h 
comparison with reporting of computer hacking without mention of terrorism (Figure 3) 
which also display a clear upwards trend over time, with over 800 articles mentioning 
hacking in 2005, although these have not been filtered for duplication and relevance. 
The significant peak in 2000 is explained by a series of high-profile hacking incidents 
which made headlines across the world: the Mafiaboy denial of service attack on eBay, 
Yahoo et al; the spread of the ‘I Love You’ virus; a rash of website defacements by 
Pakistani and Middle Eastern ‘hacktivists’ protesting against India and Israel 
respectively; Microsoft’s admission that hackers had accessed the source code for the 
next release of Windows and Office; and the FBI arrest of two notorious Russian 
hackers. Nevertheless, when the number of articles on hacking and terrorism together 
are considered as a proportion of the number of articles on hacking alone, over time 
there is a clear upwards trend, which demonstrates that, of all articles which consider 
hacking, the proportion which associate hacking with terrorism is getting larger year on 
year (Figure 4).
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, press interest peaks at certain points, and this tends to 
indicate peaks of interest in a given episode. For example, the peak in 1996 Q4 is 
explained by reporting of alleged IRA access to personal information on potential
Figure 1 Frequency of UK national newspaper articles citing hacking and 
terrorism, by year
60
40
Figure 2 Frequency of UK national newspaper articles citing hacking and 
terrorism by quarter, with 8 quarter moving average trendline
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Figure 3 Frequency of UK national newspaper articles citing hacking and 
terrorism and articles citing hacking only, by year
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targets, gained by ‘hacking’ corporate records, although in most cases company insiders 
were involved and the terrorists were not hackers at all. Another significant peak in 
2000 Q2 is explained by the ‘I Love You’ virus, which caused widespread havoc across 
the Internet. Its originator was branded a cyberterrorist. The peak in 2002 Q4 is largely 
explained by the attempted extradition to the US of a UK hacker who hacked US 
military computer systems over a period of months. There were widespread rumours 
that he had terrorist links because he was active around 11 September 2001. At 
subsequent court hearings in the extradition case, press interest peaked again, notably in 
2005 Q2 and Q3.
Perhaps these increased reporting patterns are correlated with increases in underlying 
behaviour, with terrorists more frequently engaging in hacking and hackers turning to 
terrorism. However, close examination of the corpus reveals no reports of genuine 
cyberterror attacks, so another explanation must be sought for the association of hacking 
and terrorism in the national press. To understand the increased frequency of reports, it 
is necessary to consider their actual subject matter: of those reports associating hacking 
and terrorism, how many are discussing cyberterrorism (as defined in Chapter 2), and 
how many are discussing other issues? During the coding process, the articles were 
sorted into non-exclusive categories of behaviour, meaning that an article might be 
referring to more than one category. As described in Chapter 4, tie (one or more) 
categories assigned reflected the basic subject matter of the article as a whole, judged 
according to the ‘real’ subject-matter of the article and ignoring labels assigned in the 
text. At the start of the coding process, there were the eight main categories:
Terrorist activity:
1. Conventional terrorism
2. Conventional tool; digital target
3. Digital tool; conventional target
4. Cyberterrorism 
Criminal activity:
5. Conventional crime
6. Conventional tool; digital target
7. Digital tool; conventional target
8. Cybercrime
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During the coding process further categories were added as they emerged from the texts. 
These categories relate to activities outside the criminal and terrorist mainstream, but 
were nevertheless popular in the corpus.
9. Accidental damage
These were articles where the main focus was on damage to information systems which 
had, in reality, been inflicted accidentally.
10. Communication
The activity described was generally of a non-destructive nature, such as using the 
Internet for communication, propaganda, recruitment. Some destructive activities were 
included, such as the so-called ‘hacker wars’ which amounted to little more than tit-for- 
tat website defacements by, for example, Israeli and Palestinian hackers. Reports of 
such activity were included in this category where the main reason for the website 
defacement was promotion of propaganda, although they may additionally have been 
coded as “8. cybercrime”.
11. Ethical hacking
This is the name often used where a person gains access to parts of an information 
system which he should not have access to, but then informs the organisation of its 
vulnerabilities. The tag is also applied to similar techniques used within the information 
security industry with the full permission of the target organisation.
12. Information warfare
This category started to come to prominence in the late 1990s. It includes reports 
concerning information warfare between nation states, such as security services of one 
state disrupting the dealings of another which is suspected of aiding terrorists. It also 
includes industrial and state espionage. Post-9/11 reports on hackers working for 
Governments against al-Qaeda were also added to this category.
13. Hoax
This category refers to a genuine hoax situation. A frequent example is emails claiming 
to be virus warnings, which heighten fear and concern without there being any actual 
cause. Not to be confused with hoax emails pretending to be something legitimate but 
which actually contain a virus: these are category 8 (cybercrime).
This analysis of the articles in the corpus provides the distribution of their subject 
matter as objectively determined, rather than as determined by reference to the language 
used in the article. The results are presented in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 demonstrates
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that a significant majority of articles which associate hacking and terrorism are really 
reporting criminal issues. The number of articles which actually report terrorism as part 
of the main subject matter is roughly a third of the number of those reporting crime. 
The remainder of articles principally reports issues other than crime and terrorism. It 
follows that the terrorism issue is often introduced into articles which deal 
predominantly with crime, without it being pertinent to the fundamental subject matter 
of the article.
Figure 5 Frequency distributions for categories of ‘terrorism’, ‘crime’ and 
‘miscellaneous’ which are further broken down in Figure 6
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The striking feature of the frequency distribution of the behaviour categories presented 
in Figure 6 is that 250 articles from the corpus of 681, representing over one third, are 
reporting on cybercrime specifically, even though all of these articles bring up the 
terrorism issue. This is nearly four times more than the next most popular categories of 
conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism, conventional crime and communication. Two 
further categories are worthy of specific mention, crime using digital tools to attack 
conventional targets, and information warfare. The nature of the reporting of these 
behaviour categories will be explored in the remainder of Section 1 to establish the 
context in which the terrorism issue is introduced. The discussion is emphatically in 
relation to the stance taken by the press as a claims-maker in its own right, rather than 
press reports of claims made by others, which are discussed in Chapter 6.
1.1 Cybercrime
Ordinary criminal activity is overwhelmingly the most common behaviour described in 
articles citing both hacking and terrorism. In most cases, the issue of terrorism is 
introduced to ‘spice up’ an otherwise mundane report of everyday criminal activity. 
Under the headline “Computer terrorism ‘coming to Britain The Independent 
claimed:
Bizarre new corporate computer crimes, including terrorism by electronic mail and “fax 
graffiti” attacks, now rife in the US, are coming to Britain, specialists warned yesterday.
In the US, at least 80 prosecutions are being brought for acts of electronic terrorism. 
These include cases in which offenders ring in to a company voice-mail system and 
leave threatening messages. 28 November 1991
Threatening voicemail messages, whilst undoubtedly unpleasant, do not, on any
balanced analysis, amount to terrorism. A Sunday Times headline warns ‘Secret DTI
inquiry into cyber terror”:
The government has been holding a secret investigation into attacks by ‘cyber terrorists’ 
on the City of London for more than two years. ...
Later in this article a DTI statement makes it clear that the ‘cyber terrorism’ actually
refers to suspected extortion, a simple (albeit serious) criminal offence:
... We are very interested in the allegations of extortion directed at City of London 
institutions which were brought to our attention in 1994. ... So far, we have not been 
presented with any hard evidence from victims. The Sunday Times, June 9,1996
Once again, exaggeration is being used in order to make the piece more exciting. The
Mail on Sunday resorts to ‘what i f  tactics to introduce terrorism, starting with a story
about ordinary hack attacks on government systems and then finding an expert to
extemporise on the possible consequences if terrorists ever started hacking:
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The staggering discovery that growing computer terrorism could destabilise Western 
governments has led to an international inquiry. European political leaders are so 
concerned at the ease with which government computer systems can be infiltrated by 
hackers that they are now demanding urgent action. ...
Amazingly, all die organisations and governments infiltrated in recent years have 
remained ignorant of their vulnerability to electronic terrorism - even when the hackers 
actually ‘controlled’ their computer systems. ...
One computer expert said: ‘Up to now most of the hacking has been done for fun but if 
the know-how of these people ever fell into the wrong hands - those of terrorists or 
political extremists - the consequences could be catastrophic. ...
The grim potential for terrorist gangs or sinister political groupings to hold the world to 
ransom through computer sabotage has not been lost on political leaders worldwide. 14 
February 1993
After 9/11 the issue of terrorism gained greater momeilum and it coloured reporting of 
a variety of ordinary criminal incidents. Tabloids were particularly keen on this kind of 
presentation, although the broadsheets were by no means averse. The People claimed 
“Terrorists in e-mail plot”:
Security chiefs fear that followers of Osama Bin Laden have turned to cyber terrorism 
in a plot to paralyse Western governments.
Mystery hackers have spread a highly destructive virus through the European 
Parliament’s e-mail network. Now there are fears it could be passed on to government 
systems all over the world.
One Euro source said: “This could be the work of al-Qaida terrorists.” June 16, 2002 
It seems that a ‘source’ can be found to support most claims yet, in this case, there was 
no reason to assume that this virus originated with a terrorist organisation.
Sometimes the issue of terrorism is introduced because there is a genuine, if misguided, 
belief that the attack in question was carried out by terrorists. A letter from Emma 
Nicholson, MP claims:
I have been told by security sources that extremists in Holland and Germany have used 
computer-derived information to bomb oil refineries and destabilised government 
actions.
With such a background no ‘special case’ consideration can be retained for the hacker. 
Those ‘innocents’ who claim immunity must realise that they stand in the company of 
the international terrorist and industrial blackmailer. The Independent, 30 December 
1989
Nicholson was sponsor of a Private Member’s hacking Bill which later became the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990. Sometimes such claims are made cynically, however. In 
2001, even before the World Trade Center attacks, Michael Vatis, then Director of the 
US National Infrastructure Protection Center, claimed:
Hackers come in a variety of flavours, from the unwitting teenager messing about on a 
home PC, who, “doesn’t usually mean any harm but ends up causing millions of dollars
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worth of damage,” to the Bin Ladens of this world. The Daily Telegraph, 1 March 
2001
Although terrorist use of the Internet for communication, propaganda, fund raising and 
other ancillary purposes are reasonably widely accepted, there has been no credible 
claim that Bin Laden or his associates have used the Internet for cyber-attack. As 
Director of the NIPC, Vatis would have known this well. His cybercrime unit was at 
this time newly established under Bill Clinton and this may explain why he was ‘talking 
up’ his remit.
There are endless examples of how terrorism is worked into mundane reports of 
computer-related crime, and a flavour is given here. For present purposes, note that, of 
681 news articles citing both hacking and terrorism, the vast majority are of this nature 
and, in reality, report nothing more than mundane, computer-related crime.
1.2 Conventional terrorism
Amongst the articles predominantly discussing terrorism, there is a roughly equal split 
between conventional terrorism and cyberterrorism (Figure 6). Hacking is often linked 
with conventional terrorism because the resulting issue of cyberterrorism is thought to 
capture the imagination of the reader. For example, towards the end of 2004, The 
Independent prints the headline “CBI Annual Conference: head ofMI5 warns business 
to guard against terrorism ”, and largely discusses defences against the consequences of 
conventional terrorism, but goes on to report:
A security specialist with Sun Microsystems, a software company which designs 
measures to combat “cyber-terrorism” disclosed that in almost a third of companies 
former employees still had access to internal computer systems. 17 November 2004
This had nothing to do with the terrorist angle of the story, but seems to have been
thrown in for good measure as a hot topic. Sun Microsystems deal with information
security generally, not terrorism in particular. The word ‘cyber-terrorism’ is used in
place of the rather more mundane ‘cybercrime’ or ‘hacking’.
1.3 Cyberterrorism
When cyberterrorism in its technical sense is reported, the predominant theme for 
discussion is the potential for cyberterrorism. In this study, this b termed the ‘future 
threat scenario’: an event or state of affairs is specified and this is used as evidence that 
electronic catastrophe is inevitable and, often, imminent. The specified event or state of 
affairs used as evidence for the future threat scenario changes over time. A fresh round 
of concern might be triggered by an event such as the emergence of a new technology, 
the publication of a report or a declaration of war. The importance of scenario-building
114
is elaborated further in the next chapter, but the following example is representative of 
the general approach taken by the press:
Extremists are recruiting Islamist computer hackers -  creating a breed of high-tech 
terrorist who threatens to cripple Britain's economic infrastructure.
Banks, businesses, Government offices and transport systems are in the frontline of a 
new wave of cyber terrorism that could bring the country to a standstill and drain 
billions from the economy. Sunday Express, 30 October 2005
A somewhat lesser, although significant, proportion of articles which discuss
cyberterrorism are dealing with policy issues -  the formalised social reaction to
perceived risks.
Among the Marsh commission’s recommendations are a doubling of spending on 
combating computer terrorism (from the current £160m), the formation of an office to 
assess the potential threat to computer networks in public and private sectors, and 
enhanced co-operation between the private computer sector and government 
departments. The Independent, 22 October 1997
On proposals for the Terrorism Bill, later the Terrorism Act 2000:
The Government also plans to adopt the FBI’s definition of terrorism as being violent 
acts carried out by groups such as militant computer hackers and some anti-abortionists. 
The Times, 18 December 1998
And when the Act came into force:
It also targets “cyber terrorists” who cause serious disruption by attacking computer 
installations or hack into electronic data to undermine governments or threaten lives. 
The Daily Telegraph, 19 February 2001
1.4 Conventional crime
Crime is classified in this study as conventional, rather than cybercrime, where there is 
only a weak association with computers, and the most frequent crime in this category is 
blackmail or extortion. Once again, terrorism and a computer angle are added to 
sensationalise reports. This passage describes some sort of intimidation, but there is no 
reason to assume that the activity is carried out by terrorists or for terrorist motives:
In the US, at least 80 prosecutions are being brought for acts of electronic terrorism. 
These include cases in which offenders ring in to a company voice-mail system and 
leave threatening messages. The Independent, 28 November 1991
The crime described in the next passage is blackmail, but because of the threat to
destroy computer systems, The Observer elevates the status of the blackmailers to
“cyber-terrorists”:
Cyber-terrorists are reported to have blackmailed British and US financial institutions to 
the tune of pounds 400 million by threatening to wipe out their computer systems. The 
Observer, 2 June 1996
In a different story from The Daily Mail similar tactics are used in the headline:
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CYBER TERRORIST STRIKES; Defence chiefs ‘blackmailed’ as hacker targets 
satellites and security posts. Daily Mail, 1 March 1999
1.5 Communication
These articles often report terrorist use of ICTs, which is not considered cyberterrorism 
within the definition used in this study. Bin Laden is frequently reported as a heavy 
user of technology:
Technology allows information to be encrypted into webcasts...
Osama bin Laden is an expert at transmitting his views by video - to the point where the 
Pentagon wondered whether they might contain secret messages. The Times, IS 
December 2001
There were also allegations of cyberterrorism in relation to the Bah bombing, although 
these were mainly to do with use of the Internet at the planning stage:
FBI investigators fear the outrage was al-Qaeda’s first cyberwar attack.
Defence specialists believe Osama bin Laden fanatics planned and executed the 
bombing using computers.
The masterminds could even have detonated their devices from thousands of miles 
away, possibly Pakistan or Kashmir.
The CIA have established that bin Laden ran many of his earlier operations over the 
internet. Daily Star, 15 October 2002
Another significant proportion of the communication category relates to propaganda-
motivated activities by activists or other non-terrorist groups who are often
characterised as terrorists.
The information terrorists at Undercurrents.org have been around for a while putting out 
their particular brand of social justice activism, which centres around making videos 
documenting grass-roots struggles, protests and actions from around the globe. The 
Guardian, 24 April 2003
A further example is provided by DK Matai of Mi2g who is a frequent ‘expert’ source 
of the more outrageous claims about cyberterrorism. Here he refers to the web 
defacements which occurred during the Balkan War:
DK Matai, managing director of Mi2g, said: “The internet attacks from pro-Serbian 
elements highlights, for the first time, political activism as a force for cyber terrorism.” 
The Sunday Times, 15 August 1999
1.6 Crime: digital tool, conventional target
There is an important distinction to be made between cybercrime and conventional 
crime in which a computer happens to be used. DS Don Randall, of the City of London 
Police fraud squad, summarises these distinctions succinctly:
... it was important to distinguish between a crime in which computers were used as a 
tool, and computer fraud, which involved manipulating or corrupting a mainframe, 
which was still relatively uncommon.
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‘There is very little computer fraud as such, but almost any fraud has now got an 
electronic aspect,’ he said. The Independent, 10 October 1989
There is a further fine distinction between what counts as conventional crime, as
discussed above, and what counts as ‘digital tool, conventional target’ crime. The
general criterion used when coding was that, for this category, a computer was actually
used in the commission of a conventional offence, such as using a denial of service
attack to extort money from a commercial organisation, or gaining access to
confidential information through hacking. Certainly, DoS attacks and hacking are
cybercrimes in their own right but, in these cases, they are actually means to a more
conventional end.
The issue of terrorism tends to be introduced into articles falling into this category by 
means of the ‘what i f  mechanism. A criminal innovation is detailed, examples are 
given, then there is speculation on what might happen if terrorists started doing the 
same:
Hordes of web bots do crooks’ bidding: Malicious Programs threaten to engulf UK 
corporations as hi-tech crime taskforce tracks cases of online blackmail around the 
world.
... Financial crime is not the only concern. Terrorists could use such techniques to try to 
paralyse an emergency telephone network or an air traffic control system, with 
devastating consequences, particularly if combined with a physical attack. The 
Guardian, 13 November 2004
This extract is interesting because it provides a good example of how the police
sometimes use the voice of reason, allaying fears and dampening panic. Other
examples play on existing fears, such as the following example detailing notorious
security flaws in Microsoft products, and add the spectre of terrorism to emphasise the
point:
The Government was accused last night of leaving Britain’s nuclear arsenal wide open 
to terrorist computer hackers.
MPs and computer experts demanded answers from Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon 
after claims that the computers on our nuclear submarines are to be run on the Windows 
2000 system.
They allege that the software, which runs many home computers, is vulnerable to attack 
by hackers. Sunday Express, 24 October 2004
1.7 Information warfare
The information warfare articles are a curious mixture and reflect a growing concern in 
the press which manifests from the late 1990s onwards. This category includes 
industrial and state espionage. Given that this study is not focussed on information 
warfare, as such, it was not thought necessary to separate the issues of espionage and
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information warfare which, in any event, overlap to a certain extent. Moreover, the 
boundaries between the state and global business interests are increasingly blurred, so 
that damage to one may affect the other. The coding term “information warfare” is, for 
this reason, taken to cover both state and business interests.
Here, again, terrorism is most often associated with information warfare through the 
‘what i f  mechanism. As exemplified here, the argument is often based on the 
advantages terrorists might find in new techniques of asymmetric warfare:
I-War is a great equaliser. The more technologically evolved you are, the more 
vulnerable you are. And no matter how backward your country may be, how 
unsophisticated your means of conveying utilities or waging conventional war, you can 
be David to the American, or the Western European, Goliath. This is a form of war that 
a Third World rogue state, or a small terrorist organisation, could wage against the 
mighty superpower and win - or, at any rate, not lose. The Independent, 22 February 
1998
Summary
Of the 681 UK national press articles, all of which associate hacking with terrorism in 
some way, at least 57% are fundamentally dealing with the subject of crime, computer- 
related or otherwise. Of the remainder, 12% discuss some form of conventional 
terrorism, which may include a computer-related element, 10% discuss communication, 
and 6% discuss information warfare.
11% of the articles studied have as their principal focus the subject of cyberterrorism, as 
defined in Chapter 2. The important message is that hacking and terrorism are often 
associated in a corpus of press articles which are predominantly reporting mundane, 
computer-related crime. This is evidence of concern, yes, but it is also evidence of 
attempts by various actors, including the press, to entrench the association of hacking 
and terrorism in the generalised belief system which is growing up around hackers, 
terrorists and the Internet. This despite the fact that the reports reveal neither evidence 
of hackers being associated with terrorist groups, nor evidence of terrorists using 
computers and the Internet for anything more than communication or criminal activities, 
such as fraud and counterfeiting. The press are clearly setting an agenda by deliberately 
constructing a link between hacking, terrorism and technology and often explicitly 
calling it ‘cyberterrorism’. This style of inflammatory reporting raises awareness and 
puts cyberterrorism on the map of social problems, about which ‘something must be 
done’.
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2. Im age  transm ission: reporting  the claim s  about hacking
AND TERRORISM
As well as agenda-setting, there are two further roles which may potentially be taken on 
by the media: image transmission and claims-making (Cohen 2002: xxiii). This section 
will consider the sources of the images transmitted by the press, and Section 3 will 
discuss claims made by the press as claims-maker in its own right. The substance of the 
claims made by other claims-makers is left for Chapter 6.
First, which claims-makers are represented in the UK national press? Just as the articles 
were sorted into non-exclusive categories of behaviour during the coding process, the 
source or sources of information for the article were also identified. Once again, the 
sources are non-exclusive categories, and more than one source was assigned to an 
article if appropriate. A ‘source’ in this sense refers to a ‘claims-maker’ in moral panic 
terminology. The data collected from the corpus and presented here establish which 
individuals and organisations are acting as claims-makers in the cyberterrorism 
narrative.
Figure 7 shows the number of articles associated with each source category. This is a 
measure of the general influence of each source in the UK national press. Figure 7 
demonstrates that the press functioning as claims-maker provides the impetus for more 
articles than any other source. These are instances where the writer of the article is 
himself making claims about the problematic situation, either amplifying or attenuating 
the rhetoric of cyberterrorism. The actual claims made by the press will be discussed 
further in Section 3.
Not far behind are the triumvirate of law enforcement, politicians and information 
security industry. Claims-makers in the law enforcement category include intelligence 
services and military, as well as police. They are grouped together for the purposes of 
macro analysis because their claims are remarkably similar and have enormous 
influence with the press. Differences in motivation emerge at the micro level, and these 
are discussed separately and in historical context (Chapter 6). The most influential 
political claims-makers reported in the UK press are UK and US politicians, both highly 
active in the area of cyberterrorism. The information security industry is a top claims- 
maker but it is, perhaps, surprising that the industry comes behind law enforcement and 
politicians.
So-called experts are also highly influential and may come from industry, academia, 
voluntary organisations, the public sector and elsewhere. They are called upon by the
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Figure 7 Frequency distributions for non-exclusive source categories for articles 
associating hacking and terrorism
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press, politicians and others when it is necessary to provide evidence for a particular 
viewpoint. They are important because their expertise is socially accredited and their 
pronouncements give credence to the claims being made about a problematic situation. 
Not only do they warn about the nature of the problem, but they also propose solutions. 
‘Experts’ are often quoted in the press without any indication of who they are or what 
their affiliations are. In a sense, who these experts are is of limited importance because 
it is their status, rather than their job description, which gives force to the rhetoric they 
are asked to support. Their expertise is often not so much inherent as attributed by the 
press.
Further down the list of influential claims-makers comes the criminal justice system, not 
including the police. Sources from within the criminal justice system tend not to be 
claims-makers, as such, but reports of court proceedings and the like, thus a ‘source’ of 
a story in the more traditional sense. Less frequently reported claims are made by 
sources in the commercial sector, representing commercial interests outside the 
information security industry. An example would be a spokesman from a business 
association such as the CBI. Victims of cyber attack come at the bottom of the list. 
This is likely to be because high-profile victims are unwilling to discuss their
1 2 0
experiences because of the stigma attached to security breaches. Low-profile victims, 
on the other hand, are unlikely to be deemed newsworthy.
Hackers, both former and current, feature in the list of claims-makers but are not 
regularly reported. This deviant group has not found a powerful voice in the press. 
Terrorists, perhaps unsurprisingly, do not act as claims-makers at all. This is important 
because it demonstrates how claims about cyberterrorism may remain uncontested. If 
the ‘deviant’ group cannot or will not speak up for itself, only elements from within the 
other claims-making groups can speak on their behalf.
The codes relating to the source of a claim were also used for individual text segments 
as well as entire articles. An example would be a quotation in the text of an article 
which was directly attributable to a particular source, such as a go\emment minister or 
a police officer. This is a measure of frequency of citation of, or reference to, the 
particular source in the UK national press. It is possible to split the source codes 
referring to articles as a whole from source codes referring to text segments. If Figure 7 
gives the data relating to the former, Figure 8 shows these same data, together with the 
data for the text segments.
The aggregate data in Figure 8 are important because they show how influential a 
particular source is overall, both in terms of general influence and frequency of citation. 
According to these data, the four main influences in the UK national press change. 
There are two significant results. First, when direct quotations and references are taken 
into account, tie influence of the information security industry in press reporting of 
hacking and terrorism is greatly increased. This suggests that the press uses the industry 
as its primary source of ‘experts’ (represented by the data in purple) as well as reporting 
more passively the claims made by the industry (represented by the data in blue). 
Second, the overall importance of the press itself as claims-maker is exposed as being 
somewhat less than might previously have been supposed. This suggests that the press 
is not necessarily driving the majority of what is written on cyberterrorism in terms of 
claims-making and that reports are more often reactions to claims that have been made 
in public and which editors deem newsworthy. Certainly, there is a filtering mechanism 
at work here and the press still wield considerable power over this issue, but other 
actors, such as industry, law enforcement and politicians, are self-evidently engaging in 
the dialogue.
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Figure 8 Aggregate frequency distributions for sources influencing an article as a 
whole and for sources quoted or referenced specifically in the text
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Summary
Although the press has a voice of its own, it is predominantly engaged in transmitting 
the rhetoric of other claims-makers as part of its image transmission role. This gives 
high profile and circulation to the views of key claims-makers in the cyberterrorism 
narrative. However, the press are not neutral in this process: on the contrary, the 
rhetoric of others is often either amplified or attenuated, leading to a body of reports 
which are substantively heterogeneous.
3. T h e  p r e s s  a s  c l a im s -m a k e r
This section examines the claims made by the press itself and the themes which arise in 
its presentation of cyberterrorism. Before considering these questions in detail, as with 
any other claims-maker it is worth investigating the particular motivations of the press.
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Peter Sommer, writing as Hugo Cornwall and an expert frequently called upon by the 
press, puts it vividly:
When journalists ring you up with their rumour of a hack, their report of evidence of 
eavesdropping by VDU radiation, their ‘steer’ from the authorities of a computer fraud 
about to be frustrated, their anxiety that every other journalist in town is writing about 
computer viruses, or about subversive or pornographic bulletin boards, what they really 
want is a validating quote for a slightly rickety story. They can only use your views if 
they are sensational. Tell the newshounds what you honestly think, and either the story 
dies or they rush back to the contacts list until they find a more quotable expert...
I suspect that the real losers from all these misleading press stories are computer users 
who protect their systems from dangers they don’t really face whilst ignoring more 
mundane, and real, perils. The Guardian, 5 May 1988
Sensationalism is a significant driver behind many press reports. Basic computer-
related crime is often dressed up as ‘cyberterrorism’ for added effect. Yet the tone of
press reporting is not homogeneous, and those instances where the press acts to
attenuate the rhetoric of panic will be considered first. This may be by way of direct
comment by the author, and the point is often an important one about policy and what
kind of society we want to five in:
... the Internet has been represented as a potential site for major calamities. There has 
been much press comment about so-called ‘cyber-terrorism’ and the threat to society’s 
moral well-being from pornography and paedophile rings...
Research shows that although anxieties about risk are often disproportionate to the real 
dangers facing us, they can have a major impact on the way we conduct our life. The 
Guardian, 26 July 1997
The... proposal [made by academics in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs] also suggests a 
National Information Assurance Institute... It would guard against cyber-terrorists 
spreading computer viruses and trade information before tipping off government. But 
such an institute would have a huge pool of confidential information - medical records, 
credit ratings, telephone records. Who guards the guardians?
Europeans should listen carefully to this US debate and question its assumptions. It is 
all right for Hollywood to imagine an evil mastermind striking at society. But it is 
another matter to base a hi-tech backed strategy on such an ill-defined threat. Given 
shrewd political guidance, existing agencies, acting within present laws, can provide a 
shield against catastrophe. The Times, 16 January 1999
Often, the attack is a more personal one, focussed on politicians with ulterior motives:
If you believe Robin Cook, the main threat we face from computers is “hacking”. 
Cyber-terrorism, he warned his parliamentary colleagues, can “cripple Britain faster 
than a military strike”.
It seems that Cook, like Ronald Reagan before him, has been reading too much Tom 
Clancy. Or, more likely, he knows that if you frighten the pants off us we may not ask 
awkward questions about the bill for £2.5bn that MI5, MI6, and GCHQ is presenting to 
British taxpayers for the privilege of having their email spied on. The Guardian, 16 
April 2001
This is where the dark side of the net comes in handy. If you are (say) a Home 
Secretary who seeks draconian powers to control the net, your best strategy is to scare 
the citizenry by exaggerating the risks from criminals and paedophiles to justify those
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powers. Since nobody knows the extent of criminal use of the network, you are 
unlikely to be challenged on empirical grounds. Blunt assertions from policemen and 
spooks are all you need. This was how the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was 
pushed through - giving MI5 access to every digital packet flowing through a British 
ISP’s servers. The Observer 13 May 2001
The press may also be motivated to debunk myths as part of an expose on industry
practices:
The seriousness with which we should treat reports predicting the apocalyptic threat of a 
new and virulent strain of computer virus is not enhanced when, more than 
occasionally, we can detect that behind the dire warnings lies the clear hand of a 
company selling just the anti-virus package we need to deal with it. The Times, 18 
August 1995
A final major category of myth debunking and panic dampening can occur when the 
press, albeit rarely, give hackers or ex-hackers a voice:
As editor and publisher of 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, Mr Goldstein feels he has an 
important role to play. He wants the public to get a more balanced view of what 
hackers really do, in the face of media representations classifying arrested hackers as 
computer terrorists...
It is this sort of behaviour that gets computer hackers such a bad name, though they 
generally tend to denounce these types of activities. The Independent, 17 July 1995
Ex-hacker and editor of Hack-Tic magazine Rop Gonggrijp claims the vilification of 
hackers is just the security industry scaremongering in an attempt to justify its own 
existence. The Guardian, 22 May 1997
Having dealt with the significant cases where the press acts to dampen panic about
cyberterrorism, press claims are otherwise diverse and the majority of articles aim to
sensitise the public and sensationalise the issues. In common with other sources, the
press tends to focus on stories about cybercrime, linking it with terrorism in various
ways in order to achieve a degree of excitement mt otherwise merited. In terms of
symbolism, the hacker, his supposed links with terrorism and his tools, chiefly the
Internet, attract special attention.
To underscore the concern felt about cyberterrorism, security threats on the one hand 
and vulnerabilities on the other are highlighted time and again. Claims often relate to 
the vulnerability of key systems, providing a locus for the cyberterrorist threat to 
society.
[Rjeporters, supported by computer experts, discovered that some of BT’s classified 
information had been extracted and placed on the Internet... The world could view 
some of Britain’s most closely-guarded secrets...
Among the downloaded information ... were the locations of radar command posts, 
Nato fuel depots, tactical air control centres and missile sites, private numbers for 
members of the Royal Family, secret Bank of England numbers and MI6’s training 
centre. The Independent, 15 November 1995
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The most dangerous feature of the new viruses is that many are triggered simply by 
checking an e-mail in-box. Even if a user does not click on the infected e-mail, let 
alone open an attachment, the virus will cause huge damage and send itself to every 
other address in the computer’s e-mail software. The Observer, 7May 2000
The United States... has given warning of the importance of protecting its most 
vulnerable systems from the threat of cyber terrorism. The Times, 20 November 1999
Having established cause for concern, the claims move inevitably to the deviants
deemed to cause it. Hackers are translated into terrorists. Basic computer-related crime
is morphed into ‘cyberterrorism’, and a simple process of association is the most
common mechanism used by the press to achieve this. In many cases, the offenders are
termed ‘cyberterrorists’ explicitly:
The government has been holding a secret investigation into attacks by cyber terrorists 
on the City of London for more than two years. The Sunday Times, 9 June 1996
This case involved blackmailers who simply threatened to compromise computer
systems unless substantial payments were made. There were no genuine connections to
terrorist organisations, yet once the word ‘terrorists’ is mentioned, the association is
made. In other cases, the term ‘cyberterrorist’ is associated with hacker activity, rather
than calling hackers ‘cyberterrorists’ outright:
So many hackers are using the Internet to try to break into sensitive American military 
and civil systems that the United States government is about to create an expert team to 
counter “cyber-terrorism”. The Independent, 7 June 1996
In the final type of association, hackers and terrorists are simply associated in the same
sentence, leaving the impression that they are connected:
Our species, though, is emotionally driven - and thus flawed. Terrorists and hackers 
share the warped desire to achieve fulfilment through destruction. The Business, 15 
August 2004
Millions of people risk having the personal information stored in their mobile phones 
stolen by a hi-tech electronic eavesdropping device, experts warned yesterday. It would 
enable paedophiles, terrorists and industrial spies to hack into handsets without the 
victims even realising. Daily Mail, 15 April 2004
As well as providing evidence of the specific rhetorical mechanism of association, these
are all examples of the sensationalism which is the key feature of press claims about
cyberterrorism. Other examples are varied, sometimes referring to science fiction:
Imagine the nightmare scenario. Like the movie WarGames, computer buffs hack into - 
and then take over - the systems controlling defence and economic secrets of every 
nation in the world. Fantastic? Impossible? We can reveal today that it has happened. 
Mail on Sunday, 14 February 1993
Still other stories portray the actions of hackers in a bizarrely overblown manner, such
as this report from the first Gulf War in which some young hackers hacked a European
weather computer several weeks before Operation Desert Storm:
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The Allies’ success in the Gulf War was put in danger because of three British computer 
hackers. Plans for Operation Desert Storm had to be dramatically altered after the trio 
scrambled data in the massive computer which gave General Norman Schwarzkopf vital 
weather intelligence in advance of the attack on Iraq. The group, operating separately 
from their bedrooms in the North of England, inadvertently jeopardised - almost fatally 
- the international effort against Saddam Hussein, putting thousands of servicemen’s 
lives at risk...
Scientists ... at first suspected terrorists or a foreign power had infiltrated their computer 
when things started to go drastically wrong with the Cray’s calculations. Mail on 
Sunday, 21 March 1993
Gross exaggeration is also used to give a story high impact. The following was
included in a report that the US government was about to approve the use by its
intelligence agencies of certain covert intelligence-gathering techniques which had
previously only been allowed with specific presidential approval:
Since the end of the cold war, a new breed of computer-literate terrorist and organised 
criminal has emerged. Every terrorist organisation has an array of personal computers 
and drug barons are investing millions of dollars each year to upgrade computer systems 
that keep track of their operations. The Sunday Times, 27 October 1996
A significant variation on the sensationalisation theme of claims-making is ‘prediction’.
Here, a piece of information is given and then extrapolated into a ‘what i f  scenario,
termed above the ‘future threat scenario’. This is a powerful mechanism used by all
claims-makers, and the press are no different:
Authorities fear terrorist groups could use similar attacks to disrupt rescue attempts after 
a major atrocity. Terrorists could even black out the electricity network using viruses, 
or attack air-traffic control systems. Mail on Sunday, 16 May 2004
Renegade computer programmers have developed dozens of ‘superviruses’ that each 
have the capability to inflict massive damage on global computer systems. The new 
viruses have many times the destructive power of the ‘love bug’ which wreaked havoc 
last week, and there are fears that criminals and terrorists could use them to blackmail 
governments and private institutions. The Observer, 7 May 2000
Summary
The press has a significant role in attenuating the rhetoric of moral panic, exposing the 
ulterior motives of other claims-makers or giving voice to those who seek to debunk 
myths surrounding cyberterrorism. This aside, the press underscore generalised concern 
by highlighting time and again the security vulnerabilities in computer systems, which 
constitute the locus of the threat to society. Other claims made by the press are many 
and varied, but always sensational. What draws them together is the rhetorical 
mechanisms used to get these points across. Sensationalisation has a number of facets, 
the most significant of which are the future threat scenario, association and 
exaggeration.
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This chapter has analysed the general reporting patterns exhibited by the UK national 
press in all reports where hacking and terrorism are associated in some respect. Further, 
it has presented evidence relating to press activity in each of its three main roles: 
agenda-setting, image transmission and claims-making. The next chapter will consider 
the substance of claims made by the other major claims-makers in the cyberterrorism 
narrative.
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C h a p t e r  6
F i n d i n g s :
C o n c e r n , c o n s e n s u s  a n d  t h e  c l a i m s - m a k e r s
1. Intro duction: C oncern  and  consensus
This chapter will deal with three of the six elements of the attributional model of moral 
panic as modified by Critcher (2003: 151): concern, consensus and claims-makers. 
Although these elements are distinct, evidentially they are practically impossible to 
separate. Concern is evidenced by the existence of a prevailing discourse of risk which, 
although contested, is largely dominant. Claims-makers engage in the discourse, 
identifying certain behaviour which is ultimately labelled and defined as deviant. 
Consensus is really a question of the degree to which the prevailing discourse can be 
said to be dominant and, in the most extreme cases, exclusive. When considering 
concern and consensus, evidence of one is most often pertinent to the other, so dealing 
with them both together avoids undue repetition.
The major claims-makers in the discourse on cyberterrorism were identified in Chapter 
5 as being those with the most powerful representation in the press: politicians, law 
enforcement, the information security industry and other ‘experts’, having either 
inherent or attributed expertise on the problem situation and possible solutions. The 
press has been identified as a claims-maker in its own right and those claims were dealt 
with in Chapter 5. The deviant group itself will be dealt with in Chapter 7.
The analysis in this chapter is organised according to the claims made by the major 
claims-makers. Before examining these, however, it is convenient to present certain 
aggregate data so that they can be referred to in later sections. The data presented 
below represent the number of times a given code was applied to a piece of text from 
the corpus. Figures 9, 10 and 12 represent the number of cases where two codes have 
been applied to the same piece of text. For example, Figure 9 shows that there are 70 
separate occasions in the corpus where the information security industry is the source of 
a reference to cybercrime. In other words, each of 70 sections of text was coded with at 
least two codes: ‘source -  information security industry’ and ‘8 -  cybercrime’.
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First, a very general overview of the data presented in Figures 9 to 12. The details will 
be discussed later in this chapter under headings relating to the main claims-makers in 
the dialogue on cyberterrorism.
Figure 9 Frequency distributions of claims-makers’ references to behaviour 
categories
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The frequencies with which each of these groups refers to the different categories of 
behaviour identified in this study (Figure 9) gives a measure of the types of behaviour 
which each group of actors considers significant and worthy of concern. The code for 
type of behaviour is attributed according to an objective assessment by the researcher of 
what behaviour is being described as opposed to the label attributed to the behaviour by 
the claims-maker. For example, where a hack attack is described but is labelled by the 
claims-maker as ‘cyberterrorism’, the code attributed is ‘8 -  cybercrime’ and not ‘4 -  
cyberterrorism’.
The striking feature of this dataset, drawn from press articles in which hacking and 
terrorism are associated, is lhat cybercrime is overwhelmingly the behaviour category 
most likely to cause concern overall and it tops the list of concerns for each claims- 
making group. Members of the information security industry are those most likely to 
express this concern in the p*ess. Although the term ‘cyberterrorism’ may be used
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widely to refer to all sorts of behaviour, an analysis of the frequency with which claims- 
makers discuss genuine terrorist cyber-attack, that is ‘cyberterrorism’ in the sense 
adopted by this study, shovra that frequency to be relatively low. Politicians 
demonstrate the most concern about cyberterrorism, with three times more reports than 
any other claims-maker. They are, therefore, by far the most likely to be making claims 
about the risks from cyberterrorism.
Figure 10 Recurring themes referred to by different claims-makers
terrorist link
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hacker tools
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9/11
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Figure 10 provides an indication of the targets of each group’s rhetoric, presenting the 
frequencies with which each group refers to a number of recurring themes. The 
relationship between hackers and terrorism is the theme most often exploited in the 
corpus, with the theme of hackers being very popular also. Such references to risks 
from the deviant group and their mode of deviance are far more common than 
references to their victims, the technological threat (technology viewed as problem; 
hacker tools, such as viruses and use of the Internet) or perceived vulnerabilities (IT 
dependence). It is also striking that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York (and 7/7 in 
London, which barely featured in the findings) actually played a very low-key role in 
the presentation of concerns about cyberterrorism by the various claims-makers.
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Figure 11 Frequency distributions for use of specific rhetorical mechanisms found 
to be significant in the corpus
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Figure 11 sets out the different types of rhetorical mechanism which were found to be 
significant in this study in relation to cyberterrorism and shows which were the most 
frequently used overall. Claims-makers most often resorted to exaggeration or 
distortion of facts, but also relied heavily on prediction, more specifically what has been 
termed the ‘future threat scenario’, and dramatisation, the better to appeal to the 
imaginations of a readership. It is also worthy of note that there is a significant level of 
panic-dampening activity amongst claims-makers, who assert that the cyber-disaster 
claims are overblown and lead to a misdirection of public concern. Once again, it is 
apparent from the data that the events of 9/11 and 7/7 were used relatively little as a 
rhetorical mechanism for those making claims about cyberterrorism.
Figure 12 sets out the frequencies with which the four main claims-makers in the 
cyberterrorism debate use the most prominent rhetorical mechanisms, giving an 
overview of their respective rhetorical approaches to the subject of cyberterrorism. 
Note that, if  Figure 11 gives frequencies of use of these mechanisms for the corpus as a 
whole, Figure 12 gives frequencies only for their use by four claims-making groups, 
thus the sum of the frequencies for each mechanism in Figure 12 falls short of the total 
frequencies in Figure 11.
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Figure 12 Frequency distributions of rhetorical mechanisms used by claims- 
makers
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These data are relatively complex and will be discussed in more detail below, however, 
three points are worthy of mention here. The information security industry, for 
example, are strong on future threat scenarios, exaggeration and distortion, yet they are 
also those most likely to debunk overblown claims made by other claims-makers (panic 
dampening). Politicians are those most likely to misdirect the public reaction, urging 
the focus of concern in one direction when it might more appropriately be directed in 
another. Where appeals have been made to the events of 9/11 and 7/7 in order to 
promote concern about cyberterrorism, these appeals have been made by politicians and 
law enforcers.
We will now consider, in turn, four categories of claims-maker which have emerged as 
important from the corpus of data: politicians, law enforcement and security services, 
the information security industry and other ‘experts’.
2. P o l it ic ia n s
Analysis of the quantitative data set out in Figures 9-12 provides an overview of the role 
of politicians in the cyberterrorism debate. As Figure 9 demonstrates, politicians are the 
most influential claims-makers, with press reports of them referring specifically to 
cyberterrorism being three times more frequent than the next most influential claims-
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maker. Figure 9 also shows that it is just as likely that politicians will be referring to 
cybercrime but, because cybercrime is linked with terrorism in all of these press reports, 
there is usually a terrorist angle to these references. This quantitative data supports the 
qualitative finding elaborated below, that politicians are often guilty of confounding the 
issue of cybercrime with cyberterrorism, labelling ordinary criminal behaviour as 
terrorist or simply merging the two together. Figure 10 sheds light on this by showing 
that, more than any other claims-maker, politicians emphasise the terrorist link, that is, 
the link between terrorism and hacking or technology or both In fact, for politicians, 
this recurring theme is far more significant than other themes which occur in the press, 
such as ‘hackers’ and ‘victims’.
When making claims about cyberterrorism, politicians use a variety of rhetorical 
mechanisms (Figure 12) the most important of which is the future threat scenario. They 
are often found to exaggerate or distort facts or scenarios in order to achieve impact. 
Dramatisation through scenario building is a popular mechanism for emphasising a 
point. Politicians are also more guilty than other claims-makers of misdirecting the 
reaction to an episode. Most often, this takes the form of claiming that certain deviant 
groups, usually hackers or terrorists, are likely to pose a grave threat to security in 
certain specified ways when there is little or no evidence to this effect. Occasionally, 
real events are blamed on hackers or terrorists when, in fact, they had nothing to do with 
it. Finally, politicians also employ the mechanism of association, described in Chapter 
5, whereby hackers and terrorism are mentioned together in such a way as to imply an 
association between the two.
This quantitative evidence can be backed up with qualitative evidence from the corpus. 
Although this is predominantly a UK study, it is clear that the politics of cyberterrorism 
cross national boundaries and the prominence of the US political perspective is apparent 
in the UK press reports. There is clear evidence that, where the US leads, the UK often 
follows. The bulk of political discourse, national and international, on the issue of 
cyberterrorism commences with the findings of a presidential commission set up by the 
Clinton administration, released in the last quarter of 1997. The Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection recommended a national strategy for protecting and 
assuring CNI from physical and cyber threats. The ensuing press reports focussed on 
claims about the real and growing threat from cyberterrorism, the calls for increased 
spending on computer security and the need for new government posts to coordinate the 
response. Although this is predominantly a UK study, it is clear that the politics of
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cyberterrorism cross national boundaries and the prominence of the US political 
perspective is apparent in the UK press reports. There is clear evidence that, where the 
US leads, the UK sometimes follows. The bulk of political discourse, national and 
international, on the issue of cyberterrorism commences with the findings of a 
presidential commission set up by the Clinton administration, released in the last quarter 
of 1997. The Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection recommended a national 
strategy for protecting and assuring CNI from physical and cyber threats. The ensuing 
press reports focussed on claims about the real and growing threat from cyberterrorism, 
the calls for increased spending on computer security and the need for new government 
posts to coordinate the response. The Independent gives a sense of the surprise felt by 
many American citizens at this apparently new vulnerability:
For a country relatively free from terrorist attack inside its borders, news of this 
vulnerability comes as a shock. The more computerised, the more technologically 
sophisticated they become, they are being told, the more vulnerable they are to cyber­
terrorism. The Independent, 22 October 1997
Following publication of the report, US politicians gave their view on vulnerabilities to
an increasingly apprehensive audience:
Consider this litany of woe. From former National Security Agency director John 
McConnell: “We’re more vulnerable than any other nation on Earth.” ... Or former US 
Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, speaking at a Senate hearing: “We will have a 
cyber equivalent of Pearl Harbor at some point, and we do not want to wait for that 
wake-up call.” And, Gorelick added, I-War “can disable or disrupt the provision of 
services just as readily -  if not more than -  a well-placed bomb.” The Independent, 22 
February 1998
Finally, President Clinton used his trademark, elegant simplicity to press the point 
home:
“As we approach the 21st century, our foes have extended the fields of battle from 
physical space to cyberspace... They may attempt cyber-attacks against our critical 
military systems and our economic base. We will launch a comprehensive plan to 
detect, deter and defend against attacks on our critical infrastructures.” The Times, 27 
May 1998
Following closely on these remarks, a mock ‘info-war’ was set up between the US and 
the UK in order to test each other’s vulnerabilities to cyberterrorism and information 
warfare.
Britain and America are about to go into battle in cyberspace. Staging a secret 
“information warfare” exercise in London later this month, the two governments will 
test their defences against the futuristic threat of terrorists using computers to bring the 
West to its knees...
...the exercises follow recent warnings from President Bill Clinton about die need for 
vigilance. Tomorrow’s enemy, he believes, will know better than to wage all-out war 
against America and her allies as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein did in 1991.
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Instead, small terrorist organisations or tinpot dictators might resort to biological 
weapons or information warfare, in which computer systems controlling airports, 
hospitals, traffic lights, banks and even nuclear weapons could be disabled, spreading 
more chaos than any conventional terrorist attack. Sunday Times, 7 June 1998
The potential for devastation of the CNI, including air traffic control, hospitals, defence
systems and nuclear plants, and the chaotic, deadly consequences of such an attack has
become a pervasive theme in the cyberterrorism discourse. Following this Anglo-
American exercise, the British Home Secretary picked up the rhetorical baton, making
the transfer from US to UK complete.
The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, has taken on responsibility for protecting Britain’s 
computers, including those in banking and airlines.
His advisers have warned that as Britain becomes more reliant on computers, vital 
Government systems, including those in the health service, air traffic control and 
defence, are becoming more and more vulnerable to malicious attack. The Independent, 
7 February 1999
This sequence of events illustrates the primary role of politicians in the cyberterrorism 
dialogue: sensitisation and fostering concern (Section 2.1). In quantitative terms, these 
are by far the most common activities found in the corpus and the focus tends to be on 
the lack of security and, therefore, vulnerability in given situations. The next most 
common activity for politicians is making specific claims about cyberterrorism, what 
might happen and who is responsible (Section 2.2). This can be characterised as an 
attempt to forge a consensus in the generalised belief system about what the problem is 
and what must be done. Each of these three major activities will be examined in more 
detail below.
2.1 Fostering concern
Highlighting existing vulnerabilities is fee main tool used to foster concern. These 
vulnerabilities are often not empirically demonstrated, but rather products of the rhetoric 
of fear. Politicians are the key actors when it comes to emphasising electronic 
vulnerabilities and the threats from terrorism:
Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld admitted recently that while “we are safer today from 
the threat of massive nuclear war than at any point since the dawn of the atomic age, we 
are more vulnerable now to the suitcase bomb and the cyber-terrorist”. The Guardian, 2 
May 2001
British ministers have not shied away from blunt assertions of impending disaster for 
the CM, despite a lack of evidence in support of those assertions:
Computer hacking could now cripple Britain more quickly than a military strike or 
terrorist campaign, Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, told the Commons last night. 
He said that the electronic technology controlling iessential services such as water, 
power and transport had become a leading target for terrorists and other groups who 
wanted to disrupt the life of the nation. The Daily Telegraph, 30 March 2001
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The economic well-being of the nation is also at stake, it seems, although the claims are 
not supported with any evidence:
E-commerce minister Douglas Alexander yesterday ordered internet security to be 
stepped up. He warned web experts from MI5, the MoD and GCHQ that increased 
vigilance was needed as terrorists could inflict major economic damage by bankrolling 
rogue computer hackers and infecting systems with a lethal virus. The Mirror, 27 
September 2001
The presentation of the worst-case scenario has become characteristic of political 
assessment of an electronic threat. Often, claims about vulnerabilities are combined 
with claims about the ease with which they can be exploited, as in this example where 
US defence systems are tested using ‘hacker tools’ which can be downloaded from the 
Internet by anyone:
Robert Ayers, chief of the Information Warfare Division at the US Deputy Directorate 
for Operations, conducted an offichlly sponsored four-year attempt to break in to 
Department of Defense computers.
Using hacker tools downloaded from the Internet, and only attacking systems when 
invited to do so, his team succeeded in taking control of the network in 88 per cent of 
attacks. Of those, 95 per cent went undetected. “I believe between a quarter and a half 
a million successful intrusions occurred in the US military computers in 1995,” says 
Ayers. “That’s a scary number.” The Guardian, 22 May 1997
What starts in the US is sometimes followed in the UK, and this kind of systems testing
is an example:
Britain’s vulnerability to information warfare has recently been the subject of scrutiny 
in the form of a ‘threat assessment’ co-ordinated through the Cabinet Office...
Although the results of this assessment were reassuring, government spokesmen still
employed the ‘just because it hasn’t happened yet doesn’t mean it’s not going to...’
argument, a variant of the future threat scenario:
...The outcome, so far as it went, was reassuring: they found ‘no sign of any systematic 
attack’. But those involved acknowledge that complacency would be misplaced. 
‘There may be no evidence of any foreign government with hostile intent, but everyone 
can see the threat coming,’...
... the complexity of the technologies involved ... offer die hacker a challenge and the 
terrorist an opportunity. The Guardian, 22 May 1997
Reassurance is notably absent from the official presentation of vulnerabilities due to
cyberterrorism and related threats. Politicians are active in highlighting the potential
dangers which exist even in our own homes. Under the headline “Electronic Pearl
Harbor: Should we be more worried about terrorists using digital weapons rather than
chemical and biological attacks?” Erkki Liikanen, European Commissioner for the
Information Society, claims:
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“More households are signing up for broadband internet services because they offer 
faster access and an “always on” connection. This, of course, increases the 
vulnerability of systems and multiplies the probability of some sort of cyber-attack...” 
The Guardian, 20 February 2003
It is the networked and interdependent nature of modem information systems that
motivates politicians’ attempts to shock individuals and companies into taking the cyber
threat seriously:
Schmidt [advisor to President Bush on cybercrime] pointed to evidence discovered by 
US investigators on computers found in Afghanistan that suggested A1 Qaeda 
operatives had been planning to disrupt Western power, telecoms and water supplies by 
hacking into computer systems.
“There is only so much governments can do on their own,” says Schmidt. “Almost 85 
per cent of the computer systems on which society depends are in private hands, so we 
need a partnership approach to the problem. Everyone has to do their share to secure 
their little piece of cyberspace.” Sunday Express, 24 October 2002
When it comes to society’s electronic vulnerabilities, the politicians leave us in no
doubt that, first, there is a clear and present danger and, second, that each citizen should
be concerned and must play their part in securing the nation.
2.2 Politicians as claims-makers
... Republican Senator John Warner told the committee in Washington the nation ‘would 
be unforgiving’ if a terrorist attack occurred and it was later determined that the 
government hadn’t done enough to stop it. The Guardian, 18 March 1999
It is timely to remember that a primary duty of any government is to promote national
security by all reasonable means. Senator Warner’s remarks remind us of this, together
with the fact that a government also has a duty to look forwards, to try to read the path
of future events and, where necessary, to take precautionary measures against possible
mishap. As events a mere two years after Warner’s address tragically demonstrated,
atrocities can and do occur in the real world, despite the best defensive preparations.
Yet there should be caution at the other end of the scale. With frequent calls for action,
new laws and new police powers in the name of countering threats to national security,
the problem is how to decide what measures are appropriate to the particular risk. Some
commentators have argued that politicians are not necessarily reliable arbiters in this
respect:
... politicians cannot be trusted to decide whether a person should be deprived of his 
liberty. The government hates judges because they cannot be relied on to do what it 
wants. That is precisely why judges alone should decide. Ministers do not weigh 
evidence. They measure political risk. There is little in detaining too many [terrorist 
suspects without trial], but a lot in deciding to release. Political risk should not be 
confused with threat to the nation. Politicians have a vested interest in talking up threat 
levels. They use a circular argument. The threat justifies the detentions and the 
detentions offer “proof’ of the threat. Sunday Times, 30 January 2005
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The question is: how far is society prepared to go to defend itself from attack? The 
answer depends on your view of the future, which in turn depends on the way you use 
existing information to extrapolate predictions: a good formulation of the future threat 
scenario.
Figure 12 highlights the fact that the rhetorical mechanism most used by politicians in 
relation to cyberterrorism is indeed the future threat scenario. To recap, the argument 
runs along these lines: an event or state of affairs is specified and this is used as 
evidence that electronic catastrophe is inevitable and, often, imminent. The specified 
event or state of affairs used as evidence in the future threat scenario changes over time 
and examples have included: society’s increasing reliance on computers and 
corresponding vulnerability, 9/11; and the second Gulf War. These events and the 
claims which they generated are examined in more detail below.
(a) Reliance on computers means inevitable cyber-attack 
The increasing reliance of developed Western economies on computerised systems 
throws up vulnerabilities of an order not previously experienced. Politicians consider 
this a cause for deep concern and frequently attempt to engender this concern in society 
at large. In his famous 2001 speech in the House of Commons, Robin Cook, then 
Foreign Secretary, highlighted the vulnerabilities caused by reliance on computers and 
used this as a springboard for his ultimate argument: that computer attack is potentially 
more devastating than a conventional militaiy attack.
“The revolution in communications technology is creating new opportunities on an 
exponential scab. This week, 360,000 e-mails will be sent in Britain every second, a 
fifth more than in January and twice as many as last June.
“Computers now manage most of our critical national infrastructure, but with these new 
opportunities there also comes the risk of new threats.
“A computer-based attack could cripple the nation more quickly than a military strike.” 
Daily Telegraph, 30 March 2001
The government’s security advisors cited increasing security in other areas as the main
reason for the growing focus on electronic attacks. Simply put, as conventional targets
are better protected, electronic targets become an easier option for those wishing to
damage British interests.
Sir David, the Government’s security and intelligence co-ordinator, outlined how the 
terrorist threat might develop in the next five years. ... “We must expect there will be a 
shift to softer targets including economic targets, in response to our enhanced security.”
... “We should expect attacks on our information infrastructure, some from terrorist- 
inspired motives as well as criminal.”
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Officials are concerned that terrorists will target both public and private sector 
computers. The cyber-terrorists would disrupt communications, including the banking 
and benefit computer networks.
Another strategy would be to hack into defence computer systems or systems operating 
sewage and water supplies. A cyber attack could halt electricity grids, cause air traffic 
control systems to fail and disrupt the credit-card network. The Times, 23 March 2004
Disaster scenarios such as electricity failure and air traffic chaos are now well rehearsed
in discourse on cyberterrorism and will be familiar to anyone who reads a newspaper on
a regular basis.
(b) Speculation on al-Qaeda 
Of all the events which could have prompted widespread concern over the threats from 
cyberterrorism, the attacks of 11 September 2001 are the most obvious. There was 
widespread newspaper coverage of this concern, ranging from speculation as to what at 
Qaeda might or could do, to claims as to what al-Qaeda were actually doing.
As with the case of the power failures in North America on 14 August 2003, basic, 
criminal activity such as spreading viruses has been blamed on ‘cyberterrorists’, a good 
illustration of how cybercrime and cyberterrorism are often confounded. Similarly, 
after 9/11 some were quick to attribute virus activity to al-Qaeda even though there was 
no real evidence of any terrorist motive:
Security chiefs fear that followers of Osama Bin Laden have turned to cyber terrorism 
in a plot to paralyse Western governments.
Mystery hackers have spread a highly destructive virus through the European 
Parliament’s e-mail network. Now there are fears it could be passed on to government 
systems all over the world.
One Euro source said: “This could be the work of al-Qaida terrorists.” The People, 16 
June 2002
This virus incident was followed later that month by more fears specific to al-Qaeda. 
On 28 June 2002 The Guardian published two separate, but almost identical, stories 
with eye-catching headlines: “US fears al-Qaida hackers will hit vital computer 
networks’'’ and “Al-Qaidaplanning cyber-attacks’’.
The al-Qaida terrorist network has been making preparations for potentially devastating 
attacks on America by hacking into computer networks to look for ways to disrupt 
electricity and telephone systems, dams and nuclear power stations, it was claimed 
yesterday.
Government officials said the terrorist group appeared to be far more sophisticated than 
initially thought in its use of the internet as a weapon to disrupt America’s web-based 
economy and cause potentially catastrophic physical damage by opening dam 
floodgates or blacking out air traffic control systems. The Guardian, 28 June 2002
These claims are unequivocal, yet the only evidence offered in support relates to al
Qaeda suspects browsing websites offering hacking tips and others not even identified
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as al Qaeda affiliates “studying US computer systems” connected with the CNI. 
Nevertheless, a Presidential adviser is motivated to claim:
“We were underestimating the amount of attention (al-Qaida was) paying to the 
internet,” Roger Cressey, the chief of staff of the White House critical infrastructure 
protection board, told the Post.
“Al-Qaida spent more time mapping our vulnerabilities in cyberspace than we 
previously thought. The question is a question of when, not if.” Sunday Express, 24 
October 2002
There is a strong assertion of the future threat scenario here. Although Cressey does not 
explicitly state what he is expecting, the context makes it clear that he considers a 
cyberterrorist attack inevitable.
Political rhetoric has also dealt with the motivational principles imputed to al-Qaeda. In 
the passage below, two rather strange claims are made. First, that the spectacular 
conventional attacks on 11 September 2001 somehow crystallise the threat from 
cyberterrorism. Second, that it is not possible to damage the economic infrastructure of 
the West through conventional attacks, therefore cyberterrorism will become the 
weapon of choice. For good measure, a reference to the vulnerability of the emergency 
telecommunications system is brought in at the end to continue the CNI theme.
But it’s the events of September 11 2001 that have turned cyber-terrorism from a 
theoretical threat into a very real one. The warning signs are there for all of us to see in 
al-Qaida’s public statements, says Richard Clarke, chairman of the president’s critical 
infrastructure board. ... His argument is quite simple: before September 11, al-Qaida 
tended to talk about taking human lives -  killing as many people as possible. But 
afterwards its rhetoric shifted towards threats against the economic infrastructure of the 
west. This is too dispersed and diverse to bring down with bombs, he argues, but it 
could do a lot of damage in cyberspace...
... ‘Now, if you’re a terrorist, the first thing you might want to do before an attack is 
take down the 911 system,” says Clarke. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
A major problem with these claims is that it is by no means apparent that a ramping up
of conventional attacks heralds the arrival of cyber attacks. It may certainly justify the
speculation that further spectacular conventional atrocities may occur elsewhere in the
world, and such speculation was proved horribly prescient by the subsequent bombings
in Madrid, London, Turkey and Egypt. But the idea that al-Qaeda has moved on from
the conventional to the cyber attack is simply not bome out by the available evidence
presented to the public and reported in the press. Assertions that the only way to
damage a Western economy significantly is by cyber-attack are not easily credible.
Consider, for example, the damage to lucrative tourist industries caused by fears of
further bombings; the prohibitive costs of clearing up and making good after a major
incident such as occurred in London; the revenue lost by businesses due to closure of
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offices and staff being unable or unwilling to turn up for work. It is often the case that 
the ‘economy’ is identified with the stock exchange in any given country. Yet, 
intuitively, how much easier would it be to bomb a physical stock exchange than to 
penetrate its distributed information systems and damage them electronically? Even 
allowing for disaster recovery provisions, the economic damage from a bomb in these 
circumstances would surely resound throughout the world as other exchanges felt 
themselves vulnerable.
(c) Speculation on Gulf War II 
The second Gulf War was a further event used to support claims that electronic 
catastrophe is inevitable and imminent. Once again, the future threat scenario is used to 
build and maintain levels of concern. The warnings started before the war:
Terrorist groups may try to infiltrate the computer systems of some of Britain’s biggest 
companies, government departments and emergency services if a war is launched 
against Iraq, the Home Office has cautioned. The Times, 20 February 2003
We now know that Islamic extremists did not resort to cyber-attack: they remained
committed to the gun and the suicide bomb.
The war in Iraq was supposed to dramatically raise the likelihood of a major 
cyberterrorist attack against the US and its allies. Some even predicted a “digital Pearl 
Harbor”, an electronic assault that could have shut down power plants, crippled the 
banking system, or disabled the air traffic control network. ...
Now with the war winding down, fears that Iraq, al-Qaida or even sympathetic hackers 
in Russia and China would open up a second front in cyberspace have turned out to be 
completely unfounded, with little or no evidence that either they or anyone else engaged 
in cyberterrorism. What happened?
Quite simply, the expected attacks just never materialised. The Guardian, 24 April 
2003
The article went on to explain that neither the US military nor Symantec had detected 
any significant increase in attacks as a result of the Gulf War. Yet when politicians 
make predictions which do not materialise, the future threat scenario still holds good. 
The power of this mechanism is, of course, that it is impossible to refute: there were no 
attacks this time, but there may be in the future. Such was the case with claims made 
about the risks of cyberterrorism as a result of the second Gulf War:
Even if the risk of cyberterrorism during the war was overstated, the threat of a serious 
attack by a rogue nation or a terrorist group remains very real, according to US 
government agencies. Recent reports by the FBI and the Department of Homeland 
Security have outlined the continuing danger of terrorist groups turning to the internet. 
One particular concern is that cyberterrorism might be timed to coincide with a physical 
terrorist attack, such as bombing a building while simultaneously disabling the 
emergency response system, to ensure that the maximum number of lives were lost. 
The Guardian, 24 April 2003
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Yet again, the vulnerability of the CM is emphasised in order to make the future threat 
seem more immediate and believable, providing something on which the imagination 
might seize. The following passage provides another example of this technique, as well 
as employing the asymmetry argument in the attribution of a new rationale for cyber 
attack: extremists have lost the war and cannot hope to win against the might of the 
USA in a conventional fight. Therefore, they will resort to the asymmetry of cyber- 
attack where they can achieve greater purchase.
[G]iven the recent show of American military superiority in Iraq, cyberterrorism might 
prove attractive to extremist groups looking for a more level playing field on which to 
fight. ...
Congressman Andrews predicts that if the US does not find a way to make its critical 
infrastructure more secure, there will be a “significant cyberattack within the next five 
years, whether it is on the 911 emergency response system, the power grid, the banking 
system or the air traffic control system”. The Guardian, 24 April 2003
As so often before, this amounts to little more than speculation, and there is no evidence
for these assertions other than the fact that the argument seems logical The message is
also expected to sink in through sheer repetition of the vulnerabilities in our CM.
As noted at the beginning of this section, a government has a duty to look forwards, to 
try to read the path of future events and, where necessary, to take precautionary 
measures against possible mishap. The keystone of this process is the way existing 
information is used to extrapolate predictions. The problem in the context of 
cyberterrorism is that information is either absent, incorrectly interpreted or entirely 
fabricated and it follows that the predictions based on this information, or lack of it, are 
flawed. Nevertheless, these predictions are used as justification for calls for the 
enhanced social controls which are explored further in Chapter 8.
Summary
Politicians are major claims-makers in the cyberterrorism debate and their views are 
reported in the press more often than any other. They tend to confound the issues of 
cybercrime and cyberterrorism, either for political expediency or through lack of rigour. 
Politicians tend to exaggerate and distort the facts, but the most important rhetorical 
mechanism is the future threat scenario: an event or state of affairs is specified and this 
is used as evidence that electronic catastrophe is inevitable and, often, imminent. Even 
if the predicted events do not ultimately come about, politicians are adept at using the 
ultimate power of the future threat scenario: the impossibility of proving that such a 
scenario will never take place. If he event did not happen as they predicted, it is
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possible to argue that it may still happen, or society may still be vulnerable for different 
reasons.
3. P olice and  security  services
When coding the corpus, the ‘security services’ variously included intelligence services 
and, where the context was appropriate, the military. During the coding process, the 
police and security services were dealt with together since their concerns were most 
often identical. Nevertheless, there were occasions where a distinction needed to be 
drawn and, where relevant, this will be made clear. Unless otherwise stated, however, 
from now on these two groups are referred to collectively as ‘law enforcement’. It is 
recognised that this is a somewhat unorthodox shorthand when used to include 
intelligence and security functions.
An analysis of the types of activity most frequently referred to by law enforcers reveals 
that cybercrime is the most important (Figure 9). This is to be expected, since the 
police are the law enforcers most often quoted in the press and they are usually 
concerned with the investigation of incidents which have already taken place. By far 
the most common type of cyber-delinquency reported in the corpus is ordinary 
cybercrime (Figure 6 in Chapter 5), such as hack attacks and theft of information held 
on a computer, and it is these offences which are investigated by the police. The second 
most popular behaviour for discussion is communication. The way criminals and 
terrorists communicate with each other and run their operations is of prime importance 
to law enforcers and it is clear that they will be extremely concerned, not only with the 
method of communication, but also with the substance. Use of the Internet by deviant 
groups has long been a concern for law enforcers, and this concern will be investigated 
further below (Section 3.1 (a)).
Other categories of behaviour are much less often discussed by law enforcers. Some 
attention is given to conventional crime which, bearing in mind that this comes in the 
context of reports citing both hacking and terrorism, may indicate that law enforcers are 
more likely than other groups to confound conventional crime with its cyber relatives. 
A recurring example in the corpus was the case where extortion is attempted using 
threats to compromise an electronic system. This has been referred to as 
‘cyberterrorism’ but, according to the taxonomy used in this study, it does not even 
qualify as cybercrime. The only electronic element present is the threatened computer 
system, but no electronic manoeuvre is ever made. When the codings are analysed 
more closely, however, it becomes apparent that the police themselves are not generally
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confounding conventional crime with cybercrime or cyberterrorism: it is the reporting 
of these cases in the media which introduces the confusion. Whilst a police officer will 
have used the word ‘extortion’ this will be juxtaposed with the word ‘cyberterrorist’ in 
the text of the article, leaving the impression of a terrorist link where none was intended 
by the police (this example from The Sunday Times, 2 June 1996). Indeed, the police 
are commonly meticulous in their characterisation of deviant acts as cybercrime, 
computer-related crime or terrorism. This is bome out by the fact that law enforcers 
refer to cyberterrorism infrequently and then only in the abstract since available 
information suggests they have never had to investigate such an episode.
Finally, law enforcers are those most likely to refer to conventional terrorism and the 
type of computer-related crime which applies a digital tool to a conventional target. In 
fact, when the distribution of frequencies with which law enforcers refer to each activity 
in the taxonomy (Figure 9) are compared with the overall frequency distributions of 
press reporting of these activities (Figure 6 in Chapter 5), there is a very good fit 
between the two, and the police are unique amongst claims-makers in this respect. This 
tends to suggest that they are not focusing unduly on one type of behaviour for 
rhetorical purposes. It might be said that they ‘speak as they find’, attaching a 
reasonably accurate and impartial label to the cases they investigate.
That said, of the various themes which recur in press coverage of cyberterrorism 
generally, there are two to which law enforcers make reference far more frequently than 
all others: the theme of hackers and the theme of the terrorist link (Figure 10). When 
discussing these themes, law enforcers are most likely to use the mechanism of 
dramatisation in order to emphasise a point (Figure 12). Here, the use of illustrative 
examples serves to highlight the concerns of law enforcers. Law enforcers are less 
likely, on the other hand, to employ the rhetorical mechanisms of the future threat 
scenario, exaggeration and distortion. The qualitative evidence puts this quantitative 
information into perspective. Perhaps knowing they cannot risk crying wolf too often 
for fear that the public will ignore their warnings, the police are habitually cautious 
when making specific claims about future threats. As a result, claims about the threat 
from hackers and cyberterrorism are seldom made and, even then, are relatively muted 
and rarely, if ever, sensationalist. Referring to the possibility of cyber-sabotage by 
temporary workers with an anti-capitalist agenda, the police issued a warning, but 
qualified it as merely taking precautions:
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‘We are aware that a number of events are being planned for the May bank holiday 
weekend,’ admits a spokesperson from the Metropolitan Police, adding that they are 
merely taking precautionary measures to avoid a repeat of last year’s protest, in which 
rioters brought terror to the financial district and caused £2 million of damage. The 
Guardian, 17 April 2000
Eliza Manningham-Buller, then director general of MI5, warned a CBI conference that
she was concerned UK companies were becoming complacent about an attack because,
at that time, the UK had not been targeted for outrages on the scale of 9/11 or the
Madrid train bombings. She avoided sensationalism, however, merely urging
organisations to engage in the kind of security activity they should in any event be
considering in the course of their everyday business:
“My message is to broaden your thinking about security issues. A narrow definition of 
corporate security including the threats of crime and fraud, should be widened to 
include terrorism and threat of electronic attack.” The Independent, 9 November 2004
3.1 Concerns
This section sets out those concerns law enforcers brought to public attention by means 
of the press. As availability and use of the Internet became more widespread, it became 
inevitable that old forms of deviance would be given a new form of expression and that 
new forms of deviance would become possible. This state of affairs was legitimately a 
source of concern for the police because it brought with it new challenges for law 
enforcement. Of course, the existing law could be used in many cases, so that the main 
challenge for the police was one of resources and expertise in the investigation process, 
since an understanding of and aptitude in the use of computers and networks was 
necessary. In some cases, however, there were genuinely acts of deviance which did 
not appear to be covered by any existing law, and these were generally grouped under 
the term ‘hacking’. In this respect, the police not only lacked the skills and resources 
for investigation, but also the law had been found wanting. At this time, there was no 
such thing as a computer crime unit and calls for new legislation came from the Fraud 
Squad:
Scotland Yard’s fraud squad is backing demands for computer hacking to become a 
criminal offence. The Independent, 15 May 1989
Legislation was duly passed in the form of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, but the
challenges arising from lack of skills, resources and organisation remained and, indeed,
remain to this day.
(a) Internet as problem
Detective Superintendent Brian Drew of NCIS said: “Criminals are diversifying. They 
are using the tools that the Internet provides. Interception of these communications is 
very difficult.” ...
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... Albert Pacey, director general of NCIS, said that new information technologies and 
particularly the Internet presented a serious problem.
“A new police beat is emerging,” said Mr Pacey, “not that of the streets of our cities but 
that of the information highways which are creating criminal opportunities that 
ultimately affect every citizen.” The Guardian, 29 May 1997
It is axiomatic that one of the greatest hurdles to online policing is the fact that the
Internet reduces or removes the significance to the user of geographical boundaries,
time, identity and personal resources. Conversely, the importance of these things
increases for law enforcers when attempting either to gather intelligence or investigate
an offence. Geographical boundaries suddenly become a barrier to investigation
because of the territorial nature of the police:
Acknowledgement of the international scope of computer crime is illustrated by an 
Interpol working manual that an international police committee ... is issuing to more 
than 150 countries round the world. The manual is planned as a common vade mecum 
for die computer investigator so that the FBI man in New York can talk to a counterpart 
in Hong Kong, Moscow or Nairobi. The Times, 20 December 1995
Time is of the essence, since evidence can be erased quickly:
Detective Inspector John Austen was tired but philosophical. Working on an 
investigation through the night is one of the penalties of running the police team in 
Britain dedicated to patrolling the emerging world of the computer criminal.
“We have entered a global village where normal time and geography do not apply.
Because things happen so quickly and briefly we have to act quickly,” he said. The 
Times, 20 Decemberl995
Identity becomes all but impossible to establish:
... when the authorities intercept anonymous criminal boasts about thefts and acts of 
sabotage, it’s often impossible to tell which crimes really happened, and which were 
merely imagined. The Independent, 8 August 1992
... the American government, backed by the FBI, is concerned that [encryption] will be 
used by terrorist organisations to pass instructions and plan bombings or organise riots 
across the world without the risks involved in physical or telephone contacts. Who 
needs a “dead letter drop” - open to covert surveillance -  when you can encode the 
information to be picked up anonymously on the Net? Sunday Times, 3 August 1997
Users need only limited personal resources to effect a correspondingly large amount of
harm, whereas the police need vast resources to conduct their investigations; where one
user can perpetrate a crime, many officers are necessary to investigate.
Britain faces a growing threat of an electronic attack by terrorists linked to al-Qaida that 
could paralyse key public services, including electricity and water supplies ...
For terrorist groups like al-Qaida with limited resources, it would be “a very attractive 
method” of attack, that would cause “huge damage”, said Stephen Cummings, director 
of the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre. The Guardian, 12 August 
2002
What delights the protesters -  but worries their opponents -  is that the internet acts as a 
magnifying glass for discontent. Individuals using computers can wield power they
146
vulnerabilities which, if exploited, would lead to catastrophic consequences, nor 
whether there are cyberterrorists ready and able to exploit them.
The next two sections set out the views of those on either side of this debate.
4.1 Cyberterrorism as threat
In common with other claims-makers in the late 1990s, notably politicians (section 2.2 
above), the information security industry voiced concerns that cyberterrorism was a 
logical next step for terrorist groups, and that the targets would be the economy and the 
CNI. This was an emerging idea, the public discourse about which was largely 
triggered by President Clinton’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection which 
published its findings in 1997 (see further section 2.2 above).
Dr Neil Barrett, an expert on computer hacking and “information warfare” ... predicted 
that organisations such as the IRA and Animal Liberation Front would soon take 
advantage of the technology. “It’s such an obvious and logical next step, it’s something 
we anticipate,” he said. He added that terrorists of the future might use computer 
viruses to cripple emergency and public services rather than bombs. The Independent, 
29 May 1997
Neil Barrett, senior consultant with Bull Information Systems, said terrorists found the 
Internet an obvious choice for their activities.
“Certainly it is very attractive to them,” he said. “Border controls can pick up things 
like Semtex but they cannot detect computer viruses.” Terrorist groups could cause 
economic damage without the risks they ran in planting bombs. The Guardian, 29 May 
1997
An obvious next step for terrorists, perhaps, but one which did not materialise in the 
years that followed. Still, die warnings did not stop and, indeed, gathered force over the 
years so that the response to claims about the future threat of cyberterrorism grew 
stronger in proportion to the strengthening conviction of its imminence.
...government and private computer experts will be ... look[ing] into the growing 
possibility of a “cyber-terrorist” attack on what is known as our “critical information 
infrastructure” -  the electronic systems vital for government, armed forces, business, 
finance, telecommunications, utilities, or emergency services.
There have been warnings from parts of the IT community that terrorists could attempt 
something like this for at least 10 years, but now governments are taking it much more 
seriously. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
Having predicted a future threat which did not come about, some members of the
industry resorted to labelling ordinary criminal and delinquent behaviour
‘cyberterrorism’. Thus, the teenager known as ‘Mafiaboy’, who brought several high-
profile websites to their knees, including CNN, Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon and Etrade,
became a cyberterrorist. According to the experts, he and his ilk were dangerous and
here to stay.
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introduction of compulsory identity cards as an absolutely essential tool in the war 
against terrorism. Sunday Express, 16 November 2003
Certainly, law enforcers are concerned about computer-related crime and terrorism,
particularly given the new dynamic introduced with increased use of the Internet, and
they are keen that the public should treat information security seriously. Yet law
enforcers are also keen that the public should not forget that conventional methods of
crime and terrorism are still the bigger threat.
I am concerned that this connectivity and dependency make us vulnerable to 
information warfare attacks. While attention is focused on computer-based attacks, we 
should not forget that key nodes and facilities that house critical systems and handle the 
flow of digital data can also be attacked with conventional high explosives. John 
Deutch, Director of the CIA, from a speech given to the US Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee 25 June, reproduced in The Observer, 7 July 1996
It is not uncommon for terrorist organisations to do business with other forms of 
organised crime...
But... there is ‘absolutely no suggestion’ that terrorists would be involved in hi-tech, 
multi-million-pound attacks on City firms. ‘Why bother with the effort of hi-tech when 
you can make all the money you need from drug dealing or credit card fraud?’ The 
Observer, 17 July 2005
In summary, law enforcers view the Internet with concern, since it is a facilitator of 
crime and terrorism and they lack the skills and resources to fight on equal terms with 
the perpetrators. That said, law enforcers retain, on the whole, a balanced outlook and 
recognise that the main dangers to the public, business and national security remain 
conventional for the time being. The rhetoric used is rarely inflammatory, and a 
measured approach to the issue of criminal and terrorist use of the Internet is 
maintained.
(b) Concerns relating to terrorism 
It is interesting to note that the press do not often report law enforcers as being 
preoccupied with terrorist, as opposed to criminal, use of the Internet until after 9/11. 
There is concern before this time, but it rarely finds a voice. Prior to 9/11, the most 
often reported sources of concern over terrorist cyber-attack came from the US law 
enforcement agencies. Use of the future threat scenario was common, because they 
were discussing possibilities and openly admitted that ro such attack had so far taken 
place, but the wild exaggeration often used in political rhetoric was conspicuously 
absent. This influential speech made by the Director of the CIA in 1996 is a case in 
point:
My greatest concern is that hackers, terrorist organisations, or other nations might use 
information warfare techniques as part of a co-ordinated attack designed to seriously 
disrupt infrastructures such as electric power distribution, air traffic control, or financial
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sectors; international commerce; and deployed military forces in time of peace or war
Certainly, the references to the power grid, air traffic control and so forth are in keeping 
with the sensationalist claims of politicians of a later date, but the language is relatively 
measured. The issue is couched in terms of ‘concern’ and ‘serious disruption’ rather 
than ‘fear’ and ‘catastrophe’. He continues:
... International terrorist groups clearly have the capability to attack the information 
infrastructure of the US, even if they use relative^ simple means. The methods used 
could range from such traditional terrorist methods as a vehicle-delivered bomb to 
electronic attack.
The latter methods could rely on paid hackers. The ability to launch an attack, however, 
is likely to be within the capabilities of a number of terrorist groups, which have 
increasingly used the Internet and other modem means for their own communications.
Many of the tools and technologies needed to penetrate computer systems and launch 
information warfare attacks are readily available to foreign adversaries. However, we 
need to remember that a threat is comprised not only of a capability, but also an intent. 
John Deutch, Director of the CIA, from a speech given to the US Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee 25 June, reproduced in The Observer, 7 July 1996
Deutch therefore emphasises that what he is describing is a possibility, rather than a
probability, and therein lies the difference between the language of law enforcers and
that of politicians. The underlying message here is that terrorists may be capable of
cyber-attack, but they may not yet have much of an incentive for it, since conventional
methods are still much more certain, accurate and are arguably easier.
After 9/11, the press reports rather more comment by law enforcers on die possibility of 
cyberterrorism. In the US, law enforcers have tended to put effort into maintaining the 
profile of cyberterrorism since 9/11 rather more than their UK counterparts.
Recent reports by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have outlined the 
continuing danger of terrorist groups turning to the internet. One particular concern is 
that cyberterrorism might be timed to coincide with a physical terrorist attack, such as 
bombing a building while simultaneously disabling the emergency response system, to 
ensure that the maximum number of lives were lost. The Guardian, 24 April 2003
Keith Lourdeau, FBI deputy assistant director, has told a US Senate committee that 
terrorists will develop or hire hackers to commit large-scale cyber attacks. Sunday 
Express, 30 October 2005
Yet the general consensus remains that, although terrorists are using information
communication technologies for communication, fund-raising and so forth,
cyberterrorism is an issue for the future: possible, but not yet likely.
... police suspect links between terrorist groups and counterfeiters who use the internet 
to trade in fake goods. Daily Telegraph, 19 April 2001
[Michael Vatis, former Director NIPC] adds: “Terrorist groups are already using 
technology for sophisticated communications and fund-raising activities. As yet we
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haven’t seen computers being used by these groups as weapons to any significant 
degree, but this will probably happen in the future.” Daily Telegraph, 1 March 2001
“We have pretty good consensus on what the intention of the terrorists is, but we have 
no real clue about their capability. US-European co-operation on the intent versus 
capability debate is absolutely vital,” says Roger Cressey, former director of 
transnational threats at the US National Security Council. Financial Times, 27 June 
2005
There is widespread concern, however, about terrorist use of the Internet to assist them 
in conventional methods, such as criminal methods of fundraising, including fraud and 
counterfeiting, as well as planning and propaganda:
Terrorist organisations and top criminals are starting to use the Internet to send secret 
messages and carry out fraud and counterfeiting, according to a new police study. The 
Independent, 29May 1997
Defence and law enforcement experts are convinced that the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon were planned, at least in part, using e-mail and the internet. It 
is likely that these files would have been encrypted and could only have been decoded 
by people in possession of a special software key ...
... Michael Vatis, former head of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Centre, 
said: “It is demonstrably the case that terrorists are increasingly using this technology to 
thwart lawful government efforts to gain vital intelligence and thereby to prevent
terrorist attacks.” Daily Telegraph, 21 September 2001
US intelligence sources said that websites ... are now central to the efforts of Muslim 
fundamentalist groups not only bringing in funds but also befag used to promote 
extremist opinions. Independent on Sunday, 28 October 2001
There is also concern that information freely available on the Internet, such as security
vulnerabilities, might prove useful to terrorists.
Police officers and security experts have expressed concern. What these people are 
doing is providing information which could be used by criminals and terrorists,” said 
Bill Hughes, a West Yorkshire assistant chief constable and secretary of the technical 
and research committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers (Acpo).
Members of the group, however, believe they are highlighting security loopholes which 
could and should be filled. Sunday Times, 12 May 1996
In the UK, pressure on the security services to increase efforts to secure critical
information systems seems to come more from government rather than from within,
possibly because police and security services still perceive the greatest threats to be
from conventional attacks and that prevention of these is, therefore, a better use of their
limited resources.
E-commerce minister Douglas Alexander yesterday ordered internet security to be 
stepped up. He warned web experts from MI5, the MoD and GCHQ that increased 
vigilance was needed as terrorists could inflict major economic damage by bankrolling 
rogue computer hackers and infecting systems with a lethal virus. The Mirror, 27 
September 2001
The question is, why does the Minister need to warn the security services of the threat 
from cyberterrorism and order them to act? The security services must be well aware of
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the threat and surely take system security very seriously. The Minister felt the need to 
state publicly that “Something must be done and this Administration is doing it”, yet the 
security services did not feel that such rhetoric was necessary.
3.2 The international effort
Following the publication in 1997 of the report of President Clinton’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, the National Infrastructure Protection Centre (NIPC) 
was established in 1998 and was the first single, national agency with responsibility for 
cyber attack. Uniquely, it combined advisory and investigatory functions. The creation 
of this agency was, itself, the result of a certain amount of lobbying on the part of law 
enforcers:
When he came up with the idea for a national organisation that would both investigate 
cyber crimes and warn the public and private sectors of potential viruses and other 
assorted forms of digital mischief in 1997, [Michael] Vatis [first Director of the NIPC] 
says: “There was no genuine system in place to help the government deal with specific 
cases of cyber crime.”
Until recently, computer viruses and online credit card fraud were generally considered 
to be minor hazards rather than as significant threats to national security.
He says: “My first major challenge was to convince policy makers and the public that 
internet security was a serious problem that needed to be addressed.”
Brandishing the rhetoric of a Judiciary Committee speech, Vatis says: “Cyber crime is 
not just a law-enforcement problem, nor a defence problem, nor a counter-intelligence 
problem, nor a business problem. It is all of these.” Daily Telegraph, 1 March 2001
This rhetoric was influential in the UK, as it was intended to be. The problem, of
course, is that cybercrime is a global phenomenon, so the US law enforcement rhetoric
on cybercrime and the potential for cyberterrorism was particularly important in
persuading other nations to follow suit. Once established, these new computer crime
units around the world would be able to share information and work together to
apprehend offenders.
Now other countries such as the UK, Japan and Canada are following the lead of the 
NIPC and establishing their own cyber crime units, which is a great relief to Vatis given 
the international nature of internet crime and the difficulties of co-ordinating 
investigations across borders.
He explains: “If a cyber crime takes place in the States, but the internet address is 
abroad, we are powerless to do anything.
“Cyber crime is a global issue and we routinely have to work with foreign partners.”
The NIPC enjoys a particularly strong relationship with the UK’s National 
Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC), established in late 1999. When a 
hacker from Wales known as Curador stole as many as 28,000 credit card numbers from 
e-commerce websites around the world, the NIPC and NISCC worked with the Welsh 
police to track down the offender. Daily Telegraph, 1 March 2001
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NISCC is working with the FBI in the hunt for the programmer, or group, which 
planted the love bug virus. Victims included Microsoft, Ford, the CIA and the 
Pentagon in America, and Vodafone AirTouch and Parliament in Britain. Sunday 
Times, 7 May 2000
[Chief Superintendent Len Hynds] says: “The aim of year one is to get the [NHTCU] up 
and running and to scope out the extent of the problem. We have no operational goals, 
although we are heading some investigations.”
Four investigations, to be precise, with European and American involvement, although 
he refuses to disclose any further details. Daily Telegraph, 19 July 2001
Clearly, these developments benefit all parties, not just US law enforcement. Yet US
involvement does not appear to stop at urging the creation of new national agencies
capable of cooperating internationally on cybercrime. They also appear to be involved
in European efforts at creating a pan-European cybercrime unit:
The Bureau also has a shadowy position on European Union committees, tussling with 
the task of developing a single cross-border cyber crime unit. The Guardian, 1 August 
2002
The new spirit of international cooperation was used to the full in the weeks and months 
following 9/11. The international links between law enforcement agencies were relied 
upon in tracing the activities of the suspects:
Millions of pounds secretly controlled by the terrorist leader or associates are thought to 
be washing around the Western banking system. The CIA is understood to have a team 
of computer hackers siphoning money away from suspect accounts.
British investigators believe they may have uncovered a channel of bin Laden funds 
from Saudi Arabia to London. US sources say money was transferred from Riyadh 
bank accounts to a Saudi-owned financial institution in die City, now being investigated 
by the British authorities. The Observer, 16 September 2001
There was also an impetus towards transnational legislation, rendering legal barriers to
counter-terrorism as low as possible and giving law enforcement agencies greater
powers:
The European Commission is rushing through a new set of anti-terrorist proposals to 
create a single EU system, ending the “cacophony” of 15 separate sets of laws and 
policies.
The new law, to be announced tomorrow, will broaden the definition of a “terrorist”, 
greatly expanding the powers of law enforcement agencies. It will cover anyone 
accused of aiding and abetting acts of terror rather than confining it to members of 
proscribed organisations. Daily Telegraph, 18 September 2001
This progress has not halted in the years since 9/11, and international cooperation has
been strengthened further to the benefit of police officers investigating trans- national
crime.
Chief Superintendent Mick Deats, who heads the 57-strong NHTCU, said: “The internet 
has no geographical boundaries. It is completely porous, and is therefore seen as a low- 
risk arena as an attack can be launched from any remote region of the world.”
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The unit has recently been helped by new cross-border agreements. The Guardian, 13 
November 2004
[There las been] a United Nations conference aimed at increasing international co­
operation among law enforcement agencies to combat a range of threats from terrorism 
to corruption, drug trafficking and cybercrime. Financial Times, 23 April 2005
The US investigation was carried out with the aid of the UK’s national hi-tech crime 
unit. The Guardian, 9 June 2005
He was tracked down and arrested in November 2002 by officers from Britain’s 
National High-Tech Crime Unit after an urgent appeal for help from security officials at 
Nasa. Independent on Sunday, 12 June 2005
Nevertheless, there are emerging problems with this new, necessarily international,
approach. Where law enforcers from different countries are forced to work together, the
inevitable differences in ethos will occasionally give rise to friction and missed
opportunities.
The transatlantic differences have been starkly revealed.
Last August the UK police were forced to launch a series of arrests when the US 
authorities announced that a terrorist cell had carried out surveillance of buildings in 
New York and Washington. The publicity incensed the UK police, who were forced to 
arrest several suspects before substantial evidence had been gathered against them. In a 
second incident the US refused to provide evidence to a German court, which led to the 
collapse of a terrorist trial this year.
Greater transatlantic co-operation between police and judicial authorities is now seen by 
counter-terrorism experts as essential to both streamlining operations and producing 
more accurate and specific threat assessments. Financial Times, 27 June 2005
Summary
Law enforcers are most concerned with cybercrime and use of the Internet by criminals 
and terrorists, especially for communication. They rarely resort to sensationalist 
rhetoric, however, and the expression of the concerns of law enforcers are characterised 
by accuracy when describing incidents. Use of the future threat scenario is limited and 
sensationalist language generally avoided. Law enforcers still consider that 
conventional crime and terrorism constitute more serious threats than cyberterrorism.
The broad concerns of law enforcers relate to inadequacy of the law to deal with 
emerging forms of deviance and insufficiency of skills and resources amongst law 
enforcers to meet the new challenges brought by the Internet. The Internet reduces or 
removes the importance of geographical boundaries, time, identity and personal 
resources for the user, but correspondingly increases the importance of these things to 
law enforcers, since they become significant barriers to intelligence gathering and 
investigation. Terrorist use of the Internet is, however, a double-edged sword, making 
terrorist activities, such as recruiting and fund-raising, more transparent than before so 
long as law enforcers have sufficient access to communications data.
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Before 9/11, reported concerns of law enforcers were mostly restricted to terrorist use of 
the Internet to facilitate conventional forms of deviance rather than cyber-attack. Most 
future threat discussion came from the US at this time. Post-9/11, however, law 
enforcers are quoted more on the subject of cyberterrorism, yet they remain more 
concerned about terrorist use of the Internet to facilitate conventional attacks than about 
cyberterrorism.
The US was a pioneer in the creation of a single, national agency with responsibility for 
cyber attack. Nevertheless, US observers saw cyberterrorism as a global phenomenon, 
and they required assistance from similar organisations in other countries. The 
challenge was to get other countries to set up these organisations and then to promote 
information sharing and common intelligence and investigations policies. There is 
mounting evidence that this process is well underway, with the US and the UK having 
cooperated on a number of major investigations already.
4 . T h e  in fo r m a tio n  secur ity  in d u str y
Members of the information security industry may be considered authorities on the risks 
from cyberterrorism. Information systems risk analysis is an integral part of their 
business, establishing where the threats He and whether there are any corresponding 
vulnerabilities: in this case, is cyberterrorism a threat and how might society be 
vulnerable? Of course, a large part of this industry’s revenue derives from the sale of 
security solutions. Therefore, insofar as the information security industry can be 
identified with Cohen’s category of ‘experts’ in the context of a moral panic, it must be 
admitted that they may have a clear commercial incentive to transmit their concerns 
about the risks from cyberterrorism. These experts cannot claim to be impartial 
observers. Nevertheless, commercial imperatives do not inevitably lead to exploitation 
in the sense of scaremongering for commercial gain.
Given that the concept of cyberterrorism has its roots in computer technology and 
information security, one might expect that claims made by the information security 
industry would be reflected in the press coverage of this issue from the time it was first 
reported h the late 1980s. This has not been the case. Figure 13 demonstrates that 
press reporting of claims made by the information security industry remained at a low 
level until after 9/11, at which point the figures rise sharply.
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Figure 13 Number of quotes from information security industry by year
Figure 9 shows that the primary concern of the information security industry is 
cybercrime. Industry members are almost twice as likely as law enforcers, for example, 
to express their concern with cybercrime, yet other types of behaviour represented in the 
taxonomy are of relatively little concern to them. This is most likely explained by the 
nature of their business: they sell tools to safeguard information and conventional crime, 
for example, would only ever be of incidental importance. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the predominant themes found in claims made by the industry and reported in the 
press are ‘hackers’ and the ‘terrorist link’ (Figure 10).
According to Figure 12, industry members are most likely to use the future threat 
scenario to convey their concerns.
“I’ve no doubt hackers will have infiltrated this system already. It’s only a matter of 
time before terrorists do.” Sunday Mirror, 18 August 2002
They are also likely to exaggerate or distort facts:
... someone could hack into an airline system to change the weight allowance on an 
airliner’s payload, causing the plane to crash on take-off or landing. The Guardian, 5 
December 2002
Nevertheless, they are more likely to attempt to dampen concern than dramatise a 
situation (Figure 12). The main industry discourse presented in the press centres around 
the question whether or not concern about cyberterrorism is merited. In the context of 
press articles dealing with both hacking and terrorism, the overall concern of the
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information security industry remains with hacking. When 63 claims in the corpus 
about specific threats were analysed, 33 relate to hackers and 20 to terrorists. 
Nevertheless, there is a divide in the industry between those who claim that 
cyberterrorism is a real threat, with some claiming that it is already with us, and those 
who assert that this amounts to scaremongering and that there are many real and 
growing threats other than cyberterrorism which demand attention and resources. As 
the Guardian points out:
.. .the computer security industry is sharply divided over the seriousness of the cyber­
terrorism threat, and there are dissenting voices. Just as with nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons, critics ask for the evidence that terrorists have the digital weapons to 
launch a cyber-attack. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
In information security terms, a risk exists where there is a vulnerability in a system,
together with the threat of a mechanism capable of exploiting it. There are many
established sources of threat to information systems, including hackers and insiders.
What has not been established is whether cyberterrorists should be added to this list of
sources. Donald Rumsfeld famously outlined three major categories of risk:
When Donald Rumsfeld spoke of “known knowns”, “known unknowns” and “unknown 
unknowns” the world laughed. But the concepts he outlined are familiar to risk 
managers.
Computer security knowns and unknowns correspond to risks within systems. A risk 
exists when a system has a vulnerability and a mechanism exists to exploit it.
Vulnerabilities that can be exploited are quantifiable risks (known knowns), while for 
those for which there is no exploitation (known unknowns) the impact is unquantifiable.
Security incidents within companies can seriously impact customer confidence and 
market valuation. Risks can be controlled by ensuring that vulnerabilities are fixed 
according to their potential impact.
It is clear that the ability of a company to control its risks effectively is inherently linked 
to its knowledge of exposed vulnerabilities and exploits and the existence of patches for 
them.
“Unknown unknowns” remain uncontrollable, unquantifiable risks. Financial Times 
21, September 2005
So, there are established vulnerabilities and there may be established exploits which 
threaten them. But do cyberterrorists exist? Are they capable of using or creating these 
exploits? Even if they are, would the results amount to ‘terrorism’. Thus the argument 
in relation to cyberterrorism: is the risk a “known known”, such that cyberterrorists do 
exist and are capable of exploiting known vulnerabilities with catastrophic 
consequences? Is the risk a “known unknown”, such that known vulnerabilities exist, 
but not whether cyberterrorists are capable of exploiting them with catastrophic effect? 
Or is the risk an “unknown unknown”, where it is known neither whether there exist
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vulnerabilities which, if exploited, would lead to catastrophic consequences, nor 
whether there are cyberterrorists ready and able to exploit them.
The next two sections set out the views of those on either side of this debate.
4.1 Cyberterrorism as threat
In common with other claims-makers in the late 1990s, notably politicians (section 2.2 
above), the information security industry voiced concerns that cyberterrorism was a 
logical next step for terrorist groups, and that the targets would be the economy and the 
CNI. This was an emerging idea, the public discourse about which was largely 
triggered by President Clinton’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection which 
published its findings in 1997 (see further section 2.2 above).
Dr Neil Barrett, an expert on computer hacking and “information warfare” ... predicted 
that organisations such as the IRA and Animal Liberation Front would soon take 
advantage of the technology. “It’s such an obvious and logical next step, it’s something 
we anticipate,” he said. He added that terrorists of the future might use computer 
viruses to cripple emergency and public services rather than bombs. The Independent, 
29 May 1997
Neil Barrett, senior consultant with Bull Information Systems, said terrorists found the 
Internet an obvious choice for their activities.
“Certainly it is very attractive to them,” he said. “Border controls can pick up things 
like Semtex but they cannot detect computer viruses.” Terrorist groups could cause 
economic damage without the risks they ran in planting bombs. The Guardian, 29 May 
1997
An obvious next step for terrorists, perhaps, but one which did not naterialise in the 
years that followed. Still, the warnings did not stop and, indeed, gathered force over the 
years so that the response to claims about the future threat of cyberterrorism grew 
stronger in proportion to the strengthening conviction of its imminence.
...government and private computer experts will be ... look[ing] into the growing 
possibility of a “cyber-terrorist” attack on what is known as our “critical information 
infrastructure” -  the electronic systems vital for government, armed forces, business, 
finance, telecommunications, utilities, or emergency services.
There have been warnings from parts of the IT community that terrorists could attempt 
something like this for at least 10 years, but now governments are taking it much more 
seriously. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
Having predicted a future threat which did not come about, some members of the
industry resorted to labelling ordinary criminal and delinquent behaviour
‘cyberterrorism’. Thus, the teenager known as ‘Mafiaboy’, who brought several high-
profile websites to their knees, including CNN, Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon and Etrade,
became a cyberterrorist. According to the experts, he and his ilk were dangerous and
here to stay.
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.,. Rick Broadhead, an internet consultant, said cyber attacks would continue. ‘We 
shouldn’t feel any more safe because of this arrest,’ he said. ‘It is a new form of 
terrorism called cyber-terrorism. I really believe it won’t go away.’ The Guardian, 20 
April 2000
In a similar vein, there have been claims from the faformation security industry that 
certain high-profile viruses have originated with terrorists. In response to the 
widespread disruption caused by the ‘I Love You’ virus (aka ‘Love Bug’), for example:
Experts warned that the attack could have been an attempt by “cyber terrorists” to hack 
into sensitive systems. One said: “The worrying aspect is that cyber terrorism has 
become relatively easy and we haven’t seen the last of it.” The Express, 5 May 2000
In addition, the discovery of a variety of security faws became grist to the mill for 
claims that terrorists were at work.
Private security companies also say there is growing evidence of attempts at electronic 
terrorism. “They are trying to get in through the back doors of office networks, which 
are quite vulnerable,” said Christophe Huygens of Belgium-based Ubizen. The 
Guardian, 12 August 2002
As with the Love Bug, this was another case of hacking activity being labelled
‘terrorist’. There has also been a tendency for security professionals to pick up on the
latest security flaw and claim that it could be used by terrorists, making use of the future
threat scenario. When a security flaw was discovered in Downing Street, security
experts feared that it:
... could be used by terrorists to wage electronic warfare on the Government as the 
world braces itself for the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center. Sunday Mirror, 18 August 2002
More recently, in response to a series of security flaws found in Microsoft’s Internet
Explorer a security professional claimed that:
...banks and governments are at risk from organised crime and terrorists. All the 
hackers need to break into any computer system running Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 
is for a single user at an organisation to log on to the internet on Monday morning using 
Explorer. The Business, 13 June 2004
To recap the findings of this section, when claims that cyberterrorism is inevitable
remained unfulfilled many years later, some members of the information security
industry either relabelled criminal behaviour ‘terrorist’ or claimed that certain security
flaws could be exploited by terrorists. In this way, the connection between terrorists
and cyber-attack has been maintained. One company, however, has done more to
perpetuate this state of affairs than any other. 7% of all information security industry
claims (both for and against cyberterrorism) in this corpus can be traced to Mi2g, an
information security company whose Executive Chairman, DK Matai, is widely quoted
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in the press. Of the claims which specifically relate to cyberterrorism (n=56) 25% 
(n=14) originate with Mi2g.
The first quote from DK Matai to appear in the press on the issue of cyberterrorism 
occurs in 1999, a time when levels of press reporting of information security industry 
opinion are still very low (Figure 13).
DK Matai, managing director of Mi2g, said: “The internet attacks from pro-Serbian 
elements highlights, for the first time, political activism as a force for cyber terrorism.
“You can have a small bunch of people in relatively feeble countries which have been 
attacked by the mightiest forces in the world. And they have responded effectively via 
the internet, which allows them to exercise muscle without having the firepower.” 
Sunday Times, 15 August 1999
Matai was referring to emails containing pro-Serbian propaganda and website hacks
perpetrated by Serbian sympathisers during the war in the Balkans which hit the
websites of companies in Nato countries, notably the US and UK. The term ‘political
activism’ might fit, but no terrorist element was established. Even if the attacks had
been perpetrated by hackers connected to paramilitary groups (a claim made by Mi2g),
the damage amounted to little more than vandalism and certainly does not fit any
common sense definition of terrorism.
Recently, Mi2g have concentrated on what they see as the threat from pro-Islamic 
groups and have noted a rise in ideologically-motivated hacking activity.
There is now evidence that the cyber-terrorist net is widening to include a larger number 
of firms...
“This indicates terrorist groups are targeting smaller companies than before and are also 
focusing on attacking ISPs (internet service providers), where a single penetration can 
take down 500 corporate websites,” an Mi2G spokesman said. The Business, 3 
November 2002
But now ideologically motivated hacking is rising fast, says ... Mi2g. Its study of 
major hacker groups active in 2002 notes: “Attacks on the west show a spurt of growth 
mainly coming from radical groups and individuals based in predominantly Islamic 
countries.” ... “The true extent of the shared agenda between hacktivism and terrorism is 
only now becoming visible,” says the report. “There is a requirement for government- 
funded network monitoring to go deeper into ideological hacking and to establish the 
common connections between digital attacks and physical terrorism.” The Guardian, 
20 February 2003
Matai and his company present the hacking activity logged by Mi2g’s researchers as 
being underpinned by Islamic terrorist groups. It is impossible to ascertain whether 
they are correct in their presentation It is, however, possible to say that they are quick 
to label this hacking activity ‘cyberterrorism’ in circumstances where they provide no 
solid evidence of terrorist involvement other than the finding that some attacks 
apparently have their source in “predominantly Islamic countries”. Matai is also quick
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to claim that the CNI is at risk from these sources of attack and, in one of the excerpts 
below, claims that pro-Islamic groups are working on such attacks even now.
... Matai says data attacks are more of a nuisance than a terror but “command and 
control” attacks on water, power, transport, telecommunications or aviation hubs could 
be fatal. Once inside the control systems, hackers may choose to turn off power or 
water supplies, open dams or empty sewage into rivers. The Guardian, 20 February 
2003
DK Matai... said: “There is evidence linking the increase in computer attacks to British 
support for the US policy on Iraq.
“In fact, even prior to last summer the proportion of attacks by cyber terrorists from 
pro-Islamic sources was negligible. Now we estimate that at least 15 per cent of digital 
attacks are from these sources. A range of pro-Islamic groups are working together to 
target the infrastructures of countries such as the UK and the US.” The Times, 24 
February 2003
In common with other industry sources, Matai has also used damage from high-profile 
viruses to argue that attacks on the CM may be imminent. On the Mydoom virus:
DK Matai ... said the ‘frenzy of destruction’ had not slowed down at the weekend as 
much as hoped.
‘There could be more attacks in the near future that could push the boot further than 
Mydoom and cripple airline services, telecommunications and other critical 
infrastructure,’ he added. Daily Mail, 3 February 2004
In fact, Matai and Mi2g are not making claims which are radically different from some
other members of the information security industry. However, it is worthy of note that a
company wishing to acquire a high media profile is able to do so with an aggressive
promotion strategy focussing on newsworthy issues, making their claims more likely to
be reported by the press and heard by the public.
Having considered the positive claims made by members of the information security 
industry about cyberterrorism, the following section will set out the claims of those who 
claim that the issue is a distraction from more pressing risks.
4.2 Cyberterrorism as distraction
There is a significant body of opinion in the information security industry which holds 
that scaremongering and wild claims may bring the industry into disrepute, and this may 
account for why the industry is more than twice as likely as other claims-makers to 
dampen concerns about cyberterrorism (Figure 12). As Mike Barwise, consultant at 
Computer Security Awareness, says, one problem with scaremongering is that:
There’s a risk of fulfilling the terrorist purpose ourselves. If we spread the terror 
ourselves they can sit back and relax. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
There are other problems with labelling as ‘cyberterrorism’ acts which do not actually
originate with terrorist groups. A particularly problematic virus, for example, may
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cause widespread damage and be genuinely worthy of a sustained attempt by law 
enforcers to track down the perpetrator and bring him to justice. However, if 
investigators focus on the idea of cyberterrorism, this may lead to erroneous lines of 
investigation and use of the wrong type of police resoirces.
Many experts also say the security agencies are looking in the wrong place. Mike 
Bluestone, director of Berkeley Security Bureau, said those who launch virus attacks are 
more likely to be ‘cyber-vandals’ not ‘cyber-terrorists’. ‘Terrorists make targeted 
demands and like a high degree of control over their operations. A supervirus is more 
likely to be the brainchild of a spotty adolescent than some terrorist mastermind.’ The 
Observer, 7 May 2000
Similarly, politically-motivated hacking, such as the attacks on NATO’s website in the 
course of the Balkans War and the reciprocal website defacements perpetrated by 
Palestinian and Israeli hackers, is disruptive and often embarrassing, but it is not 
terrorism and a solution to the problem does not require the Draconian measures 
appropriate to terrorist acts. All that is required is decent web security, yet the 
perception that the problem is more serious stands in the way of this. Winn Schwartau, 
a leading information security professional, argues:
You have some perception problems with the media. For example, the Nato site 
(www.nato.int) was attacked but that’s meaningless -  as is the Palestinians and the 
Israelis defacing each other’s sites (http:/nmit.georgetown.edu/papers/wtaggert.htm). 
What astounds me is that solving that problem technically is child’s play yet none of 
them are bothering to do it. It’s basically just graffiti. The Guardian, 20 February 
2003
What, then, do the industry members on this side of the fence present as the true 
position with respect to cyberterrorism? It should be emphasised here that there is no 
particular reason why the information security industry should be any more aware than 
other civilians of the occurrence of terrorist incidents, given that information about 
terrorist attacks may be classified and available only to certain sections of government 
and the security services. One popular argument is that conventional terrorist attacks 
are much more certain to hit their mark and much more effective means to generate 
terror. Cyberterrorism, on the other hand, whilst theoretically possible, is much more 
difficult to achieve and is more likely to cause disruption and annoyance rather than 
fear. A senior security analyst for BindView Corporation argues:
“Cyberterrorism is a catchy phrase and seems to be a hot topic. I’m not saying that a 
hack could never lead to someone’s death, but it’s much easier for a terrorist to throw a 
knapsack of poison into a reservoir than to do something remotely with a computer ... 
If I knew George Bush was going into hospital and would be on a life support system, 
conceivably I could interrupt the power grid or hit the back-up batteries in the middle of 
his operation. But most of these systems already have a lot of safeguards, mainly just to 
prevent simple accidents.” ...
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... “From a global perspective, I am far less concerned about cyberterrorism and 
hacking than acts of terrorism in the physical world. With bombs going off around the 
world and everyone wondering when al-Qaida will strike next, vho cares if a web 
server gets hacked?”
He admits he would be as annoyed as anyone if his web site was hacked or defaced: 
“But you couldn’t justify diverting large amounts of resources from anti-terrorism in the 
physical world to protect my assets in the virtual world.” ...
... some of these cases are legitimate causes for concern, but... usually, cyberterrorism 
is a sideline affair. “It’s a lot easier to blow up a pipeline in the middle of nowhere than 
it is to hack your way in over a computer terminal ... A single car bomb in the right 
place in Wall Street, in conjunction with the events of 9/11, would have taken out the 
US financial system. Not a hack.”
Such “force multipliers” can make a terrorist attack a great deal worse. “Using hackers 
in conjunction with real world events would have more impact, but just bringing down a 
web server does not.” The Guardian, 5 December 2002
So, the argument goes, a pure cyberterrorist attack is unlikely for the most practical of
reasons: a conventional attack is much easier to achieve. Other industry members hold
that claims about cyberterrorism should be backed by evidence, and the available
evidence shows that a serious attack by terrorists is unlikely, first, because few hackers
exist with the skills to accomplish a targeted attack and, second, because the inside
information they would need is extremely hard to access.
“Before we make assertions we must justify them with evidence,” says Barwise 
[consultant at Computer Security Awareness], and he reckons we don’t yet have a lot of 
evidence that terrorists either do or don’t have the skills. Most attacks are by “graffiti 
writers” on websites, he says, and then come the less common hacks into systems for 
financial fraud or other personal gain. Rarest of all are what he calls the “uber- 
hackers”: the one or two per hundreds of thousands of hackers who are good enough to 
hack into government systems and yet cover their tracks. “That isn’t prevalent,” he 
says, “and it’s difficult to see how serious damage could be caused by someone not 
equipped with insider knowledge -  they’ve got to know about the technical aspects of 
the system they’re trying to damage.”
This is why Peter Sommer, of the London School of Economics Computer Security 
Research Centre, dismisses the idea of an impending “electronic Pearl Harbor”. The 
number of people in government who know the sort of sensitive security information 
that terrorists would need is very few, he says. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
Some experts have emphasised that terrorist cyber-attacks on the CNI would be
extremely difficult to achieve since they are usually isolated from the Internet. In any
event, there will usually be contingency plans for service problems which already
happen by accident, human or otherwise. The easier types of cyber-attack, such as
attacking web servers, are merely disruptive and not particularly eye-catching from a
terrorist’s point of view.
Counterpane’s Schneier contends that these kinds of attacks are harder to execute than 
simply hacking a server, since most of the computers critical to running power plants 
and air-traffic control systems are usually not connected to the internet. Disrupting the 
internet with worms or denial- of-service attacks is not particularly attractive to terrorist
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groups since they lack the impact of a bombing or hijacking. “Not being able to access 
the internet does not induce terror or fear in people. Terrorists are out to cause fear, not 
inconvenience,” he says.
And even should a cyberterrorist attack prevail and shut down the power grid or disrupt 
the emergency response system, “These sorts of outages and problems tend to happen 
by accident already, so we have workarounds for them”, Schneier argues. “What we 
don’t have workarounds for are people flying planes into buildings or Uowing up 
embassies.” The Guardian, 24 April 2003
Schneier repeated this assertion a couple of years later, adding that he thought the
spectre of cyberterrorism was largely a media creation.
... Bruce Schneier, a leading cryptographer and founder of Counterpane Internet 
Security, points out that such attacks are yet to happen. The threat is somewhat 
overlooked because it is also overblown, he suggests.
“I think it’s largely a media creation. We know what terrorism is - it’s planes flying 
into buildings, it’s not that you can’t get your e-mail,” he says.
“Even something as serious as major outages that have been accidents - there’s a 
reasonable argument that the 2003 North-East (US power grid) blackout was the result 
of a computer problem, but even if al-Qaeda were to do it, they would not call it 
terrorism -  it’s bad, it’s expensive but no one would be terrorised.” Financial Times, 16 
November 2005
Some industry research confirms this view, finding that there has been no cyberterrorist 
attack on the CNI.
Despite fears that terrorists would use the internet to cripple infrastructure such as 
power grids, financial systems and telecommunications networks, the research 
[conducted by Symantec, a provider of internet security services] showed that there had 
not been a single case of cyber terrorism in the six months to December 31. The Times, 
3 February 2003
The arguments above should not lead us to suppose that there is nothing to worry about. 
On the contrary, proponents of this view are concerned that, in focussing on the issue of 
cyberterrorism, society ignores the very real problems of cybercrime to its cost.
Iain Franklin, the vice president of Entercept Security Technologies Europe, claims that 
hackers are currently gaining the upper hand, and points to he sharp increase in the 
number of website defacements reported over the past six to nine months. He believes 
the implications for e-commerce sites are extremely serious as an attack could lead to a 
loss of online consumer confidence. But while he agrees that it is theoretically possible 
that vital supplies such as water and power could be affected by hacking, he believes it 
is unlikely because hackers tend not to work in a coordinated way. The Guardian, 19 
April 2001
Some security experts wonder whether it makes sense to emphasise cyberterrorism 
when there is a more immediate danger from cybercrime and other online 
maliciousness. The SQL Slammer worm, which struck computers earlier this year, 
causing considerable damage, is not believed to be the work cf either terrorists or a 
hostile government. “Our networks really are insecure, and there is lots and lots of 
crime: that is our biggest problem,” says Bruce Schneier, founder and chief technical 
officer of Counterpane Internet Security. His hope is that companies strengthening their 
security in response to the perceived risk of cyber terrorism will have the net effect of
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reducing what he sees as the real danger -  the rising level of criminal activity online. 
The Guardian, 24 April 2003
“There is a general danger of cyber-terrorism but there are more immediate and direct 
threats to the infrastructure, and if you have limited money, I would chase the other 
threats before cyber-terrorism,” ... many of the strategies that corporations are adopting 
to protect themselves against ordinary hacker attacks will also serve them well if 
terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda strike. Financial Times, 16 November 2005
This brings us to the point at which most industry insiders meet, regardless of their
perspective on the cyberterrorism argument. Whether an organisation or individual is
trying to protect itself from cyberterrorism or from cybercrime, the security solutions
are very similar, if not identical.
Summary
Members of the information security industry may be experts in the sense that they are 
socially accredited as such to “pronounce their diagnoses and solutions” (Cohen 1972), 
but they have a clear commercial incentive to convey concerns about cyberterrorism. 
However, the industry is split between those who promote concerns about 
cyberterrorism and those who consider it scaremongering, there being other, more 
pressing problems worthy of resources. Although the future threat scenario, 
exaggeration and distortion are the favoured mechanisms by which concern about 
cyberterrorism is conveyed, a significant section of the information security industry is 
also quite likely to dampen concerns. Overall, the industry remains predominantly 
concerned with cyber-criminality, rather than cyberterrorism.
The press started to report the concerns of those in the industry who consider 
cyberterrorism a significant future threat in the late 1990s. The warnings did not stop 
when the threat did not materialise, however, and warnings gathered force regardless. 
Various mechanisms have preserved the perception of the immediacy of the threat: 
labelling cybercrime ‘cyberterrorism’; claiming high-profile viruses have originated 
with terrorists; claiming certain security flaws will be exploited by terrorists. One 
company, Mi2g, accounts for a disproportionate number of industry claims on 
cyberterrorism reported in the press. This demonstrates that those who are prepared to 
market themselves aggressively will get their claims reported and, therefore, heard.
One the other side of the industry there are those who argue that those broadcasting the 
threat from cyberterrorism risk fulfilling the terrorist purpose themselves through 
scaremongering. Mislabelling crime as terrorism may lead to erroneous lines of 
investigation, misuse of resources, or inaction through fear. Proponents of this view 
argue that conventional terrorism and conventional cybercrime are much more serious
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threats and society’s resources should be directed there. Although cyberterrorism is 
theoretically possible, it is difficult to achieve without insider knowledge and unlikely 
to cause the brand of breathtaking violence which is most likely to inspire fear. It is 
argued that there is no evidence of any cyberterrorist attack. Few hackers have the 
necessary skills and the inside information often needed for success is extremely hard to 
access. The isolation of the CNI from the Internet and the contingency plans which 
exist for accidental service problems make cyber-attack even more difficult. 
Nevertheless, the industry largely agrees that the technical and procedural security 
solutions are the same whether protection is sought against cybercrime or 
cyberterrorism.
5. THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
“... socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions” (Cohen 1972) 
When the corpus was coded, it was found that those who might be considered socially 
accredited experts in the sense meant by Cohen split into two camps: those in the 
mainstream information security industry and others. Experts from the information 
security industry are by far the most numerous and most quoted in the press (Section 4). 
They were coded with the term ‘infosec industry’. The ‘others’ include those in related 
industries and professions, academics and those referred to by the press as ‘experts’ but 
who are never actually identified. It is these others who make up the category of 
‘experts’ in this study’s coding system.
Figure 9 demonstrates that experts are most often used in the press to comment on 
cybercrime, even though these comments may be couched in terms of terrorist activity. 
Remember that the categories of behaviour in Figure 9 relate to an objective assessment 
of the behaviour being described and do not reflect the terms in which that behaviour is 
couched in the article. Figure 10 underlines this by showing that the theme most often 
used by experts is that of the terrorist link, although the theme of hackers is also an 
important one for experts. Experts are also more likely to discuss true cyberterrorism 
than either law enforcers or the information security industry (Figure 9), although the 
precise source for these quotes is often not identifiable from the article and the language 
used is often of the type “Experts say that...”.
The rhetorical mechanisms most often used by experts for presenting their arguments 
are exaggeration/distortion, the future threat scenario and dramatisation (Figure 12). 
This is consistent with the presentation of mostly sensationalist content relating to the
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perceived problem. There is actually relatively little said by experts (other than the 
information security industry) on what the solutions to cyberterrorism might be.
When journalists ring you up with their rumour of a hack, their report of evidence of 
eavesdropping by VDU radiation, their ‘steer’ from the authorities of a computer fraud 
about to be frustrated, their anxiety that every other journalist in town is writing about 
computer viruses, or about subversive or pornographic bulletin boards, what they really 
want is a validating quote for a slightly rickety story. They can only use your views if 
they are sensational. Tell the newshounds what you honestly think, and either the story 
dies or they rush back to the contacts list until they find a more quotable expert. Either 
way, no publicity for Hugo.
The generally accepted statistic for the incidence of computer crime in the UK is around 
Pounds 400 million per year. Its authority derives from being frequently quoted. A rich 
publicity reward awaits the ‘expert’ who announces that this is a huge underestimate. A 
much less attractive prize is in store for the sceptic who says, on the contrary, there is 
hardly any computer crime at all. The Guardian, 5 May 1988
This piece by Peter Sommer, writing as Hugo Cornwall, author of The Hacker’s
Handbook, underscores nicely the dialectic between, on the one hand, the press and the
filtering process which is central to the search for a newsworthy story and, on the other
hand, the ‘expert’, who so very often has a vested interest in being quoted, whatever it is
that he chooses to say. Experts are most often sought out by the press to give weight to
a story which has a sensationalist angle to it. There may also be times when an
individual or organisation goes to the press with sensationalist claims as a profile-
raising exercise. The claims made by Mi2g, detailed in section 4.1 above, are an
important example of this. However, there is also a relatively strong representation
amongst experts of the view that cyberterrorism has been blown out of all proportion,
and this shows up as panic dampening activity in Figure 12, an activity which is
significant amongst experts. As with the information security industry generally,
experts display a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of the views expressed. And, of
course, views are not static and change over time, as Simon Davies of the LSE points
out:
Looking back to, say, 1996, it seems everyone from the G7 to the man-in-the-street was 
convinced that the Internet equated to anarchy. Cyberspace, they believed, could never 
be controlled by any government -  totalitarian or otherwise. This is still the common 
view.
But now, those same civil rights advocates have turned on a sixpence, and are warning 
that the world is on the brink of an era of unprecedented mass censorship. Far from 
being a morass of anarchy, it turns out that the Internet is homogeneous and orderly -  
ideal conditions for control. The Independent, 4 September 1998
What, then, can be said about the patterns which emerge from the contributions of
experts to the UK national press? Certainly they have plenty to say about
cyberterrorism, but it is interesting that the majority of these references are to ‘experts’
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who are never fully identified: the mention of the word ‘expert’ is meant to add weight 
to a statement and the reader is expected to take them at face value.
So-called ‘secure’ information systems are vulnerable to attack from terrorists and 
hostile regimes, say the experts. The attacks, they contend, have already begun: the 
only reason we haven’t heard much about them is because either the victims don’t know 
they have been targeted yet, or they would rather keep it a secret. The Guardian, 22 
May 1997
This example is archetypal. The reader is not told who these ‘experts’ are but their 
citation as the source of this information is meant to add weight to the associated 
claims. The claims made about the problem are not particularly robust. Secure 
information systems may be vulnerable to attack from terrorists and hostile regimes, but 
where is the evidence that they are willing or, indeed, able? The claim that such attacks 
have already begun but the public has not yet heard about them seems far-fetched 
without the provision of more evidence or at least an assertion that classified evidence 
to this effect probably exists. Why, for example, would a terrorist attack in secret or in 
such a way that the victim does not know he has been attacked? This would preclude 
the spreading of fear, an essential element in any definition of terrorism. Secrecy b the 
hallmark of crime, not terrorist attacks. This claim is analogous to the future threat 
scenario: the former cannot be disproved because it is kept ‘secret’ or has not yet been 
discovered; the latter cannot be disproved because, by definition, it has not yet 
happened.
Of course, unidentified ‘experts’ are widely used to give weight to bald statements of 
future threat scenarios:
The work of these hackers throughout the developed world first alerted international 
leaders to the dangers. One computer expert said: ‘Up to now most of the hacking has 
been done for fun but if the know-how of these people ever fell into the wrong hands -  
those of terrorists or political extremists -  the consequences could be catastrophic. Mail 
on Sunday, 14 February 1993
Whilst hackers are certainly capable of causing widespread disruption and a reasonable
of economic loss, the words ‘danger’ and ‘catastrophic’ do seem rather out of place.
Such terms seem to be justified by the addition of the terrorist angle, but the ‘expert’ is
making a leap too far. He does not show how a catastrophe might be caused by a
terrorist or extremist, or even whether it is possible. Similarly, readers are asked to
accept at face value the experts’ claim that cyberterrorists are capable of attacking
transport and communications systems, with or without the additional justification of
the spread of the Mydoom virus:
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Internet security experts say the speed with which Mydoom has spread and the scale of 
the damage suggests that companies have failed to properly educate employees about 
the dangers of viruses. They say it shows how vulnerable the world’s computer systems 
are at a time when concerns are mounting that ‘cyber terrorists’ could use viruses to 
paralyse transport and communications systems. Daily Mail, 3 February 2004
Experts have warned that the world’s computer systems are increasingly at risk from 
‘cyber terrorists’ who could paralyse transport and communications systems. Daily 
Mail, 4 May 2004
In this excerpt, ‘experts’ are used to validate a future threat scenario of disaster caused 
by cyberterrorism which would be on a par with other, better known, forms of calamity:
Experts believe cyber terrorism is as strong a threat to the United States as nuclear, 
chemical or biological proliferation. The Times, 10 October 1997
By linking the concepts of cyberterrorism and nuclear, chemical and biological disaster
in the same sentence, it is implied that a cyber-attack would be every bit as nightmarish
as one of the latter scenarios. Specifics of how the attacks would be executed are not
discussed in this article, but the next example goes a stage further by citing experts’
claims that terrorists may use the Internet to cause chaos, train collisions and attack the
CNI:
Experts say there is growing concern that terrorist groups are trying to use the internet 
both to communicate and to launch cyber-attacks on US and British companies and 
government bodies in order to create chaos. Experts believe the software could allow 
terrorists to cause train collisions by hacking into rail companies’ computer systems. 
There is also the potential for sabotaging water, gas and electricity supplies in the same 
way. Sunday Times, 14 October 2001
‘Experts’ have also been used to back claims that terrorists, including al-Qaeda, are
behind hacks on Whitehall systems.
Terrorists are feared to be behind an alarming rise in hackers’ attacks on top-secret 
government computer files. Home Office figures obtained by the News of the World 
show sinister cyber raiders are making an average of 18 attempts a day to break into the 
key systems. Experts believe that terrorists -  including Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda 
network might be trying to steal sensitive British and American military information. 
The News of the World, 24 March 2002
Whilst it is well-known that government systems have always been targets for hackers,
there is little evidence that any of these hacks have been peipetrated by terrorists and it
would be interesting to know which ‘experts’ were behind this claim.
All of this gives a good flavour of how ‘experts’, who are never actually identified in 
the relevant article, are used to give weight to sensationalist portrayals of the dangers 
from cyberterrorism. This trend is very much media-driven. A journalist decides on an 
angle he wants to take and then justifies that by reference to a nameless ‘expert’. 
However, there are many other issues on which experts have pronounced, indeed too 
many to list here. Where claims are made about specific issues, the unidentified
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‘expert’ starts to fade into the background and specified academics and industry figures 
come to the fore. Sometimes their views are sought out by journalists in order to give 
weight to certain claims made in a story, as with the previous examples with the 
nameless ‘experts’. But often claims originating with experts come to the attention of 
the press and form the basis of the story. One such example originated with speakers at 
an academic conference in Australia in the late 1990s who made of their own motion 
claims which every journalist dreams of: cyberterrorism is imminent and its results 
potentially catastrophic:
International terrorists can now inflict as much damage using computers and 
information technology as they could with bombs and explosives, according to security 
experts in Australia. Delegates at the Australian Institute of Criminology conference in 
Canberra heard that terrorists are increasingly able to use “information warfare” instead 
of traditional weapons to inflict damage on their targets. They could, for example, 
hijack air traffic control systems to crash aircraft and cut power lines, or take hostage 
computerised services such as telecommunications and power supplies. Terrorists were 
also increasingly able to use the Internet as a tool of destruction, for example by 
carrying out “e-mail bombings” to throw computer equipment into chaos. Russell 
Smith and Peter Grabosky, both security researchers, said computer systems 
everywhere could be vulnerable to disruption by terrorists, pranksters and extortionists, 
and gave a warning that authorities around the world had so far failed to realise the 
potential for computer terrorism. They said: ‘Techniques of ‘information warfare’ may 
be employed by terrorist organisations with no less effect than the traditional bomb. 
Some people regard their information systems with a degree of nonchalance. It’s the 
contemporary equivalent of leaving your home with the door unlocked.” The Times, 18 
February 1998
This apocalyptic vision of the future has probably lost its currency in mainstream 
academic debate over recent years, even if it is a vision very much current in the 
political debate, as exemplified by this report written for the US Congress:
Extremists are recruiting Islamist computer hackers -  creating a breed of high-tech 
terrorist who threatens to cripple Britain’s economic infrastructure.
Banks, businesses, Government offices and transport systems are in the frontline of a 
new wave of cyber terrorism that could bring the country to a standstill and drain 
billions from the economy.
A new report claims that as physical security in the West tightens, terrorists are looking 
to exploit vulnerable computer networks and forge new alliances with cyber criminals.
The study warns of a wave of cyber attacks and points to the London bombings in July 
as evidence that homegrown terrorists are already “embedded” in high-tech 
organisations. Sunday Express, 30 October 2005
Various topics associated with cyberterrorism have fallen in and out of the limelight
over time. References to experts in the press are a good barometer of this, since their
views on very specific topics are either sought out or reproduced according to the
journalistic imperative to give an account of the hot topics of the moment. The issue of
viruses is one which has come in and out of focus many times over the last two decades,
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and their release has often been associated with terrorism. Citing the concerns of 
experts in this respect has become a mainstay of press coverage:
For example, Virus Construction Lab (VCL), a program recently discovered in the 
United States, promises to make virtually anybody into a “computer terrorist” . VCL 
offers a huge range of viruses, from the merely annoying that flash messages on a 
computer screen to those designed to destroy the information held in a system.
“The programs are fairly primitive and their effects are not too difficult to sort 
out,” says Edward Wilding, the editor of The Virus Bulletin, a monthly newsletter, 
“but there is considerable worry that they will soon become more sophisticated and a 
real danger to company computer systems.” The Times, 18 September 1992
In 2001, the issue of anonymisers and how they might be used by terrorists gained
centre stage. This came in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and in the midst the hunt for bin
Laden and his associates. It was clear that any technology which had the potential to
assist terrorists in covering their tracks would make the headlines and there were plenty
of experts available to add their comment.
Stephen Whitelaw, Iomart’s chief entrepreneurial officer, warned that computer 
software known as ‘Triangle Boy”, which helps users to operate anonymously, is now 
the “most dangerous tool for terrorist and criminal networks”.
He believes that with anonymous, untraceable access to the internet, groups such as 
militant Islamic fundamentalists could wreak global havoc,
“It is a potentially terrifying tool, which means that terrorists could communicate or 
access illegal sites without detection,” he said. ...
... Dr Neil Barrett, a computer security adviser to the British government, said: “It is a 
concern that people may use this the wrong way. This is a sophisticated anonymiser, 
which means more people will be able to use tins for bad reasons.”
He said the software had helped computer users in repressive regimes but admitted it 
could be used to create widespread chaos. “You could cause phenomenal damage by 
hacking into computers controlling the electricity grid, and theoretically you could 
cause two trains to collide,” he said. Sunday Times, 14 October 2001
In 2004, a technique for hacking into mobile phones, called ‘bluesnarfing’ after the
Bluetooth technology involved, dominated the technology headlines. It was reported
that criminals and terrorists might use this technique to dangerous effect, and the
experts were called on to comment:
Ian Angell, Professor of Information Systems at the London School of Economics, 
described the discovery of the flaw as a devastating blow for the phone companies.
“This could really disrupt the whole industry,” he said. “The idea that a perfect stranger 
could spy on you -  that represents a technology too far.” The Times, 14 April 2004
Another perennial favourite is the issue of insiders creating havoc with computer
systems, either disgruntled employees seeking revenge or, more recently, the spectre of
terrorists infiltrating key organisations.
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‘It is incredibly easy to do a search on the internet for a program that you can then 
download and use to read emails round your office,’ said Dr Magnus Ranstorp, of the 
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, at St Andrews University.
‘Then you get recruited by a group or business outfit and used to infiltrate an office with 
fake credentials. Someone starts working as a temp in one department. After a few 
weeks, he or she could have gone through half the secure documents in the whole 
building.’ The Observer, 8 December 2002
Experts do not, however, confine themselves to comments on the dangers from
cyberterrorism. There are many who are vocal on the subject of the dangers posed to
society by its response to terrorism. One subject which has been current since at least
the mid-1990s is the ‘surveillance society’, brought about by government’s overzealous
reaction to the problems of cybercrime and cyberterrorism. Early on in this debate there
was much controversy about cryptography, for instance. Some experts, such as Dorothy
Denning (1996), advocated technologies which would render encrypted data transparent
to the authorities. Others, such as Ross Anderson, saw danger in allowing such
unprecedented access to personal communications:
Academic cryptographers are divided. Ross Anderson of Cambridge University tells 
the programme: “The transactions which make up our daily lives are rapidly becoming 
electronic. If we’re denied the means to protect them, we’re not just talking about 
hackers and electronic crime. We’re talking about a surveillance society in which 
authority will know every detail of our Ives. Even Hitler and Stalin couldn’t have 
dreamt of that.” The Independent, 3 September 1995
Simon Singh, author of The Code Book (Singh 1999), neatly encapsulates the balance
which must be struck between security and privacy in relation to the use of encryption
technologies:
Such ciphers would guarantee privacy for all personal and business transactions on the 
internet and, as such, would seem to be a boon to society.
National security agencies and police forces, on the other hand, see super strong 
encryption as a potential threat.
It would hinder their ability to monitor the activities of criminals, organised crime and 
terrorist groups, not to mention paedophile rings, many of which already use 
sophisticated methods to scramble their communications. ...
...The challenge for governments and scientists is to come up with a way of allowing 
law-abiding citizens to have their right to privacy while allowing the police to spy on 
the bad guys. Daily Mail, 31 August 1999
Simon Davies of the LSE has been lobbying governments for many years in an attempt
to protect privacies which he considers to be menaced by the creation and use of broad
coercive powers ostensibly to address quite narrow issues. As an acknowledged expert
in this area with very strong opinions, he regularly writes articles which are published in
the press. Here he argues, in relation to measures to combat child pornography on the
Internet (a goal which he fully supports):
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If governments can succeed in their strike against one form of expression, why not 
others? Why not, say, hate speech, marijuana promotion or political dissent? After all, 
the technology that generates and distributes kiddy pom images is the same technology 
that processes the traffic on political discussion groups ...
... A new Europe-wide initiative -  “Action Plan for Safe Use of the Internet” -  will be 
established this year. Its intention is to conduct the censorship equivalent of a high-tech 
driftnet fishing expedition over the Internet, blocking access to content deemed to be 
harmful, unlawful or undesirable. The Independent, 4 September 1998
Davies sees this as inimical to the freedoms offered to us by the Internet and argues for
a more refined approach to combating crime and terrorism. Similarly, in response to
proposals for enhanced access to personal communications for government agencies, for
reasons including, but not limited to, counter-terrorism, some experts have spoken out
about their fears:
... the legislation could lead to distinctly sinister scenarios. “It’s shocking,” said Dr Ian 
Brown, director of the Foundation for Information Policy Research, “Just like the 
government trying to get information to smear Pam Warren, the Paddington rail crash 
campaigner, you can imagine that happening all over the country -  councillors could 
gather ammunition on their opponents.” Sunday Times, 16 June 2002
Other experts, such as Paul Taylor, a sociologist at Salford University, have been more
specific in their accusations of ‘control of the Internet by the back door’:
... the authorities insist that the measures [access to civilian internet data without 
warrant] are essential to combat international crime and terrorism. But others worry 
that they will be used to monitor and discourage legitimate political activity and will 
ultimately ensure that only “acceptable” voices are heard on the net. Hacktivists fear 
that politicians, often lacking technical expertise, will be easily swayed by business. 
The Guardian, 2 January 2001
According to some, exaggerating fears over a possible cyber-terrorist attack is part of 
that attempt to exert control over the internet. Clearly, hacking and viruses targeted at 
the West are possible, says Hables Gray [professor at the University of Great Falls in 
Montana]. “But the good news is that Saddam Hussein is an uninspired, if not 
incompetent, military leader who fought the Iran and Gulf wars as if they were the first 
world war. It seems unlikely Iraq will even attack the internet.” The Guardian, 
February 2003
Fear and risk are key concepts h the debate on cyberterrorism, and the meta-debate 
about these very concepts and their place in modem society has been brought to public 
attention through the press by academics such as Frank Furedi, a sociologist at the 
University of Kent:
We seem incapable of embracing innovation or new experience without recasting it as a 
risk
The fear of risk feeds on itself. And safety has become the fundamental value of the 
nervous nineties. Hardly a week goes by without some new danger to the individual 
being reported, and another safety measure proposed....
... the Internet has been represented as a potential site for major calamities. There has 
been much press comment about so-called ‘cyber-terrorism’ and the threat to society’s 
moral well-being from pornography and paedophile rings. ...
172
... So why has this inflated sense of danger come about? Any attempt at an explanation 
must inevitably be schematic. But one factor at play could be a collective striving to 
make sense of the uncertainty created by fundamental changes in human relations. The 
weakening of traditional forms of solidarity -  family and class -  has been widely 
commented on. The consequence of this process has been an intense individuation of 
everyday life, forcing people into situations where little can be taken for granted. ...
... Commercial factors may also be operating. There can be little doubt that the culture 
of fear has been seized upon by astute entrepreneurs. Products and services that are 
linked to risk avoidance are doing well. The Guardian, 26 July 1997
Summary
It is clear that unidentified ‘experts’ are frequently cited by the press to give weight to 
sensationalist and unsubstantiated claims about the general dangers from 
cyberterrorism. On the other hand, many identifiable experts have expressed views 
about various and specific aspects of the cyberterrorism problem. It tends to be the case 
that, where specific claims are made, these can be traced back to an expert identified in 
the article. However, the overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from the contribution 
of experts to the cyberterrorism debate is that there is a wide range of different claims 
being made and that, cf all the claims-makers, the views of experts are the most 
heterogeneous in nature. Although the very general, sensationalist claims about 
cyberterrorism are consistent, in all other respects it is very difficult to draw together 
coherent strands of argument representing the views held by experts, or a significant 
group of them. This reflects their mostly reactive role, that of responding to press 
enquiries. On the other hand, it may also speak to the fact that there is a lack of 
consensus amongst experts about the nature of the problem.
The next chapter extends issues of concern and consensus into the realm of hostility: 
who or what are the targets of hostility; can a consensus be identified; and how do 
targets of hostility fit into the belief system which is growing up around the issue of 
cyberterrorism?
173
C h a p t e r 7
F in d in g s : 
H o s t il it y  a n d  c o n s e n s u s
Previous chapters have considered concerns about cyberterrorism and the level of 
consensus which has been achieved between the different claims-makers. If 
cyberterrorism is the subject of concern, then cyberterrorists are the object of hostility. 
In moral panic terms, consensus is relevant to the issue of hostility, just as it is relevant 
to the issue of concern. Over a period of time, sometimes long, sometimes short, a 
consensus may develop as to which groups are responsible for the perceived threats to 
society, resulting ultimately in their definition as ‘deviants’. Cyberterrorists are an 
interesting case: many have claimed that they exist, but there is no empirical evidence in 
the public domain of their existence, nor any publicly documented example of a genuine 
act of cyberterrorism.
How, then, can this particular phenomenon be characterised? Cyberterrorism unites a 
trinity of elements: the hacker, the terrorist and technology. The question which 
underlies the evidence is this: does the cyberterrorist ha\e his own social identity, or 
have social understandings of hackers, terrorists and technology evolved to embrace the 
concept, effectively relabelling existing folk devils? The answer will be provided by 
analysis of the stereotypes presented in the press.
When the corpus was coded, the three most significant codes overall in terms of 
frequency were: the code for hackers2 (n=828, rank: 1); the terrorist link (n=657, rank: 
2); and technology (n=449, rank: 3), the code employed for references to technology, 
including the Internet. The data show that each of the three elements -  hackers, 
terrorists and the technology -  have been demonised by claims-makers in the press. By 
understanding the types of hostility displayed to each of these elements, it is possible to 
understand how the cyberterrorist has been constructed.
2 A note on formatting: where terms are in italics, this denotes a code or sub-code which has been derived 
from the corpus of data.
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Because the frequencies of the codes just described were so high, a secondary coding 
process was necessary in order to effect a more nuanced analysis. Quotations coded 
with the three primary codes -  hackers, terrorist link and technology -  were subjected 
to a secondary coding process which produced several sub-codes for each primary code.
It was noted that different views predominated at different times, so the frequencies for 
these codes and their sub-codes were distributed over six unequal time periods chosen 
for their historical significance: late 1980s; early 1990s; late 1990s; 2000-10 September 
2001; 11 September 2001-2002; and 2003-2005. The late 1980s refers to the period 
from 1987 (the first identified UK national press article mentioning both hackers and 
terrorism) to 1989, a time when the very early thinking about the terrorist link with 
ICTs was emerging. The early 1990s was the period during which PC ownership 
became widespread and people became acquainted with computers at school, home and 
work so that they became embedded in social discourse. In the late 1990s, use of the 
Internet by ordinary people really took off and its potential was widely debated. The 
next time period chosen was 2000 to 10 September 2001, being the period between two 
defining episodes: the turn of the Millennium and the 9/11 attacks. The penultimate 
time period runs from 11 September 2001 to the end of 2002, a time of intense media 
coverage and speculation covering the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The final period 
spans 2003 to 2005, bringing us up to the end of the last complete year covered by this 
corpus of data. This is a period characterised by war and post-9/11 suspicion, 
particularly with respect to technology and its potential uses by terrorists and criminals 
on the one hand, and the authorities on the other.
The remainder of this chapter is organised into three sections which will deal in turn 
with the analysis of the three primary codes -  hacker, terrorist link and technology. At 
the start of each of these sections will be two charts. The first is a bar chart showing the 
frequencies of the sub-codes for the whole corpus. The bar charts are also colour-coded 
to show how the sub-codes are distributed over the time periods described above.
The second chart at the start of each section is a line chart giving data for each time 
period. This chart is based on the same data used in the first chart, but a compensation 
has been made to take account of the fact that the time periods are not equal. Take for 
example Figure 15. In the period 2003-5, there were 217 quotations coded with the 
primary code hacker and 91 of those were coded with the sub-code criminal In order 
to compare like with like across tie time periods, the frequency of the sub-code 
criminal for 2003-5 is expressed as a percentage of the total number of hacker
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quotations for that same period, giving a value of 42%. In other words, during the 
period 2003-5, 42% of all the references to hackers portrayed them as criminal This 
contrasts with only 14% in the late 1980s. Over the whole corpus, that is 1987 to 2005 
(represented by the thick, red line in Figures 15, 18 and 20), 27% of all the references to 
hackers portrayed them as criminal. This gives us a reference point from which 
conclusions may be drawn in a historically situated manner.
In each of sections 1-3, these charts are then followed by an analysis of the quantitative 
and qualitative results of the coding process. Perceptions of hackers, the terrorist link 
and the technology will be considered in a historically situated manner, with a 
discussion of which features have been amplified and which have been attenuated.
1. H a c k e r s
During the coding process, 828 quotations referring specifically to hackers were 
identified. All such quotations were coded with the primaiy code hacker. The vast 
majority of these quotations referred to hackers in the abstract, as an amorphous group.
The aggregate figures represented in Figure 14 demonstrate the overwhelming 
predominance within the corpus of views of hackers in the abstract as criminal or 
terrorist. Remember, these data concern references to hackers which were found in 
articles in which both hackers and terrorism are mentioned. However, on an objective 
assessment, only about 1/5 of these articles (149 out of a total of 681) have as their main 
subject matter any kind of terrorism, cyber- or otherwise. Despite this fact, it is 
interesting to note that the view of hacker as terrorist comes second only to hacker as 
criminal in terms of frequency. When considering the hacker myth in general, Skibell 
(2002) found that there was a strong and enduring shift from ‘hacker as nuisance’ to 
‘hacker as criminal’ around the mid-1980s. These results are entirely consistent with 
his findings, the surprise being that, in a sample deliberately skewed towards the 
terrorism issue, hacker as criminal still comes out on top by a significant margin.
Hacker as criminal is a perception which has increased in importance over the last 20 
years. In the late 1980s, 14% of all references to hackers in the corpus viewed them as 
criminals, compared with a peak of 42% in the years 2003-5. On the other hand, the 
view of hacker as terrorist rose during the 1990s to a peak of 24% and then roughly 
stabilised. With just under a quarter of all references to hackers labelling them terrorist, 
this is still a very significant theme.
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Figure 14 Cumulative frequency distribution of hacker sub-codes by time
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Figure 15 Relative importance of hacker sub-codes: sub-codes as a percentage of total hacker primary codes for each time period
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In the late 1980s, the debate was mostly about the Computer Misuse Bill (later the Act 
of 1990) and what effect it might have on hackers. There was a prevalent view that, if 
hacking were criminalised in the Computer Misuse Act, it would:
... amount to ‘a charter for blackmail’ and will drive innocent youngsters underground 
and into the hands of serious criminals ...
... young people who hack innocently and for fun will be more inclined to listen to 
approaches from potential evil doers. ... ‘Having committed one offence and been 
given a criminal record for innocent hacking, they may feel that they might as well get 
in a bit deeper.’ The Independent, 11 October 1989
The same article went on to claim that companies would actually lose out if all hacking
were criminalised because so-called ethical hacking (where the perpetrators tell
companies how they breached security, thus allowing the company to patch the system)
would equally be criminalised and because low-level hackers who had previously been
informers in investigations into more serious crime would no longer be willing to
perform that function. Computer product companies would continue to sell insecure
goods because the security flaws would no longer be made manifest. At another level,
it was argued that, whereas the harmless challenge-seeker once worked for society,
within the system, as a kind of informal, external bug-hunter, he would now work
against society, turning to the ‘dark side’ because society did not have the vision to
incorporate him into the system. In other words, call a hacker a criminal, and that is
what you will have. A clear example of labelling theory and deviance amplification in
practice.
However, this argument did not prevail and hackers were criminalised. Only a part of 
the debate is found in this corpus, but the reason it occurs at all is that it was the first 
time hackers were labelled terrorists. In the long-running debate heralding the 
introduction of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, Emma Nicholson MP made a series of 
claims, including:
... ‘I am very concerned that the key minister, who has not been brought up in a 
computer environment, may not have grasped fully the fearsome nature of computer 
terrorism,’... The Times, 24 October 1989
... no ‘special case’ consideration can be retained for the hacker. Those ‘innocents’ 
who claim immunity must realise that they stand in the company of the international 
terrorist and industrial blackmailer. Letter to The Independent, 30 December 1989
There was no suggestion at this stage that terrorist groups such as the IRA were
resorting to hack attacks to supplement their conventional methods. In the late 1980s,
the term ‘terrorism’ was used simply to add drama to the discussion about computer-
related crime. Yet Nicholson seemed taken with her own rhetoric, including a vague
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reference to Dutch and German extremists’ use of “computer-derived information to 
bomb oil refineries and [destabilise] government actions” {The Independent, 30 
December 1989). She was effectively the first in a long line of highrprofile claims- 
makers to use cyberterrorism scenarios as an effective tool in arguing for extensions of 
social control.
The early 1990s saw an upwards trend in the scale of reporting of hackers. Similar 
views were expressed as to criminality, and the terrorist issue tends to be introduced to 
add impact to the claims being made.
The hacker and the virus programmer embodied the popular notion of computer crime 
in the 1980s, and they are still the most widely known criminal acts in computer 
technology. ...
... His prospective list ranges from the annoying to the fraudulent, and includes small 
computer theft, desktop forgery, digital imaging piracy, voice and electronic mail 
terrorism, fax graffiti attacks, electronic data interchange fraud, and placement of 
unauthorised equipment in networks. The Times, 3 April 1992
However, there was still the pervading sense that, although these individuals were
criminals, they vere disruptive vandals and saboteurs more than dangerous, and still
motivated by the challenge rather than base financial gain. That view started to change
from the mid-1990s and a more serious brand of criminality came to the fore.
The type of the computer criminal of the day before yesterday was the American Kevin 
Mitnick, an overweight, myopic prodigy who hacked into some of the most elaborately 
protected systems in the US ... Having got into these sacred cyberspaces, he did no 
harm - but he frightened the wits out of the corporations concerned, and was sent to gaol 
in 1988. ...
But the new breed of cybercriminal is no juvenile meddler; he has very clear goals. 
Often helped by vulnerable young nerds, he hacks into companies to steal sensitive 
information of every description: hospital databases, credit reference agencies, tax files 
and files in newspaper offices have all been ransacked for potentially valuable 
information. Those behind the ransacking include firms conducting industrial 
espionage, detectives investigating for clients, and rival newspapers hoping to scoop a 
scoop. The Independent, 13 October 1996
Experts claimed that:
‘There’s a real shift in desire to attacks for personal, financial gain.’ The Guardian, 22 
May 1997
Concern was so high that the G8 held a conference on computer crime and hackers 
became the subject of political debate at an international level.
When world leaders meet to discuss the greatest threats facing the human race, they 
normally talk about things like weapons of mass destruction, irreversible climate 
change, drugs and famine. But when the representatives of the G8 economic powers 
met in Washington this week, they added a new danger to the list: international 
computer crime. ...
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... If the G8 ministers had been looking for an event which would underline both the 
scale of the problem and the difficulty of dealing with it, then such a thing occurred 
even as they met. On Monday night, hackers broke into the most popular Internet 
search engine, die California-based Yahoo! website, and threatened to explode a deadly 
virus ‘bomb’ into each of the 17 million computers which have visited the site in the 
past month. The Guardian, 12 December 1997
The transformation of the hacker into a dangerous criminal was well advanced, so much
so that the transformation was itself the subject of press comment:
The transformation of hackers in the public imagination is almost complete. The term, 
which once described pioneering West Coast programmers laying the foundations of the 
electronic frontier, now conjures up obsessive criminals hunched over terminals 
attempting to extract cash from banking systems. The Guardian, 12 December 1997
As the new Millennium turned, there was a dip in the portrayal of hackers as criminal as
the focus rawed over towards hacker as terrorist. This view had been propounded
previously, but became more important at the turn of the century. This will be
discussed further in Section 2.
Finally, in the period 2003-5 there was a huge increase in the proportion of quotations 
portraying hackers as criminal and a corresponding dip in the portrayal of hackers as 
terrorist. This huge increase in the criminal sub-code appears to be due partly to 
widespread reporting of, first, a number of notorious hacking court cases and, second, a 
number of notorious virus attacks. The court cases involved Simon Vallor, a virus 
writer; Joseph McElroy, blamed for sparking a nuclear panic by hacking into a US 
weapons laboratory; and Gary McKinnon, accused of scores of hacking offences in the 
US, some around 9/11, and facing extradition proceedings from the UK. The main 
viruses commented on dming this period were SQL Slammer, Blaster, Mydoom, Sasser, 
Bagle and Netsky. However, the high levels of the criminal sub-code in the 2003-5 
period also had much to do with the rather paranoid reporting of the threat from 
criminal hacker.
The view of the hacker as threat is the third most frequent in the corpus. This ties in 
neatly with the next most popular category: future threat scenario. There is some 
overlap between die two sub-codes, but the future threat scenario refers to a very 
specific form of claim, where the condition perceived as a threat has not yet 
materialised, it is merely predicted. Hacker as threat takes a much more general form 
and relates to threats from a condition which exists and is ongoing, the threat of 
information theft, for example. As Figure 15 highlights, hackers have always been 
perceived as posing a threat to society, whereas the future threat scenario was not 
applied to hackers until the early 1990s and has risen in significance since then. In both
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cases, promotion of these views has peaked in the period 2003-5. 30% of all references 
to hackers in this period viewed them as a threat and this is explained by a massive 
increase in reporting of security vulnerabilities, mostly in a business context. The 
terrorist angle does not usually feature in these quotations.
Businesses are failing to protect themselves adequately from crippling internet threats 
and computers are more vulnerable to cyber attack, new research shows.
The study, conducted by Symantec, a provider of internet security services, also reveals 
that a sharp increase in the number of flaws in software is enabling computer hackers to 
take advantage of the weakness. The Times, 3 February 2003
... the survey found that 97 per cent of businesses rated security issues a matter of great 
or some concern, with terrorism, computer hacking and animal rights extremism being 
seen as the major threats. Mail on Sunday, 7 November 2004
The use of the future threat scenario has risen steadily since the early 1990s so that, for
the period 2003-5, it featured in a fifth of all references to hackers. This, more
formalised, view of the hacker as threat characterises mw technology or security flaws
as vulnerabilities which hackers might exploit.
Technicians at the US software giant Microsoft are working flat out to prevent a new 
security threat that could this week give criminals access to computer systems used 
worldwide by banks and governments. Raws in Microsoft software allow hackers to 
use replica internet banking sites to empty customers’ accounts. The Business, 13 June 
2004
Quotations featuring the future threat scenario often allude to the terrorist angle, the 
most common form being, ‘If hackers can do this, terrorists might, too’.
Security concerns are now growing in the wake of the recent virus attacks. The 
Windows systems that run on most personal computers are under threat from the new 
generation of worm viruses. The latest type of virus also presents an added security 
threat. A worm virus can be used to exploit weaknesses in Microsoft’s operating 
system to take over control of the machine or deny legitimate users access. In today’s 
climate, governments are increasingly aware of the opportunity this could potentially 
offer terrorists. The Business, 19 October 2003
Millions of people risk having the personal information stored in their mobile phones 
stolen by a hi-tech electronic eavesdropping device, experts warned yesterday.
It would enable paedophiles, terrorists and industrial spies to hack into handsets without 
the victims even realising. Daily Mail, 15 April 2004
Characterisations of hackers as a threat or a future threat tend to be highly
depersonalised, the arguments flowing from what is technically possible, rather than
what is humanly probable. This phenomenon has strengthened in recent years and there
is no sign of abatement in the near future.
The other attributes of hackers featuring prominently in the frequency list presented in 
Figure 14 build a picture of a group of destructive youngsters, who have high levels of 
skill in their chosen activity, which they pursue chiefly because they find it challenging.
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They are often seen as vandals or saboteurs, but might just as easily be political 
activists or agents o f a state, either friendly or hostile. Hackers commonly target 
government and big business -  the peak in the period 9/11 to 2002 is explained by a 
rash of ‘hacktivist’ activity and the indictment in the US of British citizen Gary 
McKinnon on hacking charges. Less often, but still significantly, they are seen as 
harmless pranksters/mischief makers, who exist to show o ff to their peers their dubious 
achievements.
Clearly, the overall reporting of hacker behaviour tends to the negative. There are some 
positive attributes higher up the frequency table, notably the views that hackers are 
highly skilled, see what they do as intellectually challenging (with the tenacity that 
implies) and are mostly harmless. However, positive attributes are more often towards 
the bottom of the table. Hackers are less often seen as folk heroes, victimised by society 
and used as scapegoats. ‘Ethical hacking’ exists, but is less frequently reported, as is 
the widely held belief amongst hackers that freedom o f information is an ideal.
Although the issue of pornography features reasonably high on the list, it is rarely 
claimed that hackers are closely associated with pornography. The links made in die 
press tend to be weak, such as “On the Internet, we are all at risk from hackers, 
pomographers etc”. The association is deliberate, but stops short of actually 
confounding one with the other.
But freedom is indivisible, and the open, unregulated nature of cyberspace offered 
opportunities not just to decent folks like you and me but also to unsavoury characters - 
money-launderers, tax dodgers, pomographers, paedophiles, hackers, virus-writers, 
terrorists and the like. The Observer, 13 May 2001
Because hackers are predominantly seen as young, perhaps it is possible that there is
something of a taboo at work here. Whilst it is acceptable to claim that youngsters are
engaging in an activity they find challenging but which is, nevertheless, destructive,
there is a reluctance to claim that children are accessing pornography.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note what is not present: drugs. There were only 
four references to hackers and drugs overall. A search for references to hackers and 
drugs in close proximity (within 10 words of each other) revealed only 36 references in 
all UK national press articles in the Lexis-Nexis database. This compares with around 
7000 articles citing hackers in total. Even the image of hackers as cannabis-smoking 
nerds does not seem to have permeated the press significantly. Rather, challenge, 
adrenaline, black coffee and junk food are seen as the drags of choice for hackers.
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The Coffee Wars play up one of the computer hacker’s most liberally served 
stereotypes; that they are nocturnal mammals whose penchant is for sucking strong cups 
of coffee as they raid sleeping computers. Hackers are also portrayed as being loners, 
sartorially inelegant, messy and lovers of spicy food. The Times, 14 July 2001
During the secondary coding process, the sub-code character/appearance attributes
was applied every time a description of a hacker’s character or appearance was
encountered. This sub-code does not appear in Figure 14 since its purpose was to mark
passages in which specific hackers or groups of hackers were described, as opposed to
the usual references to hackers in the abstract. The adjectives used in the descriptions
were collected and are presented in Figure 16, where they have been grouped, like with
like. Group 5 contains three attributes which are of a threatening nature, but each of
these attributes was ascribed only once or twice in the entire corpus. This group aside,
an entirely different picture emerges. The hackers described have addictive
personalities (Group 1) and tend towards the juvenile in character, childish fantasists
who are not popular with their peers and are particularly unsuccessful with girls (Group
2). This is a definitively male stereotype. These boys are meticulous and persistent
with their hacking, tending to the reclusive and totally dedicated to the exclusion of all
else. They will share information generally, but rarely cooperate in any given attack
(Group 3). They are sometimes portrayed as brave but, more often, as having bravado,
bragging about their skills (<3roup 4). Appearance-wise, hackers are often viewed as
geeky, pasty-faced, with long hair and unshaven faces. They may either be chubby with
junk food, or skinny with a wired look from too much caffeine. They will often wear
either spectacles or branded shades, several body piercings and dress either entirely in
black or in urban skateboarding gear (Group 7).
What does not appear in descriptions of individuals or specific groups of hackers is any 
reference to them being dangerous criminals or terrorists. Hackers such as the 
infamous Kevin Mitnick may be considered to have had the power to “blow up the 
world” (The Observer, 4 September 1994). But their supposed dangerous powers are 
eventually mitigated by the portrait painted in the press. Mitnick has spent time in 
prison for his hacking, but he was ultimately drawn as an addict who could not help 
himself, and a modern-day Robin Hood who exposed the flaws in Big Business. 
Despite his incredible skills, he would never have caused real harm, we are told. Unlike 
the black-and-white images painted of hackers in the abstract, individual hackers tend to 
grow out of their offending behaviour, and this is veiy much reflected in the media 
coverage:
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Figure 16 List of character/appearance qualities attributed to hackers
Character
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[Computers set up for an experiment in PC security] were then intensively monitored by 
a team of experts which included Kevin Mitnick, the guy once regarded by the US 
government as the world’s most dangerous hacker and now gainfully employed as a 
security consultant. The Observer, 5 December 2004
Similarly, Londoner Gary McKinnon is currently wanted in the US for hack attacks on
the US Defense infrastructure around the time of 9/11. His offences are real, yet
McKinnon is painted as a deluded soul who thought the Americans were hiding proof of
alien life and was caught searching for that proof. He now lives in fear of what the
Americans might do to him.
He said: ‘I am walking down the road and I find I cannot control my own legs. I’m 
sitting up all night, thinking about jail and what they might do to me. An American jail. 
And remember, according to them, I was making Washington inoperable immediately 
after September 11.
... ‘I am only a little nerd.’ So how did this jobless techno-geek with a fondness for 
science fiction and alien invasions find himself at the centre of a plot so bizarre that 
even the most gung-ho of Hollywood directors would reject it out of hand for being too 
fanciful? Daily Mail, 16 July 2005
All these attributes in Figure 16, when taken together, describe in detail the geeky,
computer-obsessed, socially-inept, teenage stereotype which most people have in mind
when they imagine a hacker. The importance of this finding is that it demonstrates that
distance between a claims-maker and the subject of his hostility is key. When viewed
individually, hackers are just geeks and, although disruptive, are not particularly
harmful. Only when viewed as an amorphous group do hackers become the subject of
the more worrying associations with dangerous criminality and terrorism. It will
become plain below that all traces of humanity are erased when the terrorist link is
described in the press.
2. T h e  terrorist  lin k
The primary code terrorist link (n=657) was applied to all quotations in which a link 
was made between terrorism and hackers or the use of technology. This included all 
references to ‘cyberterrorism’. There is some overlap with the sub-code hacker as 
terrorist (Figure 14) so that 139 quotations were coded with both terrorist link and 
hacker as terrorist. As before, a secondary coding process was undertaken to establish 
sub-codes for the primary code terrorist link. The quantitative results of this process are 
set out in Figures 17 and 18.
The striking feature of these results is that the future threat scenario is by far the most 
popular method of introducing the terrorist link, and it has become increasingly popular 
over time. In the absence of any concrete evidence in support of cyberterrorism, the
186
Figure 17 Cumulative frequency distribution of terrorist link sub-codes by time
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majority of claims resort to this mechanism. The future threat scenario was not used in 
the press in the late 1980s, but started to appear in the early 1990s, during which period 
over one quarter of the terrorist links were made in this manner. Since then, there has 
been a fairly even increase in the use of the future threat scenario to a level of 42% for 
the period 2003-5. As might be expected, there was a peak of 46% following the 9/11 
attacks. There was a pervasive sense of vulnerability which led society to look in all 
directions for possible attacks. Vulnerabilities brought about by dependence on 
technology were a common theme:
The seriousness with which governments are taking all kinds of terrorist threats on the 
internet - including attacks by computer hackers - was further illustrated by one of the 
first US Congressional hearings following the tragedy, which focused on cyber attacks.
At die hearing Joseph Lieberman, the Democrat senator from Connecticut who chairs 
the committee, said: “Our enemies will increasingly strike this mighty nation at places 
where they believe we are not only dependent but where we are unguarded. That is 
surely true of our cyberspace infrastructure today.” A further hearing will take place 
tomorrow. The Daily Telegraph, 21 September 2001
It was also postulated that terrorists might use virus attacks to cause major economic
damage, with phrases such as ‘infecting systems with a lethal virus’ sitting at odds with
pure economic loss, but emphasising the deadliness of the perpetrators.
E-commerce minister Douglas Alexander yesterday ordered internet security to be 
stepped up. He warned web experts from MI5, the MoD and GCHQ that increased 
vigilance was needed as terrorists could inflict major economic damage by bankrolling 
rogue computer hackers and infecting systems with a lethal virus. The Mirror, 27 
September 2001
The use of disaster scenarios was widespread, with apocalyptic possibilities being 
peddled by those tasked with ensuring public safety.
In the worst case, cyber-terrorists could open floodgates in dams or poison water 
supplies with sewage.
Earlier this year, Ronald Dick, head of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection 
Centre, expressed fears that attackers might cut power to hospitals and police radios 
after a conventional attack to maximise casualties.
“Is that an unreasonable scenario? Not in this world. And that keeps me up at night,” 
Mr Dick said. The Daily Telegraph, 23 August 2002
In the subsequent period, 2003-5, focus turned from the immediate aftermath of 9/11
towards the Gulf War. Future threat scenarios envisaged cyber-attacks from Islamic
extremists as part of the insurgency.
Terrorist groups may try to infiltrate the computer systems of some of Britain’s biggest 
companies, government departments and emergency services if a war is launched 
against Iraq, the Home Office has cautioned.
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Stephen Cummings, director of the National Infrastructure Security Coordination 
Centre (NISCC), said key IT systems were under threat of cyber attack by Islamic 
extremists. The Times, 20 February 2003
As noted above (Chapter 6, Section 2.2 (c)), these attacks never materialised and
politicians parried neatly with a subtle change in rhetoric: ‘It may not have happened
yet, but it w ill...’.
Even if the risk of cyberterrorism during the war was overstated, the threat of a serious 
attack by a rogue nation or a terrorist group remains very real, according to US 
government agencies. The Guardian, 24 April 2003
The future threat scenario at its most powerful, and useful.
On the other hand, there is significant evidence that terrorists make use of technology in 
the sense meant by Conway (2002). This is reflected in the number of quotations with 
the sub-code terrorist use o f technology (n=147) which are spread over the whole time 
period covered by the corpus. There are many references to terrorists communicating 
by email, using the Internet for posting and gathering information and propaganda, and 
planning terror campaigns on computers, and these references peak, as one might 
expect, in the period 9/11 to 2002. None of this amounts to true cyberterrorism, 
although it is often represented as such in the press, as this example referring to the Bali 
bombing exemplifies:
Headline: ‘BIN’S FIRST CYBER BLAST’
FBI investigators fear the outrage was al-Qaida’s first cyberwar attack. Defence 
specialists believe Osama bin Laden fanatics planned and executed the bombing using 
computers. The masterminds could even have detonated their devices from thousands 
of miles away, possibly Pakistan or Kashmir. The CIA have established that bin Laden 
ran many of his earlier operations over the internet. An indication that an attack on Bah 
was planned came after the US Defence Department found hackers in Islamic former 
Soviet republics had tried to break their codes. Daily Star, 15 October 2002
The third most significant mechanism used to introduce the terrorist link is the
relabelling of existing groups or social phenomena as ‘cyberterrorist’. There are a
number of sub-codes which refer to this relabelling process. The first is hackers
labelled ‘terrorists’ (n=128) which refers to all instances where ordinary hackers have
been labelled ‘cyberterrorists’ or very closely identified with terrorist activity with no
obvious justification other than a desire to make a story more eye-catching. Figure 18
shows that the labelling of hackers as terrorists was very popular during the 1990s when
cyberterrorism was still a relatively new concept and arguably had greater impact.
However, as time went on, terrorist use o f technology took over from hackers labelled
‘terrorists This signals an interesting shift in emphasis so that the trend seems to be
moving away from the ascription to hackers of terrorist motives towards terrorists being
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ascribed technology skills in their own right. The mechanism of labelling hackers as 
terrorists is still important:
James Adams, chief executive of Infrastructure Defence, which collates and provides 
information on cyberspace threats, says: “Hackers are a new form of terrorist. You can 
bring a country to its knees. It is a unique weapon. Things are getting exponentially 
worse.” Sunday Times, 4 April 1999
Is hacking a constant threat? I have been targeted by cyber-terrorists. It has mainly 
been by neo-Nazi groups and Islamic fundamentalists. The Guardian, May 8, 2003
Last month was the worst-ever for computer terrorism, when the SoBig Virus helped 
cause business to lose £22 billion globally, say experts mi2g. The Mirror, September 2, 
2003
However, it should be contrasted with the increasingly popular reporting of terrorist use 
o f technology which leans towards terrorists becoming ‘cyberterrorists’ in their own 
right:
“The battlefield is being played out in cyber space where the terrorists have used the 
Internet to indoctrinate, train and coordinate deadly terror attacks.
The terrorists have become more sophisticated by linking up with cyber criminals to 
infiltrate the computer systems of major corporations as a means of stealing money to 
fund terrorists’ activities.
“The main threat we face is cyber terrorism which has the potential to destabilise our 
entire economy and information technology networks.” Sunday Express, 30 October 
2005
Next, there is the use of association (n=104), which can be considered a method of relabelling 
in that its aim is to associate two ideas (in this case hacking and terrorism) so closely that they 
are eventually confounded. Sometimes the association is unintentional, though none the less 
effective for that, but very often it is deliberate.
Now an IT conference at Cambridge has heard how “terrorism, cyber-vandalism, other 
criminal activity, natural disasters and situations yet to be encountered can destroy 
supply chains and businesses”. The Guardian, 25 June 2003
On die plus side, Linux received a boost last week when it passed a security 
certification required by the US Defense Department. This enables it to be used on 
mission-critical computer systems, ensuring that these are safeguarded against hackers 
and cyber-terrorists. The Business, 10 August 2003
Association is often found in the context of a future threat scenario in which, for
example, a newly discovered vulnerability might be exploited by hackers and terrorists.
...as Britain becomes more reliant on computers, vital Government systems, including 
those in the health service, air traffic control and defence, are becoming more and more 
vulnerable to malicious attack.
“An attack could come from individuals such as hackers, criminals or terrorist groups 
who might benefit from seeing our business disrupted,” said a Home Office spokesman. 
The Independent, 7 February 1999
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There are two further types of relabelling which were found to be significant in the 
corpus. The first was the relabelling of activism as cyberterrorism, very often political 
activism taking the form of defacing websites and posting propaganda.
Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon looks on grinning at a swastika daubed over the 
Stars and Stripes.
This is the latest shocking example of the surge in political cyber terrorism that’s hitting 
Western businesses.
“Hundreds of similar propaganda images are uploaded on to online servers every week 
by pro-Islamic hacker groups protesting at the prospect of war with Iraq, Israel- 
Palestine and other Islamic - interest issues,” says a spokesman for digital risk specialist 
firm mi2g. The Mirror, 2 7 February 2003
The final type of relabelling is where criminals are labelled ‘cyberterrorists ’. This
almost exclusively relates to attempts by criminal groups to extort money, usually from
financial institutions, by threatening to attack their computer networks. This is not
cyberterrorism and does not even qualify as true cybercrime, in the sense that no
unauthorised access to the system is actually achieved, only threatened.
City of London financial institutions have paid huge sums to international gangs of 
sophisticated “cyber terrorists” who have amassed up to Pounds 400m worldwide by 
threatening to wipe out computer systems. Sunday Times, 2 June 1996
The importance of all these cases of relabelling is that they create ‘cyberterrorism’ out
of existing phenomena which have not previously been considered to have any links
with terrorism. Thus, the net is widened to include hackers, activists and criminals
under the umbrella of cyberterrorism. Attacking from the other side is terrorist use o f
technology, a mechanism which attempts to create ‘cyberterrorism’ by adding the
ingredient of technology to existing terrorist activity.
Turning to the sub-codes with lesser frequencies, sometimes the terrorist link is 
introduced through reports of the authorities'pursuit o f terrorists (n=55). The corollary 
of terrorist use o f technology is that the authorities can also use technology as an 
investigative tool:
E-mail and telephone data has proved vital in the fight against A1 Qaeda. Sunday 
Times, 16 June 2002
It also follows that encryption and other technologies which might hinder these 
investigations meet resistance from law enforcers on the basis that it would hinder the 
tracking of terrorist activity across the Internet.
So why don’t the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies in America (which generally 
decides what happens on the Internet, whether we like it or not) like encryption? 
Perhaps they think it will make it harder to catch terrorists. The Independent, 30 
September 1997
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Elsewhere in the corpus, it is baldly claimed that cyberterrorism exists (n=44) as a 
matter of fact or, alternatively, that cyberterrorism is suspected (n=35) to he behind a 
particular attack.
“In fact, even prior to last summer the proportion of attacks by cyber terrorists from 
pro-Islamic sources was negligible. Now we estimate that at least 15 per cent of digital 
attacks are from these sources. A range of pro-Islamic groups are working together to 
target the infrastructures of countries such as the UK and the US.” The Times, 24 
February 2003
Terrorists are feared to be behind an alarming rise in hackers’ attacks on top-secret 
government computer files. The News of the World, 24 March 2002
It seems too much of a coincidence that New York and then parts of London and Kent 
were plunged into darkness.
Could the power cuts in these two major cities have been caused by people hacking into 
the computers that control the power grid by any chance? And, if so, are these people 
criminals anarchists or terrorists? The Mirror, 4 September 2003
Finally, to the question of which messages are present, but attenuated. The most
important message of all is that there has never been a publicly verified cyberterrorist
attack, although this does not preclude the possibility that the government and security
services are in possession of classified information to the contrary. There are other,
related issues, such as the fact that it is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible in most
cases, to cause death or serious injury through a remote hack, however talented the
hacker; that causing economic loss probably does not inspire terror in the sense meant
by ‘terrorism’; and that the weight of considered academic and professional opinion still
considers that, if terrorists are interested in cyberterrorism at all, the threat is probably
not imminent. Data drawn from the corpus demonstrate that claims that hacking is not
terrorism (n=44) are present but not common. They were most prominent in the late
1980s when many experts were trying to argue that criminalising hackers would lead
youngsters who were not causing significant mischief to turn to more harmful activities.
There was another peak in such claims after 9/11 when cyberterrorism was suspected to
be behind various attacks and law enforcers and industry insiders were forced to spell
out that this was ordinary hacking, not terrorism.
The involvement of FBI cyber-crime agents and the Office of Homeland Security raised 
the spectre of terrorism, but the expert consensus - echoed by Mr Fleischer - was that 
the attack was far more likely to be the work of conventional hackers, possibly young 
computer users seeking a wider stage for rivalries hatched during online gaming 
sessions. The Guardian, 24 October 2002
Bank of Ireland confirmed that material originating from Russia had been sent out in its 
name. It said, however, that it understood the e-mails were harmless and it was 
unaware of any terrorist link. Sunday Times, 27 October 2002
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Although it is not widely reported, there is a reaction to the process of relabelling 
described above, and the sources for such comments tend to be journalists, experts and 
hackers themselves, keen to debunk the more sensationalist claims being made.
Many experts also say ... those who launch virus attacks are more likely to be ‘cyber­
vandals’ not ‘cyber-terrorists’. ‘Terrorists make targeted demands and like a high 
degree of control over their operations. A supervirus is more likely to be the brainchild 
of a spotty adolescent than some terrorist mastermind.’ The Observer, 7May 2000
To summarise, the most significant factors linking terrorism to information security
issues are use of the future threat scenario and discussions of terrorist use o f technology
as if this amounts to cyberterrorism. In both cases, the technology itself is often at the
heart of the claims, not just its human operators. The next section sets out perceptions
of the technology which emerge from the corpus.
3. D emonisation of the technology
The sub-codes derived from the secondary coding of the technology quotations and the 
quantitative findings are set out in Figures 19 and 20.
Overall, technology is most often discussed in the corpus in the context of the future 
threat scenario. The proportion of quotations devoted to such discussions has increased 
with each successive time period, demonstrating its increasing importance as a 
rhetorical mechanism. For the period 2003-5,42% of all references to technology in the 
corpus involved a future threat scenario. In the great majority of cases, a new 
technology or development is described and predictions are then made about how it 
might be used or abused by criminals or terrorists.
One recent case highlights the tensions created by the development of technologies 
which can be used for both good and bad purposes. Calls were made in the US for 
anonymising software to be banned on the grounds that it might be used by terrorists. 
Its author claimed it was intended to promote free speech.
The Senate commerce committee in America recently called on the US government to 
legislate against such technology because terrorists might employ it. ...
... The programmer says his software will permit the anonymous publication and 
consumption of information on the internet, making it impossible for governments, 
especially repressive regimes, to restrict information. “My hope is that it will be more 
difficult for undemocratic countries to censor their citizens’ access to information 
through the internet,” he said. Sunday Times, 7 August 2005
To call for a complete ban on such software appears an extreme reaction by most
standards. Very often, the future threat scenario is combined with other claims about
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Figure 19 Cumulative frequency distribution of technology sub-codes by time
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technology. In these examples, the focus is on vulnerabilities ‘caused’ by technology 
and by IT dependence, both major themes discovered in the corpus.
The attack clearly shows the weakness that Microsoft’s growing monopoly causes to a 
country reliant on computers: if every computer runs the same operating system, all will 
have the same flaws, and a lone cyber-terrorist could seriously dismpt communications. 
The Independent, 5 March 1998
[Richard Clarke, chairman of the US President’s critical infrastructure board] argues 
that we should be worrying about how to protect our critical systems, rather than where 
the next attack will come from. Every new technology is a potential target for cyber­
terrorists. ... “Now, if you’re a terrorist, the first thing you might want to do before an 
attack is take down the 911 system,” says Clarke. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
Thus, technology itself becomes the focus of claims about cyberterrorism since the
arguments are really about what the technology makes possible, rather than evidence of
the motivations of terrorists. In the same context, technology has been portrayed as an
offensive weapon which, when combined with the future threat scenario, makes for a
very potent image:
The West’s intelligence agencies are bracing themselves for the use of what they have 
dubbed “weapons of mass disruption”: when terrorists take up cyberwarfare, hacking 
into the West’s key control systems, all of which are computer-dependent. The 
Independent, 13 October 1996
In the context of this corpus of data, the portrayal of technology is overwhelmingly
negative. Representations of technology as problem were over three times more
numerous than technology as solution. The former code was applied to quotations
which cast technology as problematic, creating a vulnerability:
Technology may be able to help the industry, but it also introduces security threats. 
One former airline insider, who asked not to be named, says there are two critical 
weaknesses in airline technology that could be exposed by terrorists and criminals. 
Independent on Sunday, 23 September2001
.. .a means of attack:
Experts say there is growing concern that terrorist groups are trying to use the internet 
both to communicate and to launch cyber-attacks on US and British companies and 
government bodies in order to create chaos. Sunday Times, 14 October 2001
.. .or a channel for crime:
The Net was hailed as the ultimate communication tool. But the Superhighway has fast 
become the tool of pomographers, pimps, drug-sellers and burglars. Daily Mirror, 28 
November 1995
But freedom is indivisible, aid the open, unregulated nature of cyberspace offered 
opportunities not just to decent folks like you and me but also to unsavoury characters - 
money-launderers, tax dodgers, pomographers, paedophiles, hackers, virus-writers, 
terrorists and the like. The Observer, 13 May 2001
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The representations of technology as solution tend to go hand-in-hand with technology 
as problem. The view is that, where one technology creates a difficulty, another 
technology can be used to address that difficulty. It is noteworthy that this view does 
not become prevalent in the corpus until after the 9/11 attacks, underscoring the 
technical approach to security which characterised that period.
“[The airlines’ e-booking system] is wide open to abuse,” said one airline insider. 
“Sophisticated criminals can easily create fake IDs and hack into the internet.”...
But... security threats could be thwarted by the technology of one US firm, Visionics, 
which makes software that can recognise facial features and patterns. It can also he 
used both to check the authenticity of an identification document and to check a 
passport photo with the face of the person holding it, removing the possibility of human 
error.
Amongst the quotations on technology, there is also significant emphasis on a 
phenomenon discussed in Chapter 6: that technology, especially the Internet, is a double 
edged sword and, if it can be used by terrorists, it can also be used by the authorities 
hunting them down.
So is the internet a boon to criminals and terrorists everywhere? Surely what is sauce for 
the terrorist goose is sauce for the police gander, so to speak. Just as the internet offers 
new opportunities for communication among terrorists, so it represents a major step 
forward for law enforcement. The Guardian, 22 November 2001
James Bond-style technology is used to track criminals and terrorists but now texts are 
proving vital evidence in securing convictions. Sunday Express, 18 April 2004
The government is excited rather than alarmed by what technology can do. It sees 
utility, not danger, in each opportunity to increase its surveillance. If more of our 
movements and purchases are logged, it will help the police to fight crime. Sunday 
Times, 3 July 2005
The well-rehearsed arguments about the use of technology for crime and for destruction 
are familiar and have been used in relation to hackers for years. They are only relevant 
to the issue of cyberterrorism when combined with the future threat scenario: terrorists 
might use the Internet for fraudulent purposes in order to raise funds; or they may use 
viruses to destroy the systems on which the Stock Exchange relies. On the other hand, 
the use of technology (usually the Internet) for harmful information/communication is 
very pertinent to terrorism generally. In the words of one journalist:
The internet has been getting some bad publicity recently because of its presumed role 
in helping terrorists perpetrate the September 11 atrocities. In addition to using the 
internet to communicate, the shadowy network of terrorists supposedly hid encoded 
information in image and music files. The message is that the internet is complicit in 
the planning and execution of evil crimes. The implication is that the internet itself is 
evil - even more than mobile phones, which the terrorists almost certainly also used. 
The Guardian, 22 November 2001
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It is often reported that terrorists use email and websites to communicate with each 
other and with sympathisers.
A1 Qaeda cyber terrorists are plotting over the internet to launch a suicide attack on 
Britain’s HMS Ark Royal using a speedboat packed with explosives. Daily Star, 14 
March 2003
Al-Qaeda chiefs are circulating plans to British extremists for a bomb designed to evade 
airport scanning machines, writes Adam Nathan.
The instructions for the “invisible” bomb are among thousands of Al-Qaeda files in a 
secret online repository discovered by computer hackers and passed to MI5. Sunday 
Times, 26 October 2003
There is also the issue of availability of information on techniques, such as how to make 
bombs or viruses, which is not so much communicated from A to B, but is generally 
available to all. It is almost axiomatic that, whatever you want to know, you can find 
the information on the Internet.
But you don’t need the coding abilities of a Netsky or Mydoom author to create basic 
viruses. Virus-writing websites and toolkits make it easy for any malcontent to create 
their own computer plague. Mail on Sunday, 16 May 2004
In contrast with the prevalent view of technology being used for harmful 
information/communication, its use for positive information/communication is much 
less widely reported. When it is, the positive aspects are usually presented as the flip­
side of the harmful ones. This is a good example of how positive messages d>out 
technology have been attenuated in the context of the debate on cybercrime and 
cyberterror.
The Net was hailed as the ultimate communication tool. But the Superhighway has fast 
become the tool of pomographers, pimps, drug- sellers and burglars. Daily Mirror, 28 
November 1995
The trouble is, not only does the Internet allow the mass distribution of ideas, but it can 
also bolster their plausibility.
The Web is establishing a democracy of ideas on a scale unimagined by previous 
generations. With plans to connect all schools to the Internet, the issue of controlling 
access to ‘undesirable’ sites is being hotly debated. The Guardian, 17 July 1997
IT dependence was a theme which occurred reasonably often, signifying a
preoccupation with the vulnerabilities brought about by such dependence. There is a
very real sense of unease which arises when manning the physical boundaries of a
nation against attack is no longer enough and people begin to perceive that there are
other ways to attack a nation on its home soil and that the geographic location of the
enemy is irrelevant.
For a country relatively free from terrorist attack inside its borders, news of this 
vulnerability comes as a shock. The more computerised, the more technologically
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sophisticated they become, they are being told, the more vulnerable they are to cyber­
terrorism. The Independent, 22 October 1997
[President Clinton] has ordered the military to develop its own information warfare 
capabilities to respond to such attacks. But [Congressman] Weldon, describing 
dependence on computer systems as “the Achilles heel of developed nations”, said this 
is not enough. Sunday Times, 25 July 1999
Finally, this sense of unease is highlighted again in the quotations coded with
technology is complex and technology is simple. When technology is viewed as
complex, the argument generally goes that it is possible for certain, gifted individuals to
invade our information systems secretly, spy on us, modify, destroy or steal our data
and then withdraw leaving no trace that they have ever been there. They are able to do
this because they have mastery of these arcane systems and ordinary people do not.
There is a strong feeling of lacking control over the systems society depends on due to
their complexity.
New generations of viruses are taking advantage of the complexity of the latest 
computer operating systems to spread software devices that propagate themselves, hunt 
down information of interest and send it wherever they want via the Net The 
Guardian, 18 March 1999
A teenage hacker narrowly escaped jail yesterday after sparking a nuclear panic by 
keying into the computer system of a top-secret U.S. weapons laboratory.
Joseph McElroy was a 16-year old schoolboy when he bypassed the electronic security 
with sophisticated software he had developed and nicknamed Deathserv. Daily Mail, 3 
February 2004
... as CCTV becomes driven by computers instead of videotape, any expert hacker will 
be able to find his way into your private security system. Even now, if you have a 
webcam, then (if you can be tricked into downloading some Trojan-horse software) you 
can be watched in your home by an outside hacker, whether a private individual or a 
state agency. With broadband, people leave their computers on all the time, which 
means the possibility of 24-hour surveillance within the walls of your own house. The 
Times, 14 May 2005
The stand-out result from all the coding on technology is a massive peak in the early 
1990s in the presentation of technology as complex. During this period, 56% of all 
references to technology described it as complex (Figure 20). Whilst there is no single 
reason for this finding, it seems to be bome of a feeling of helplessness, of being out of 
control. This was also the period when hackers’ skills were perceived as being at their 
highest (Figure 15) and it was not yet widely known that many hacking tools could be 
downloaded from the Internet -  the view of technology being used for harmful 
information/communication had not yet registered (Figure 20). The perception was that 
hackers had the upper hand and their skill was such that they could do as they pleased 
without redress.
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‘The hackers are now so sophisticated that their knowledge is outstripping the 
technology designed to keep them out.’ Mail on Sunday, 14 February 1993
But there was suspicion of computers themselves and the mood of the time is nicely
captured in this quotation:
Of course, computers being such complex machines, we should expect “and learn to 
live with” bugs and inconsistencies. In fact, their complexity, and the resulting 
unpredictability, is the source of a kind of cyber-superstition. Most of us still have no 
idea how computers function. All we know is that they can work some powerful magic; 
so powerful, who knows where it stops? Hence the chatter about mutant cockroaches 
living inside PCs and video display terminals which leak carcinogenic radiation. The 
Observer, 11 April 1994
Since the turn of the Century, there seems to have been a move away from viewing
technology as complex to the view of technology as simple, that ‘anyone can do it with
cheap equipment and tools downloaded from the Internet’. This finding is supported by
the corresponding rise in the view of technology being used for harmful
information/communication. This chimes with the New Millennium paranoia which
was so exacerbated by 9/11, the subsequent wars and civilian attacks. It also makes
more compelling the argument that terrorists are able to and will perpetrate a cyber
attack. If technology is still portrayed as being highly complex, this future threat
argument becomes harder to make.
[Due to a flaw in Internet Explorer] banks and governments are at risk from organised 
crime and terrorists. All the hackers need to break into any computer system running 
Microsoft’s Intranet Explorer is for a single user at an organisation to log on to the 
internet on Monday morning using Explorer. The Business, 13 June 2004
... in a chapter of his autobiography entitled “Hacking, Why Not?”, the Bali bombings 
mastermind Imam Samudra directs readers to Indonesian-language sites for instructions 
on how to carry out online credit card fraud and money-laundering. These instructions 
are simple to follow: ... a consultant on international terrorism ... calls it “hacking for 
dummies”, and adds that “in this day and age, you don’t have to be an expert hacker to 
have a tremendous impact”. Sunday Times, 11 September 2005
The point about simplicity is very often reinforced by claiming that ‘even a child could
do it’.
Once the access point was identified it was relatively easy to log-on to the Government 
network. To prove how simple the process was we asked an 11-year-old boy to repeat it 
- he did. Our reporters were then able to monitor the flow of electronic data around 
Portcullis House. For example, every time an email was sent it registered on a box on 
our laptop screen. It clicked up 26 times in the time it took to turn the comer of the 
building in a car. Sunday Mirror, 18 August 2002
And this [a DDoS attack on the 13 DNS root servers] was done not by some fiendishly 
clever piece of cracking, but by off-the-shelf techniques involving the penetration of 
unprotected machines all over the net (mostly running Microsoft software) and then 
using these zombies to flood the DNS servers with packets until each machine in turn 
was overwhelmed and unable to respond to legitimate requests. It’s so simple a child 
could do it. For all we know, a child did. The Observer, 27 October 2002
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Of the remaining themes found in the quotations on technology, there are two which 
bear special mention. Concern is expressed that technology can be used to ensure 
anonymity and this is often linked with the idea that the networked nature of modem 
information systems makes geography irrelevant, particularly where cyber-attacks are 
concerned.
Triangle Boy works by allowing computer users to evade filters and firewalls - barriers 
used by governments, schools and corporations to restrict access to sensitive or 
unsuitable sites to authorised users only.
The software also helps those attempting to enter sensitive sites secretly by foiling 
investigators’ attempts to trace back any “break- ins” to the computer used and the 
country it is in. Sunday Times, 14 October 2001
Like many of the sites used by Muslim groups to promote their cause in Chechnya, 
Kashmir and Afghanistan, the IOC’s was set up using technological expertise in the 
UK. Creation of the websites follow a similar pattern with details deliberately spread 
around the globe in an attempt to conceal the identities of the people providing both the 
content and funding. Independent on Sunday, 28 October 2001
Once again, the ideas that terrorists might be able to communicate anonymously and
attack without the need for physical proximity have caused much vexation to law
enforcers and politicians alike.
Summary
There is one theme which cuts across the analysis of all three of the elements of 
cyberterrorism: the future threat scenario. In all cases, it is a highly significant 
mechanism used to create or highlight concern. The classic formulation highlights a 
new technology or the discovery of a new system vulnerability and predicts ways in 
which such things might be used by hackers and/or terrorists to threaten society in some 
way. This unites the elements of cyberterrorism and creates a sense of immediacy 
which surrounds the issue, generating concern about deviant groups which is not 
necessarily based on solid evidence.
There are significant processes of redefinition being undertaken. Hackers are relabelled 
‘cyberterrorists’; terrorist use of technology, whilst not amounting to cyberterrorism, is 
labelled as such; the technology itself is being re-examined in the fight of potential uses 
by terrorists. One fact is certain: true cyberterrorism is not yet with us. Nevertheless, 
the cyberterrorist has already been defined into existence.
The next chapter will discuss the policies and mechanisms of social control which have 
been introduced in the name of combating cyberterrorism; consider whether the social 
reaction is proportionate to the scale of the threat; and examine the evidence as to how
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and why efforts have been made to sustain concern about cyberterrorism over the last 20 
years.
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C h a p t e r  8
F i n d i n g s : 
D i s p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  a n d  V o l a t i l i t y
This chapter will assess the evidence relating to the final two ingredients of the 
attributional model of a moral panic: disproportionality and volatility. Section 1 will 
gauge whether it can be said that the subjective response to cyberterrorism is 
disproportionate to the objective threat. Section 2 will consider the extent to which 
there is volatility in the social dynamic. Although these two elements are not connected 
to the same extent as, say, concern and consensus, they are presented in the same 
chapter because the task in both cases is to draw together the threads of the evidence 
presented thus far rather than assessing exclusively new evidence.
1. D ispr o po r t io n a l it y
According to the arguments rehearsed in Chapter 3, it is scientifically defensible to 
measure subjective views against an objective dimension, in this case the levels of 
concern about cyberterrorism against an objective assessment of the risk. Moreover, it 
is possible to formulate objective propositions, even if they are couched in conditional 
and tentative terms. Where the existence of a threat is exaggerated and couched in 
absolute and alarmist terms, it is usually possible to counter that the probabilities of the 
threat crystallising are much lower than stated and the effects are unlikely to be as 
severe. Distortion may also be present in discussions of the causes and effects of 
cyberterrorism.
One further, practical problem must be addressed, a problem not discussed in the moral 
panic literature. It is all very well, it might be argued, for academics to assess levels of 
objective harm having, as they do, access to the very best and most up-to-date studies, 
theories and reasoning. Yet the subjective concern of the ordinary man is based on the 
information to which he has access. His concern should only be judged as 
disproportionate, therefore, if it is disproportionate in terms of the information available 
to him. The approach taken in this section, therefore, is to formulate objective 
propositions against which to measure subjective concerns, taking account only of 
information available in the corpus. This acknowledges that an average reader of a UK
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daily newspaper has ready access to the information contained in the corpus in a way 
that he does not have access to the kind of academic or industry information referenced 
in Chapter 2. The question is still one of proportionality, but the focus shifts from 
objective standards derived from external scientific enquiries towards objective 
propositions derived from a critical analysis of the information presented in the corpus. 
This is on the basis that the reader of a UK national newspaper is able to apply critical 
reasoning to information in an article he reads (whether or not he does so is a moot 
point) because media reporting is not homogeneous and does provide alternative 
viewpoints which can be compared and contrasted, rather than accepting at face value 
the information presented. His hypothetical response will only be considered 
disproportionate if other information from the corpus and a critical approach suggests it 
is so.
Certainly, many of the reactions represented in the corpus are the reported reactions of 
politicians, industry insiders, journalists and the like. Unlike the ordinary man, they do 
have ready access to other information and specialist advice. However, by reducing the 
analysis to the ‘lowest common denominator’, it is possible to argue that, for example, a 
politician who claimed that X is a serious threat should at the very least have realised 
that it was not as much of a threat as he was suggesting because of information readily 
available in the press. These are the grounds on which the ordinary man would be able 
to judge the politician’s claim.
Concern about a cyberterror attack is often identified with a particular element of an 
attack (Figure 21). First, there is the concern about the source of the attack, in other 
words, those deemed responsible. Then, there are concerns about the method of the 
attack, the target of the attack, and its outcome. Finally, there is the high-level social 
reaction to the phenomenon. In each of these areas, it is necessary to identify where 
fear and concern exceed appropriate or proportionate levels and where causes and 
effects of deviance have been distorted (Critcher 2003: 151). At each stage, 
propositions can be formulated, based on the available evidence, against which the 
concerns noted in previous chapters can be measured.
A final note: generation and dissemination of figures fabricated or exaggerated by 
claims-makers is normally a very important feature of the dimension of 
disproportionality in a moral panic. In the case of cyberterrorism there are figures -  
generated by the information security industry, government and law enforcers and 
usually relating to hacking offences and quantification of damage -  but they play a
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relatively small part in a debate which is far more focussed on unquantifiable future 
threats.
Figure 21 Anatomy of a cyberterror attack
Method
Reaction
Concern
Target OutcomeSource
1.1 Source of attack
Claims that cyberterrorists exist, that hackers are turning to terrorism or that terrorists 
are turning to hacking are rife in the corpus and were detailed in Chapter 7. One fact is 
certain: there has never been a true act of cyberterrorism publicly reported, in the press 
or anywhere else, although it is always possible that such an attack has taken place but 
that the information has been kept classified by the government and security services.
There’s curiously little proof that al-Qaida or other terrorist groups are engaging in 
cyberterrorism. Robert Andrews, a congressional representative from the state of New 
Jersey and a member of the House select committee on homeland security, concedes 
that there is “no evidence on the public record” that any terrorist group has ever 
launched an attack on the information infrastructure of the US.
It turns out that the vast majority of network intrusions and hacking attempts against US 
computers aren’t the work of terrorists hiding out in caves along the 
Pakistan/Afghanistan border, or hackers in Russia or China, but originate within the US. 
One security firm estimates that 86% of all “security events” can be traced back to the 
US. The Guardian, 24 April 2003
Despite the claims that cyberterrorists exist, close reading of the material in the corpus
reveals that there are no specific claims that, for example, al Qaeda have hacked into the
British CNI or that the IRA have ever succeeded in committing an atrocity using
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information technology alone. There are occasional claims that a terrorist group is 
behind a particular event, such as the electricity failures on 14 August 2003 in North 
America, but these are always exposed later as having been accidents or the result of 
hacks without terrorist motive. There is plenty of believable evidence that terrorists use 
technology but no evidence in the public domain of cyberterrorist attacks (Denning 
2000). Claims by civilians that the latter have taken place are, therefore, likely to be 
wide of the mark unless they have privileged access to classified information
The CMA [Communications Management Association] asked 172 of its senior 
personnel to report on incidences of cyber-terrorism in their organisations. Anonymity 
was guaranteed, though many of the companies involved are household names. ... 
Thirty-two per cent admitted being the victim of cyber-terrorism. The Guardian, 3 
April 2001
It is clear that the term ‘cyber-terrorism’ is used here to describe criminal breaches of 
security, and yet the claim is unequivocal: 32% of respondents have suffered 
cyberterrorist attacks. There is no shortage of such examples:
There is now evidence that the cyber-terrorist net is widening to include a larger number 
of firms. According to Mi2G, there are 65,000 projected overt attacks for 2002, an 
increase on the figure of 31,332 for 2001.
“This indicates terrorist groups are targeting smaller companies than before and are also 
focusing on attacking ISPs internet service providers , where a single penetration can 
take down 500 corporate websites,” an Mi2G spokesman said. The Business, 3 
November 2002
In fact, even prior to last summer the proportion of attacks by cyber terrorists from pro- 
Islamic sources was negligible. Now we estimate that at least 15 per cent of digital 
attacks are from these sources. A range of pro-Islamic groups are working together to 
target the infrastructures of countries such as the UK and the US. The Times, 24 
February 2003
Cyber-terrorists have launched a record number of attacks on business and government 
computers. There were 20,182 attacks around the world in the first 20 days of May, 
breaking the previous monthly record of 19,658 attacks in January.
A quarter of all attacks were the work of political or religious hackers protesting against 
Western policy in the Middle East. Systems in Britain, the USA, Germany and 
Argentina were the main victims, said digital risk specialists mi2g. The Mirror, 23 May 
2003
What seems fairly clear is that these are all false statements based on a redefinition of 
ordinary information security breaches as ‘cyberterrorism’. Sensationalisation of the 
language in which the findings of surveys are expressed quite clearly leads to 
disproportionate levels of concern in the target audiences:
It seems almost suicidal to connect a business to die internet, if the statistics for fraud, 
hacking and other computerised malice are right. The latest study says that 44% of UK 
businesses have suffered “a malicious security breach” in the past year. The Daily 
Telegraph, 7 May 2002
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The false statements and exaggerations with respect to the source of cyberterrorism, that 
is, those deemed responsible, almost always comes down to net-widening through 
redefinition.
Figure 22 The concept of net-widening
Terrorist use of technology
Technology
'HackingTerrorisi
Cyberterrorism
Technology
HackingTerrorism
Cyberterrorism
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The concept of net-widening can be considered using a Venn diagram (Figure 22): 
consider a set ‘Terrorism’ and a set ‘Technology’ with its subset ‘Hacking’, 
‘Cyberterrorism’ being the intersection of all three. Applying the definition of 
cyberterrorism used in this study, the intersection is, apparently, currently empty as 
there has never been a publicly documented case of cyberterrorism. However, by 
attributing terrorist motives to serious hacking cases and by relabelling terrorist use of 
the Internet and other technologies ‘cyberterrorism’, some of the elements are drawn 
into the intersection. A similar argument has been made in relation to computer crime:
In fact, by altering the definition of computer crime you can make it as large or as small 
a problem as you wish. Computer security consultants, surprise, surprise, tend to favour 
wide definitions; hard pressed police forces can ‘solve’ the problem of computer crime 
by refining it out of existence. The Guardian, 5 May 1988lt is not necessary to rehearse 
them again, but the findings set out in Chapter 7 demonstrate that net-widening is 
indeed prevalent on two levels. First, hackers are often labelled ‘terrorist’ in 
circumstances where there is no evidence of any terrorist motive or involvement 
(Figures 14, 15, 17 and 18). This is usually a rebranding exercise, as in this example 
relating to the Sobig F virus:
Internet giant Microsoft said yesterday it is working with the FBI and the Secret Service 
to track down those responsible for this week’s virus attack.
Coming so soon after another point-blank virus attack on Microsoft last week, the 
Seattle-based firm is on red alert and fearing a co-ordinated attack on world commerce 
by so-called e-terrorists. The Express, 23 August 2003
In other cases, it is simply assumed that, of all the hackers in the world, some of them
must be working for terrorists.
Although al-Qaeda’s ideology is simplistic, it seems to have access to sophisticated IT. 
One of the newest items of intelligence jargon is what some experts call “Hackint” - 
intelligence obtained from the penetration of information systems. According to a US 
presidential commission, the global population with the computer skills required for 
Hackint operations and other forms of cyber-attack against important Western targets 
has grown from a few thousand 20 years ago to about 19 million today. It would be 
naive to assume that none of them works for al-Qaeda. The Times, 4 October 2001
This may be true, but no firm evidence has been presented that terrorist organisations
have teams of hackers working for them. Whatever the true position, the contention that
19 million individuals have the skills to execute targeted information raids of the type
implied by the term ‘intelligence’ must be false. It is frequently claimed that tools are
widely available on the Internet to enable individuals to construct various types of
malware, but it is extremely unlikely that these tools could be used to gather the
sophisticated intelligence necessary for a truly targeted and devastating attack unless the
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operator were unusually skilled to begin with. There are few enough hackers with skills 
at this level (see father Section 1.2 below).
Second, terrorist use of technology for communication, organisation, fundraising 
through criminal activity, recruitment and propaganda is often labelled ‘cyberterrorism’ 
(Chapter 7, Figures 17-20). This is not an accurate use of the term and produces a 
disproportionate amount of concern by conjuring up visions of cyber-attacks which are 
simply not taking place. Even if terrorists are, for example, going one step further by 
creating and distributing destructive viruses -  a proposition which has never been 
proved in public -  this does not amount to terrorism.
“Even something as serious as major outages that have been accidents - there’s a 
reasonable argument that the 2003 North-East (US power grid) blackout was the result 
of a computer problem, but even if akQaeda were to do it, they would not call it 
terrorism - it’s bad, it’s expensive but no one would be terrorised.” Financial Times, 16 
November 2005
So, the argument goes, viruses do not inspire fear in a population or coerce governments 
into acting differently. Terrorist use of technology is a concern, as is anything which 
facilitates terrorist activity, but the level of concern it inspires should be proportionate 
to concern over other facilitators of terrorism, such as financial sponsors and training 
camps. With or without technology, terrorists will function just as other criminals do.
But this does not mean that the Internet is full of bomb-making instructions. It is not. 
The same goes for hacking information, guides to lockpicking, sexually-explicit 
material, discussions of drugs, banned books, and anarchist literature. All are available 
online in roughly the same proportions as you’d find them offline. The Guardian, 27 
July 1995
As well as the reclassification of existing activity as ‘cyberterrorism’ there is also, of 
course, the widespread use of the future threat scenario. This mechanism introduces 
high levels of concern in respect of conditions which have yet to arise. The issue of 
disproportionality arises precisely because these issues are a matter of pure conjecture. 
The fact that the majority of these scenarios are technology-centric -  positing what 
might happen because technology permits, rather than focussing on the motivations and 
skills of hackers or terrorists -  is central to an understanding of why the future threat 
scenario is so strong.
Forget about missiles, bombs and outlaw militias armed to the teeth. The United States 
faces another threat that is invisible, but potentially even more lethal. According to a 
report delivered to President Clinton this week, the most powerful state in the world 
could be laid low by the flick of a cyber-terrorist’s switch. The Independent, 22 
October 1997
The allegation is that cyberterrorism is a simple matter, necessitating merely the flicking 
of a switch. It is argued that terrorists have hijacked our technology and are using it
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against us in myriad ways, the next logical step from terrorist ‘use’ of technology being 
a cyberterrorist attack.
Simon Barrett, director of the International Coalition Against Terror, said: “We are 
fighting an information war against Islamic terrorists who are manipulating and abusing 
our advancement in Western technology to undermine our way of life.
“The battlefield is being played out in cyber space where the terrorists have used the 
Internet to indoctrinate, train and co-ordinate deadly terror attacks.
The terrorists have become more sophisticated by linking up with cyber criminals to 
infiltrate the computer systems of major corporations as a means of stealing money to 
fund terrorists’ activities.
“The main threat we face is cyber terrorism which has the potential to destabilise our 
entire economy and information technology networks.” Sunday Express, 30 October 
2005
There is no evidence presented in the article to support such assertions: this is another 
example of the usual reasoning, being “It must be possible, so it will probably happen”. 
It is arguable that such bald assertions can be presented as authoritative on the basis of a 
public lack of understanding of technology, a suspicion borne of the fact that its 
workings are invisible, that evildoers can hide behind it, that physical barriers are no 
longer sufficient to protect society from harm, all concepts found with relatively high 
frequencies in the corpus (Figure 19). If experts proclaim that a certain attack is 
possible, the argument goes, then a terrorist is bound to carry it out.
In days gone by, people were not so much frightened of science, as oblivious to it. ...
... The pride and scom for science, that saw most people through the 20th-century, is 
now giving way to fear. Why the change? Jargon and methodology, more than ever, 
are raising the wall between the cognoscenti and Everyone Else. After all, it is a truism 
that we fear that which we don’t understand ...
... we have been plunged into brain-scrambling mobile phones, brain-gnawing prion 
diseases, contaminated foodstuffs, not to mention the underlying stealth of chemical and 
cyber-terrorism... Small wonder there is a simple knee-jerk to veto all this confusion 
and scary technology in one go. How can Joe Public, after a hard day at work, come 
home and be expected to tease out the pros and cons, weigh up the risks, consider all the 
implications, and differentiate the “yuck” from the reality. Wouldn’t it be much easier 
to sit back in a past where everyone was 100% human, with their human values and 
understanding: the post comes three times a day, there are no mobiles, emails, or videos, 
perhaps no planes... The Guardian, 10 April 2003
It is, in part, this fundamental lack of technological understanding which may prevent
the public from asking questions, leading to acceptance of otherwise tenuous claims.
The fact that the threat is a future threat gives greater strength to the claims because, by
definition, there is no evidence of the threat having crystallised yet, so it seems
unreasonable to demand any. But even when strong claims are made -  the Millennium
Bug, widespread cyberterrorism prompted by the second Gulf War -  and they
subsequently fail to materialise, the vast majority of individuals persist in their mute
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acceptance. It is claimed that “It didn’t happen this time, but the threat is still strong.. 
and this argument still goes unchallenged.
Even if the risk of cyberterrorism during the war was overstated, the threat of a serious 
attack by a rogue nation or a terrorist group remains very real, according to US 
government agencies. The Guardian, 24 April 2003
The true power of the future threat scenario les in its ability to produce a level of
concern disproportionate to the scale of the risk. The concern here is not with rigorous
risk analysis and a careful presentation of the findings, but with those sensationalised
statements based on pure conjecture.
It is a chilling cyber-scenario as set out by Singapore government minister Ho Peng Ke. 
Instead of a backpack of explosives, he has warned - justifying new laws against 
“computer misuse” - a terrorist could create just as much devastation by sending “a 
carefully engineered packet of data” into the computer systems which control essential 
services, such as the power stations.
The supposed menace of “cyber-terrorism” has become the subject of alarming 
predictions of this kind since September 11, most of hem originating in the new sense 
of vulnerability felt in the US. The subject conjures an image of Dr No come back to 
life with supreme keyboard skills. In the words last year of US homeland security 
director Tom Ridge: “Terrorists can sit at one computer connected to one network and 
can create worldwide havoc.” The Guardian, 19 November 2003
Certainly, it is possible, but is it really likely? There is no evidence presented that a
cyberterrorist could “create just as much devastation” as a “backpack of explosives”.
After September 11, US cyber-warfare experts also found that users on Saudi, 
Indonesian and Pakistani servers had been studying US computer systems governing 
emergency phone systems, nuclear power stations, dams, reservoirs, water pipelines and 
gas storage facilities.
“We were underestimating the amount of attention (al-Qaida was) paying to the 
internet,” Roger Cressey, the chief of staff of the White House critical infrastructure 
protection board, told the Post.
“Al-Qaida spent more time mapphg our vulnerabilities in cyberspace than we 
previously thought. The question is a question of when, not if.” The Guardian, 28 June 
2002
The only certainty arising from this extract is that there have been attempts at breaching 
the information systems which control the US CNI, and some of them may have been 
successful. It is also clear that some of these attacks have originated from or been 
routed through Saudi, Indonesian and Pakistani servers. Does this really justify a claim 
that al Qaeda have been ‘inapping our vulnerabilities in cyberspace” and that it is a 
“question of when, not if ’? Such statements can, and should, be challenged, but they 
are not.
Interestingly, there are some who appear to believe their own hype. When a serious 
hack was discovered in US military systems, terrorists were suspected:
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Boffin Joseph McElroy sparked fears that World War Three was being started after he 
hacked into a top-secret US nuclear weapons installation.
McElroy, aged only 16, developed his “Deathserv” software at his home in east London 
to crack the security shield of the US Department of Energy, which is responsible for 
the safety of America’s nuclear weapons.
In scenes reminiscent of the 1983 film WarGames, in which a computer whizzkid hacks 
into Pentagon computers, US officials thought they were under attack from terrorists. 
The Express, 3 February 2004
Considering that nearly all known culprits for this type of hack have been young men
or, as here, boys, announcing the start of World War Three seems a strangely
disproportionate response.
1.2 Method of attack
There are two major aspects to the element of disproportionality when it comes to 
discussing methods of cyberterrorist attacks. First are the claims that risks from 
cyberterrorism are high in circumstances where the realities of conventional terrorism 
make the possibility of cyberterrorism pale into insignificance. Second are the claims, 
already touched on, that the existence of certain technologies will automatically lead to 
terrorist exploitation.
Dealing first with the cyber vs. conventional terrorism debate, ample evidence has been 
presented in previous chapters of claims that cyberterrorism is a real and growing threat:
Howard Schmidt, vice-president of the President Bush’s Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Board, believes terrorists are searching for ways to use privately owned 
assets such as power grids, financial systems and telecoms networks to wreak havoc.
Mr Schmidt told The Times yesterday that more than 80 per cent of infrastructure 
deemed “critical” for society to function properly is privately owned, and much of it is 
vulnerable to cyber attack. The Times, 15 October 2002
But the degree of concern actually warranted by the threat of cyberterrorism must surely
be far less than the concern merited by the reality of conventional terrorism. Common
sense and even a tenuous grasp of current affairs imply that conventional terrorism is a
present danger in the Western world, one against which the vast resources of the state
are ranged and for good cause. On the other hand, information security breaches are
also a real concern, but the perpetrators here are criminals, not terrorists. It is entirely
right that an entire industry exists to service this need for information security which,
incidentally, has the merit of protecting against cyber attacks from criminals and
terrorists alike.
Mark Rasch, former head of the US Justice Department’s computer crime unit... says 
many of the strategies that corporations are adopting to protect themselves against 
ordinary hacker attacks will also serve them well if terrorist organisations such as al- 
Qaeda strike. Financial Times, 16 November 2005
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When compared with the real and pressing problems of conventional terrorism and 
cybercrime, the high levels of concern about die possibility of cyberterrorism expressed 
by politicians, law enforcers, industry, experts and the media seem disproportionate.
But Bruce Schneider, a leading cryptographer and founder of Counterpane Internet 
Security, points out that [cyberterrorist] attacks are yet to happen. The threat is 
somewhat overlooked because it is also overblown, he suggests.
“I think it’s largely a media creation. We know what terrorism is - it’s planes flying 
into buildings, it’s not that you can’t get your e-mail,” he says. Financial Times, 16 
November 2005
In very simple terms, there are many, more immediate threats to worry about. There are 
several reasons for this. Firsdy, a targeted conventional terrorist attack is far easier and 
more accurate than its cyber equivalent.
But Hollywood-style hacker scenarios such as those outlined in the latest James Bond 
movie are far removed from reality. At least, that’s according to the people who should 
know: the hackers themselves.
As hackers and security consultants gathered last week for Dublin’s Hivercon 
conference, a newer and simpler argument was aired: that it is far easier to be a real- 
world terrorist than a virtual-world one. The Guardian, 5 December 2002
As one experienced hacker claims:
“Cyberterrorism is a catchy phrase and seems to be a hot topic. I’m not saying that a 
hack could never lead to someone’s death, but it’s much easier for a terrorist to throw a 
knapsack of poison into a reservoir than to do something remotely with a computer,” he 
says.
“If I knew George Bush was going into hospital and would be on a life support system, 
conceivably I could interrupt the power grid or hit the back-up batteries in the middle of 
his operation. But most of these systems already have a lot of safeguards, mainly just to 
prevent simple accidents.” The Guardian, 5 December 2002
Secondly, due to the type of security protecting some of the most critical systems,
insider assistance would often be required for a targeted attack.
Thieme argues that the true cyber threat does not come in the traditional form of the 
disaffected hacker located in a remote country, but the insider - the guy who already 
knows all the passwords and works inside the system. The Guardian, 5 December 2002
... it’s difficult to see how serious damage could be caused by someone not equipped 
with insider knowledge - they’ve got to know about the technical aspects of the system 
they’re trying to damage.”
This is why Peter Sommer, of the London School of Economics Computer Security 
Research Centre, dismisses the idea of an impending “electronic Pearl Harbor”. The 
number of people in government who know die sort of sensitive security information 
that terrorists would need is very few, he says. The Guardian, 20 February 2003
It would be possible and relatively easier for a terrorist group to plant an insider or
persuade an existing insider to work for them, and the mechanics of any targeted cyber
attack suggest that there ought to be more concern about this threat from insiders,
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criminal or terrorist, than about external cyberterrorists. Yet the faceless outsider 
remains the focus of society’s fears.
Next to cyberterrorism, cybercrime is a genuine and far more pressing problem because 
of its sheer scale. Most information security breaches are of a routine nature and are 
easily countered with appropriate security systems, frequent updates and patches, 
although genuine concern is warranted about the extent to which many organisations 
fail to execute routine updates.
“I am amazed at the number of staff who automatically open every attachment they’re 
given,” he says. If you’re not expecting an attachment, [Jack Clark, Network 
Associates] advises, always phone or email the sender to check they meant to send it. 
“Make back-ups of everything and have as few email addresses in your address book as 
possible. Most importantly, make sure you continually update your anti-vims 
software.” The first rule of combat, after all, is to be properly armed against the enemy. 
The Guardian, 5 June 2000
Hackers good enough to commit a theft or attack CNI using purely electronic means are
relatively rare and do not form a significant part of the problem, although they are high-
profile. Once again, the levels of concern expressed in this regard are disproportionate
to the scale of the problem.
Most attacks are by “graffiti writers” on websites, [Mike Barwise, Computer Security 
Awareness] says, and then come the less common hacks into systems for financial fraud 
or other personal gain. Rarest of all are what he calls the “uber-hackers”: the one or two 
per hundreds of thousands of hackers who are good enough to hack into government 
systems and yet cover their tracks. “That isn’t prevalent,”... The Guardian, 20 
February 2003
The second main issue of concern in terms of methods of attack relates to technology 
itself. Two of the many examples relate to demonisation of the Internet and the case of 
encryption. It is an incontrovertible fact that technology is used in the vast majority of 
cases for legitimate purposes. Yet the mere prospect of illicit use, particularly of the 
Internet, seems to have some concerned parties reaching for the draft legislation:
One of the more galling moments in media coverage of the Internet came in early 
reports of the Oklahoma City bombing. Someone on Sky News showed a file called 
The Terrorist’s Handbook that he’d picked off the World-Wide Web ... Demands 
poured in from, among others, US Senator Dianne Feinstein, that information about 
making bombs be banned from the Internet - even though the information is available 
from many other sources. The Guardian, 27 July 1995
Over 4,000 people turned up to hear International Telecommunications Union secretary 
general Dr Pekka Taijanne argue that a little regulation may be a good thing when the 
Internet is widely perceived as ‘a haven for pomographers, terrorists and hackers’. The 
Guardian, 12 October 1995
Detective Superintendent Brian Drew of NCIS said: “Criminals are diversifying. They 
are using the tools that the Internet provides. Interception of these communications is 
very difficult.”
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Mr Drew suggested the possible creation of new laws which would enable police to 
carry out monitoring and interception of communications. The Guardian, 29 May 1997
Aside from use of the Internet by terrorists and other criminals, there are also concerns
that it creates a vulnerability which terrorists will exploit in order to cripple
communications:
The US government’s greatest concern, however, is that terrorists or even hostile states 
could cripple communications networks that are vital to the running of the national 
infrastructure. Ironically, the Internet was developed to guarantee exactly that sort of 
infrastructure in the event of an atomic strike by the Soviet Union. Instead, it might 
now turn out to be the architect of disaster.
... Possible targets could be financial networks, including those of the main banks and 
the Wall Street trading floors, air traffic control computers, the power grids and the 
systems at the centre of national defence. The Independent, 7 June 1996
Yet this issue was tested very recently:
The White House and the FBI announced a joint investigation last night into die biggest 
ever attack on the 13 computers that are the crucial basic components of the internet.
For at least an hour from 9.45pm Bitish time on Monday, the internet’s 13 “root 
server” computers ... were deluged with massive amounts of extra data, creating 
bottlenecks that prevented legitimate data from reaching its destination.
Seven of the servers were completely paralysed and two failed intermittentiy. ...
... Despite its scale, though, few internet users would have noticed this week’s assault, 
partly because of its short duration and partly because the Internet’s framework has the 
capacity to continue to function partially without the afflicted computers.
... backup versions of much of the relevant information is often already stored in 
“caches” at lower levels of the infrastructure, meaning that the root servers do not need 
to be consulted. The Guardian, 24 October 2002
Far from disaster, the Internet proved that its resilience is everything its architects had
intended it would be. Concerns about the communications vulnerabilities created by the
Internet and extent of damage which terrorists might be able to cause appear to be
overstated.
Perhaps the most widely reported technology issue in recent years, aside from the 
Internet itself, is that of encryption. If the potential of Internet-based communications is 
to be realised, encryption is an essential tool for assuring security in communications, 
allowing verification of contracting parties (PKI, for example), safe passage of 
commercial information, protection of personal privacy and so forth. Yet one claim has 
overridden all of these positive benefits: that terrorists and other criminals might use 
encryption, thereby rendering their activities safe from the eyes of law enforcers.
With encryption becoming ever cheaper, more powerful and more difficult to crack, a 
halt to progress may come from an unlikely source: our intelligence agencies. 
Correspondence between the British and US governments ... reveals concern about 
encryption at the highest levels.
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In May 1999, Janet Reno, then US Attorney General, wrote to Jack Straw, then Home 
Secretary, saying: ‘I believe that the difficulties that encryption will pose for law 
enforcement are among the greatest challenges we will face in the coming years.’ Straw 
replied: ‘I fully share your concern at the threat posed by criminal use of encryption.’
Since then, the 11 September attacks have added urgency to official eavesdropping, and 
new laws make it easier for law enforcement agencies to confiscate encryption codes. 
They are unlikely to countenance any technology that makes it more difficult to catch 
terrorists. The Observer, 18 May 2003
To curtail the use of encryption ignores two facts. First, the use of encryption brings
enormous benefits to society, particularly in the spheres of commerce and personal
privacy. Second, there are many ways to catch a terrorist, and it is unlikely that law
enforcers would stumble on a hive of terrorist activity through wide-spectrum
monitoring of unencrypted Internet communications without first having some
alternative intelligence pointing them in a particular direction. Terrorists exist in real
time and space, and this is where they will be caught. An encrypted email may hamper
an investigation, but curtailing use of encryption for this reason alone seems to be a
disproportionate response to a technology which has potential benefits to the wider
society. In any event, it may be a moot point:
Much of the commentary has focused on the use of encryption technologies, but this is a 
red herring. There has been no reported evidence that the terrorists actually used 
encryption. Moreover, the use of encryption is still relatively rare. Fewer than 1% of 
the billions of emails sent around the world each day are encrypted. The Guardian, 22 
November 2001
1.3 Target of attack
There is disproportionate concern expressed in the UK national press that cyberterrorists 
will attack government and CNI systems.
... Possible targets could be financial networks, including those of the main banks and 
the Wall Street trading floors, air traffic control computers, the power grids and the 
systems at the centre of national defence. The Independent, 7 June 1996
Britain faces a growing threat of an electronic attack by terrorists linked to al-Qaida that 
could paralyse key public services, including electricity and water supplies, the 
government’s adviser on computer security has told the Guardian.
For terrorist groups like al-Qaida with limited resources, it would be “a very attractive 
method” of attack, that would cause “huge damage”, said Stephen Cummings, director 
of the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre. The Guardian, 12 August 
2002
Cyber criminals and terrorists will win an “arms race” against law agencies unless 
action is taken, a government-commissioned report said yesterday. The Guardian, 12 
June 2004
Similar arguments are reported to hold sway in the US:
Last week, another role was quietly created.
Richard Clarke was appointed President Bush’s principal adviser on cyberspace 
security.
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Fearing hacker attacks on, for example, the world’s money transfer systems, stock 
markets, or nuclear facility control centres, the US rightly regards virtual terrorism as a 
real threat and something that is relatively easy for bad guys to do. Mail on Sunday, 14 
October 2001
Evidence from hackers and the information security industry suggests that, far from 
being “easy to do” a virtual takeover of, for example, a nuclear facility would be 
immensely more difficult than organising a well-sited explosive device. However, the 
newly appointed Presidential advisor on cyberspace security set about proving his point, 
although it is not clear how much information the hackers might have been given in 
advance.
Behind the scenes, Clarke was slowly trying to stiffen the administration’s spine - and 
hunting for new options. To demonstrate America’s vulnerability, he organised a group 
of government-paid hackers to break into the Pentagon’s most secure computer systems 
in 1998. They gained control of the nation’s military command centre systems - the 
very ones to be used to defend America during an attack. It took only three days and a 
batch of off-the-shelf PCs. Sunday Times, 20 January 2002
Firstly, it has been argued above that there is no solid evidence that terrorists are
planning attacks on government or the CNI, and it is certain that no such attack has
occurred to date.
Despite fears that terrorists would use the internet to cripple infrastructure such as 
power grids, financial systems and telecommunications networks, the research showed 
that there had not been a single case of cyber terrorism in the six months to December 
31. The Times, 3 February 2003
Secondly, ordinary hackers should, surely, be of more concern since their credentials in
being able to penetrate government and military systems are proven -  witness, for
example, Gary McKinnon’s hacks into US defence systems in the months around 9/11.
Thirdly, there is no evidence to suggest that government and the CNI hold privileged
status as targets, since the overwhelming majority of deliberate hacks and random
security breaches occur in the private sector.
Cyberterrorising is more often than not directed at opposing groups, rather than 
governments. In the Israeli-Palestinian battle, criminal hackers, or “crackers”, on both 
sides are constantly attacking one another’s web sites. A Pakistani cracker once stole 
the credit card numbers of members of a pro-Israel lobbying group and posted them 
online.
Private sector security breaches are a considerably bigger problem and the potential 
consequences are, arguably, no less significant.
1.4 Outcome of attack
Perhaps the most flamboyant of claims about cyberterrorism are reserved for the issue 
of what damage cyberterrorists might be able to cause. Death, nuclear explosions, plane
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crashes, flood from breached dams, electricity outages, drug overdoses, all these have 
been heralded as possible outcomes of a cyberterrorist attack.
My greatest concern is that hackers, terrorist organisations, or other nations might use 
information warfare techniques as part of a co-ordinated attack designed to seriously 
disrupt infrastructures such as electric power distribution, air traffic control, or financial 
sectors; international commerce; and deployed military forces in time of peace or war. 
The Observer, 7 July 1996
President Bill Clinton will announce plans this week to build ramparts against a new 
and invisible enemy threatening to spread more chaos in America than any conventional 
terrorist attack.
He will unveil defence measures unprecedented in the history of human conflict to 
protect America from the potentially devastating peril posed by cyber warfare, in which 
computer systems controlling airports, hospitals, traffic lights, banks and even nuclear 
weapons could be destroyed, creating havoc. Sunday Times, 17 May 1998
The al-Qaida terrorist network has been making preparations for potentially devastating 
attacks on America by hacking into computer networks to look for ways to disrupt 
electricity and telephone systems, dams and nuclear power stations, it was claimed 
yesterday.
Government officials said the terrorist group appeared to be far more sophisticated than 
initially thought in its use of the internet as a weapon to disrupt America’s web-based 
economy and cause potentially catastrophic physical damage by opening dam 
floodgates or blacking out air traffic control systems. The Guardian, 28 June 2002
These examples are all important, because they deliberately paint a very vivid picture,
one in which the very fabric of our society begins to unravel. These claims are based on
the idea that our vulnerability rests on our dependence on computer systems, and
claims-makers play on these keenly-felt vulnerabilities by spinning disaster scenarios
for public consumption:
A US defence department report earlier this year described how an information warfare 
attack might unfold. It starts with an unexplained power blackout in a large city. 
Telephone systems across the country become paralysed. Freight and passenger trains 
collide. Civilian air traffic control systems go haywire. Malfunctioning pipeline-flow 
control mechanisms trigger oil refinery blasts.
As alarm spreads, “logic bombs” disable the financial system, disrupting money 
transfers and causing stocks to plunge on world exchanges. Automatic teller machines 
randomly credit or debit customers’ accounts. Sensitive weapons systems malfunction.
“(An) information war has no front line,” says the study. “Potential battlefields are 
anywhere.” Sunday Times, 29 November 1998
Individually and as a society, we are, the argument goes, at risk whoever and wherever
we are: physical boundaries and barriers mean nothing any more. No-one is safe. But
these disaster scenarios cross the boundary from worst-case scenario into the realms of
science fiction. The evidence of some hackers and information security experts is, as
explained above, that any one of these attacks would be no mean feat in itself, probably
requiring insider assistance. Moreover, these scenarios wilfully ignore the failsafe
systems which are undoubtedly built into the CNI.
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And even should a cyberterrorist attack prevail and shut down the power grid or disrupt 
the emergency response system, “these sorts of outages and problems tend to happen by 
accident already, so we have workarounds for them”, Schneier argues. “What we don’t 
have workarounds for are people flying planes into buildings or blowing up embassies.” 
The Guardian, 24 April 2003
Bruce Schneier, chief technical officer of Counterpane Internet Security, makes the
point perfectly. Estimations of the degree of damage tend, in any event, to be
overblown. Even a successful attack on the CNI is unlikely to produce damage on the
scale claimed, and this has been seen elsewhere with other technology-related concerns:
Despite many people’s initial concerns about internet banking, the losses from hacking 
into people’s accounts have so far been negligible. Not that there has been a lack of 
attempts. Using a technique known as phishing, described by the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as “the hottest and most troubling new scam of the internet”, fraudsters 
send out bogus e-mails asking customers to reveal their account details. Most major 
banks have already been targeted, but the amateurish nature of the e-mails has limited 
their success. The Times, 24 January 2004
1.5 Reaction to attack
There is scant evidence suggesting that cyberterrorism is likely in die short- to medium- 
term. There are far more pressing issues which warrant at least as much, if not more, 
attention than cyberterrorism but concern about the latter continues to escalate 
regardless. Claims about possible sources, method, target and outcome of cyberterrorist 
attacks are often wide of the mark and, on any common sense analysis, the concern 
these claims generate is disproportionate to the probability of harm or its likely scale. 
Cyberterrorism is, however, a future threat which is by definition unquantifiable and it 
is nowhere argued in this study that cyberterrorism will never happen. It follows that 
measures implemented now to guard against cyberterrorism in the future are not 
disproportionate in principle. Nor, in fairness, are they usually disproportionate in 
practice insofar as they are aimed squarely at terrorist activity. There are two major and 
related problems arising out of the formalised social response to cyberterrorism as 
enshrined in UK legislation and policy. First, measures which are ostensibly aimed at 
terrorist activity can in practice be used against ordinary criminals, bringing Draconian 
measures within the grasp of enforcers of the ordinary criminal law. Second, legislation 
pertinent to criminal law is promoted by reference to arguments about terrorism, thus 
distracting legislators and the public from debates about the way in which legislation is 
really intended to be applied and whether new law is proportionate or even necessary.
(a) Measures directed against terrorism 
The prevention and prosecution of terrorism is always a politically and socially vexed 
question, raising as it does the spectre of unfettered power for the executive with limited
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safeguards, transparency and accountability. Certainly, the terrible nature of the threat 
warrants a response beyond the ordinary criminal law, but the question of what response 
is legitimate and what goes too far is controversial. Recent developments in the law on 
terrorism, such as the row over detention without trial, demonstrate that feelings run 
high, an issue compounded by the contemporary climate of distrust of politicians:
As Lord Nicholls said in his judgment: “Indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial 
is anathema in any country that observes the mle of law.” Ian McDonald QC, who 
resigned as an advocate for the detainees, talked of “an odious blot on our legal 
landscape” that offended principles going back to Magna Carta.
What we have at present is the worst of all worlds. The evil of entrusting our liberty to 
politicians is compounded by a lack of independent safeguards or transparency. Sunday 
Times, 30 January 2005
Central to the issue of proportionality of response to terrorism is its definition. Even the 
most extreme counter-terrorist measures, if applied to only the most extreme and deadly 
forms of terrorism, are readily justifiable. However, the wider the definition of 
terrorism, the more it encompasses activities which are not quite so serious, nor so 
deadly, and the more extreme responses become mich harder to justify, particularly 
when they start to infringe the civil liberties of those not themselves committing 
terrorist acts. This extract illustrates the problem:
The war on terror is already proving a headache for environmentalists, taking them into 
murky legal territory. “It’s a ludicrous extension of the word terrorist,” says Steven 
Best, a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso, who has written 
about the animal rights movement. “It drains it of any meaning.”
In the US, terrorism is usually depicted as politically-motivated violence towards 
people, but if terrorism is expanded to attacks on property, argues Best, then are 
corporations who destroy rainforests not also terrorists?
“The semantics of this is very important,” he says. “In order to apply anti-terror laws, 
you have to first define a group as terrorists. Once you have accomplished that, you can 
override constitutional protections.” The Guardian, 2 March 2005
The beginnings of this dispute in its recent incarnation are found in the debates on what
is now the Terrorism Act 2000. There were grave concerns about animal rights and
environmental activism falling within the definition of terrorism but far more important
for these purposes were the proposals to bring computer hacking within the definition of
terrorism.
Animal rights extremists and religious cults face bans under proposals to strengthen 
anti-terrorist laws. The Government also plans to adopt the FBI’s definition of 
terrorism as being violent acts carried out by groups such as militant computer hackers 
and some anti-abortionists. ...
... “We propose to frame the new definition so that it is flexible enough to cover any 
terrorist threats which might develop in future, whether due to new causes or ideals or 
to terrorist use of technology.” The Times, 18 December 1998
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Peers did, however, agree various government amendments aimed at extending the anti­
terrorism legislation, including action to counter cyber-terrorism.
The Lords voted to extend the definition cf terrorism to include the use or threat of 
action “designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”.
Such action would be covered under the bill if it was done for political, religious or 
ideological purposes and if it ained to influence government or intimidate the public. 
The Guardian, 21 June 2000
The Act now defines cyberterrorism in Section 1, the relevant parts being as follows: 
use or threat of an action designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system in order to influence the government or to intimidate the public for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. This is a very wide 
definition of terrorism which does not require any threat of personal injury, merely the 
threat of electronic interference or harm and, on this basis, the full might of the counter­
terrorism regime comes into play. The government justified this approach as:
... covering actions which might not be violent in themselves but which can, in a 
modem society, have a devastating impact. These could include disrupting key 
computer systems or interfering with the supply of water or power where life, health or 
safety may be put at risk’. The Guardian, 3 December 1999
However, there is no such qualification in the Act. Hacking can be a terrorist offence
without any risk to life, health or safety, as long as it is done to influence the
government or intimidate the public in order to advance a political, religious or
ideological cause. A cyberterrorist attack resulting in malfunctioning of an air traffic
control system whether or not anyone actually dies should be, and is, caught by this
definition of cyberterrorism. That is the kind of future threat which is properly dealt
with in the anti-terrorist legislative regime. But the Act does not stop there. On its face,
it also defines as terrorist those Palestinian teenage hackers who deface the websites of
Israeli organisations with pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli slogans. The definition of
terrorism is the gatekeeper of the state arsenal. If the definition is too wide, the state has
access to that arsenal too readily. Such is the case here and there is clearly scope for the
full spectrum of anti-terrorist measures to be wielded against hackers with a criminal,
rather than terrorist, intent.
Although this over-wide definition of cyberterrorism is now on the statute books, there 
is still scope for limiting the extent to which emergency powers can be used against 
hackers through the use of concepts such as ‘proportionality’ of response. The Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004, which provides for emergency powers in relation to terrorism 
and other civil emergencies, nods in this direction with its requirement that emergency 
powers be proportionate to the nature and scale of the threat.
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Remember, emergency powers extended to governments under such acts are extensive. 
They include the right to confiscate, requisition or destroy private property; require 
people to evacuate specific areas; bar public access to particular sites; over-ride existing 
laws; and ban public gatherings or entire organisations. The original definition in the 
draft bill would have allowed unrestricted action on computer hackers and political 
protest on a wide range of issues. ...
... Six months on ... a new bill emerged. It is not yet perfect, but both Liberty and 
Justice, the two leading civil liberty groups, paid tribute yesterday to the changes which 
ministers had conceded. They include a tighter definition of emergency and new 
safeguards requiring emergency powers to be proportional to a perceived threat. The 
Guardian, 8 January 2004
Nevertheless, the definitions are still wide and these emergency powers could, in theory,
be deployed in relation to what would normally be considered criminal acts which do
not threaten life or limb.
Apart from these very wide definitions of terrorism, the idea of creating a government 
department to monitor the threat from cyberterrorism and related threats, to advise the 
government and to inform the public is beyond reproach. President Clinton did it in the 
US:
Clinton will announce the creation of two government organisations to concentrate on 
monitoring the cyber threat and informing the public of the danger. He will also 
appoint a “terrorism tsar” to co-ordinate efforts to prepare for cyber warfare. Sunday 
Times, 17 May 1998
The UK has similarly founded NISCC:
... in January last year Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, announced a “series of 
measures to minimise the risk of electronic attacks” including the setting up of a 
National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre to alert key industries such as 
telecommunications, water and electricity. The Times, 6 May 2000
A shadowy government organisation set up to protect Britain’s infrastructure from 
“cyber attack” is investigating the love bug virus, as well as at least two attacks on 
government computers that have been linked to foreign powers.
The havoc spread across die globe by the world’s fastest-moving computer virus has 
brought to light the role of the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre 
(NISCC), a front for MI5 and GCHQ, the government listening centre. Sunday Times, 7 
May 2000
NISCC did not remain ‘shadowy’ for long and now has a good reputation for the work 
that it does, particularly for its role in informing the public and information sharing 
programmes such as the WARP initiative outlined in Chapter 2. Perhaps the allocated 
resources are disproportionate to the scale of the threat of cyberterrorism, perhaps they 
are not, but there can be little harm per se in an organisation dedicated to threat 
assessment and advising the public. The problem comes later, when these new 
organisations are looking to justify or increase their remit or resources. As detailed 
above, Clinton’s new terrorism tsar embarked on a hacking exercise to ‘prove’ the
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extent of the threat to the US CNI. NISCC has also made some rather alarmist claims 
about the potential consequences of cyber-attack.
Terrorist groups may try to infiltrate the computer systems of some of Britain’s biggest 
companies, government departments and emergency services if a war is launched 
against Iraq, the Home Office has cautioned.
Stephen Cummings, director of the National Infrastructure Security Coordination 
Centre (NISCC), said key IT systems were under threat of cyber attack by Islamic 
extremists.
He said: “There will be groups attacking US Government and defence websites and 
similar groups carrying out activity against the websites of any country involved in 
military action.”
This was an unequivocal prediction of cyber-attacks carried out by terrorists which 
never materialised. There was no evidence of increased hacker activity over the period 
of the second Gulf War, and none from terrorist sources (Chapter 6, Section 2.2 (c)). 
Nevertheless, even if the claims were overblown, the advice was sensible and outlined 
what organisations should be doing routinely to safeguard information security against 
hackers and terrorists alike:
Mr Cummings urged businesses to step up security ahead of a possible war in the Gulf. 
He gave warning that terrorist groups might try to infiltrate activists into the IT 
departments of leading firms. ... Last year NISCC warned companies, including BT, 
Lloyds TSB and BAA, to beef up their IT security. The Times, 20 February 2003
Rather confusingly, there are a number of new agencies dealing with information
security, including the former Office of the e-Envoy, the NISCC, the e-Govemment
Unit in the Cabinet Office, the DTI’s Information Security Policy Team and the Central
Sponsor for Information Assurance. All seem to have some measure of responsibility
for combating cyberterrorism, although the strategy is not yet entirely clear.
The language is reserved, the discussions kept within a close circle of specialists, but 
security experts say the government is taking the threat seriously. In the United States, 
repeated warnings of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” from terrorism and technology 
experts have given the subject more public prominence. The White House is due to 
release a national strategy to secure cyberspace within the next few weeks. The UK’s 
parallel effort, the “national information assurance plan”, was revealed last May but is 
“still in its early stages”, a spokesman for the e-envoy’s office admitted. The Guardian, 
20 February 2003
... the Government ha[s] embarked on a four-pronged strategy which involve[s] 
preventing attacks, protecting civilians, pursuing terrorists and preparing for the 
aftermath of an attack. The Times, 23 March 2004
This outline strategy seems fine as far as it goes, but suspicions have been raised about
the lack of detail fleshing it out. This has led to claims that not enough is being done to
protect society from the menace of cyberterrorism.
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But the Tory Shadow Minister for Economic Affairs, Michael Fabricant, who believes 
Britain is a ‘prime target’ for cyberterrorism, says the UK government does not take the 
threat seriously enough and is ‘inviting trouble’. ...
... a Home Office spokesman admits: ‘The US has put more money into this issue but 
this reflects the greater dependence that the US has on interconnected systems. It is for 
companies to take responsibility for IT protection and security issues themselves.’ The 
Observer, 6 June 2004
I [Toby Harris, Labour Peer] have sought through parliamentary questions clarity as to 
what measures are in place to protect against such attacks. The responses all referred to 
the pivotal role of the national infrastructure security coordination centre established in 
1999. But the NISCC is only an advisory body and each element of the critical national 
infrastructure is responsible for its own defence - the NISCC does not even know how 
many computer systems comprise the UK’s critical national infrastructure.
In practice, no governmental organisation has operational responsibility for managing 
defence against systematic cyber-attack. MI5 is right to warn of such an attack. What 
is surprising is the degree of complacency about addressing the threat. The Guardian, 
17 November 2004
It is interesting and, perhaps, telling that the UK government has placed relatively little 
emphasis on centralised administration of the national response to cyberterrorism when 
it has been so vigorous in promoting the problem in the first place and so proactive in 
establishing targeted legislation and corresponding powers for law enforcers. There are 
other anomalies, particularly the apparent lack of police resources, both in terms of 
technology and technological expertise, despite the statutory powers granted to them.
How are Blunkett’s boys in blue equipped for the fight?
Hum, said my honest informant. We’re almost ground zero. He was only allowed to 
send emails himself 18 months ago. He only got on the net in the office six months 
back. The five managers in the unit he works for have had to scrabble through other 
budgets, raising the £100 a head they need to log on. The rest of the department is still 
on the outside, sucking its collective thumb. The computers inside HQ don’t interface 
with each other, let alone those of other forces. Force recruiters don’t ask whether the 
new men and women coming in have IT skills. It’s not a question on their screens - and 
if you do, by luck, happen to hire a slick operator, you lose him quick. Of course. The 
money outside is so much better. The Guardian, 10 December 2001
This lack of resources provides a check, however unintentional, on the wide-ranging
powers available to the executive in relation to broadly-defined acts of terrorism.
Why are those who advise the home secretary so keen to throw anything that “might” be 
relevant to a criminal inquiry into this stew? Well, they would be, wouldn’t they? 
Never opt for a limited power when a generalised one is so much comfier. But the 
home secretary - like us - needs to ask who is licensing whom? Where are the dedicated 
squads of expert officers who know what to look for and how to look for it? What use 
is traffic data from AOL when you haven’t got a terminal to call your own?
... The scope of what Mr Blunkett proposes has barely been recognised. The little 
matter of who will enforce it, and how, remains utterly mystic. (Yes, there is a small 
central hi-tech coordinating unit established this year - but it’s still recruiting.) The 
Guardian, 10 December 2001
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(b) Criminal measures promoted through terrorism 
The analysis so far has focused on legislation directed towards terrorist acts which can, 
by means of wide definitions, be directed towards what would normally be considered 
ordinary criminal activities which would not usually be thought to merit the emergency 
powers applicable to terrorism. Another, connected, problem arises when ordinary 
criminal laws are justified with reference to arguments about terrorism.
As John Naughton of The Observer notes:
This is where the dark side of the net comes in handy. If you are (say) a Home 
Secretary who seeks draconian powers to control the net, your best strategy is to scare 
the citizenry by exaggerating the risks from criminals and paedophiles to justify those 
powers. Since nobody knows the extent of criminal use of the network, you are 
unlikely to be challenged on empirical grounds. Blunt assertions from policemen and 
spooks are all you need. This was how the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was 
pushed through - giving MI5 access to every digital packet flowing through a British 
ISP’s servers. The Observer, 13 May 2001
There are many methods of controlling the Internet, nearly all of which are applicable to
criminal behaviour and most of which can and have been justified with claims that they
will help in the fight against terrorism. The most controversial legislation in the UK in
this respect has been the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which, despite its
name, is usually thought of as granting powers to law enforcers rather than derogating
from them.
The Bill gives law enforcement agencies new powers to intercept e-mails and decode 
encrypted data. It requires Internet service providers (ISPs) to install “black box” traffic 
surveillance systems linked to an MI5 monitoring centre. Police and security services 
can then obtain a readout of all the websites a customer has visited and, with a warrant 
from the Home Secretary, inspect the contents of e-mails. These agencies can also 
demand encryption keys to coded information from individuals or companies, again 
with a ministerial warrant. The Times, 12 June 2000
Police and MI5 access to bank statements, health records, private files in private places? 
That is only the beginning. The Home Office wants to sit astride the digital revolution. 
It wants internet service providers to keep (not junk) the records of every log on, every 
site visited, every email sent or received - and to produce them on demand. In parallel 
with that will go records of every mobile phone call you make, identifying (in the third 
generation) where you were and when to within a radius of 10 yards. The Guardian, 10 
December 2000
These measures sparked huge controversy around the time the Bill was passed, most of 
which centred around the data retention provisions and those which allow requisition of 
keys to encrypted data. Most controversial of all, perhaps, was that these powers were 
accorded not only to the police and intelligence services, but to a wide array of other 
public bodies, including government departments and local authorities. The Act is 
worded to cover all sorts of criminal behaviour and yet ministers were keen to highlight 
only the most serious crimes and terrorism.
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The home secretary will insist that these provisions are to prevent drug barons, child- 
pomographers and terrorists from using technology to defeat the police. Sunday Times, 
5 March 2000
But commentators noted the broad application of these powers and particularly the fact 
that they were not limited to terrorism:
And all this isn’t limited to combating terrorism itself. No, it affects anything “that 
might be relevant to a criminal inquiry”. The Guardian, 10 December 2000
On the face of it, these measures, aimed at combating terrorism, child pornography and 
organised crime on the Internet, may seem reasonable. But this Bill will do little to cow 
the online underworld; and it will, without doubt, infringe civil liberties and subject 
businesses to needless costs and uncertainties. ...
... No other country regulates the Internet in such draconian fashion. The Times, 12 
June 2000
It was also noted that the powers may not even be effective against those committing 
the most serious crimes and terrorism.
.. .The inevitable price of fighting terrorism? Not quite. Hi-tech terrorists have their 
sophisticated “stealth techniques” that none of these powers can counter. Low-tech 
terrorists can merely log on once in an internet cafe or pinch a mobile phone then chuck 
it away. Such trawls, for the most part, will be routine business. ...
... No wonder the government’s own information commissioner, Elizabeth France, is 
alarmed. No wonder she thinks this bit of the bill indefensibly broad, lacking all 
“proportionality”, an affront to the European convention on human rights, a mockery of 
“data protection”. The Guardian, 10 December 2001
That said, data retention is still an ongoing project for the UK government and the next
stage was to seek EU coordination on data retention laws. Once again, these were
justified as anti-terror measures, but they have much wider application to ordinary
criminal matters.
Charles Clarke will seek to win support from European Union countries tomorrow for 
contentious Europe-wide anti-terror laws on retaining personal data.
The home secretary will call on the 25 member states to store telephone and internet 
records for at least 12 months as they review counter-terrorism work undertaken since 
the London bombings in July.
At a meeting of EU justice ministers in Gateshead, Mr Clarke will stress the importance 
of the information to terrorism investigators. He will make his call for an agreement by 
next month amid industry claims that the measures could cost communications 
companies millions of euros each year and police warnings that they could be swamped 
with information. ...
... In a paper to be presented to ministers at the meeting, the UK says such data are the 
“golden thread” running through terrorism investigations. Some of the suspects in the 
attacks on Madrid last year were identified using telephone records. Hamdi Issac, a 
suspect in the failed attacks on London on July 21, was reportedly traced by his mobile 
telephone use.
“I think we can make the case that our ability to retain data is a real and genuine plus in 
the war on organised crime and terrorism. We have done a lot of work on this and we
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also believe the issue of cost is not an issue,” Mr Clarke said this week. Financial 
Times, 7 September 2005
Here again is the rather strange situation of government ministers pushing hard for new
controls over electronic communications whilst the police warn that they cannot cope
with this quantity of data. Communications service providers are also concerned about
the considerable financial and administrative burdens placed on them. The Home
Secretary weighs against these issues a few, very rare, cases in which communications
data assisted in the investigation of a terrorist offence -  investigations, not prevention.
There is no suggestion that this was the only evidence available to the investigating
authorities or that it was crucial to the investigation. Requiring the retention of data
potentially affecting all communications service providers and users would appear to be
a highly disproportionate response if the aim is merely to provide evidence which might
be helpful in the few cases of terrorism which occur in Europe every decade. The
response might be less disproportionate if the real intention is to use such data routinely
in criminal investigations, assuming both that the police have the resources to make
sense of such huge quantities of data and that society is content to allow it to be used in
such a way. These are weighty assumptions. Although it is impossible to establish the
truth, there are some who claim that there are strong reasons why the UK government
and others need data retention legislation, even if these are not the reasons given:
Simple Nomad is a senior security analyst for BindView Corporation and a founder of 
the Nomad Mobile Research Centre, an internationally known group of hackers. He is 
concerned about how governments are using the cyberterrorist pretext to “sniff’ 
personal email and web traffic. ...
... In the name of cyberterrorism, there is more funding than ever going into the 
listening and data sniffing capability of governments.” ...
... He says one of the biggest “sniffers” is the international Echelon project, set up by 
western governments to sniff the net, telephones, and almost everything digital to 
provide intelligence for the security services. Most of Echelon is large scale, to do with 
all telecommunications - which is why, he says, national governments have had to 
introduce such legislation as the UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act to be 
able to monitor pure ISP internet traffic. The Guardian, 5 December 2002
Some corroboration for this view can be found in a European Parliament report which
noted that US and UK intelligence services had used Echelon to filter both private and
commercial communications.
... a European Parliament report this summer ... said the US and the UK had used a 
communications spying system called Echelon to “intercept, at the very least, private 
and commercial communications, and not military communications.”
Ironically, the report recommends that individuals and companies encrypt e-mails as a 
matter of course to protect themselves. The Daily Telegraph, 21 September 2001
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Encryption has been feared by the US and UK governments alike since the mid-1990s. 
The UK government mooted a key escrow arrangement in the 1990s, but it was hugely 
unpopular and never became law. There are now provisions in the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which allow the authorities to compel the disclosure of 
encryption keys, but these provisions remain unpopular and are not yet in force.
A second, high-profile example of an instrument of civil and criminal control being 
justified as an anti-terrorist measure is the case of identity cards. This time, the police 
are in favour.
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir John Stevens has no doubts. Warning that 
Britain is at its highest level of alert in its peacetime history, he described the 
introduction of compulsory identity cards as an absolutely essential tool in the war 
against terrorism. ...
... Home Secretary David Blunkett says an ID card scheme will tackle such serious 
issues as illegal working and immigration abuse as well as fraud, terrorism and 
organised crime. Sunday Express, 16 November 2003
However, it is far from proven that identity cards would be effective to prevent
terrorism or crime more generally. There may, indeed, be unintended consequences,
such as actually increasing the opportunities for crime and increasing security risks to
individuals through the establishment of an identity database.
The great myth about ID cards is that they make us safer.
France has a national ID system that made no difference to the terrorist bombing of its 
Metro system.
Turkey has ID cards without making the slightest impact on rampant crime.
And it is worth remembering that those who hijacked the planes in the US all had full 
sets of ID documents that took them into the country and through airport controls. 
Morning Star, 2 October 2001
Most damning for the Government is the fact that the study does not believe the ID 
system as proposed will fulfil any of is intended functions such as curbing identity 
fraud or countering terrorism. If anything, the existence of such a large database and 
the assumption that the system is foolproof, when it is likely to give false readings, will 
make it vulnerable to hacking and fraud.
Professor Ian Angell, of the LSE’s IT department, said the scheme was a “one-stop shop 
for fraudsters”. “It is a dog’s dinner. I do not believe it is going to work.” The Daily 
Telegraph, 28 June 2005
It has been argued by many that the invasion of privacy, the financial cost to individuals
and the state and the risks inherent in setting up an identity databases are not
proportionate to the intended benefits of fighting terrorism and crime which are, in any
event, unproven. These arguments of proportionality have taken place in protracted
debates at the highest level. It is not the purpose of this study to state a definitive
opinion on that issue. It is necessary to note that the use of identity cards will, in the
main, be restricted to civilian and ordinary criminal matters and the extent to which the 
cards have been touted as a panacea for terrorism of any kind is clearly disproportionate 
to the likely extent of their use for this purpose. Moreover, focussing on the headline 
issues and ignoring the everyday mechanics of operating such schemes may lead to a 
failure to consider adequately the potential for unintended consequences. An identity 
database raises the possibility that this will become a focus for hackers, both criminal 
and terrorist, effectively adding a future threat to the long list of threats the scheme was 
meant to address in the first place.
The case against identity cards rests on proportionality. The invasion of privacy and 
cost are disproportionate to the benefits. ... Any serious crook or terrorist will 
undoubtedly find a way to avoid detection. ... And, of course, the better the system, the 
more incentive for the wrongdoer to crack it. And we can already see internet hacking 
getting increasingly sophisticated. The Times, 31 May 2005
... the Government’s ID card plans [are] an “insane scheme to give £10 billion of 
taxpayers’ money to the IT industry”. ... “It’s not so much the fact that they won’t 
work as advertised, or even the cost. It’s the database behind it, which will provide a 
big target for hacking.” Improbulus quoted a child of ten: “They can fake passports, so 
why can’t terrorists copy ID cards?” The Times, 2 July 2005
Peers also warned that it would not be possible to protect the cards from hackers, 
making them a security risk rather than the answer to the threat of terrorism. The 
Mirror, 16 November 2005
In truth, the government is establishing a mouth-watering target for fraudsters and 
terrorists. Anyone who hacks into the national identity register can make a fortune or 
reduce Britain to chaos. Sunday Times, 3 July 2005
There are many other such examples, where proposed laws or policies are either
unlikely to address the problem they are aimed at or are more likely to produce
unintended consequences, or both. In the mid-1990s, German authorities tried to
prevent German citizens from accessing Radikal, a left-wing magazine, illegal in
Germany, the electronic version of which was available to German citizens from a
Dutch web host via German ISPs. The German ISPs tried to block German users from
accessing the Dutch website. The Dutch web host appealed to censorship campaigners:
Net activists responded by putting up mirrors of Radikal - at last count there were 47 
worldwide. ...
... As for the German government, their problems seem to be just starting. Thanks to 
some hamfisted action, a little-known magazine they didn’t like is now all over the Net. 
‘The big question is, will they now block the 47 Radikal mirror sites,’ ... ‘But if they 
do, it could create an international scandal, because there are lots of US sites involved.’ 
The Guardian, 26 September 1996
Following the same logic, the police in the UK are similarly risking escalation of the 
problem they are seeking to address if they are granted the powers they seek to attack 
various websites connected to terrorism:
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The Association of Chief Police Officers (Acpo) recently called for “powers to attack 
identified websites” as one of 31 new measures to tackle terrorism. ...
But will it work? Already, “if (a website is) hosted in the UK, it should be relatively 
straightforward to get the host to remove the content,” says Struan Robertson, senior 
associate at law firm Pinsent Masons. This is because internet service providers usually 
remove sites when asked to do so by the police. Robertson adds that if legal pressure is 
required, the Terrorism Act of 2000 makes it an offence to provide or receive 
instructions in the making or use of explosives.
However, many explosive-making sites use domain names registered to owners in the 
US (although they could also be hosted elsewhere). The US has a law prohibiting 
online instructions for bomb-making, but Richard Clayton, treasurer of the Foundation 
for Information Policy Research, says the country is a popular location for such sites 
because of the cultural and constitutional support for freedom of speech. “There’s a 
strong lobby here, so these sites will continue to exist whether the British police want 
them to or not,” he says. The Guardian, 4 August 2005
So, if the objectionable site is hosted in the UK, the police do not need a new law to
take it down. If it is hosted in the US, constitutional commitments to freedom of speech
make it unlikely that any new law in the UK would be effective. If the site is hosted
elsewhere, the UK police may or may not achieve its removal, but in any event risk the
site being mirrored elsewhere, perhaps many times over, raising its profile in the
process.
Likewise, routine use of the data mining technology Echelon by the US and UK 
intelligence agencies risks incentivising users towards greater use of encryption 
technologies, thereby rendering communications impenetrable. Introduction of 
biometrics into identity tokens may also raise more problems than it solves:
The Passport Service’s six-month trial of biometric passports will be used to justify ID 
cards as a solution to terrorism or identity theft. But concerns will grow about the high 
number of false positives given by facial-mapping software, and those seeking to 
disguise their identity will find ways of falsely recording their details on the underlying 
database. The Times, 6 January 2004
Previous examples show how a particular response to a problem may actually
exacerbate it. This last example is especially worrying, however, and sums up many of
the problems discussed in this section because it raises the possibility that totally
innocent people might be identified and treated as terrorists or criminals. The chances
of preventing a terrorist attack through biometric identity cards alone is negligible. On
the other hand, they significantly increase the chances of harm or disruption to innocent
individuals who are mis-identified. By focussing on the anti-terrorism argument, those
who want such measures introduced -  identity cards, extensions to emergency anti-
terrorism powers, data retention -  are able to brush to one side the arguments about
proportionality.
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The thinking behind it was laid bare, even celebrated, in Tony Blair’s speech at the 
Labour conference, where he dismissed concern for freedom as ‘libertarian nonsense’. 
But perhaps the most alarming illustration of Labour’s tin ear for liberty came this 
week, with the publication of Jack Straw’s anti-terrorism bill. It is a dangerous 
document, violating some basic, precious fundamentals of human freedom. The 
Guardian, 4 December 1999
The public is asked to trust its leaders, not to ask awkward questions. If the leaders are
taking more power than they strictly need, the public should be reassured that they will
not use those powers unless they are really necessary and then only to fight terrorism.
So the secrecy is justified. The government knows more than we do. What we don’t 
know is for our own good. Leave it to the administration. Trust Daddy. Close to half 
of the voting-age population in America appears to subscribe to that view, while the 
other half fears that democracy itself is being fatally undermined by the administration’s 
unseemly eagerness to exploit every available political possibility of this war (which 
isn’t quite a war) on terror (which, as an abstract noun, is unlike any enemy ever caught 
in the sights of a sniper’s rifle). Independent on Sunday, 11 January 2004
Summary
The debate on cyberterrorism is part of a wider debate on terrorism, organised crime, 
national security and personal freedom. When politicians and other claims-makers 
amplify the risks from cyberterrorism -  whether in terms of the existence of 
cyberterrorists, their methods, targets and the potential outcomes of attacks -  they are 
contributing to the pressure which is being exerted more generally for increased security 
through new measures of social control at the expense of personal freedoms. This is the 
broader issue. There is a narrower issue: that of control of the Internet and the 
communications it facilitates. Disproportionality is found in the amplification of the 
negative aspects of the Internet and other technologies and attenuation of their 
corresponding and immeasurably greater benefits.
When the individual legislative measures relating specifically to cyberterrorism are 
examined, there is little against which a serious objection could be made, if only the 
actions against which they are targeted have sufficient terrorist motive and are 
sufficiently destructive to qualify as terrorism, rather than hacking or any other crime. 
This is not the case, and over-wide definitions of terrorism are beginning to open up the 
possibility for the most severe anti-terrorist measures to be applied against standard 
criminal activities. In addition, ordinary criminal laws are often justified by appealing 
to the fight against terrorism, so that genuine concerns about their wide application, 
their proportionality, their effectiveness and their effects on human rights and civil 
liberties are side-stepped and passed by.
These important issues will be discussed further in the following chapter.
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2. V o l a t il it y
Volatility is the last of the five elements of a moral panic outlined by Goode and Ben- 
Yehuda (1994). The essence of a moral panic is that it rises up quickly; concern reaches 
a high level, perhaps even fever pitch; consensus is established as to what the problem 
is and who is responsible; hostility is displayed towards those identified as responsible; 
the perceptions of the situation and the means of its resolution are wholly 
disproportionate to an objective assessment of the level of threat; finally, the scare dies 
down, often as quickly as it rose.
However, as Critcher points out (Critcher 2003: 151), volatility is one of the least usefiil 
attributes of a moral panic and is extremely difficult to test. This is because it is not 
possible to place temporal boundaries around the concept of volatility: a panic may last 
a few weeks or a couple of years; there may be a drawn-out period of concern 
punctuated by highly volatile episodes; the panic may even be serial in nature, each one 
building on the last. The panic about cyberterrorism did not rise up quickly and it has 
not died down, so the findings on volatility are quite simple: the concern about 
cyberterrorism is not volatile in the long term. As Figures 1-4 in Chapter 5 
demonstrate, press coverage has risen steadily over the last 20 years. Reporting levels 
in the national press are high -  it is certainly a hot topic -  and there is no evidence of it 
tailing off. This is not the pattern of press reporting Goode and Ben-Yehuda expect 
from a full-blown moral panic: little or nothing one day, very high levels of coverage 
the next, continuing, possibly increasing for a period, then dying away just as quickly.
There were, however, points at which cyberterrorism received more coverage than 
usual. Figure 2 in Chapter 5 shows a peak in the second quarter of 2000 which was 
almost entirely due to a mini-panic caused by the ‘I Love You’ virus. The highest peak, 
in the fourth quarter of 2002, had no single cause, although widespread reports 
identifying Gary McKinnon as the UK hacker responsible for a number of US defence 
system intrusions over a two year period were by far the most numerous. This episode 
marked a period of high sensitisation to the issue of cyberterrorism. Another peak in 
the third quarter of 2005 was again partly attributable to the McKinnon saga and partly 
to high levels of concern about Government plans for ED cards and a related database. 
The narrative on this issue locates a paradox in which these measures are presented by 
the Government as part of the solution to terrorism but in themselves may make society 
more vulnerable to attack by hackers and terrorists if the database and related systems 
are not sufficiently secure.
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Cyberterrorism appears to be an issue with staying-power, with generally increasing 
levels of concern being punctuated by periods of increased intensity. This despite the 
fact that no confirmed cyberterrorist attack has ever been reported. The reasons for this 
remarkable state of affairs will be discussed in the following chapter, which will 
concentrate on the social mechanisms at work.
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C h a p t e r  9
D is c u s s io n  a n d  C o n c l u s io n s
1. Recapping the attributional model
The chapters in Section II have set out in detail the findings of this study organised 
according to the attributional model of moral panic developed by Goode and Ben- 
Yehuda (1994) and elaborated by Critcher (2003). According to this model, all the 
boxes have been ticked for a moral panic in relation to cyberterrorism except one: 
volatility.
1.1 Concern
Concern about cyberterrorism has been expressed in the press, by politicians, police and 
security services, the information security industry and other experts, including 
academics. There is no particular evidence of public concern, but this is not strictly 
necessary for the constitution of a successful moral panic (Critcher 2003: 150).
1.2 Hostility
Three main objects of hostility have been identified h  the discourse on cyberterrorism: 
hackers, terrorists and technology itself. When the three are blended together using the 
classic mechanisms of exaggeration, distortion, symbolisation and prediction (future 
threat scenario), the mythical cyberterrorist emerges, ready to be cast as a folk devil for 
the Information Age. Cyberterrorists are characterised unambiguously as the ‘enemy’, 
harmful and threatening to the values and interests of society, especially those of 
personal privacy and national security. There is a duality in the social anxiety relating 
to technology itself because it is both the cyberterrorist’s weapon and target.
1.3 Consensus
The cyberterrorist narrative is not uncontested. Although the vast majority of press 
coverage of this issue is hostile and reinforces the message that cyberterrorism is either 
already present or an imminent danger, there are those who challenge this view. They 
propose an alternative position, that terrorists are not ready to turn to cyberterrorism and 
that conventional terrorism and cybercrime are activities which are both current and in 
need of a targeted solution. This receives some press coverage and some journalists 
even accept the view that cyberterrorism is a useful construct for a government
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desperate to exert more control over the unruly domain of the Internet. Nevertheless, 
the messages of caution are largely attenuated in the press and the dominant view is 
undoubtedly that which considers cyberterrorism an immediate danger.
1.4 Disproportionality
All available evidence points to the fact that no terrorist group has ever successfully 
carried out a cyber-attack causing significant damage to persons, property or the 
economy, nor are they imminently likely to do so. Any claims that they have or 
concern that they are imminent exaggerate the scale of the problem and are, therefore, 
disproportionate. There is also copious evidence of distortion of the issues, for example 
the relabelling of hackers as ‘ cyberterrorists ’ and of cybercrime as ‘cyberterrorism’; the 
various claims that al Qaeda is actively pursuing a cyberterrorist agenda; the 
construction of technology as inherently dangerous and even ‘evil’. All of these claims 
and more divert public attention away from the real dangers from conventional hacking 
and cybercrime towards the mirage of cyberterrorism.
1.5 Volatility
Critcher recommends that the element of volatility be abandoned (Critcher 2003: 151). 
Nevertheless, a true moral panic has a beginning, middle and end. It is possible to 
locate the beginning of the discourse on cyberterrorism, although it is less evident when 
this discourse begins to resemble a panic. As for the end of this episode, that lies in the 
future as it appears to be ongoing. What can be identified are a series of peaks in 
concern generated by specific events, such as the development of a new technology or 
the identification of a particularly prevalent virus. This points to the conclusion that 
cyberterrorism is a persistent issue and a peak may occur at any moment, giving it the 
appearance of a serial panic. Concern about the issue, measured in column inches, is 
indisputably growing year on year and higher levels of concern probably lie in the 
future, generated by growing technological dependency and a corresponding sense of 
vulnerability.
1.6 Claims-makers
Critcher added this sixth attribute to the original list of five because claims-makers are 
fundamental to the constructionist perspective espoused by Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
(Critcher 2003: 151). The claims-makers in relation to cyberterrorism are quite clear: 
politicians, the information security industry and, to a lesser extent, police and security 
services and other ‘experts’. The press also functions as a claims-maker in its own 
right. There are many different strategies for claims-making, but by far the most
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important for all claims-makers is the future threat scenario. The claims made can be 
characterised as exploitation, using the mechanisms of deviance amplification and 
orchestrating social reactions to achieve either social control or economic advantage.
Accepting that the criterion of volatility, at least as it is narrowly conceived by Goode 
and Ben-Yehuda, should be discarded, all the ingredients for a moral panic about 
cyberterrorism according to the attributional model are present. Yet, intuitively, this 
does not seem sufficient. The bare bones of this model as applied to this case do not 
expose adequately the reasons why concern is expressed, the importance of the media, 
the processes involved in social control and historical cortext. In fact, this information 
is available in the preceding chapters, but only because the material was merely 
organised according to the attributional model and the analysis, as such, took a 
grounded approach so that no significant information which came to light during the 
content analysis was left out. This is why Cohen’s processual model is required, with 
the addition of attention to the construction of moral boundaries and underlying 
discourses.
The processual model, as elaborated (Critcher 2003:151), is made up of a discussion of 
a series of elements: emergence, media inventory, moral entrepreneurs/claims-makers, 
experts, elite consensus and concern based on distortion, coping and resolution, fade 
away and legacy. Critcher notes the need to add two further dimensions to the existing 
processual model: discourse analysis and establishment of moral boundaries (Critcher 
2003: 177). Definition of social problems usually involves a variety of competing 
discourses, but a hallmark of moral panic is the development of a closed, incontestable 
discourse, the genesis of which should be identified in a model of moral panic. Critcher 
does not prescribe how discourse analysis should be merged with the processual model, 
but it fits neatly within the existing processual framework and this is how it will be 
discussed below. Critcher further notes that moral panics result in an “expression of 
irreducible moral values”, reaffirming the moral boundaries of society with deviants on 
the outside. This seems obvious, but should be made explicit in any account of a moral 
panic using the processual model. The remainder of this chapter will cut across the 
findings of this study using these tools to expose what is missing from the 
cyberterrorism story.
2 . E m erg ence
A moral panic does not emerge from nowhere: it has its roots in an existing discourse. 
Previous moral panics have been based on discourses of youth (Mods and Rockers),
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childhood (paedophilia), and drugs (rave/ecstasy). The emergence of the cyberterrorist 
is rooted in two enduring meta-discourses relating to technology and terrorism. The 
fundamentals of the discourse on terrorism are relatively stable, despite changes in the 
nature and source of terrorism itself. Terrorists are unequivocally evil, irrational 
murderous and destructive, threatening the lives of innocent and unsuspecting 
individuals going about their daily business. They operate outwith the boundaries of 
society and are excluded from political debate. Exceptional legal regimes are 
constructed to allow law enforcers and security services special powers of investigation 
and detention and penalties on conviction for terrorist offences are severe. Terrorists 
are in some circumstances denied even the normal due process rights accorded to other 
criminals because their crimes are considered so heinous. The language of risk is 
habitually adopted by politicians, law enforcers, security services and the media, with 
phrases such as ‘level of risk’, ‘terrorist threat’ and ‘vulnerability to security breaches’ 
being common. There is very broad consensus on these issues and tie underlying 
themes of good against evil are well-established, pervasive and largely uncontested.
The discourse on technology is less homogeneous, but there is a strong narrative 
referring to technological dependency bringing with it corresponding vulnerabilities. 
The public feels a collective insecurity inspired by awareness of its own ignorance of 
how die technology works and an inability to control it, combined with the anxiety that 
there are others, hackers, who have mastered the technology, can control it and are 
somehow all-powerful (Skibell 2002). When this insecurity is coupled with the spectre 
of terrorism, it is a powerful brew indeed. In common with terrorism, die language of 
risk is pervasive. The hacker has come to symbolise these perceptions of risk and has 
been seen as an adolescent challenger to the adult order, bent on destabilising adult- 
created, computer-dependent systems (Halbert 1997). The insecurities of the 
Information Age, including the perceived lawlessness of the Internet, are summed up in 
the hostility towards this modem folk devil.
The image of the computer hacker has evolved over time, from ‘kid with precocious 
powers’ in the early 1980s; through ‘pathological addict with unlimited powers’ in the 
mid-1980s; then, when computer use was widespread among ordinary people so that the 
addiction tag was no longer appropriate, hackers became criminal, a threat to commerce 
in an increasingly computer-dependent business community (Skibell 2002). Hackers 
remain ‘criminal’ to this day, although the perceived dangerousness of their criminality 
has increased. Throughout this time, however, there have always been those who claim
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that most hackers are law-abiding citizens who exist to push the boundaries of what 
technology can do. Hackers themselves have challenged perceptions of criminality, but 
the challenge has been unsuccessful because they lack cohesion as a community and do 
not present a united front. Sympathetic journalists have also challenged the hacker 
myth from time to time. Nevertheless, these counter-claims are attenuated in the press 
and the dominant discourse characterises the hacker as criminal and now dangerous.
The latest evolution in the construction of the hacker is the attribution of terrorist 
qualities. Here the discourses of terrorism and technology intertwine and their common 
language of risk allows this to happen almost seamlessly. There is perceived to be a 
novel threat, the cyberterrorist, whose form is constructed on three fronts. First, the 
hacker is repackaged as a terrorist and ordinary cybercrime is relabelled as 
cyberterrorism. The stakes have been raised so that, whereas before the hacker 
challenged personal privacy and commercial interests, now he is a threat to national 
security. Second, the use of ICTs by terrorist groups, mostly for communication 
purposes, is characterised as cyberterrorism Although die available evidence indicates 
that cyberterrorism in the sense used in this study does not yet exist, this has not 
prevented claims that it is a reality or that it is at least imminent. Vulnerable targets are 
perceived to include air traffic, trains, dams, electricity networks and nuclear weapons, 
in short, the CM and military networks. Third, technology itself, particularly the 
Internet, is implicated in the new threat from cyberterrorism. The emergence of new 
technologies is often a flash point for fresh rounds of claims-making about how such 
technology might represent either a weapon or a vulnerable target
The Internet and networks generally are crucial to an understanding of the emergence of 
the cyberterrorist. Whereas terrorism has historically been geographically bounded, the 
Internet appears to render insignificant national boundaries. Cyberterrorist attacks may 
originate in one country and have a target in another without the necessity for any 
physical proximity between attacker and target. Moreover, technology allows the 
attacker anonymity so that any attempts at forestalling an attack or locating the attacker 
after the event are inevitably compromised. In this way, security forces are impeded 
and the social order is threatened.
The media report on public anxiety about technological dependence and the influence of 
the Internet and related technologies on society. The extent to which these reports 
represent real feelings is unclear, but it is the invocation of public anxiety by the media 
rather than its reality which is important in a moral panic. Ordinary people must,
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according to the media, use or rely on technology, yet they do not understand how it 
works, giving rise to mistrust. An extreme sense of vulnerability is created by the 
concept of interconnectedness: everyone is connected, everyone is vulnerable. 
Furthermore, there are well-rehearsed narratives about online criminality, not just 
hacking but also pornography, paedophilia and other sexual perversions, organised 
crime, drug-trafficking, espionage, theft, ftaud and so on The Internet is portrayed as 
both central to modem society and as a lawless domain, a hive of criminal activity. 
Thus, there are threats not only to social order, but also to moral order from deviant 
activities. The emergence of the cyberterrorist has come to symbolise all of this. By 
adding the element of terrorism to the existing concerns about technology and its effects 
on society, the problem becomes more obviously moral, a struggle between the good of 
social stability and the evil of terrorist attacks. More importantly, however, the threat is 
transformed from being an organisational information security issue to a national 
security issue. This is more fertile ground for claims-makers amongst the political 61ite 
wishing to exert greater social control over the use of technology and, more specifically, 
electronic communications.
3 . M ed ia  in v en t o r y
3.1 Sensitisation
Deviance, crime, terrorism and certain popular types of technology are inherently 
newsworthy and are issues to which the media are habitually sensitised. However, the 
last two decades have witnessed a reinterpretation of some of these familiar events and 
objects. They are combined and reworked and, when viewed from different angles, the 
mundane and familiar becomes threatening and dangerous: cyberterrorism. Hackers, 
terrorists and the technology itself are variously the targets of blame and stories relating 
to one or more of these are now interpreted as being part of the cyberterrorist threat.
Reports about cyberterrorism started in the late 1980s and increased steadily year on 
year until late 1997 and the publication of a report of President Clinton’s US 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP 1997). The Commission 
made recommendations for the protection of the CNI from both physical and cyber­
threats, but press reports focussed on claims about the real and growing threat from 
cyberterrorism, the calls for increased spending on computer security and the need for 
new government posts to coordinate the response. This apparently new vulnerability 
seemed to take the US and the rest of the world by surprise. Whereas hackers presented 
a nuisance, cyberterrorists appeared to present an imminent danger, threatening the very
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underpinnings of society with attacks on the critical national infrastructure. For the first 
time, an internationally important, government-commissioned report identified 
cyberterrorism as a serious issue and called for an organised response. The profile of 
cyberterrorism had been raised to new heights and became firmly established as an issue 
about which ‘something must be done’. Press coverage has continued to increase since 
then and at an accelerated rate.
Unusually for an otherwise high-profile issue, the broadcast media do not seem to be 
sensitised to the issues of cyberterrorism to any significant degree. This is a 
phenomenon which has been constructed almost exclusively by and through the press. 
Another interesting feature of media coverage is that cyberterrorism is an issue to which 
the upmarket press seem to be particularly sensitised and the downmarket press less so, 
although their interest has increased in recent years. The Times, The Guardian and The 
Independent, including the Sunday editions, feature as particularly important in the 
corpus. Nevertheless, the press generally do now seem to be sensitised to the issue of 
cyberterrorism as a social problem.
3.2 Stereotypes and folk devils
The findings of this study demonstrate how hacking, terrorism and technology are 
associated to produce something sinister for public consumption. The cyberterrorist is a 
stereotype, of course, but one constructed from other stereotypes. This is crucial to an 
understanding of the social reaction to cyberterrorism. Deviants become easier to 
demonise if they are dehumanised and the context of their actions is ignored. 
Stereotyping assists in this process because it distances deviants from the realm of the 
normal and acceptable and confirms moral boundaries, with the deviants firmly on the 
outside. The cyberterrorist, being a stereotype constructed from other stereotypes, 
seems to be doubly damned and the context of his deviance, cyberspace, enables even 
more distance to be placed between the cyberterrorist and reality.
“Moral panics depend on the generation of diffuse normative concerns, while the
successful creation of folk devils rests on their stereo-typical portrayal as atypical actors
against a background that is overtypical.” (Cohen 2002: 45)
This is a ‘them and us’ mentality and an example of the imperative in a moral panic to 
reduce complex social problems to simplicity, to which end the underscoring of 
dichotomous relationships -  particularly good against evil -  is useful. The differences 
in motivations between the hacker and the (cyber)teirorist have largely been suppressed. 
Their particular brands of deviance have been defined as being contrary to the stability 
of society, the personal safety of innocent citizens and national security. In this way,
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hackers, terrorists and, later, cyberterrorists have been successfully constituted as folk 
devils, with ICTs at the heart of their activities.
Occasionally, a moral panic may fail because stereotypes are successfully challenged in 
the media, either by the putative folk devils themselves or by someone speaking up for 
them. In cases of a successful challenge, the object of attack will be highly visible, yet 
structurally strong. Terrorist groups are both of these things, yet they do not fight back, 
at least not in the usual way, since one goal of terrorist groups is to gain the very type of 
sensationalised, snowballing media coverage typical in a moral panic. A good, strong 
moral panic is just the thing terrorists crave. Although they may have the means to fight 
back, they do not have the motivation.
However, hackers are different. They may well object -  and it is well known that many 
do -  to being labelled terrorists and cast as folk devils. However, they are highly visible 
and, because of the fragmented nature of their community and their, and society’s, 
inability to agree on the definition of a ‘hacker’, they are structurally weak. Clearly, 
they have the powerful mechanism of the Internet through which to publish their views, 
and many do. Nevertheless, new media cannot yet compete with the press in terms of 
stereotyping. Hackers have little influence with the press and have found it difficult to 
find a mouthpiece for their views. The stereotypes necessary for the successful 
construction of folk devils have, therefore, remained largely unchallenged.
The stereotypical hacker is an anarchic youth or criminal, challenging from cyberspace 
the social order to which ordinary people adhere. He is a young man or adolescent -  
this is an exclusively male stereotype -  pale and spotty, dressed in black, solitary, anti­
social, even sociopathic. The stereotype has him as a master of his medium, a technical 
wizard who has society at the mercy of his superior skills. The reality is that only a 
handful of hackers actually have the level of mastery attributed to them.
Terrorists are stereotyped as the embodiment of evil: mass murderers beyond reason, 
the very worst type of social outcast, spumed by society at the very highest levels. 
They are perceived as irrational and ruthless fanatics and, to the extent that their ‘cause’ 
is recognised at all, it is denounced as delusion and madness. They are excluded from 
society to such an extent that dialogue or negotiation with them is strictly prohibited, 
even when human lives are at stake. This stereotype is strong, enduring and 
uncontested in the mainstream media.
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The Internet itself is stereotyped as a lawless place where criminals flourish and all 
manner of deviance, criminal tendency and perversions are catered for. It protects the 
guilty with anonymity and renders innocent citizens vulnerable. Children are sucked 
into the network, there to be groomed by paedophiles, transformed into hackers (script 
kiddies) or brainwashed in chatrooms. Adults fare little better, being exposed to 
pornography, risking identity fraud or theft of credit card details. The Internet is 
everywhere, dangerous and indomitable except by those with extraordinary skills and ill 
intentions: hackers and terrorists. This stereotype is not uncontested since the Internet 
and other ICTs bring undeniable benefits to individuals and society at large. 
Nevertheless, this narrative of hostility is strong in the press.
The stereotype of the cyberterrorist is a combination of all these things. He has 
extraordinary technical skills, borrowed from the hacker stereotype, and is capable of 
breaching even the tightest security. If ICTs are die cyberterrorist’s tool, they are also 
his target. The message is that advanced societies are technology-dependent, which 
means that they fall apart if that technology is attacked. Air traffic controls, trains, 
dams, electricity networks and nuclear weapons are all vulnerable. Because he is a 
terrorist, the harm he seeks to cause is severe: disruption and destruction on a massive 
scale; paralysis of critical infrastructure; death and injury. He is far more dangerous 
that the hacker. The danger is often couched in terms of national security, but the 
implications are global. The Internet and other ICTs allow him to attack anonymously 
and at a distance from his target, giving him global reach yet sheltering him from 
reprisals.
There is, however, no strong visual image of the cyberterrorist. The stereotype really 
amounts to little more than a conceptual linking between terrorism and technology. For 
example it is claimed that al Qaeda relies heavily on technology to plan atrocities and 
will soon be branching out into cyberterrorism. However, the public image of Bin 
Laden and his followers are of men in desert dress, living in caves and holding guns. 
Bin Laden himself does not seek to promote an image of a man sitting at a computer, 
rather that of a warrior ready for conventional armed combat. The gun is the most 
immediate symbol of his rhetoric. A computer does not enhance this image.
Terrorists are more immediately associated in the public mind with bombs, guns, 
explosions, physical destruction, death and mutilation. All these things are far removed 
from the clinical intelligence required for a successful computer hack, remote from the 
physical world. Analysis of symbols, images and stereotypes associated with
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cyberterrorism demonstrate that they are really those associated with computer hackers 
and the terrorism aspect is bolted on Hackers are inextricably associated with the 
computers which serve as the tools of their trade. Terrorists are not. There exists a 
social vocabulary with which to discuss the risks posed by hackers and yet these risks 
have never been amplified to the status of a moral panic. Hackers are stigmatised and 
vilified, but not particularly feared. Sometimes they are even viewed in a positive fight. 
This is why the visual image of the cyberterrorist is not particularly powerful or 
successful, although that conceptual fink between terrorism and technology is.
3.3 Exaggeration/distortion, symbolisation and prediction
Exaggeration and distortion are essential features of a moral panic and contribute 
towards disproportionafity in both perception of and reaction to the problem. In relation 
to cyberterrorism, there is gross exaggeration of the seriousness of the problem; the 
critical nature of the supposed targets; the extent to which society is really computer- 
dependent; the amount of damage a cyber-attack is capable of causing; and the skills 
possessed by would-be attackers. Distortion is equally important. Terrorist motives are 
imputed to hackers; the gravity of likely outcomes of a cyberterrorist attack is placed on 
a par with that of conventional terrorist attacks using bombs; it is claimed that terrorists 
are pursuing the cyberterrorist agenda with just as much vigour as their bombing 
campaigns. The language used is alarmist and sensational, deliberately highlighting the 
vaguely-possible, nightmare scenario and suppressing the highly-likely, mundane 
outcome or non-event.
Two very particular manifestations of exaggeration and distortion can be found in the 
processes of symbolisation and prediction. The socio-cultural effects of technology and 
global terrorism are two of the biggest current sources of social anxiety. When 
combined, they construct the terrifying prospect of a threat to the very fabric of society. 
The fear is that society is dependent on technology which, in turn, renders society 
vulnerable to those with absolute mastery of that technology who may use it to their 
own evil ends. The stereotypical cyberterrorist has come to symbolise this fear.
Other symbols can be identified, some of them stereotypes, others not. The 
stereotypical hacker is symbolic of electronic delinquency. The negative stereotype of 
the Internet -  contrasting with the positive views which also exist -  is symbolic of 
lawlessness, disorder and the negative aspects of globalisation. The much-used phrase 
‘electronic Pearl Harbor’ is symbolic of catastrophic attack in the homeland (here the 
US) and underlines the new uncertainties generated by the increasing tendency of
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electronic networks to render geographical boundaries insignificant. It is often reported 
that geographical boundaries no longer guarantee protection against criminal and 
terrorist attack. 9/11 has become symbolic of all the issues related to President Bush’s 
War on Terror. Perhaps the most powerful symbol for decades, in the aftermath of the 
atrocity mere reference to 9/11 was sufficient to summarise a whole raft of justifications 
for governments to engage in offensive action abroad and repressive legislative regimes 
at home. In one date was encapsulated the national security agenda. Another date, 
Y2K, became a symbol of the inherent fragility and untrustworthiness of computers. 
Microsoft, at once a global business and a dominant retail product, is a symbol both of 
Western hegemony and of Western vulnerability caused by dependence on specific 
technologies. Claims that UK nuclear submarines were to be run on the notoriously 
insecure Windows 2000 platform were sufficient to trigger outrage: “The Government 
was accused last night of leaving Britain’s nuclear arsenal wide open to terrorist 
computer hackers” (Sunday Express, 24 October 2004).
These symbols are powerful and are combined in myriad ways to convey the discourse 
of technology, terrorism and danger. Yet, this is not an accurate reflection of reality. 
So far as we know, and with the usual caveats about the classified nature of much 
information about terrorism, cyberterrorists do not yet exist. Their appearance in the 
press is almost entirely attributable to another distortion, a net-widening process such 
that previously unconnected activities, hacking and terrorism, become characterised as 
belonging to this particular class of deviance, cyberterrorism, by a process of re- 
evaluation and redefinition. Hacking, cybercrime and terrorist use of ICTs are 
relabelled as cyberterrorism. The presence of the cyberterrorist seems established, but it 
is a mirage. Net-widening through relabelling has resulted in exaggeration of the size, 
even existence, of the problem of cyberterrorism and a distorted view of the causes and 
effects of the underlying and genuine problems of information security and terrorism
Prediction about cyberterrorism has become the most powerful mechanism for 
distortion establishing the cyberterrorist as a symbol of fear. Such predictions nearly 
always take the specific form of the future threat scenario. This is subtly different from 
the type of prediction identified by Cohen, where there is an implicit assumption that 
recurrence of particular events is inevitable and talk of ‘next time’ and what to do about 
it is widespread (Cohen 2002: 26). With the fixture threat scenario, the future event is 
not based on past events, but is entirely hypothetical and based on tenuous links made 
between two or more elements. Hackers have done x so terrorists will do it soon. This
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new technology could be used by terrorists to do y. A new vulnerability discovered in 
system z might be exploited by terrorists. It is implied that the future threat is imminent 
and that immediate, prescriptive social reaction is necessary. It matters not that these 
predictions fail to come to fruition. This is either ignored and replaced by fresh claims 
or used as evidence that action was taken in time t> prevent catastrophe. If the 
prediction has been veiy specific, such as claims that cyberterrorist attacks were 
inevitable in reaction to the second war in Iraq, the shortcomings in such a prediction 
are dismissed with the argument “It didn’t happen this time, but it will happen...”. The 
argument is unassailable because it cannot be disproved and fresh reports about new 
future threat scenarios will soon divert public attention towards other alarming 
prospects. The parallel distortion of relabelling existing cybercrime and so forth as 
‘cyberterrorism’ serves to keep the sense of fear immediate. Cohen describes the import 
of this:
Unlike the case of natural disasters where the absence of predictions can be disastrous, 
with social phenomena such as deviance, it is the presence of predictions that can be 
‘disastrous’. (Cohen 2002: 26)
Cohen speaks of self-fulfilling prophecies. Yet the issue with cyberterrorism is not that
it will suddenly appear for real, but that such prophecies will lead to fear and
consequent changes in social behaviour and will permit justification of excessive social
controls.
4 . C l a im s-m a k e r s
What Cohen terms ‘moral entrepreneurs’ will here be called ‘claims-makers’ since this 
seems to be a more accurate term for the behaviour discussed h this section. The 
processual model calls for a separate discussion of claims-makers, experts and the 
political and media elites, yet a particular feature of the discourse on cyberterrorism is 
that these categories of actors are almost impossible to separate. Critcher has noted that 
this can be a problem (Critcher 2003: 152). The stakeholders are easy to identify: 
politicians, law enforcers and security services, and the information security industry. 
However, all of these have made claims about cyberterrorism, all have some degree of 
specific expertise -  or at least are accredited with such expertise in the press -  and all 
can be considered elite in some sense, although politicians are more obviously so than 
the others. Nonetheless, even if the same actors are performing multiple functions, it is 
still important to attempt to tease out those functions into separate strands. Claims- 
making activities will, therefore, be discussed in this section, with experts and elite 
consensus discussed in following sections.
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4.1 Orientations
Both US and UK politicians make claims which are widely reported in the UK press. 
Both countries exhibit similar concerns about the ubiquitous topics of technology and 
terrorism, especially since 2001, at which time the US experienced a phenomenon well- 
known to the UK: a terrorist attack on home soil. There is evidence of diffusion of 
concern manifesting in a trend, but no more than that, for claims made by politicians in 
the US to be made subsequently by politicians in the UK. Claims of politicians are 
oriented towards prophecies of doom and disaster and, although they may have specific 
information which points towards the imminent nature of the threat, they have certainly 
not intimated in public that such a class of information exists, even if they are precluded 
from discussing it in detail. They use the rhetoric of fear to highlight vulnerabilities 
which might be exploited by terrorists, asserting that our society is as much at risk from 
cyberteirorism as it is from bombers. Politicians have stressed both the networked and 
interdependent nature of information systems and the apparent ease with which they can 
be attacked with catastrophic effect. The statements made are always sweeping, over­
simplified and lacking in evidence to back them up. The audience is left in no doubt 
that cyberterrorism is extremely dangerous but, were an interested member of the public 
to dig a little deeper, he would have extreme difficulty ascertaining how a cyberterrorist 
attack might actually work. The underlying vision is of the fragility of social order, 
exacerbated by the addition of another layer to society -  cyberspace -  which is 
nebulous, largely unregulable and is beginning to challenge the status quo. The Internet 
in particular has brought with it enormous benefits for individuals, but represents in 
many ways a nightmare of destabilisation for the state and a threat to the hegemonic 
interests of Government. The unison of the twin sites of anxiety of terrorism and the 
Internet in the concept of cyberterrorism is an attempt at restoring certainty in a period 
of flux. The fight against a common enemy has that effect. In terms of the relationship 
between these claims-making politicians and the press, such claims have been extremely 
influential h sensitising the press to the issue of cyberterrorism and ensuring its high 
profile. In the cyberterrorism discourse, politicians are leaders, not followers.
Contrary to politicians, law enforcers are concerned with the fine detail of cyber-threats. 
The findings demonstrate that they are in the business of claims-making, but in a 
restrained manner. They emphasise that the Internet and related technologies have 
given rise to new challenges for law enforcement. New crimes, and new ways of 
committing old crimes, have emerged, but law enforcers lack the skills and resources to 
tackle them effectively. Overblown images of disaster are rare, but we are given a
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picture of a growing problem which will remain unaddressed until such time as law 
enforcers are properly equipped to deal with it. Law enforcers seem to have a relatively 
calm attitude towards cyberterrorism and the prevailing view seems to be that this is 
something for the future. For now, there are more pressing problems of cybercrime and 
conventional terrorism. As to the latter, law enforcers do make claims about terrorist 
use of ICTs but, again, these claims are tempered with the assessment that the Internet is 
a double-edged sword: useful to terrorists, but also useful to law enforcers who have a 
new means of tracking their activities. It is this edge of the sword they seek to sharpen 
with appeals for enhanced powers of surveillance and investigation.
Of all the claims-makers, the orientations of law enforcers are the most balanced. The 
discourse of law enforcers is firmly rooted in traditional issues of crime and terrorism. 
They are, in general, careful not to confound these two issues, which would be a pre­
requisite for participation in the cyberterrorist discourse. As a result, law enforcers do 
not tend to be the source of die more alarmist accounts of cyberterrorism in the press 
and seem to be operating alongside the media rather than leading it.
Perhaps surprisingly, the information security industry is a late-comer in terms of 
claims-making which is visible in the press. Not until after publication of the FCCIP 
report in late 1997 does the industry start to feature to any significant degree. Since it 
became an active claims-maker, however, the industry has shown itself to be deeply 
split. One faction claims that cyberterrorism is a serious threat, real and growing. The 
future threat scenario is used liberally and cyberterrorism is characterised as the ‘next, 
logical step’ for terrorists. Security flaws which might be exploited by cyberterrorists 
are emphasised.
The other faction counter-claims that cyberterrorism is a distraction from the genuine 
problems of cybercrime and conventional terrorism, although they claim no particular 
expertise in respect of the latter. They use the language of disruption rather than 
destruction and stress that successful cyber-attacks require rare skills, often inside 
information or access, and are unlikely to cause damage on a scale attractive to 
terrorists. These counter-claims, now representing the majority view in the industry and 
academic press reviewed in Chapter 2, are attenuated in the national newspapers which 
favour the minority vision of cyberterrorist disaster scenarios. These scenarios and 
claims do not reach the stage of emotional or intellectual evaluation of the situation. 
Prophecies of doom are made, but are not linked to moral and social decline. This is a 
purely technological perspective. As far as the industry’s relationship with the press
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goes, a few regular contributors, such as Mi2g, can be identified who seem to have a 
symbiotic relationship with the press. If a quote is needed to back up a sensational 
story, they are happy to oblige. In return, the press often publish details of reports 
drafted by these organisations, raising their public profile and reinforcing their aura of 
expertise.
The media, in this case specifically the press, are, according to Cohen’s formulation of 
moral panic (2002: xxiv), capable of acting as claims-makers in their own right and 
such is the case here. In common with politicians and some exponents of the 
information security industry, images of information system vulnerability are combined 
with exaggerated and distorted claims about past cyberterrorist attacks and nightmare 
visions of what will undoubtedly happen in the future. Once again, the view of 
cyberspace as a force for uncertainly and instability is common, leading to the 
conclusion that social order is at risk from sociopathic individuals operating outwith the 
physical restrictions and legal and moral constraints of the real world.
4.2 Images
The claims of politicians and exponents of the information security industry are quite 
clear that cyberterrorists exist and are responsible for unprecedented threats to 
information systems. These claims rest on a collection of images relating to who the 
threatening individuals are and why they are resorting to this behaviour.
Images of vulnerability are important for the construction of the cyberterrorist threat. 
After all, if there are no vulnerabilities, the threat is largely academic. However, 
although frequently referred to, these supposed vulnerabilities are rarely described in 
detail. Security flaws undoubtedly exist, but these are subjects for specialist press, not 
national newspapers. A general sense is promoted that computers and their systems are 
full of holes just waiting for exploitation. The ubiquity of Microsoft products and their 
apparent notoriety for being unstable and insecure plays a part in this perception. The 
Internet itself is portrayed as insidious, a powerful force in its own right and sometimes 
even described as having a will of its own. But detail is important. How, for example, 
is a cyberterrorist located in the Middle East going to reach and then breach the 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems of a nuclear power station 
and set off a nuclear explosion? Such systems are not, in fact, connected to public 
networks like the Internet and are often isolated even from internal networks (Green 
2002). Again, the notion that aeroplanes can be made to crash by hacking air traffic 
control systems is far fetched, to say the least. These systems cannot be accessed from
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the Internet and are, in any event, mediated by human beings, the air traffic controller 
and the pilot, both of whom have eyes in their heads. This, too, is simplistic, but the 
examples do not need to be more complicated to demonstrate the absurdity of the claims 
which are routinely presented in the press. These scenarios are repeated time and again, 
often not just as possibilities but as probabilities. The image of vulnerability gains its 
force through repetition, not reason
The image of the perpetrators is constructed on two fronts. On the one side, claims- 
makers indiscriminately relabel hackers as cyberterrorists and cybercrime as 
cyberterrorism, although law enforcers are less prone to this. This relabelling applies 
both to specific incidents and to the community of hackers and their activities more 
generally. Anything which might be regarded as both technologically-related and in the 
grey areas of deviant behaviour is liable to be labelled ‘cyberterrorism’. As to the 
reason why hackers would engage in cyberterrorism, this seems to amount to little more 
than a natural extension of the existing ‘criminal’ label routinely applied to hackers 
since the 1980s to the more serious ‘terrorist’ label. Underlying motivations and the 
fact that hackers are not trying to coerce governments or intimidate the public are 
routinely ignored.
On the other side, it s taken for granted that terrorists are engaging in cyberterrorism 
which is, thereby, instantly conjured into existence. Government politicians have 
tended to emphasise computer dependence as a self-evident reason for cyberterrorist 
attack. This argument is sometimes backed up with the reasoning that, as security 
surrounding more traditional targets gets tighter, terrorists will naturally turn to the 
‘softer’ alternative of cyber-attack. Similar arguments have been made by the military 
and some in the information security industry, who turn to theories of asymmetric 
warfare to ‘demonstrate’ that it is the logical next option for terrorists. The might of 
conventional Western military force overwhelms the meagre resources of a terrorist 
group or rogue state, so the latter must inevitably turn towards the asymmetric 
advantages offered by networked technology, both as a tool and as a target. Such 
claims ignore the reality that a cyber-attack is neither soft nor easy, with human and 
technological barriers being virtually insurmountable to anyone but a well-placed 
insider, yet he image painted is invariably of a terrorist attacking from outside the 
target entity.
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4.3 Causal explanations
Normally, claims-makers in a moral panic would proffer causal explanations for the 
condition causing concern These are not easily identified in the cyberterrorism 
discourse. There is no attempt by claims-makers at socio-cultural explanation of why a 
particular anomic individual would want to perpetrate such an attack or from which 
social problem he himself suffers which would motivate him to such deviance. ‘Facts’ 
are presented instead: the fact of society’s technological dependence; of security flaws; 
of society’s vulnerability; of cyberterrorists trying to attack.
Sometimes the Internet is presented as being the ‘cause’ of cyber-deviance in general 
and cyberterrorism in particular. This does not advance any rational explanation, it 
simply permits the grouping together of a raft of undesirable behaviour -  hacking, 
paedophilia, pornography, fraud, theft and terrorism -  as evidence that the Internet is 
somehow immoral in itself for facilitating such behaviour. The closest thing to an 
explanation is in the notion, discussed above, that it is logical that hacking should 
escalate to cyberterrorism and it is logical that terrorists should turn to cyberterrorism, 
either recruiting hackers or developing skills themselves. It is presented as self-evident 
that terrorists will increasingly turn to cyberterrorism as conventional terrorism 
becomes harder to execute. Yet there is no sign that the strategy of the suicide bomber 
is either difficult to execute or anything other than spectacularly successful from the 
terrorist’s point of view. Such an ‘explanation’ for the phenomenon does not bear even 
the most cursory scrutiny.
4.4 Interests and exploitation
Claims-makers are “groups organized to make claims about an issue, whose own 
interests are served by its prominence” (Critcher 2003: 152) and it is important to 
understand what these interests might be. The interests of claims-makers are rarely 
made explicit and must be inferred from all the circumstances. Such an analysis should 
not be approached with cynicism The motivations of claims-makers may be quite 
transparent but this does not necessarily mean that their stated beliefs are not sincerely 
held or that they do not genuinely believe they are acting for the good of society. 
Nevertheless, claims-making is a rhetorical exercise (Best 1990: 24). Claims-makers 
give a type of deviance a name, establish it as a threat and advocate solutions. When 
concern spreads and manifests in the media, this confirms the gravity of the issue. The 
only evidence presented is supposition and prediction, so the question must arise: what 
do claims-makers seek to achieve by elevating what is apparently a non-issue to such a
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prominent position? Perhaps the real focus is less on the supposed social problem and 
more on the proposed solution to that problem? It does seem that each major group of 
claims-maker has something to gain from the ‘solution’. The conclusion is that 
cyberterrorism appears to be constructed exclusively of rhetoric.
It is quite common for politicians to make claims, sometimes individually, sometimes in 
groups, but it is rather less common for government politicians to be a leading exponent 
of sensationalised claims about a social problem, as is the case with cyberterrorism. 
There may be several reasons for this. In common with other governments, ihe UK 
Government has exhibited a desire over a number of years to exert increasing control 
over technology and behaviour in cyberspace by enhancing regulations and introducing 
new legislation, civil and criminal. This is not necessarily social control for its own 
sake. Privatisation, deregulation and globalisation of many industries and utilities have 
resulted in reduced government control over and knowledge of owners and operators of 
information networks and regulation of the Internet in particular is extremely 
challenging (Madsen 1996; Rathmell 1999). The Government is now in the position of 
wanting to reassert control over the telecommunications networks and is facing an 
uphill struggle against a public whose imagination has been captured by the perceived 
freedoms offered by the Internet (Madsen 1996). There is a real need for Government 
to highlight the importance of information security and to encourage those in the private 
sector to take appropriate defensive measures. This is especially important in respect of 
systems forming part of the CNI since the majority of these systems and, consequently, 
their security, rest in the hands of the private sector. It is possible that the 
cyberterrorism discourse is, in part, an attempt to raise the profile of the need for 
security and to spur the private sector to further action, although there is scant evidence 
in the corpus for this proposition
The criminal angle has a much higher profile. The fight against terrorism, including 
cyberterrorism, has routinely been used as a justification for increasing levels of social 
control, particularly in the form of increased powers of intelligence-gathering and 
investigation for the police and security services. This will be discussed in detail below. 
It is undoubtedly the case that law enforcers and the Government have, to a certain 
degree, common interests in this regard. The Government’s ambition is to further its 
anti-terrorism and law and order agendas with increasingly ‘tough’ measures. To the 
extent that these measures include enhanced powers for law enforcers which make their 
difficult job easier, the claims made by both parties have similar ends. It is extremely
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significant that arguments about terrorism and cyberterrorism have been used to justify 
legislation which in fact applies to crime as well as terrorism. Cyberterrorism is used to 
leverage arguments about social control in another sphere of social policy. Government 
has a legitimate interest in promoting security and social order, but political emphasis 
on cyberterrorism is properly labelled ‘exploitation’ if it obscures appropriate debate 
about the target issues of information security, law and order.
The natural interests of law enforcers in securing enhanced powers to assist with 
intelligence and investigation have been noted. There are, however, further 
considerations relating to remit and resources other than investigatory powers. 
Responsibility for cybercrime and cyberterrorism has passed through and between 
several units over the years and it has been a consistent criticism that it is not clear 
where the lines of responsibility lie. MI5, the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS), a computer crime squad at Scotland Yard, Special Branch and regional police 
forces all seem to have had a stake. The National Information Security Cbordination 
Centre (NISCC) is also involved in research and intelligence-gathering. The National 
Hi-Tech Crime Unit was set up in April 2001 and it was hoped at the time that it would 
permit rationalisation of policing of hi-tech crime. It suffered, however, from under­
resourcing and, again, lack of a clear remit. It is now defunct and, along with NCIS, has 
been absorbed into the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), set up in April 2006. 
It remains to be seen if SOCA is capable of achieving the much-needed rationalisation, 
but this is likely to depend on the one thing which has undoubtedly plagued the police 
throughout the history of cybercrime investigation: lack of resources. There is 
insufficient manpower, training and logistical resources to cope with the increasing 
technological aspects of modem criminal investigation. Although the police and 
security services tend not to sensationalise their claims, their claims in relation to 
cyberterrorism have certainly been a part of the campaign to justify both an extended 
remit and additional resources.
The interests of that faction within the information security industry which advocates 
the existence of the cyberterrorist threat are more obviously commercial in nature. A 
large part of this industry’s revenue derives from the sale of security solutions, both 
products and services. Claims about the threat from cyberterrorism seem designed to 
stimulate greater sales of security products. In addition, companies making such claims 
often do so by way of publication of security reports which are then taken up by the 
press. This enhances the public profile of the company and lends an aura of expertise,
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discussed further below. Both are commercially valuable and are likely to lead to 
greater demand for their services. Therefore, it must be admitted that they may have a 
clear commercial incentive to transmit their concerns about the risks from 
cyberterrorism. Those taking the contrary view within the industry dismiss this as 
scaremongering and likely to bring the industry into disrepute. If they are right, 
potential customers may come to regard information security vendors as cynical 
exploiters and consequently reduce their demand for goods and services.
5. E xper ts
Experts are not straightforwardly distinguished from claims-makers. Genuine experts in 
a moral panic are, in any event, rare and it is much more common for claims-makers to 
be accredited as experts in order to lend greater weight to their claims, so that expertise 
is not so much inherent as bestowed by the media and political elites (Critcher 2003: 
152). In the case of cyberterrorism, all major claims-makers can lay claim to some 
degree of expertise. Government politicians can lay claim to a certain expertise on 
cyberterrorism because they have access to that which most others do not: detailed 
intelligence on the terrorist threat provided by the police, security services and the 
military and reports on the security and vulnerability of the CNL When they claim that 
terrorists are developing the capability for cyber-attack, it is assumed that they do so 
with access to classified information and that in itself implies expertise of a sort: they 
know something others do not. For that reason, weight is accorded to such claims in the 
press and it is rare for them to be contested. For identical reasons, the police, security 
services and the military claim, and are considered by the press to have, expertise in 
matters relating to cyberterrorism.
This is a slightly strange state of affairs, since ‘experts’ n a moral panic are more 
normally drawn from relevant professions, pressure groups and the like. Information 
security professionals are a much better fit in this respect. They claim expertise on 
information security issues for the logical reason that that is their profession. Those 
who claim expertise on cyberterrorism are perhaps stretching that logic because it is 
unlikely that they have access either to detailed terrorist intelligence or to studies on 
CM vulnerability. Nevertheless, the press is ever-willing to accredit information 
security professionals with expertise and this applies whichever side of the fence they 
are on. Claims by those asserting that cyberterrorism is a threat are effectively 
presented in the press as evidence of the fact. Conversely, the significant minority of 
press articles which seek to attenuate the threat message use quotes from those on the
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other side as a debunking tool. On the basis of literature reviewed in Chapter 2, it is 
likely that the majority of information security professionals do not view cyberterrorism 
as a significant and imminent threat, but the views of these experts are not reported in a 
representative fashion in the national press.
There is another sort of ‘expert’ used in the press who is never identified except by the 
characteristic of his own expertise, which readers are asked to accept without question. 
The classic formulation is “Experts say that...” and then a proposition is made which 
backs up the whole tenor of the article. This device is widely used in press reports on 
cyberterrorism to give weight to sensationalist and unsubstantiated claims about the 
dangers from cyberterrorism. When the views of the unidentified ‘experts’ are analysed 
as a whole, it is difficult to find any coherent thread of argument running through their 
claims. This suggests that such people are of the ‘rent-a-quote’ variety, who simply 
reply to questions asked by journalists in the manner best suited to the journalist’s 
purpose. They cannot be considered as a coherent body with a consistent message. 
Some of these contributors may be academics, others may be unidentified information 
security professionals, it is not generally clear. Academics, if they can lay claim to 
expertise on cyberterrorism, are rarely quoted explicitly and, despite the substantial 
literature on cyberterrorism, cannot be considered to be a meaningful part of the public 
discourse.
6. E lite  co nsensus and  c o ncern
This element of the processual model is not present in Cohen and was added by Critcher 
as a result of lessons learned from Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s attributional model 
(Critcher 2003: 153). The essential insight is that the support of public opinion is a 
bonus in a moral panic but not a necessity. If public opinion is needed, it tends to be 
constructed and invoked by the media. On the other hand, consensus and concern 
among the political and media elites are essential to a moral panic. Critcher explains:
In moral panics we have a circuit of communication between the mass media, claims 
makers and the political elite. If enough of these decide there is an issue and that action 
is required, a moral panic becomes possible. Conversely, if there are differences of 
opinion within them, a moral panic is more likely to founder.
... [T]he media are linked to the elites on whom they report, decide who can join the 
ranks of this elite and construct for the elite a version of ‘the public’ who are addressed 
and invoked but never actually consulted. (Critcher 2003: 138)
There is no indication that the public is unduly concerned about cyberterrorism,
certainly not to the point that online behaviour has been modified (Chapter 2, section 8).
Nor has the press considered it necessary to construct and invoke such public concern in
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its presentation of the cyberterrorist threat If the intention were to sensitise the public 
to cyberterrorism, it has been successful insofar as the term ‘cyberterrorism’ has been 
accepted into public discourse, but widespread public concern of the sort normally 
found in a moral panic has not apparently followed.
Concern among the political and media elites is evident, however. The political 61ite in 
this case includes both US and UK politicians since the UK press has recognised the 
claims of both. Concern about cyberterrorism has been something of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, with the endless rounds of claims-making, based on distortion, reinforcing 
and augmenting the concerns expressed in those very claims. Hackers are distorted into 
cyberterrorists; cybercrime is twisted into cyberterrorism; terrorists must be working on 
a cyberterrorism programme because it is ‘logical’ for them to be doing so; each newly 
discovered information system vulnerability is an inevitable target for cyberterrorism; a 
successful attack would produce terrible destruction and loss of life. Any related 
episode might trigger such claims, common examples being the emergence of new 
computer viruses, arrest or prosecution of a hacker, discovery of a security flaw in a 
popular product, publication of a new cybersecurity report or the aftermath of a 
conventional terrorist attack.
After a number of such cycles of claims-making, the threat solidifies and becomes more 
real. The definition of cyberterrorism becomes clearer and the discourse becomes more 
consistent, both essential for a moral panic. This is the point at which consensus is 
reached. Press reports of cyberterrorism had been running for a decade by the time the 
PCCIP report was published (1997), but this report appeared to herald the first signs of 
political consensus that the cyberterrorist threat was genuine and that government action 
-  in both the US and UK -  was needed. The many devastating terrorist attacks 
attributed to al Qaeda since then have reinforced this consensus, but in a curiously 
tangential manner. First, hey provided an opportunity for fresh rounds of claims- 
making based on evidence that al Qaeda operatives used ICTs in the planning phase of 
these attacks. These claims were based on two types of distortion: the relabelling of the 
evident terrorist ‘use’ of ICTs as cyberterrorism; alternatively, the argument that this 
‘use’ was the precursor of what was inevitably to come, viz a full cyberterrorist attack. 
Second, these events heightened sensitivity to terrorism generally and unrelated, 
electronic events were drawn into the terrorism net For example, new virus attacks 
were attributed to al Qaeda, as was, briefly, the 2003 North American power failures. 
Further, use of the future threat scenario became more frequent so that the link between
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ICTs and terrorism became even stronger. Third, the string of conventional terrorist 
attacks starting with 9/11 has resulted in a strong consensus that extreme measures are 
necessary to contain the terrorist threat and the established link between ICTs and 
terrorism has been a central plank in arguments about exactly what measures are 
necessary.
The consensus evident in the political and media elites is, therefore, based on distortion 
of the seriousness of the threat from cyberterrorism, its causes and effects. The 
cyberterrorist has been brought into sharp focus as an al Qaeda operative with 
exceptional technical skills who is capable of attacking the CNI in such a way as to 
produce massive destruction and death. This consensus has been challenged with 
counter-claims, mostly from within the information security industry; that 
cyberterrorism does not exist and is not imminent; that hackers, insiders and routine 
system failures, not terrorists, are the challenge for information security; and that cyber­
attacks are not capable of producing the catastrophic results mooted. Nevertheless, 
these claims are not given prominence in the press and, to use Critcher’s formulation, 
their exponents are not permitted to join the political elite.
A closed discourse has developed, then, agreed by both politicians and the press. The 
source of the threat has been identified as the triumvirate of hackers, terrorists and ICTs, 
most prominently the Internet, which have been confounded so consistently that the 
cyberterrorist has emerged. The nature of the threat is that infrastructure critical to the 
veiy operation of society is vulnerable to attack from a single terrorist individual sitting 
at a computer on another continent. Such an attack is likely to lead to the deaths of 
innocent citizens and/or destruction which will disrupt lives on a massive scale. Legal 
and practical measures to protect citizens and punish perpetrators must be developed 
and the ultimate responsibility for doing this rests with the state and its agents.
7. C o pin g  a n d  r eso l u tio n
This stage in the processual model focuses on the solutions which are advocated to 
address the problem and by whom, the measures which are actually instigated and 
whether these legal or procedural innovations turn out to be effective or symbolic.
Obvious solutions to the problem are almost never discussed by politicians and law 
enforcers. They may stand accused of opportunism and scaremongering, but the 
information security industry is at least promoting something resembling an answer to 
the problem, that is security products and services. It is self-evident that protecting
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systems against hackers, vims attacks and so forth, also protects them against 
cyberterrorism. The method of attack would be identical, only the intentions behind the 
attack would be different. Nevertheless, although the claims of the information security 
industry about the threat from cyberterrorism are highly visible, the proposed solution, 
their goods and services, are not often explicitly mentioned in the press. Politicians and 
law enforcers might be expected to promote high standards of information security 
more vigorously in the circumstances, perhaps by characterising it as a positive civic 
duty to secure vital networks upon which so many rely. They may even be justified in 
describing it as a matter of national security. But they do not.
Instead, politicians, and law enforcers to a lesser extent, concentrated on legal 
proscription. A wide definition of cyberterrorism was incorporated into English law in 
Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and individuals suspected and found guilty of the 
offence are subject to the full might of the arti-terrorism regime. The enactment of 
legal measures squarely addressing the subject of a moral panic generally heralds a 
rapid decline in interest about the issue. This was not the case here. Around the time 
the Act was being debated and for a period after its enactment, there was significant 
press interest but, contrary to the narrative so far, this interest centred around the view 
that the definitions in the Act were too wide and risked the bizarre situation of hackers -  
and here the press reverted to hackers’ erstwhile image as spotty teenagers -  becoming 
terrorists overnight. The press did not at this point abandon their insistence on the 
dangers of cyberterrorism, quite the contrary. This legislation was not, however, 
recognised as being the solution to the problem.
Here were the first signs of the cyberterrorism episode departing from the model moral 
panic. The Act barely features in the main discourse on cyberterrorism which, it now 
seems apparent, is about more than the legal recognition of the problem. The key to 
understanding the social reaction to cyberterrorism is to place it in its rightful position: 
as the cognitive link between terrorism and technology.
At this point, it is useful to make a brief digression to explore Cohen’s deviancy 
amplification model. This model provides a ‘link’ between folk devil, in this case 
hackers and cyberterrorists, and moral panic, although Cohen now acknowledges that 
the deviancy amplification model is better characterised as a model of causation in a 
constructionist sense rather than in a positivist sense (Cohen 2002: xxiv). An initial 
(social structural) problem is addressed by an initial (deviant) solution. The initial 
(deviant) solution in this case was hacking and the initial problem was not so much a
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problem as an opportunity: computers and networks there to be explored, boundaries to 
be pushed. The societal reaction follows, based on distortion. From hackers to 
cyberterrorists, the social reaction has now been through several evolutions, but 
distortion of the seriousness of the issue, its causes and effects, has been a consistent 
feature throughout. Next comes the operation of the control culture, exploitation and 
the creation of stereotypes. New police units have been created to combat cybercrime 
and terrorism, new legislation has been passed to criminalise cyber-deviance and assist 
the police, there has been evidence of both ideological and commercial exploitation by 
claims-makers and strong stereotypes have emerged of both hackers and cyberterrorists. 
The next steps of the deviancy amplification model stipulate polarisation of the deviant 
group and increased deviance, followed by confirmation of the stereotypes such that the 
theory on which the social reaction is based appears to be proved. In other words, the 
definitions of deviance are justified. According to Cohen’s revised views, this should 
not be understood as a literal increase in deviance in response to the social reaction, but 
as an increase in the number and types of activities which are defined by society as 
deviant. “For those who define and those who are defined, sensitization becomes a 
matter of cognitive framing and moral thresholds” (Cohen 2002: xxiv). This is the net- 
widening effect, by which, in this case, any form of cyber-deviance may be attributed to 
cyberterrorists and events which would otherwise be ignored attract attention The real 
effect of this ‘increased deviance’ is on the magnitude and scope of the social reaction, 
not on the deviants themselves. By labelling more and more events and types of 
activity ‘cyberterrorism’, more cyberterrorism exists and so the initial concern about it 
appears to have been merited. This is a departure from the traditional labelling theory to 
which Cohen originally subscribed.
In fact, the supposed deviants themselves have actually played a surprisingly low-key 
role in the panic about cyberterrorism. Whereas it might be expected that the 
identification of a social problem and a group of likely culprits would be logically prior 
to the advocated solution, it seems that in this case a vision of the solution came first 
and the social problem was constructed to justify that solution. For tie solutions 
advocated in this discourse are not aimed solely at mitigating the problem of 
cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism is used as one of a number of justifications for new 
measures of social control which address the twin evils of terrorism and ICTs. This is 
another example of how undue emphasis is placed on the use of technology generally. 
Technology, and the Internet in particular, is a new medium for human interaction, but
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without it terrorist organisations would still function as they have always done. 
Communication, organisation, fundraising through criminal activity, recruitment and 
propaganda would still take place. Technology does, however, provide terrorists with 
the benefits of speed and anonymity; it allows propaganda and recruitment drives to 
reach wider audiences; it obviates the necessity for geographic proximity for the 
purposes of communication, organisation and fundraising. It is these properties of 
scale, anonymity and the severing of geographic ties which inspires fear and urgent calls 
for greater controls over the Internet and other technologies.
So it transpired, that the legislation enacted gives law enforcers and others greater 
access to electronic information. Data retention provisions, the right to requisition keys 
to encrypted data and enhanced powers of electronic surveillance have been the most 
controversial aspects of this legislation. All these measures are geared towards 
removing or reducing barriers to intelligence gathering and police investigation. The 
concept of cyberterrorism was an essential tool for justifying these sweeping powers 
because it had created that all-important link between terrorists and ICTs, particularly 
Internet communications. By concentrating on eye-catching arguments about terrorists 
and technology, attention was drawn away from another reality, that these new 
measures were not restricted just to terrorist activity: they applied equally to ordinary 
criminal intelligence and investigations.
The findings demonstrate two sides to this rhetorical coin. First, measures which were 
ostensibly aimed at terrorist activity and were exclusively promoted as such might, 
through the use of wide definitions, be used in criminal investigations, bringing 
Draconian measures within the grasp of enforcers of the ordinary criminal law. Second, 
criminal legislation which really had little to do with terrorism was, nevertheless, 
promoted by reference to arguments about terrorism, thus distracting legislators and the 
public from debates about the way in which legislation is really intended to be applied 
and whether the new law was proportionate or even necessary. A central problem for 
governments has been how to claw back some control over the Internet. Free flow of 
information and communications has made the Internet enormously popular with users, 
but it has become a nightmare for governments and law enforcers who are increasingly 
anxious to establish mechanisms for surveillance and access to personal records 
analogous to those long-established in the real world. If control is to be achieved by 
persuading users that their electronic comings and goings should be overseen rather as if 
by CCTV, powerful reasons must be given if the public is not to revolt. In the
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cyberterrorism discourse, the ubiquitous Internet comes to symbolise moral 
degeneration and lawlessness, the ubiquitous terrorist threat is blended into the 
electronic environment and the result appears to be increased vulnerability of individual 
and state which, in turn, justifies increased powers for police and security services. 
Herein lies the utility of the concept of cyberterrorism which, from this perspective, is 
less about cyber-attack and more about terrorist use of technology.
On this view, politicians and law enforcers become the major players in the 
cyberterrorism discourse because they are framing the desired ‘outcomes’ which were, 
in fact, the goal all along. Once the media inventory and sensitisation processes had 
taken hold, over-estimation of the seriousness, causes and effects of cyberterrorism 
followed, leading in turn to these escalations in the control culture. This societal control 
culture operates to construct and then maintain a moral consensus which, in this case, 
reduces to the idea that too much electronic freedom for society at large is damaging 
because it allows crime and terrorism to flourish.
8. F ade  a w a y
In a moral panic, legal and procedural innovations normally provide a form of narrative 
closure or, from another perspective, a symbolic resolution (Critcher 2003: 141). It is as 
if a bubble of hysteria grows, with ever louder calls for “something to be done” and, 
when something is seen to be done, the bubble is burst, the urgency gone. The issue is 
forgotten or routinised and other social problems take centre stage. This has not yet 
happened with cyberterrorism. New legislation has been introduced but it has not 
brought about narrative closure. The future threat scenario is still strong and the 
evidence suggests it is still growing in importance year on year. This makes sense if the 
cyberterrorism discourse is viewed as a tool for strengthening the social control culture 
rather than a social problem in need of an urgent and focused solution.
Cyberterrorism, then, seems to be established as an enduring focus for claims and news 
coverage. Periods of greatly increased intensity can be distinguished, tending to suggest 
that this is not a single, prolonged episode of moral panic, but perhaps a serial panic, 
rather like the classic paedophilia moral panic (Critcher 2003: 110). The meta- 
discourses of technology and terrorism as perennial sites of social anxiety have been 
mobilised and linked by the cyberterrorism panic. The link now established, they 
provide a stable background against which concern about cyberterrorism may rise up 
again at any time. It is likely that cyberterrorism is yet to have its day as each 
successive peak of concern continues an upwards trend (Chapter 5, Figure 2).
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9. Le g a c y
This study has demonstrated that all the elements for a moral panic about cyberterrorism 
are in place. A new social problem has been defined and the finger of blame has been 
pointed. Those responsible have been identified and stereotyped. Politicians, elements 
of the information security industry, the police and security services have emerged as 
the groups involved in defining the problem and pronouncing on suitable remedies. 
Other, usually nameless, individuals have been accredited with expertise by the press. 
A new, symbolic legal category of cyberterrorism has been created and other solutions 
have been advocated, almost always involving an increase in the social controls over 
ICTs, most specifically granting law enforcers increased powers of electronic 
surveillance, interception and data acquisition. These powers have not been limited to 
terrorist activity, although the justifications given for them were.
All the elements are in place, except one which has not hitherto formed a part of the 
processual model; the critical mass in terms of media coverage has not quite reached the 
level at which it can be said “here is a clear moral panic”. This can never be an absolute 
judgment, but a relative one made with reference to related issues. The related issues, in 
this case terrorism and hacking, still command more column inches (Figures 3 & 4). 
High levels of concern about conventional terrorism and hacking, measured in terms of 
quantity of press coverage, are justified and hardly seem disproportionate. The suicide 
bomber exists and walks among us. The hacker, in a far less dangerous role, continues 
to be a nuisance, although not much more than that. The cyberterrorist is not yet ready 
to take centre stage. Rather, he is waiting in the wings, already written into the script, 
with his lines learned and patiently waiting his turn in the limelight. His cue will be a 
significant event such as a hack with genuinely catastrophic consequences or the 
discovery of terrorist plans to carry one out. That may happen next week, or it may 
never happen.
In one sense, this episode has already served its purpose. Without the need to generate 
more press coverage, claims-makers have already achieved those measures of social 
control which they have so far deemed necessary in the fight against terrorist use of 
technology. They have also achieved the bonus of extending these controls beyond 
terrorism and into the realms of conventional criminal acts. The need to drive the 
rhetoric of terrorism and technology further will only be necessary in the future if 
politicians and others desire to make further inroads into civil liberties of ordinary 
citizens in the name of law and order and national security.
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Society should be extremely cautious about confounding hackers with terrorists and 
accepting the cyberterrorist construction if we accept that deviance amplification, along 
the constructionist lines elucidated by Cohen in his later work, is possible. The use of 
cyberterrorism as a tool to mobilise a combination of the meta-discourses on technology 
and terrorism has given politicians and law enforcers a justification for taking an 
expansionist view of the anti-terrorism regime. The approach of policy makers has been 
“What tools might be needed in the fight against terrorism” rather than “How can we 
fight terrorism in a manner least likely to infringe the civil liberties of ordinary 
citizens”. In practical terms, allowing the cyberterrorism label to spread to behaviour 
unrelated to terrorism allows policy makers to apply the Draconian version of social 
control reserved for terrorists to those who do not merit it. But this is not simply a 
matter of criminals receiving a harsher version of something they deserve anyway. It is 
a question of exaggerating, even fabricating, the scope and scale of a serious problem in 
such a way as to persuade the innocent to compromise something precious: their 
freedoms.
It is possible that the harm caused by cyberterrorism may spread further than this. The 
tendency of a moral panic is to confuse through over-simplification and distortion rather 
than to illuminate. If the public are induced to focus on cyberterrorism, there is a 
danger that other, more serious and immediate problems may be allocated a lower 
priority than they merit. Although hackers, and now cyberterrorists, are the public face 
of information insecurity, the greater problem lies within organisations. Threats from 
insiders, both innocent mistakes and malicious damage, and routine system failures 
remain a far greater headache for most information security officers. Information 
security professionals, deemed experts by virtue of their profession, tread a fine line 
between hyping the hacker myth to gain business and remaining competitive in the 
market place by giving sensible advice and practical solutions to businesses who know 
where the real problems he.
Whether or not this episode qualifies as a moral panic, the result has been the same: the 
imperative to reduce complex arguments to simplicity has the effect of distorting the 
public’s capacity for understanding. I have argued that the social control culture has 
operated to establish and maintain the moral consensus that too much electronic 
freedom is a bad thing because it allows crime and terrorism to flourish; and that society 
must inevitably accept curtailment of civil liberties and individual privacy in order that 
criminals and terrorists may be thwarted. This all sounds very cynical and it would be if
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the primary goal of politicians and law enforcers were to limit the freedoms of citizens 
and increasingly to control their everyday activities. Yet I do not think that this is their 
goal. I think it has come to be considered the inevitable and necessary consequence of a 
genuine desire to protect the public from crime and terrorism. It is a fine distinction, 
but a vital one. There is nothing wrong with the desire to protect the public, indeed it is 
what society expects of its leaders and their agents. What is wrong, is the price society 
is asked to pay for this goal and I conceptualise the price as those restrictions on civil 
liberties and personal privacy. The mistake is to stifle debate on what is the right price 
to pay. Politicians and the press have acted systematically to stifle such debate and 
evidence for this can be found in the small-scale but oft-repeated claims about the 
dangers from cyberterrorism to the grand-scale suppression of the views of the privacy 
lobby over ID cards. The fault lies equally with the public who allow this debate to be 
stifled, who do not question the lazy argument of those who confound cybercrime with 
terrorism and who stare with bovine indifference whilst their freedoms are cut away.
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C h a p t e r  10  
C o n t r ib u t io n s  a n d  F u t u r e  D ir e c t io n s
The assertions of claims-makers who argue that cyberterrorism is the next ‘logical’ step 
for terrorists are important because they highlight an implicit defect in social 
understanding. These ideas hark back to the work of academics who have analysed the 
cyberterrorist threat using models based on rational choice theory (Rabbie 1991; 
Devost, Houghton et al. 1996; Giacomello 2004). Such analyses, based as they have 
been in the positivist paradigm, concentrate on predicting behaviour within a relatively 
deterministic framework of assumptions about patterns of social behaviour. The 
interpretative assumptions underlying this study lead to a contrary view, that prediction 
of human behaviour with any degree of accuracy is exceptionally difficult since there is 
a high level of indeterminacy in social processes characterised by free will. ‘Rational 
choice’ in the sense used by Rabbie et al. has nothing to do with how individuals, in this 
case terrorists and hackers, understand the world because it does not address the 
cognitive and evaluative processes specific to them. Rather, these choices are only 
‘rational’ from an objective, disconnected perspective. Such claims may highlight the 
possibility of a future course of action, but they say nothing about its likelihood. This is 
why the academic fields of terrorism and information security are desperately in need of 
interpretivist study into the actions and motivations of would-be attackers. It also 
explains why there is a dearth of such studies: some degree of access to the relevant 
individuals would be a prerequisite, but such research subjects are unlikely to grant 
access willingly. These research aims are almost impossible to operationalise without 
unacceptable risk to the researcher.
This study has taken a different approach. By espousing a constructivist perspective 
within the interpretative paradigm, it has taken a first step towards an understanding of 
where the concept of cyberterrorism comes from. On this view, positivist perspectives 
on the ‘rational choices’ of a deviant group become less important than an 
understanding of how deviance is first constructed then reacted to in a social context. 
This does not fill the gap just identified, but it does make a contribution towards a 
socio-cultural understanding of the perception of technological risk at the very highest
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levels of society. The argument that cyberterrorism is socially constructed forces a 
reconsideration of the assumptions of risk on which policy-making is currently based.
As technology becomes further integrated in the socio-cultural landscape, it is 
increasingly important to show how technological risk is constructed and not just 
experienced. This has far-reaching implications, and the case of cyberterrorism is only 
one case in point. The discourses which have been alluded to in this study are just part 
of a process of negotiation over where the line should be drawn between the rights and 
freedoms of individuals on the one hand and the exercise of social control by the state 
on the other. This is not a new debate, of course, but it has intensified with the arrival 
of the so-called Information Society.
As this discourse evolves, as it assuredly will in the coming years, it needs to be 
informed by a deeper understanding, not only of how technology changes the 
characteristics of the risk to society from hostile actors, but also of low society itself 
constructs and manages that risk and the effects of this on the construction and 
positioning of moral boundaries. This discourse is still in its early stages and it is 
important that there is an open, meaningful and informed debate about how society 
should look. Constructs such as cyberterrorism, having no settled definition and 
confounding so many distinct issues, should not be allowed to obfuscate the real issues. 
Simply put, careless use of terminology impedes understanding, communication, sense- 
making and, ultimately, affects both the justifiability and ultimate efficacy of policy 
decisions. Forming policy to counter a phenomenon which is insufficiently understood 
may result in rules which either do not address the issue adequately or overextend the 
law into areas where it is not warranted. The extension of the social control culture into 
the electronic environment is inevitable but how it is done and how far it goes are still 
questions subject to debate. This debate would be greatly clarified if the definition of 
cyberterrorism developed in this study (Chapter 2, Section 2.4), or something like it, 
were adopted and, in this limited sense at least, this study has been able to identify a 
problem and propose a possible solution It is, however, clear that social perspectives 
on technology, risk and morality are vast substantive areas in need of a concentrated 
research effort in the coming years to supplement the existing literature in this area so 
that academics can offer their ideas and help to inform the debate.
This study has focused on the stereotypes, images and symbols employed in the 
discourses associated with cyberterrorism. These have a wider importance than that 
hitherto identified, because they determine at a fundamental level how the problem is
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characterised. If the problem is characterised as quasi- military and a threat to national 
security, as seems to be the case at present with cyberterrorism, then high levels of 
social control are indicated, with a centralised, government-led approach. If, on the 
other hand, the problem is characterised as one of information and organisational 
security, as is the case with hacking, then it is more appropriate for individuals and 
organisations to take responsibility for their own defensive strategies and there is a less 
obvious role for state intervention. The central importance of the use of stereotypes, 
images and symbols in characterising a social problem in this way is addressed by a 
variety of models of social problem construction, already well-developed in reference 
disciplines such as Sociology. The Information Systems domain has a long history of 
turning to the reference disciplines for its theoretical foundations, particularly when 
faced with the need to “address one of the most troublesome issues of the field, namely 
the reconciling of the technical and the social, the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’” (Avgerou 
2000). Arguments about consolidating the discipline of Information Systems should not 
be allowed to get in the way of the fertile exchange of ideas between this discipline and 
others (Keen 1980; Benbasat and Weber 1996; Robey 1996). This study has pioneered 
the use of the moral panic concept, borrowed from Sociology, in the Information 
Systems domain and it is hoped that the benefits of this approach have been made 
manifest.
As well as providing a theoretical explanation of the social processes at work in the 
particular case of the social construction of cyberterrorism, the findings of this study 
have also contributed to the wider debate on moral panic by adding another case to the 
literature, discussing the relevance and usefulness of the moral panic framework and 
making some modest suggestions for modification. The latest evolution of the 
processual and attributional models of moral panic as developed by Critcher (2003) are, 
themselves, relatively untested. They have been used together in this study in an 
innovative way, the attributional model to organise the findings and the processual 
model to guide the discussion. This has worked particularly well as a research strategy 
and helped to prevent the researcher from becoming overwhelmed by the sheer volume 
of information. The addition of the meta-principles for interpretative research in the IS 
domain elucidated by Klein and Myers (1999) and the use of grounded theory methods 
has enhanced scientific rigour in the course of a long and arduous period of research and 
made sense of the use of moral panic as an heuristic device within the interpretative 
tradition. Some would argue that this approach has been at the cost of the purity of the
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grounded theory method which is demanded by scholars such as Glaser (eg 1992), 
although Strauss and Corbin do allow the use of their version of grounded theory 
methods in this way, albeit that this is probably at the far end of the scale of uses which 
they do permit (1998: 49 et seq). With these modifications, this study may be added to 
the evidence of Critcher (2003: 178), that the usefulness of the decades-old concept of 
moral panic to social science is not yet spent.
Nevertheless, this study has other limitations, many of which flow from the choice of 
corpus of data and the method of analysis used. First, because of practical limitations of 
time and resources, data was gathered only from the national press and no primary 
sources relating to any of the claims-makers -  apart from the press itself -  were 
consulted. This means that the findings of this study are, in part, based on claims made 
by third parties which are filtered, reported and interpreted by the press before they are 
interpreted by the researcher. Although the findings of this study are grounded in the 
available data, they can only go so far in making claims about the totality of the 
discourse on cyberterrorism. This approach has been justified with reference to 
arguments about the centrality of the media role in a moral panic (see further Chapter 
3). Realistically, however, the findings are limited to that part of the discourse which 
appears in the UK national press and generalisability of the specific findings in relation 
to the case of cyberterrorism is compromised to that extent.
There is no doubt that the findings and discussion would have carried more weight had 
there been an opportunity to incorporate systematically other sources of data, such as 
interviews with the public, information security trade publications, police publications 
and political sources, much as Cohen did in his study of Mods and Rockers (2002). It is 
clear that future research might fruitfully analyse such alternative data sources using 
similar research methods to those used in this study. This would, to a certain extent, 
remedy the bias knowingly introduced into this study because a shortage of time and 
resources precluded a wider variety of data sources. This broader approach to data 
gathering would also make a valuable contribution, not only to moral panic research, 
but also to the wider field of socio-technical research which deals with public 
perceptions of technology.
Nevertheless, the broader findings about the use and applicability of moral panic as an 
heuristic device are more easily generalisable than those specific findings about the case 
of cyberterrorism Critcher correctly objects that the processual model of moral panic is 
vague about both the triggers for and decline of moral panics. He further suggests that
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it is necessary to specify which discourses are evident in a moral panic and their 
relationship to perceptions of risk. It appears that the latter suggestion may in fact be a 
partial remedy to the former objection. Discussion of underlying discourses can be 
incorporated, as indeed they were in this study, into a wider view of what should be 
included at certain stages of the processual model particularly ‘emergence’ and ‘legacy’. 
Moral panics do not spring out of the ether. They are rooted in their historical context 
and generally, as Critcher’s work demonstrates, emerge out of one or more existing 
discourses. Once a moral panic has run its course, its legacy may be to “produce such 
changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives 
itself’ (Cohen 2002: 1), so contributing towards a change in the underlying discourse. 
This may be achieved in the course of one panic, or it may require several, loosely 
related panics. Critcher detects a shift in the underlying discourse in moral panics from 
youth in the 1960s and 1970s to childhood in the 1980s and 1990s (Critcher 2003: 155). 
Cohen detected a shift in the underlying discourse from offender and the criminal 
justice system to victim (Cohen 2002: xxiv). This study of cyberterrorism has identified 
another possible shift, from technology as benign and enabling to technology as 
dangerous and a source of vulnerability. It also seems likely that the transformation of 
the hacker into the cyberterrorist parallels a shift in the wider discourse in society from 
law and order issues to questions of national security. There is a wealth of Information 
Society issues here which have not hitherto been investigated in detail and might be 
taken up by scholars in that field.
This study could have been set up in a number of different ways using different research 
methods, although a different approach would inevitably lead to a change of emphasis 
in the findings and conclusions of the study. An interesting future direction for this 
work would be to triangulate the findings of this study by employing alternative 
techniques to link the corpus of data to the moral panic framework in order to establish 
whether the same or similar findings would result. This would certainly address one of 
the fundamental problems with this type of research, that of the deep immersion of the 
researcher in the research material and the inevitable interplay between that material and 
the researcher’s interpretation of it. However careful the researcher is to achieve a 
balance between objectivity and sensitivity to the subject (Strauss and Corbin 1998), for 
both researcher and reader, the difficulty in ascertaining the extent to which the 
researcher has been successful remains. A separate study of the same corpus using a 
different research method and, perhaps, a different researcher would not only add depth
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to the findings and conclusions of this study but would also serve either to verify or to 
challenge its results. Either outcome would be valuable to research in this field, either 
by adding weight to existing research or adding a different perspective to the same 
problem.
Two possible methodological candidates, Critical Discourse Analysis and content 
analysis, were identified in Chapter 4 as alternatives to the Grounded theory approach 
used in this study. A study of this corpus of data using content analysis techniques from 
a positivist perspective would certainly be an interesting exercise and would provide an 
alternative viewpoint. Moral panic research has historically been located in the 
positivist paradigm as well as the interpretative, and the comparison would be an 
illuminating one.
Moving sideways into the critical tradition, the use of CDA is likely not only to be 
helpful in cross-checking the results of this study but would also take it on to the next 
analytic level. It should be made explicit that the use of the concept of underlying 
discourses in this study, whilst important, has been tangential to the main thrust of the 
research. This is emphatically only a first step in demystifying a topic, cyberterrorism, 
and its related concepts as identified using a grounded theory approach. Discourses 
relevant to the cyberterrorism debate have been identified but not analysed in any detail. 
Simply put, this study has not set out to achieve an analysis of the discourses involved 
in cyberterrorism: it has merely identified those discourses as being present and in need 
of further research. A logical next step would be to go further and examine the 
language used in the context of a true discourse analysis using CDA.
Moral panic was chosen as a framework for this study for the reasons discussed in 
Chapter 3. However, other frameworks could have been chosen and might usefully be 
followed up in future research as a means of complementing and, perhaps, verifying the 
findings of this study. It was decided at an early stage that the concept of the public 
perception of risk would not necessarily be a primary focus of this study, although it 
does arise as one issue amongst many others. Future research might fruitfully explore 
this area in more detail. For example, the Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
(Kasperson, Kasperson et al. 2003) is increasingly popular within the Information 
Systems domain. It was noted in Chapter 3 that SARF considers how risk 
communication interacts with social, psychological, institutional and cultural processes 
to produce inteipretations of risk and that there are close parallels with deviance 
definition. The fact that SARF is primarily concerned with risk contrasts nicely with
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moral panic, which places greater importance on morality. Perception and acceptance 
of risk is so often tied to a process of blaming, and a SARF study of cyberterrorism 
would complement nicely the obvious moral dimension of blaming which is better 
highlighted by moral panic.
If the findings of this study are not sensational, that is all to the good: it is hoped that 
one of its central contributions will be to show how the debate on cyberterrorism should 
be moved away from the sensational, back to a more level-headed discussion where 
political transparency and rational argument can be promoted. At the end, there are two 
certainties about cyberterrorism. First, to this day, there are still no publicly 
documented cases of the real thing. Second, cyberterrorism will continue to make the 
headlines. A paper tiger indeed.
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A p p e n d i x : t h e  u s e  o f  A t l a s / t i
The building blocks of grounded theory are facilitated by Atlas/ti. In order to 
supplement the explanations given in Chapter 4, this Appendix aims to provide pictorial 
examples of how the analysis was carried out.
Primary documents
The primary texts themselves were ordered and separated into family groups. This 
facility was used to categorise the texts according to date and publication (ie the 
newspaper the article came from). Each entry in the two middle boxes in the picture 
below represents a primary document, in this case a newspaper article. Each document 
name shows the primary document number (Px -  ie PI to P681, since there are 681 
articles in this corpus of data); the date of the article in the format yyy-mm-dd; and the 
publication, eg The Times.
r 'r iu ih r /  Lot; r i m M j  Frill: U/. ik i ii ' j i ih l i
Families Edit Miscellaneous View
^ □ i  K 111 S
Name ~ Size Author Created Modified i  ;■
2003-2005 238 Super 18/01/06... 02/04/07...
2003-Nov 2004 150 Super 24/01/05... 24/01/05...
<^2003 80 Super 30/01/06... 30/01/06... f  *
<^2002 73 Super 30/01/06... 30 {01/06... j
<^2001 85 Super 30/01/06... 30/01/06... .
<^2000-10 Sept 2001 113 Super 24/01/05... 24/01/05... G
^ 1 9 9 9 61 Super 30/01/06... 30/01/06...
4^1998 33 Super 30/01/06... 30/01/06...
^ 1 9 9 7 21 Super 30/01/06... 30/01/06...
1996 32 SuDer 30/01/06... 30/01/06... L- ----- - _ — , .... ......— ____  -.... __. ___ __ -___  ,
P22
P22
P22
P225
P226
P227
P228
P229
2000-02-13 The O bserve. 
2000-02-27 Sunday Expr.. 
2000-02-27a Sunday Exp. 
2000-02-28 T he Mirror.txt 
2000-03-05 Sunday Time. 
2000-03-17 The Mirror.txt 
2000-03-19 T he Indepen.. 
2000-03-26 Sundav Mirro. G
P 1:1987-05-26 The Times.txt 
P  2:1987-11-11 The Guardian.txt 
P  3:1988-05-05 The Guardian.txt 
P  A: 1988-05-13 The Guardian.txt 
P  5:1988-08-16 T he Times.txt 
P  6:1988-12-1A The Guardian.txt 
P  7:1989-04-27 T he Guardian.txt 
P  8:1989-05-15 The Indeoend... D
27 Families 2000
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In the example above, the names of the document families are displayed in the top box. 
In this case, the document family names are all dates because time periods were 
particularly significant in this study. All the texts from the year 2000 family have been 
retrieved and are displayed in the middle box on the left. The box on the right contains 
all the texts which do not belong to this family. The empty box at the bottom is used for 
memos should the researcher wish to record any, although none was necessary here. At 
the bottom of the window, the programme notes that there are 27 families of primary 
documents in all and that the one currently being displayed is the family called “2000”.
Coding
A variety of different coding techniques are called for by Strauss and Corbin (1998) in 
order to build grounded theory: open coding, axial coding, selective coding and coding 
for process. The differences between these types of coding are facilitated in Atlas/ti, 
although the researcher needs to be very experienced with the software in order to grasp 
all the nuances. There are several ways to code in Atlas/ti. First, one can perform open 
coding by highlighting text and attaching to it whatever new code the researcher 
chooses. Second, one can perform in vivo coding, in which the text selected becomes 
the name of the code itself. Third, one can code by list, so that a right click brings up 
the available codes which have been used before (or only a family of codes if the 
researcher is performing axial or selective coding) and the researcher can attach one or 
more of those codes. As the researcher reaches saturation of each theoretical category, 
this will become the most used method of coding. Finally, the quick coding function 
allows the researcher to attach a specific code to a sequence of quotations -  particularly 
useful for selective coding.
The screenshot on the following page shows the main workspace of Atlas/ti, with a 
window overlaid on the right hand side which contains a full list of all the codes in use. 
In this example, a passage in an article from The Times on 22 May 1998 (the left side of 
the workspace) has been highlighted and, with a right click of the mouse, the available 
coding options are displayed. To the right of the Times article is the window which 
displays the codes which have already been attached to quotations from the document.
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Name G D Author Created Modified
HTR - infowar- 21 0 Super 24/01/06 14 47:24 25/01/06 20 16 49
0  HTR - inside job 12 0 Super 24/01/06 14:42:06 26/01/06 12:45:58
0  HTR - new law 28 0 Super 24/01/06 18:13:08 26/01/06 11:44:23
0  HTR - technology as terrorist 11 0 Super 24/01/06 12:00:00 25/01/06 18:33:05
0  HTR - terrorist link introduced for ultenor 26 0 Super 24/01/06 12:03:35 26/01/06 12:46:35
12 HTR - terrorist use of technology 147 0 Super 24/01/06 12 06:29 26/01/06 12:48:02
0  HTR - Y2K 5 0 Super 24/01/06 18:32:31 24/01/06 18:33:19
0  infosec industry - dampening panic 9 0 Super 16/09/05 08 35:31 04/10/05 19.35.16
0  infosec industry - data 13 0 Super 03/10/05 16:40 06 05/10/05 11:53:26
0  infosec industry - ethical hacking 2 0 Super 16/09/05 08 40:31 05/10/05 11:51:32
0  infosec industry - human defences 5 0 Super 03/10/05 16:31:24 05/10/05 11:54 07
0  infosec industry - Mi2g 15 0 Super 16/09/05 08 43:51 05/10/05 11:48:59 |J
0  infosec industry - necessary protection 12 0 Super 16/09/05 08 41:37 05/10/05 11:46:28 d
0  infosec industry - potential for infowar 4 0 Super 16/09/05 08 47:28 04/10/05 19:32:07
0  infosec industry - technical solution 2 0 Super 04/10/05 11 07:58 04/10/05 19:23:47
0  infosec industry - terrorists 45 0 Super 16/09/05 08 39:30 10/01/06 18:10:52
0 infosec industry - threats- 63 0 Super 16/09/05 08 41:25 10/01/06 17:55:57
0  infosec industry - view of hackers 36 0 Super 16/09/05 08:38.14 05/10/05 11:49 49
0  law enforcement - accuracy 9 0 Super 09/08/05 15 37:01 12/08/05 16:47 48
0  law enforcement - backlash against 9 0 Super 11/08/05 14 44:19 12/08/05 15:48 59
0  law enforcement - CCC 12 0 Super 11/08/05 12 33 24 12/08/05 16:43:57
0  law enforcement - evidentiary problems 2 0 Super 10/08/05 17:01:36 11/08/05 15:00:45
0  law enforcement - exaggeration 1 0 Super 09/08/05 15 46:55 09/08/05 15 47 18
0  law enforcement - future threat 24 0 Super 11/08/05 12:28:14 12/08/05 16:44:47
0  law enforcement - geography & cooperation 12 0 Super 10/08/05 16:53:41 12/08/05 16:46.57
0  law enforcement - i/n as problem 16 0 Super 10/08/05 16 41 36 12/08/05 16:41:11
0  law enforcement - information exchanoe ^ 5 0 Super 11/08/05 16:02:13 12/08/05 15:50:17 £3
r
245 Codes FD - drugs {4-0} AS Name - Title
The picture above is a detail of the code manager window. There are 245 codes in all 
(see bottom left), which is a very large number but this is accounted for by the fact that 
they are effectively arranged into code families by name. The codes starting with HTR 
are sub-categories of the HTR category, which stands for “hacker-terrorist relationship”. 
Likewise, the individual codes commencing with infosec industry and law enforcement 
are sub-categories of that parent category. This dual-naming system was simply a 
work-around developed by the researcher because she found it necessary to add a third 
level of analysis to the two basic levels provided by Atlas/ti. The number of times each 
code has been applied to a segment of text appears as the number to the immediate right 
of each code and this is used as a measure of theoretical significance of each 
code/concept.
Quotation retrieval
The findings chapters are presented in the form of a narrative which weaves in and out 
of quotations from the corpus. It was possible to retrieve all the segments of text which
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were coded with a particular code by double clicking on the relevant code in the code 
manager window. A more complex retrieval process could be constructed using the 
query tool.
Query:
*
t
Ml
G
G
*
El
i
Families:
Security perspective (2)
&  Source for a rtd e  (13)
Subject of article (14) 
f t  Symbolism (19)
$ $  Taxonomy of devianc... 
^Technology (32)
Terrorist link (25)~
Theoretical approach ,..
Codes:
symbolism - none: factual (6-0)  
symbolism - technology {253-... 
^sym bolism  - technology as pro... 
£|lsymbolism - technology as sol.., 
^sym bolism  - technology is com...
symbolism - technology is sim... 
^ 1  symbolism - terrorist link {657... 
IJsymbolism - the medical analo...
symbolism -victim {lS6-0}~
8  Tech - annoying {2-0}
8  Tech - anonymising {30-0} 
U T e c h  - dever {12-0}
& T ec h  - democratising {6-0}
O  Tech - destructive {80-0}
Tech - enabling {9-0}
£$Tech - evil {12-0}
Tech - for crime {84-0}
^|)Tech " for harmful information... 
t^ T ec h  - for positive information... 
S^Tech - future threat scenario ... 
f$T ech  - geography irrelevant {... 
t^ T ec h  - good {1-0} 
t^ T ech  - lawless {154)}
Distance in lines: 1 jjj|
Result: 18 TB: ’2001’
¥1
ANDOsymbolism * technology*,'symbofism - terrorist Ink*)
("symbolism - technology" & "symbolism - terrorist M O
Create Super Code
Id Name Size St a X
290:2 All of which would be funny if.. 5
!£ ) 319:3 But freedom is indivisible, an .. 12
iEi) 332:7 Dr Neil Barrett, of Informatio.. 3
S )  345:1 E-commerce minister Douglas Al.. 5
IS) 354:7 SCOTTISH computer experts have.. 3
iS ) 354:8 Experts say there is growing c.. 8
IS) 356:9 Goggans sounds a chilling warn.. 5
S )  360:3 A network of internet sites us.. 4
S )  360:4 Like many of the sites used by.. 6
!S) 360:5 Websites for other Muslim orga.. 4
IS) 360:9 According to Richard Hollis, m.. 9 m
H I ■ — — I m
|Refresh Codes | Scope Help
This example shows a relatively simple query. Only articles from the year 2001 were 
searched (the reference to TB: “2001” at the bottom of the window). From the codes 
list (bottom left window) the codes symbolism -  technology and symbolism -  terrorist 
link were combined in a Boolean AND search (the technical form of the search query is 
shown in the grey window, top right). All the quotations which answer this query are 
listed in the bottom right window and we can see from the bottom left of the workspace 
that there are 18 of these quotations. If this combination of search terms is considered 
to be theoretically significant, it is possible to compile the results into a “super code” so 
that they are instantly retrievable in the future under a specific code/concept name. 
Again, this technique is particularly useful for axial coding.
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Memos
The following is a screenshot of the Memo Manager window from which all the memos 
recorded during the analysis process can be accessed. A total of 131 memos were 
recorded and, in accordance with the strategies described by Strauss and Corbin (1998: 
see, for example, Chapter 14) many of them were integrated into the theoretical 
explanation set out in the findings and discussion chapters.
U* iXwwj A li/iiigsr ffJUr U>' l Idil'jhiif j M U i
Memos Edit Miscellaneous Output View
*63 'tbn  $ £  X-  a
Name
|g
KjBluesnarfing: security loophole interpreted as a too! for terrorists 
| $  ster of apocalyptic stories in
0$ fosec industry wary of scarernongenng and playing into temj
.Labeing theory comes good
JjJ taw  enforcement as interest group 
Mechanisms
z-ssag-.ng the facts
0$
Mo evidence of cyberterrorism as result of Iraq war 
^underly ing  theoretical approach - technological determm ;
Si
Here, a virus writer admits that it is fun to play up 
to the label society has pinned on him. This is 
dear evidence that these labels actually affect 
their subjects. Deviancy amplification1 Well, he 
says he likes to "pretend" and "plav on people’s 
preconceptions and negative stereotypes", but says 
explicitly that he doesn't actually engage in this 
behaviour. It’s as if he enjoys playing God by 
deliberately entrenching our false beliefs. But if s 
more than that. He outlines how he can 
understand why people would react badly- to oppression 
in society. Social control may well, in light of this 
information, lead to deviance, as Lemert supposes.
131 Memos Labelling theory comes good {2 All Name - Tide
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The memo highlighted here records my thoughts at the time I came across some 
quotations from a hacker who was discussing his motivations for writing viruses. 
Reading this passage triggered in my mind a strong association with the deviancy 
amplification model described by Cohen which was based on Lemert’s idea that the 
notion that social control might lead to deviance is potentially a richer premise for 
deviancy research than the notion that deviance leads to social control. These ideas are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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A complete list of codes used
1 - conventional terrorism
10 - communication
11 - ethical hacking
12 - information warfare
13 - hoax
2 - c tool; d target 
3 - d  tool; c target
4 - cyberterrorism
5 - conventional crime
6 - c tool; d target
7 - d tool; c target
8 - cybercrime
9 - accidental damage 
empirical evidence 
experts - anonymity 
experts - comments on others' 
motivations
experts - control of Internet
experts - culture of fear
experts - cyberwar
experts - data
experts - future threat
experts - hackers' motivations
experts - hackers becoming militant
experts - Internet
communication/democracy
experts - nature of threat
experts - pundits & their motivations
experts - solutions
experts - surveillance society
experts - terrorists
experts - vulnerability
exploitation
exploitation - commercial
exploitation - ideological
FD - 9/11
FD - activists
FD - agents of a State
FD - aggression
FD - anarchy
FD - annoying/irritating
FD - anonymous/alter ego
FD - anti-Microsoft
FD - challenge
FD - character/appearance attributes
FD - construction of
FD - cost to victims
FD - criminal
FD - deception
FD - denial of service
FD - destructive
FD - disgruntled employees
FD - drugs
FD - espionage
FD - ethical hacking
FD - evil
FD - folk hero
FD - freedom of info ideal
FD - future threat scenario
FD - geography irrelevant
FD - government & big business targets
FD - harmless
FD - influence of sci-fi
FD - innocents corrupted by
FD - mechanisms - exaggeration and
distortion
FD - mechanisms - rumour and urban 
legend
i
FD - pornography 
FD - pranksters/mischief 
FD - scapegoat/victimised 
FD - self-regulation 
FD - show-off 
FD - skill - high 
FD - skill - low 
FD - students 
FD - terrorist 
FD - threat
FD - vandals/saboteurs 
FD - victim non-reporting 
FD - vigilante movement 
FD - young 
H TR -9/11 
HTR - activism 
HTR - association
HTR - attribution of extreme powers to 
hackers
HTR - authorities' pursuit of Tts 
HTR - criminals labelled 
'cyberterrorists'
HTR - cyberterrorism exists 
HTR - cyberterrorism suspected 
HTR - fiction
HTR - future threat scenario 
HTR - hackers adopting the Tt label 
HTR - hackers coopted by State 
HTR - hackers coopted by terrorists 
HTR - hackers labelled 'terrorists'
HTR - hackers threatening anti-terrorist 
systems
HTR - hacking as a terrorist cause 
HTR - hacking is NOT terrorism 
HTR - infowar
HTR - inside job
HTR - new law
HTR - technology as terrorist
HTR - terrorist link introduced for
ulterior motives
HTR - terrorist use of technology 
HTR-Y2K
infosec industry - dampening panic
infosec industry - data
infosec industry - ethical hacking
infosec industry - human defences
infosec industry - Mi2g
infosec industry - necessary protection
infosec industry - potential for infowar
infosec industry - technical solution
infosec industry - terrorists
infosec industry - threats
infosec industry - view of hackers
law enforcement - accuracy
law enforcement - backlash against
law enforcement - CCC
law enforcement - evidentiary problems
law enforcement - exaggeration
law enforcement - future threat
law enforcement - geography &
cooperation
law enforcement - i/n as problem 
law enforcement - information 
exchange
law enforcement - lack of reporting 
law enforcement - need for new law & 
power
law enforcement - new unit
law enforcement - on FDs
law enforcement - resourcing issues
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law enforcement - secrecy 
law enforcement - terrorism 
law enforcement - turf war 
law enforcement - use of i/n by 1/e 
mechanisms - appeal to 9/11 and 7/7 
mechanisms - association 
mechanisms - dampening panic 
mechanisms - dramatization 
mechanisms - exaggeration / distortion 
mechanisms - future threat 
mechanisms - misdirection of reaction 
mechanisms - rumour and urban legend 
mechanisms - sensitisation 
media claims - agency empire building 
media claims - misleading 
media claims - potential 
media claims - security risk 
media claims - sensationalism 
media claims - talking up hacker skills 
media role - agenda setting 
media role - claims-making 
media role - image transmission 
moral boundaries 
moral enterprise 
Newspaper - Daily Mail 
Newspaper - Daily Telegraph 
Newspaper - Financial Times 
Newspaper - Mail on Sunday 
Newspaper - Sunday Times 
Newspaper - The Times 
politicians’ claims - 9/11 
politicians’ claims - cyberterrorism 
politicians' claims - denying security 
breach
politicians’ claims - developing
intelligence necessary
politicians' claims - govt use of IW
politicians' claims - lack of security
politicians' claims - need for control
politicians' claims - need for secrecy
politicians' claims - prescience
politicians' claims - privacy not at risk
politicians' claims - threat overstated
politicians' claims - what if
real-virtual world tension
security - social approach
security - technical approach
source - (ex-)hackers
source - commentary piece
source - commercial sector
source - criminal justice system
source - experts
source - infosec industry
source - law enforcement & security
services
source - media
source - other interest groups
source - politicians
source - public
source - public body
source - victim
subject - activism
subject - asymmetry
subject - censorship / freedom of speech
subject - deviance
subject - experts' opinions
subject - fiction
subject - information warfare/espionage 
subject - law enforcement
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subject - policy
subject - privacy
subject - secrecy
subject - social anxiety and fear
subject - social reaction
subject - terrorism
supertech
symbolism - 9/11
symbolism - anonymity
symbolism - courts and criminal justice
system
symbolism - experts
symbolism - Government
symbolism - hacker
symbolism - insects
symbolism - interest groups
symbolism - IT dependence
symbolism - law enforcement
symbolism - none: factual
symbolism - technology
symbolism - technology as problem
symbolism - technology as solution
symbolism - technology is complex
symbolism - technology is simple
symbolism - terrorist link
symbolism - the medical analogy
symbolism - victim
Tech - annoying
Tech - anonymising
Tech - clever
Tech - democratising
Tech - destructive
Tech - enabling
Tech - evil
Tech - for crime
Tech - for harmful
information/communication
Tech - for positive
information/ communication
Tech - future threat scenario
Tech - geography irrelevant
Tech - good
Tech - lawless
Tech - malicious
Tech - medical analogy
Tech - offensive weapon
Tech - powerful
Tech - sophisticated
Tech - terrorist
Tech - use by authorities
Tech - use by terrorists
Tech - vulnerability
underlying theoretical approach - social
determinism
underlying theoretical approach - social 
shaping
underlying theoretical approach - 
technological determinism
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